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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study focuses on specific aspects in the organization of teaching religion in Indonesia. It analyses 
the position of religion within the Indonesian Basic Law, consequential legislation, and educational policies. 
How  does  this  framework  translate  into  national  and  regional  policies  pertaining  to  the  emergence, 
institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in Bali from 1945 to 
2008?  
 
Muslim majority Indonesia constitutes an interesting laboratory for doing fundamental research on religious 
plurality and transformations of religion. The model of organizing the religion class in Indonesia is rooted in a 
specific historical, socio-cultural, political, and legal context, which is fundamentally  different to European 
models of religious education. In addition, in contrast to classical Islam and modern Islamic states, Indonesia 
recognizes Asian religions as equal in status with the religions of the book. Besides Islam and Christianity, Hindu 
Dharma and Buddhism were recognized as state funded religions in 1965.  This recognition had important 
consequences  for  the  Indonesian  model  of  organizing  five  confessional  religion  classes  and  faith-based 
education systems.  
 
The Balinese are a rare case of a religious and ethnic minority being simultaneously an ethnic and religious 
majority.  Therefore,  the  Balinese  provide  an  outstanding  case  to  analyze  how  Indonesia’s  religious  and 
educational policies do deal with that particular ethnic and religious minority. In addition, how do the Balinese 
themselves use the constitutional and legal framework to establish the Hindu religion class in public schools 
and a private Hindu education system from the level of pre-school to higher education? 
 
A qualitative examination was conducted basing on a combination of theoretical and empirical investigations. 
The province of Bali and three educational institutions were chosen, because the Balinese were the reformers 
of  Indonesian  Hindu  Dharma  and  the  inventors  of  the  Hindu  education  system.  As  the  study  focuses  on 
constitutional and legal contexts of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system, teachers’ professional 
education,  and  composition  of  curricula  and  textbooks,  a  qualitative  approach  was  applied  combining 
ethnographic  fieldwork  and  case  study  research.  In  consequence,  the  subject  positions  the  study  in  the 
academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. Data were collected through bibliographical surveys 
and fieldwork.  
 
The amended 1945 Basic Law and consequential legislation give the same right to state sanctioned religions. 
The  state  is  based  on  “One  Supreme  Lordship”  prescribing  national  monotheism  or  monism.  Indonesia’s 
spirited statehood is based on a religious, but not confessional interpretation. In addition, the strategy to 
manage  religious  plurality  is  authoritarian,  as  positive  freedom  of  religion  is  limited  to  six  state-funded 
religions, whereas negative religious freedom is not provided for. Despite the equal status of the six state 
funded religions, discriminative practices prevail with regard to funding those Asian religions. Notwithstanding, 
the  Muslim  majority  Pancasila  state  can  serve  a  model  function  for  countries  with  illiberal  politics  in  the 
Muslim world. 
 
The first objective of strategic and educational policies is to mould a citizen who has faith in God, follows the 
commands  of  God,  and  has  morals.  The  dimension  of  spiritual  intelligence  in  education  is  a  particular 
Indonesian dimension of education, which Indonesian educational planners added to the UNESCO standards of 
student-centered learning throughout life. Indonesia organizes the religion class and faith-based education 
systems in a confessional but pluralistic style. The citizens are required to attend the religious class in the 
religion they adhere to instructed by a teacher of the same belief from elementary to higher education. In 
addition, the religious mark is a compulsory item in the school report, and whether a pupil/student stays back 
or is promoted to the next level depends, amongst other factors, on how the religion teacher grades the 
student.  
Unlike the Muslim or Christian based education systems, the Hindu education system is still marginal and 
minuscule. Its funding is discriminative. Funding and expansion are linked to national policies, and the personal 
networks of Hindu agents are given the mandate to organize the Hindu administration and education system.  ERKLAERUNG 
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MOTTO 
The  advent  of  modern  schooling  was  not  a  simple  imposition  of  the  colonial  state  on  society. 
Different groups with different interests – some with nothing to lose, others with whole kingdoms 
under their traditional authority – welcomed, modified, and sometimes contested the introduction of 
schooling. (….) one of the most distinctive and insistent themes, the Balinese concern with religious 
identity (Bakker 1993, 44)  
Examination of the discussions, meetings and study groups of the 1920s and 1930s reveals that 
Balinese intellectuals were, for the first time, having to explain their religion: to rationally synthesise 
rituals, custom and hierarchy to make them fit Dutch understandings of such matters. This meant the 
conceptual separation of religion and society.  
(Lynette Parker 2000: 58) 
 
The knowledge of Tantra is the essence of God himself.  
(Acarya Sadyojyoti, IX Century A.D.; in Victor M. Fic 2003)  
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Introduction 
1.1 Focus of the study 
The subject of the present study constitutes the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu 
class and the Hindu education system in Bali. In this, the study focuses on specific aspects of how to organize 
teaching religion in Indonesia. Indonesia forms an interesting laboratory for doing fundamental research on 
processes of religious plurality, transformations of religion, and the founding of new congregations in a nation 
state characterized by longstanding socio-cultural plurality and colonial history. In consequence, the subject 
positions the study in the academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. In order to demonstrate 
how Hindu education is informed by the institutional context of the Pancasila
1 state, the study analyses the 
position of religion in the constitutional and legal framework in Indonesia and how this constitutional and legal 
framework translates into national strategies and policies pertaining to the organization of religious education. 
On a more general level, the study locates the Indonesian organization of religious plurality in the general 
context of international human right documents.  
 
The  religion  class  in  Indonesia  is  grounded  in  a  historical,  social,  political,  and  legal  context  which  is 
fundamentally different to European models of religious education. Therefore, the focus lies on direct formal 
Hindu  religious  education  in  two  institutions:  state  schools/universities  and  Hindu  denominational 
schools/universities.  Hindu  denominational  schools/universities  are  private  faith-based  organizations  that 
integrate Hindu modules in general subjects or attach a considerable amount of Hindu oriented subjects to the 
curriculum. Therefore the study sets aside all phenomena of  
 
1.  Hindu informal religious education as pasraman (Hindu Sunday Schools);  
2.  Islamic models of education (pesantren, madrasah)  
3.  religious education in families and the Hindu religious communities;  
4.  religious studies at state or faith based universities (established in 1999
2); 
5.  multi-faith education (not provided for in Indonesia); 
6.  inter-religious education (not provided for in Indonesia)  
7.  moral education/ethics (only provided at certain schools)
3 
 
In 2004, I conducted a four month field work at the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar writing up my MA 
thesis on a Balinese purification ritual. During a discussion, Prof Dr Edmund Weber expressed his surprise on 
the empirical phenomenon that Indonesia  – the  state that is home to the largest percentage of Muslims 
worldwide  -  organizes  for  all  state  sanctioned  religions  compulsory  confessional  religious  classes  in  public 
schools from primary to tertiary education. Despite having studied one term Indonesian language in Surakarta, 
Java and two terms Hindu theology in Denpasar, I never wondered about this empirical fact. Yet, Prof Dr Weber 
insisted on the uniqueness of the observed phenomenon, and thereby I had won my doctoral project focusing 
on Hindu religious education in Indonesia. The then Head of Master Studies at the Indonesian Hindu University, 
Prof Dr Ida Bagus Yudha Triguna acted as second supervisor.  
 
The broad research interest in the question why Indonesia operates statutory religion classes remained too 
general. Initially, during a first preparatory field work phase in 2005, I planned to examine the Hindu education 
system  across  the  Indonesian  archipelago,  but  due  to  the  magnitude  of  the  task,  limited  monetary  and 
temporal resources, and the geographic extension of the Archipelago, the research scope was narrowed down 
during a second preparatory field phase in 2006 in order to be workable. The study positions the Hindu religion 
class in public schools and universities and the private Hindu education system within the social and legal 
context of Indonesian policies on religion, education, and religious education. Basically, I identified three areas 
of inquiry that translate into research questions, aims, and objectives: 
   
                                                 
1 The Pancasila are five principles on which the Indonesian state is based.  
2 At the tertiary level, there are a few State Universities and State Islamic Universities that Religious Studies. In this area, further research is 
required.  
3 On the subject of moral education (Budhi Pekerti) see the monograph of Prof I Made Titib (2006) Menumbuhkembangkan Pendidikan 
Budhi Pekerti Pada Anak (Perspektif Agama Hindu). Denpasar: Pustaka Bali Post; also Donder 2004; and Wibawa, Made Aripta (2006) 
Siapakah yang disebut GURU? (Suatu kajian theologis dan sosiologis) Denpasar: Panakom Publishing Introduction | 2 
1.  Religious diversity, religious pluralism, and freedom of religion: Pancasila as a model? 
2.  Institutionalization  of  Hinduism  in  the  nation  state  and  the  legal  framework  of  religious 
education 
3.  Case study at Bali 
 
Heil (2003) outlines three research areas in conducting empirical research on religious education: 1.) What 
happens in the class room (Unterrichtsgeschehen); 2.) Learning process (Unterrichtsrezeption); 3.) Contexts of 
education (Unterrichtskontexte). Under the precondition of religious plurality, Heimbrock et al. (2001) identify 
two basic research areas of religious education: first order and second order problems. First order problems 
are  concerned  with  the  plurality  of  religions  and  other  world  views  during  the  learning  process  in  the 
classroom. In this, they are concerned with the first and second research area outlined by Heil (2003). Second 
order problems concern the organization of plurality in schools under religious and cultural diversity and are 
fused  here  with  Heil’s  social  and  political  context  research  approach  to  doing  research  on  or  comparing 
religious education.  
 
As the present study did not concentrate on first order problems related to the classroom or learning processes 
(Heimbrock 2001; Heil 2003), I investigated into second order problems: the emergence, organization, and the 
social, legal, and political context of Hindu religious education. The general question in research on contexts of 
religious  education  inquires  into  what  impacts  social  and  political  contexts  wield  on  religious  education 
(henceforth RE). Studies that do not especially treat in-classroom didactics and pedagogy, but focus on the 
legal context of RE, the professional education of teachers, composition of curricula and textbooks, and their 
printing belong to this research area. In this they advocate for a qualitative research approach. (Heil 2003: 23) 
More specific, the present study focuses on constitutional and legal contexts (Heil 2003) of the Hindu class and 
the Hindu education system in Indonesia. It aims to give a thick description (Geertz 1973) of second-order 
problems that is the social and legal context (Heimbrock 2001; Heil 2003) of the Hindu class and the Hindu 
education system in the province of Bali. The province of Bali has been chosen because the Balinese were the 
inventors of such an education system. The broad research focus is laid on the years 1945 - 2008, whereas the 
narrow research focus is laid on the years of transition to democracy from 1998 onwards that dramatically 
changed the social, political, and legal situation in Indonesia. 
 
The  purpose  of  the  study  was  to  give  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  Hindu  education  system  at  three 
formative  sites  in  Denpasar  and  one  in  Jakarta  to  generate  and  develop  a  comprehensive  set  of  basic 
knowledge on the religion class in Indonesia and to generate a propositional theory of the current state of 
Hindu religious education. In consequence, the objectives of my study have been 1.) Analyzing the Indonesian 
political and juridical style of managing religious plurality(how the state organizes its interaction with and 
relation to religious traditions) 2.) describing the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu 
religion class. The style of accommodating the demands of minorities, such as the Balinese Hindus, to establish 
private  schools,  and  to  enclose  their  tradition,  culture,  and  religion  in  the  national  administration  and 
education system is of interest to the academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. The present 
study contributes to the field of academic studies that deal with the Indonesian Hindu education system; it 
gives a comprehensive account of the Indonesian legal framework pertaining to religious education from 1954 
to  2007.  In  addition,  it  describes  the  impact  national  policies  of  religion  exert  on  the  emergence  and 
organization of Hindu religious instruction. In analyzing the current state of the Hindu class and education at 
public and faith-based schools and universities in Indonesia, the present study adds to the general scholarship 
in Religious Studies, Southeast Asian Studies and the academic field of comparing religious education with an 
international perspective. In this, the study is aimed to be of interest for students and academics working in the 
fields of Southeast Asian Studies, Religious Studies, religious pedagogy, and policies on religion.  
 
A  major  objection  to  confessional  religious  education  as  answer  to  religious  pluralism  is  that  “separation 
fosters intolerance in the population”. (Nipkow 2006: 585) As the present study aimed to generate a thick 
description of the legal context, institutionalization, organization of the Hindu class in doing a case study, I do 
not discuss the strength and weaknesses of the different approaches to religious education. However, it is 
Nipkow (2006: 585), who reminds us that “One must not forget that the pupils will be instructed together in all 
other subjects and that the separating influence of a two-lessons subject on attitudes and behavior should not 
be overestimated.”  
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With exception of the Taman Siswa Movement, approaches of multi-faith or inter-faith education (Souza 2006; 
Nesbitt 2006; Lähnemann 2008) are not provided for in contemporary Indonesia, and a discussion would be far 
beyond the scope of the present study. The state Islamic and private Islamic school system is extensive. The 
question in how far Islamic curricula integrate brotherhood, mutual respect, tolerance, and a pluralist paradigm 
along Islamic concepts is an interesting one, but it has been as well beyond the scope of my study. As the 
question in how far inter-religious education helps to realize public and global peace is of great relevance to 
the study of religion, the current study indicates that there is a need for further research in this specific area. 
Inconsequence, religious education is compulsory and confessional in Indonesia despite its pluralistic character, 
and the concept of interreligious or interfaith education is not promoted. Such a multi-faith approach appears 
to be contrary to many ideals the Shafi’i-conservative educational reformers and planners in the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in Jakarta hold. (Tan 2011)  
 
Pluralistic elements of citizenship are included in the civics subject. In Indonesia, inter-religious modules aiming 
to mould tolerant and pluralistic citizen are to be found in civic education (pendidikan kewarganegaraan) that 
emphasize learning of friendly encounter, religious harmony, and tolerance. Since 2003, Pancasila education is 
integrated into reformed civic education classes which include human rights modules. From 2005 onwards, the 
member  nations  of  the  ASEAN  hold  workshops  in  which  experts  discuss  and  conceptualize  human  rights 
modules to be integrated into the curricula of the confessional religion class, but since the focus of the study 
was direct formal Hindu religious education in state schools and Hindu denominational schools, the present 
study leaves out these topics, but signals that there is immediate need for further research in this area.  
 
On a normative level, the Indonesian legal framework gives the same right to state sanctioned religions in 
Indonesia to organize faith-based education in public schools and a faith-based education system. The first 
principle,  Ketuhanan  Yang  Maha  Esa(One  Supreme  Lordship),  is  interpreted  as  guarantor  of  rights-based 
pluralism, for the reason that it accepts plurality of theologies and religious traditions, yet the strategy followed 
is authoritarian or delimited (Howell 2003), as the state vindicates the right for itself to limit the freedom of 
pluralistic expression. The state limits the positive freedom of religion as six religions (agama) which is funded 
whereas belief system (kerpercayaan) is not funded and faces not only several governmental restrictions, but 
also social hostilities, whereas negative religious freedom is not provided for at all.  
 
The national basic norm (Grundnorm) Pancasila provided Hindus with room to maneuver, (Willford/George 
2005)  who  use  the  public  space  strategically  in  order  to  make  their  voices  heard,  to  participate  in  the 
government, and receive state funding and legal protection. A specific objective of my study is to contribute to 
a positive understanding of Indonesian policies on religious education. In the perspective of the human rights 
instruments, which assure the individual right to attend the religious class in public schools, the Indonesian 
management  of  religious  classes  may  be  regarded  -  despite  its  confessional  character  -  as  pluralistic  and 
therefore  modern,  and  in  this  regard,  Indonesia  could  serve  as  a  model  for  other  (Islamic)  countries  in 
managing  rights-based  religious  pluralism  by  demonstrating  that  democracy,  pluralism,  and  Islam  are 
compatible. Introduction | 4 
1.2 Research questions,aims of research, and structure of the thesis 
This chapter introduces the central research questions of this study, describes the aims and specific focus of 
research, and provides the rationale for research. The structure of the thesis follows the logic of the research 
questions and answers them. Three areas of inquiry were identified that translate into research questions, 
aims, and objectives: 
 
1.  Religious diversity, religious pluralism, and freedom of religion: Pancasila as a model? 
2.  Institutionalization of Hinduism in the nation state and the legal framework of religious education 
3.  Case study at Bali 
 
Question1:How does Muslim majority Indonesia organize the relation between state and religion under the 
condition of religious plurality?  
 
This question about the first problem, the political organization of religious diversity, had to be answered first 
in order to position the right of the Hindu community to practice and teach their religion within the national 
legal  framework.  The  supposition  underlying  this  study  is  that  the  particular  Indonesian  Weltanschauung
4 
combined with Indonesian Muslims’ interpretation of diversity produced the unique context of Indonesian 
religious pluralism as expressed in the five principles (Pancasila), the state motto Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika), the concept of agama (religion), and Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (One Supreme Lordship). Those 
conceptions were analyzed in order to 
 
Question 1/ Aim 1/ Objective 1: conduct an assessment of what social and political contexts brought forward 
the operation of six faith based religious education systems and classes and thereby identify the emic political 
or legal framework that established non-Islamic RE in majority Muslim Indonesia. 
Question 1/ Aim 2/ Objective 2: to gain an understanding of the cultural and legal framework of religious 
freedom and education in Indonesia and to provide a discussion of their transferability as model of and for 
organizing religious education.  
 
The question how to guarantee or to limit religious freedom directs attention to the issue of whether the state 
should provide religious instruction or not? In Indonesia, only state sanctioned religions receive funding and 
protection.  With  this  in  mind,  the  political  and  conceptual  struggle  of  the  Balinese  to  get  their  religious 
practices acknowledged, funded, and protected automatically moves into the focus of interest. The second 
problem  concerns  thus  the  organization  process  of  Hindu  education  with  a  special  reference  to  the 
consolidation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. Certainly concerning the acknowledgment of the Asian religions as 
proper  religion  (agama)  in  Indonesia,  the  main  national  symbol,  the  concept  of  One  Supreme  Lordship, 
constituted the main problem.  
 
How do Hindus, who are traditionally said to be polytheists by Muslims, negotiate and define this key element 
of  national  Indonesian  life?  How  did  the  Balinese  re-invent  their  religious  practices?  The  present  work 
describes how HDI was transformed from dozens of locally defined regional variants into one congregational 
Hindu community and one more or less coherent set of religious concepts. The study further shows how HDI 
was gradually institutionalized in the Hindu Council (Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia) and the Directorate 
General for Guidance of the Hindu Congregation at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). Logically closely 
related to the second area of inquiry, the third area of inquiry gives a thick description of the three cases 
studied.  In  consequence,  the  final  research  step  and  chapter  describes  in  detail  the  process  how  Hindu 
education  has  been  institutionalized  in  three  educational  institutions:  Dwijendra  Foundation,  State  Hindu 
Dharma Institute, and Indonesian Hindu University.  
 
Question 2: How did the institutionalization process of Indonesian Hindu Dharma proceed? Related to its 
institutionalization in the Indonesian Hindu Council and Ministry of religion, how did then a Hindu education 
system emerge? 
Question 2/ Aim 1/ Objective 1: to gain an understanding of the consolidation and systematization of Hindu 
Dharma and thereby providing a thick description of its institutionalization process in the Indonesian Hindu 
Council and Ministry of Religion.  
                                                 
4 In his “Birth of the Pancasila” Address, President Sukarno used the term Weltanschauung in German on June 1st, 1945. Therefore the use 
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Question 2/ Aim 2/ Objective 2: to gain an understanding of the establishment process and organization of 
Hindu education system in Bali by doing a case study at three educational units in Bali and one in Jakarta and 
thereby offering a systematic thick description of the history and contemporary situation of those institutions 
to an academic readership.  
 
The structure of the thesis follows the logic, that only if  readers are aware of the institutionalization process of 
Balinese religion in the Indonesian Hindu and Council (Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia) and the Directorate 
General for Guidance of the Hindu Congregation at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, may they fully grasp the 
positive consequences of the educational reform of 2003 for the built-out of the Hindu religious education 
system  in  democracy.  The  structure  of  the  book  discusses  first  the  institutionalization  of  Hindu  Dharma 
Indonesia  and  only  then  the  legal  framework  of  the  religion  class  and  religious  education.  As  religion  is 
considered a vehicle of development and modernism in the past and contemporary Indonesia, the present 
study investigated in national policies of strategic development, religion, and education from 1954 to 2008 
 
Question 3: How is the legal setup of religious education? How did this legal framework translate into the 
Hindu class and Hindu education sector on Bali? 
 
Question  3/  Aim  3/  Objective  3:  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  Indonesian  educational  acts  on  religious 
education from 1954 to 2008 and thereby to identify the legal framework in which the Hindu education system 
is  operated  and  institutionalized  and  thereby  offering  a  systematic  thick  description  of  the  history  and 
contemporary situation of three Balinese Hindu education institutions to an academic readership. 
 
The rationale behind the present study has been to analyze the statutory requirements for religious education 
and Hindu education from 1945-2008 to make its socio-cultural and legal context internationally comparable. 
The focus is on how Indonesian cultural diversity produced six state funded religions and how statutory religion 
classes  and  faith-based  education  systems  were  enacted  in  historically  specific  situations.  The  importance 
ascribed to the religious classes in Indonesia motivated the current study to fill an assessed gap of academic 
studies concerned with Hindu religious education and to investigate into the genesis of stated phenomenon in 
order to explain the specific Indonesian setting to an international readership. The central task of the study is 
to make sense out of the specific Indonesian situation through “thick description”. (Geertz 1973).  
1.3 Research Design 
Tailored to answer the cluster of research questions, the basic research design adopted in this study uses a 
variety of approaches. (Janesick 1994; Flick 2003) This study consists of a qualitative examination based on the 
combination of theoretical and empirical investigations. Data were collected through bibliographical surveys 
and fieldwork. The internal publications of the organizations studied here are of particular importance. In 
consequence,  the  present  study  applies  a  heuristic  (Chou  2005),  open  and  circular  research  design 
(Strauss/Corbin 1996; Flick 2003;Glaser/Strauss 2005) and combines ethnographic fieldwork with case study 
research (Denzin/Lincoln 1994).  
 
Since reality provides the dataset to generate theories, the applied research design is inductive as research 
questions  were  gradually  generated  out  of  the  gained  data  set  and  not  out  of  a  prevalent  theory 
(Glaser/Strauss 2005). The present study uses methods strategically; that is as resources for understanding and 
for producing knowledge about the research topic. Chou (2006: 131) recommends a heuristic approach for an 
academic inquiry of the Southeast Asian region. A heuristic approach is not a fully developed theory of any 
kind; more accurately, it is an approach which provides the flexibility to seek solutions creatively that make 
sense empirically or lead to a solution to the inquiry. (Chou 2006: 130; cf. Hammersley/Atkinson 1983) 
 
A heuristic approach as I have proposed relaxes self-binding categorical rules to allow everybody 
and anybody from whatever point of view, but with a rich and in-depth experience of Southeast 
Asia either as an academic discipline or as homeland or as an activist, to offer a contribution 
towards our understanding of the region. (…) Rather than serving as a static unit for comparative 
scholarship, a heuristic approach in encompassing a hybrid of global, local as well as indigenous 
knowledge and material to studying the region promises to elevate it to be a more dynamic 
“field” crossing traditional disciplinary as well as geopolitical boundaries. (Chou 2006: 132) 
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Besides  literature  review,  this  study  used  a  heuristic  approach  employing  the  emic  strategy,  methods  of 
extended ethnographic fieldwork, and case study research to decode the Indonesian context by encoding its 
specific  Weltanschauung,  organization  of  religious  freedom,  and  religious  education.  The  ethnographic 
approach was applied because the scientific purpose necessitates a systematic description of how religious 
education is conceptualized in Indonesia. Ethnography denotes in-depth empirical research and a variety of 
data collection techniques, which rely on prolonged and intensive interaction between researchers and their 
subject  of  research  in  the  field.  The  ethnographic  research  strategy  combines  extended  fieldwork, 
participation, and introspection to result in a thick description of the field.  
 
Basing on a differentiation between a universalist (normative) point of view and a relativistic (descriptive) point 
of view, two main strategies of analysis of cultural processes and data collection are deduced: The etic and the 
emic strategy. The etic strategy is based on the analyst-centered, objective, and transcultural interpretation of 
culture. An etic approach is a description of a behavior or belief by an observer, in terms that can be applied to 
other cultures; in other words, an etic account is culturally neutral. The etic approach aims to systematize data 
from different (emic) domains in order to construct categories that work trans-emically. (Avruch 1998: 60-61; 
Mariappanadar 2005) In order to render intelligible the nature, history and cultural particularity of the Hindu 
education  system  and  to  identify  nuances  of  cultural  and  social  change  leading  to  the  emergence  and 
conception of Hindu religious education, the study employed the actor-centered (emic) strategy of analysis of 
cultural processes and data collection.  
 
Based on an actor-centered understanding, the emic strategy provides microscopic, context-specific, and in-
depth analyses (a thick description) of the object of study at a certain time, space, and situation. By identifying, 
systematizing and utilizing native/indigenous categories, terms and propositions about the world, culture or 
domain under study, the emic strategy deals with crucial ideas, conceptions and institutions plus patterns of 
meaning and social functions inherent to those local cultures. Only on that base, can abstraction and a process 
of inter translatability proceed, because distilled, locally bound cultural categories are offered to comparison, 
which are then used to generate a theory grounded in data. (Avruch 1998. 58-59; Lohmann 2005: 2089).In this 
context, I position the study within the context of relativism. Ethical relativism, held by the anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict (1887-1948) and others, comprises three doctrines. (Goring 1992: 434) 
 
1.  cultural  relativism,  the  anthropological  hypothesis  that  different  societies  have  fundamentally 
different views about values 
2.  normative relativism, the thesis that there are no absolute values valid for all societies 
3.  meta-ethical  subjectivism,  the  doctrine  that  there  can  be  no  objective  decision  procedures  for 
resolving value disputes 
 
Relativism contends that opinions are to be evaluated relative to the societies or cultures in which they appear 
and are not to be judged true or false, or good or bad, based on some overall criterion but are to be assessed 
within the context in which they occur (Popkin 1987: 274)
5.  
 
The present study takes the perspective of cultural relativism: religion is defined as a cultural system providing 
solutions to life problems (Geertz 1973; Prothero 2010) but it rejects the perspective of normative relativism, 
because  there  are  generic  elements  of  culture  common  to  all  species.  (Avruch  1998)  Likewise,  critics  of 
relativism have suggested that 1.) evidence of cultural differences does not rule out the possibility that there 
exist  common  beliefs  and  attitudes  held  by  most  or  all  cultures;  and  2.)  factual  information  about  such 
differences does not eliminate the possibility that one belief system may in fact be better, or more true, than 
another.  (Popkin  1987:  275)  While  the  present  study  does  not  agree  with  the  truth  claim  of  the  second 
argument, it argues that factual information about such cultural differences does not answer the question 
whether the traditional core definer of religion, the “sacred”, exists or not. 
 
As every researcher, I entered the field and processes of data collection and interpretation with preexisting 
ideas and conceptions of the problem (Strauss 1987; Strauss/Corbin 1996; Flick 2003; Glaser/Strauss 2005). As 
the majority of the population adheres to Islam, the minority religion Hinduism provides us with an attractive 
case  for  analyzing  how  Indonesia’s  policies  deal  with  (religious)  minorities  and  the  principle  of  religious 
                                                 
5 Climate, history, customs, education, institutions, and so on would account for the fact that societies differ in their social, cultural, and 
religious practices. One’s personal psychological conditions would account for an individual’s strong or weak religious conviction. ( Popkin 
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freedom. Indonesian Hindus comprise various ethnic groups, with considerable variations in religious tradition 
and practice, some settle in the Riau region, others are the Karo Batak (Sumatra), Indians in Medan, Banten, 
and Jakarta, Sikhs in Medan, Banten and Jakarta, Hindu Tenggerese (East Java), Hindu Kaharingan (Kalimantan), 
Toraja, Aluktodolo, Mamasa (Sulawesi), Lombok Hindu, Balinese in transmigration areas, Hindus in Ambon, 
Madura, and the Javanese Hindus (wongso weton, wongso kulon nearby Gresik).  
 
As the high concentration of Hindus is in Bali only, in consequence, among the Indonesian Hindu minority, the 
Balinese  constitute  a  regional  ethnic  majority  -  a  rare  case  of  a  religious  and  ethnic  minority  being 
simultaneously  an  ethnic  and  religious  majority.  Hence  the  case  of  the  Balinese  provides  an  outstanding 
population to analyze how Indonesia’s religious and educational policies deal with that particular ethnic and 
religious minority and how Balinese themselves use this room to maneuver to establish the Hindu religion class 
in public schools and a private Hindu education system from pre-school to tertiary level. 
 
The contemporary structure and theology of Indonesian Hindu Dharma were conceptualized as valid religious 
normative framework of the Hindu congregation throughout Indonesia in the 1960s by mostly Balinese Hindus. 
(Geertz 1973; Howell 1978, 1982; Bakker 1993; Howe 2001, Picard 2004, 2011) The embryo of Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia is local Balinese religious tradition. Following the political and conceptual struggle of the Balinese to 
get their religion acknowledged, the reinvention or systematization of Balinese religion in interaction with 
Indian Hinduism proceeded along the lines of the definition of religion of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion. 
(Howell 1978, 1982; Bakker 1993; Howe 2001, Picard 2004; 2011) Only since 2005, the curriculum standard of 
the Hindu religion class is unitary for all Indonesian Hindus irrespective of the specific ethnic religious or Hindu 
tradition they belong to. Only the local content curriculum incorporates specific religious ideas and practices of 
those many ethnic or Hindu traditions into the national unitary Hindu class curriculum. In consequence, the 
present study does not investigate in detail into Balinese culture and religion, but conceptualizes the national 
legal framework and national history as the focus of study.  
 
The current work illustrates the thirteen years lasting struggle and steps undertaken by Balinese reformers to 
assure Hinduism a place within the legal framework of the nation-state. In the 1950s and 1960s,they felt the 
need  that  they  had  to  form  a  new  Western-educated  Hindu  elite,  which  could  not  only  supplement  the 
traditional priesthood’s ritual function, but which were capable to develop and teach a systematized theology 
and ethic, and who could be employed in strategic governmental and military positions. (Howell 1978; Bakker 
1993) These experts considered a reformulation of their varying sets of religious practices by constructing a 
more or less coherent set of religious concepts according to local, Indian, and national discourses. (Howell 
1978; Bakker 1993; Picard 2004, 2011) The present work presents the Upadeca (Howell 1978, 1982; Bakker 
1993; Parisada 1967), the catechism of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, compiled in 1967 by the Hindu Council, a 
doctrinal manual in the style of questions followed by answers, as the basic summary of the Indonesian Hindu 
doctrine. Out of political and administrative needs and the question of identity, the primary task of religion 
experts is to develop, provide, and disseminate the coherent set of Hindu concepts (tattwa (theology), susila 
(ethics), upacara(ritual)) and symbols codified in the Upadeca, thereby a doctrinal Hindu Dharma orthodoxy 
has been systematized. 
Consequently, I focused on the dilemma in which Balinese or Hindu individuals, groups, and institutions have 
been in, while reaching an agreement in public sphere on the relation between Islamic majority, nation state 
and their religion. The contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia (henceforth HDI) and its image of Lordship were 
to be constructed along the narrow, Islamic definition and standards proposed and developed by the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs. The whole point of the legal changes sought by Balinese and Indonesian Hindus was to 
bring their individual practices into the public realm as legitimate forms of religion. Since 1955, Hindu religion 
classes are held in Bali, but until today Hindus in other provinces struggle for their right to educate their 
children in religion motivated by big concerns about the religious competence of their offspring. (Personal 
observation, Work Shops organized by Ministry of Religious Affairs)  
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As through prior studies (1999) and fieldwork at the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar (2003-2004; 
2005), I had been provided with access to the field and a good academic network. In consequence, as a good 
access into the field had been given, I decided out of pragmatic reasons and directed by findings of a first 
survey in 2006 to interview only experts in the field of religious education and religious policies in addition to 
an extensive literature review of primary sources (Indonesian laws and regulations, publications of government 
agencies, statistical data, publications of the Ministry of National Education (Kementerian Pendidikan Nasional, 
MONE),  publications  of  the  Ministry  of  Religious  Affairs  (Kementerian  Agama,  MORA)
6,  publications  of 
Institutions where I conducted my case study, eye witness accounts, interviews in Jakarta or Bali) and 
secondary  literature  sources  (technical  literature,  articles  in  newspapers,  books,  internet,  and  scholarly 
journals). As implied by an inductive, circular research design,  the research is based to a large extent on my 
analysis of Indonesian primary material. Then I coded existent models and theories to which my data set had 
pointed. The long period of fieldwork (2007) enabled me  to continuously member-check (Flick 2003) my 
findings and thereby I could validate my dataset and the conclusions it had pointed to.  
 
In an initial step, I conducted three problem-centered biographic interviews. These interviews were recorded, 
transcribed, and textual units were thematically paraphrased irrespective of the sequentiality of statements 
made  by  the  interviewee  during  the  interview  (Meuser/Nagel  2005;  2009).  Thereby  I  gained  a  first 
understanding of the field, which provided the background for  the selection of the samples of the case study, 
the emergent theoretical sampling, and the consecutive steps of emic conceptualization and theoretical 
generalization. (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009) With this I identified key agents and agencies involved in the field of 
Hindu education, in other words, the coding and analysis of the first three interviews defined the specific cases 
to be studied: the Dwijendra Foundation (Yayasan Dwijendra) in Denpasar, the State Hindu Institute (Institute 
Hindu Dharma Negeri) in Denpasar, the Indonesian Hindu University (Universitas Hindu Indonesia) in Denpasar, 
and  the  Directorate  General  for  the  Guidance  of  the  Hindu  Congregation  (Direktorat  Jenderal  Bimbingan 
Masyarakat Hindu)at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jakarta, and the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council 
(Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia).  
 
Consequently,  the  selection  of  experts  to  be  interviewed  within  the  predefined  sample  was  guided  by 
theoretical sampling (Strauss/Corbin1996; Flick 2004), as further experts were interviewed following a chain 
approach – if specific information was needed, the respective expert who had the knowledge, the documents 
or the competences to provide the information and insight, was located, contacted, and interviewed, often on 
the basis of the recommendation of another expert. Thereby the predefined theoretical sampling included 
implicit data source triangulation (Flick 2007: 53) 
 
All interviews were made with individual experts, not with focus groups. Experts were defined as executives, 
government officials, professionals, experts, university lecturers, and teachers in the sector of religion and 
education. (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009) All experts are classified as primary selection. To identify their technical 
and process expert knowledge (technisches Wissen and Prozesswissen) (Bogner 2005: 43) about the Hindu 
class, individual problem-focused expert interviews, and informal interviewing were conducted at the research 
sites. A critical sample was included. It is of interest to the study why I chose to interview only the ‘Hindu elite’, 
in other words, professionals and religious experts, in Denpasar and Jakarta. I interviewed experts, because I 
think  as  those  professionals  have  the  power  or  are  in  the  position  to  enforce  standards  on  others,  their 
statements concerning Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, the Hindu catechism and curricula, the management of the 
Hindu congregation provide much factual information to understand and describe the social, political and legal 
context of the Hindu religion class. In addition, they are the agents that shape the future of Indonesian Hindu 
Dharma and the Hindu class. Out of their technical and processual expert knowledge I could reconstruct a 
preliminary theory of the state of Hindu education in Bali. 
 
                                                 
6 In 2009, all former Departments (Departemen) were renamed into Ministries (Kementerian).   
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As I have been provided with several legislative texts and ministerial documents related to the religion class by 
Prof Yudha Triguna in March 2007, I analyzed in the first step the legal framework of the religion class in order 
to locate Hindu religious education in its larger political and legal context. Likewise, the study explicitly uses 
official statements of Indonesian politicians, officials, and Hindu experts and officials, because those people are 
the ones responsible for compilation, ratification, and implementation of strategic visions, missions, policies, 
and  curricular  content  in  the  religious  or  educational  sectors.  The  broader  guidelines  espoused  in  those 
statements
7 are “indicative of deep-seated values and commitments that are not made explicit in the course of 
everyday life.” (Bellah 1967: 2; cf. Purdy 1984: 92) 
In consequence, the present study acknowledges the prominence of elite and middle class discourse and the 
heavy support from officials and authorities in the religious field. This is a typical problematic of Javanese 
Studies,  as  the  subaltern  is  often  absent  in  the  studies  and  an  official,  nationalistic,  and  administration 
supported  view  is  reproduced.  (Antlöv  2005)  In  other  words,  the  study  employed  a  top-down  oriented 
approach, for this reason the view reproduced is the perspective of the Hindu elite in the cultural, political, and 
religious field and may not be congruent with the perception of pupils, parents, students and the general 
public. As the aim of my study has been to provide a thick description of the institutional context of the Hindu 
class, I focused on the political and legal context of such a religion class (Heil 2003) and not on classroom 
pedagogic.  
 
Following process-model of Hindu education evolved during the ethnographic case study. As the first principle 
of the religious Pancasila state, Belief in One Supreme Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) commands a 
monotheistic  civil  religion,  itwas  conceptualized  as  contested  yet  unchanging  constitutional  framework  to 
guarantee  religious  freedom  and  religious  pluralism.  Strategic,  educational,  and  religious  policies  on  the 
national level, and Human Rights instruments on the international level are identified as changing conditions 
and contexts, which influence the paradigm, aims, and organization of the contemporary Hindu education 
system and even command its conformity to some extent with those changing contexts. The Islamic framework 
is to some extent the parameter of religious and educational policies as political Islam and public Islam shape 
the outcome of any political process in Indonesia. Also, political considerations before elections have to be 
taken into account, as politicians may adopt laws or support religious or other worldviews in order to gain 
votes and to secure their share in the distribution of power. 
                                                 
7 The present study does not take “at face value” (Bellah 1967: 2) what Indonesian politicians, officials, and Hindu experts and officials 
people say on specific occasions, but as Bellah (1967: 2; cf. Purdy 1984: 92) suggests, those statements show that “it is often indicative of 
deep-seated values and commitments that are not made explicit in the course of everyday life.”  Introduction | 10 
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1.4. Indonesia: a laboratory for research on spirited politics? 
This chapter will present the general background context to the current study. 
1.4.1 Plurality and religious education 
The events of 9/11 and beyond suggest that the problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the 
religion line (Prothero 2010: 11) 
 
Religious plurality has become an “undeniable fact” in modern societies. (Prothero 2006: 6; Weber 2002) In this 
context, the point open to controversy is, whether modern societies and nation states are willing to accept this 
diversity/plurality,  and  how  they  organize  ethnic-religio-cultural  diversity.  As  far  as  religious  plurality  is 
concerned, these questions constitute important fields of inquiry in all disciplines of religious studies. (Weber 
2002) Because religious peace is an important cement of domestic peace (Tibi 1995; Lähnemann 2008), a 
critical academicchallenge for religious studies today is inquiring into the encounter of religious communities 
and their relations with the state in order to gain insight intothe dynamics of religious life and identities. (Eck 
2006;  Lähnemann  2008)  A  comparative  glance  at  those  mechanism  in  different  nation  states  shows,  that 
actually each state has developed a specific mechanism to manage the plurality of religions. (Stepan 2001; 
Casanova 1994)  
In this light, a distinction between diversity/plurality and pluralism (Skeie 1995, 2003; in Jackson 2003: 3; Skeie 
2006) needs to be drawn. Traditional plurality refers to societies in which the origin of religious plurality is 
either historical or caused by migration, whereas modern plurality refers to the pluralistic intellectual climate 
of contemporary thought. (Ingram 2004) Thus, traditional and modern plurality refer to a given social condition 
within a nation state characterized by the contemporaneous presence of groups distinct in linguistic, cultural or 
ethnic backgrounds, faith traditions, world views or different political attitudes and concepts expressed in 
competing and probably contradictory assumptions, ideas and values.  
 
Skeie suggests “using the word ‘plurality’ in cases where a description of diversity is intended, and the word 
‘pluralism’ where the intention is to give a normative valuation of the plurality.” (Skeie 2006: 308) With regard 
to religion, diversity/plurality denotes the concurrent existence of different faith traditions at one place in time, 
whereas  religious  pluralism  goes  beyond  mere  diversity  to  active  engagement  with  the  plurality  of  faith 
traditions. In this light, “pluralism as normative position” (Skeie 2006: 308)refers to the presence and toleration 
of those diverse groups within the modern nation state, the “protector of religion and religious education” 
(Moran  2006:  46),  because  religious  diversity  will  create  growing  tensions  and  conflicts  in  contemporary 
societies without any real encounter (Eck 2006) between those faith traditions. Diversity or plurality of faith 
traditions is interpreted here as social reality that may be “studied, celebrated, or complained about” (Ingram 
2004), but pluralism (Callan 1998; Weber 2002; Ingram 2004; Eck 2006) is a social construction
8, “a theological, 
academic, or civil orientation, a theoretical, or political construct seeking to interpret and organize coherently 
the data of religious diversity”. (Ingram, 2004: 136)  
 
“The politics of religion concern not only maneuverings in a religiously plural society but also the way a religion 
articulates with the authority structure of a nation or particular locale.” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 28) “The 
context  of  religious  plurality  raises  issues  both  of  general  interest  and  of  specific  concern  for  religious 
education  such  as:  Questions  of  power  related  to  the  situation  of  religious  and  ethnic  communities,  in 
particular majority/minority relations and issues of oppression and racism.” (Skeie 2006: 312) In this light, the 
implementation of the religious class, the maintenance of faith based education systems by religious groups, 
and governmental funding of religious education constitutes sensitive issues worldwide especially in general 
pedagogy and in public schools. Religious education in public schools remains “a battlefield!” (Pew 2007: 3)  
   
                                                 
8 Skeie (2006: 310-311) suggests that our reactions to and understanding of plurality often rest upon a implicit understanding of plurality, in 
this “the description of socio-cultural plurality are always in some way marked by certain attitudes towards plurality, even if they are not 
explicitly articulated as theories or positions”. Parekh (1996 in Skeie 2006: 310-311) identifies three types of such attitudes: 1. Naturalist 
attitudes; 2. Rationalistic attitudes; and 3.) Romantic attitudes. The current study takes a romantic attitude toward pluralism adopting an 
open  view  of  human  nature  and  –  socio-cultural  plurality  is  seen  as  “a  fact  of  life”;  instead  of  trying  to  overcome  it,  “we  should 
acknowledge it”. (Skeie 2006: 310) “Plurality is a result of deep-going divisions between humans; it is not a matter of superficial differences 
that can be overcome”. (Skeie 2006: 310)  – However, the present study assumes that there is some common human potential and 
common human creativity (Skeie 2006: 311; Sen 2007; Avruch 1998) Introduction | 12 
Concerned  European,  North  American,  and  Australian  scholarship  has  developed  the  theoretical  basis  of 
comparing  international  approaches  to  confessional  religious  education  (henceforth  RE)  and  inter-faith 
religious education in nations of the ‘Global North’ with religious plurality
9. Nipkow (2006: 577) postulates that 
scholarly exchange about theory and semantics in RE is still lacking comparative research on a global scale. 
With regard to the implementation of the religious class by the state and the maintenance of faith based 
education systems by religious groups, the present study on Hindu religious education extends the perspective 
into Southeast Asia, particularly the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and specifically the province Bali.  
 
Both the member  states of  the European Union (henceforth EU) and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (henceforth ASEAN) consider education as key area for development. With regard to the problem of 
religious education, the bodies follow different agendas. As for compliance with international human rights 
standards, the ‘Oslo Declaration’
10 (1998) and the ‘Toledo Guidelines on Teaching about Religion and Beliefs in 
Public  Schools
11’  (2007)  constitute  watershed  events  in  the  juridification  of  teaching  about  religion  as 
legitimate topic for public schools in the ‘Global North’. (Evans: 2008: 456
).  
The Association of South East Asian Nations, however, does not interfere in religious issues of its member 
states and cooperates explicitly not on religious issues. The strictly secular ASEAN organization does not yet 
propose a systematic approach on the organization and institutionalization of religious education. Despite the 
secular attitude of ASEAN, religions play a major role in the Indonesian Basic Law, in legislation, education and 
in everyday life. Religion and religious education are key areas of development and spiritual advancement in 
Indonesia’s strategic planning instruments. In this, the religious sphere is considered as a critical dimension in 
the religious, moral, and spiritual development of the child.  
   
                                                 
9 Enlisted publications provide a selection of works on comparative international studies of religious education. The years of publishing may 
be adduced as example of internationally growing interest how to organize religious plurality in schools: Heimbrock (ed.) 2001: Towards 
religious competence: diversity as a challenge for education in Europe; Heimbrock 2004: Religionsunterricht im Kontext Europa. Einführung 
in die kontextuelle Religionsdidaktik in Deutschland; Jackson (ed.) 2004: Rethinking religious education and plurality: issues in diversity and 
pedagogy; Jackson (ed.) 2008: Peace Education and Religious Plurality: International Perspectives; Jackson 2003: International perspectives 
on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity; Jackson (forthcoming 2008) Education and Religious Diversity: The Interpretive Approach 
in an International Context; Knauth 2008: Encountering Religious Pluralism in School and Society’. 
10 In August 1998, an international conference on freedom of religion was held in Oslo, Norway in connection with the celebration of the 
50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR). For the first time in history, it has been recognized that the 
existence of human rights transcends the laws of sovereign states. The Oslo Declaration adverts to Articles 18 both of the UDHR and of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (henceforth ICCPR), which have created a universal standard pertaining to 1.) religious 
education, 2.) protection of equality, 3.) freedom of religion, 4.) rights of states to implement religious education, 5.) rights of communities 
to maintain faith-based education, 5.) right of parents to have children educated consistently with their own values, and 6.) educational 
rights of children. This universal standard has been strengthened by passage of the 1981 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (henceforth 1981 Declaration). Crucial to the present study is the mandate 
given to scholars and teachers to study and apply the UDHR and the 1981 Declaration as universal standards on freedom of religion or 
belief and to create educational programs using the 1981 Declaration as a universal standard to build a culture of tolerance, understanding 
and respect between people of diverse beliefs.  
11 Drafted 26 years after the 1981 Declaration, the 2007 Toledo Guidelines constitute the first systematic approach and transnational 
effort to manage religious education on a European scale in establishing religion as a valuable item in school curricula. Introduction | 13 
1.4.2 Laboratory 
This profusion of religiously charged political alignments and situations makes Indonesia a superb place 
for anthropologist and other students of religion to investigate the relationships between religion and 
society and, indeed, to explore the very definition of religion. Indonesian experience calls into question a 
number of comfortable assumptions sometimes made in the study of religion in other world areas.  
(Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 4) 
 
Southeast Asian studies are a part of Area Studies
12. (King 2006: 23-44) The geographical underpinnings of the 
Southeast Asian ellipse can be clearly distinguished from a sinicized Asia (Northeast Asia: Japan, China, Korea), 
the Hindu-Islamic sub-continent (India) and Central Asia. The big three differentiations among the research 
area of Southeast Asian Studies, comprise Indonesianists, Thai experts, and Vietnamologists. It is not possible 
within the scope of the present study to describe the complex debates that have been pursued in questions 
what constitutes Southeast Asia as a region and whether this signifies a distinct territorial and cultural space. In 
essence, the significance of Southeast Asian Studies lays in its importance for theoretical knowledge production 
about the area. “As ‘epicenter’ for such a production, the field has made crucial contributions with analytical 
categories  such  as  “agricultural  involution”,  “thick  description”,  “theatre  state”,  “imagined  communities”, 
“galactic polity”, “geobody”, “weapons of the weak” and “moral economy”.” (Houben/Chou 2006: 1 emphasis 
in original) Manyrenowned scholars in humanities and social science developed their theoretical concepts, as 
for example Geertz his “thick description” after conducting field research in Indonesia, especially in Bali
13. 
Consequently, the area of Southeast Asia can be understood as theoretical problematic and as an object of 
inquiry offering new sets of questions and methodologies. (Houben/Chou 2006: 14).  
 
Southeast Asian and Indonesian Studies have acquired a new practical and theoretical relevance in the context 
of simultaneous processes of localization and globalization
14. The contextualization of the global into the local 
and  the  local  into  the  global  or  the  combination  of  globalization  and  localization  is  called  glocal  or 
glocalization
15 (Leganger, 2001: 12-13).  
   
                                                 
12 This section is drawn from Vincent Houben and Cynthia Chou 2006, who have edited a brilliant inventory on the current state of research 
in Southeast Asian studies. Wilhelm Solheim II (2000: 273) found evidence for a very widespread maritime trading and communication 
network (nusantao network). It presented a communication network that could pass around ideas, tool types, and elements of many 
different shared technologies. Consequently, I assume that preceding the begin of the Christian Era, people have exchanged ideas and 
goods from the Mediterranean Sea to the East Asian region, a fact pointing to correlated influence and cross-fertilization but also to 
limitation of boundaries, ideas and concepts originating in Western and Eastern thought. For centuries the Chinese referred to the region 
of as ‘Nanyang’ and the Japanese as ‘Nanyo’, the ‘South Seas’, while Indians saw it as ‘Further India’ and the Dutch as ‘The East Indies’. 
‘Southeast Asia’ was a twentieth century term invented in the West, which became popular at the end of World War II when the Allies 
organized the Southeast Asian Command. The Southeast Asians themselves had no common name for the region. (Yamashita, 2003: 8-9) 
Therefore as the result of its history, Southeast Asia is best understood according to the self-definition of the Association of Southeast 
Asian (ASEAN) nations which reads that ASEAN comprises a mosaic of ethnicities and cultures; across the seas of the world cultures: Indian, 
Chinese, Islamic, and Western, one might add. In a celebratory fashion the ASEAN- Committee on Culture and Information (ASEAN-COCI) 
states that “diversity is a cultural strength and an economic asset which needs to be protected by compatible national legislation”. In 
November 2007, during Indonesia’s term as chair of the ASEAN Secretariat, it fostered the establishment of a ASEAN Community, which 
comprises besides the traditionally developed economic sector, a socio-cultural, and a security sector – as outlined in the draft of the 
ASEAN Charta. Following the ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN-COCI gives the objective of ASEAN being “(a) community conscious of its ties 
of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity”. (ASEAN Secretariat, Strategic review of ASEAN-COCI 
program, 2005: 4, in: www.aseansec.org (May 2008) 
13 Just to name a few: John Bowen, Roy Rappaport, Frederik Barth, Ruth Benedict, James Boon, Clifford Geertz, Gregory Bateson, Walter 
Spies, Michel Covarrubias, McPhee/Belo and Mead/Bateson. Yamashita has demonstrated that these scholars not only contributed to the 
introduction of Balinese culture to the West, but also how Balinese art forms and dances which are now famous, emerged as an outcome 
of Bali’s encounter with the West and were “invented” during the colonial period under the influence of those Western artists, scholars 
and tourists (Yamashita 2003: 7, emphasis in original). 
14 Appiah (2007: 10) proposes the provisional minimal definition of the term globalization as a global network of trade relations and 
information. In  the present  era the accelerating globalization  process is thought to increase the frequency of exchange and flow of 
economic and intellectual items, including goods, knowledge, ideas, habits, values and images, as well as people, on a global scale, 
resulting in a dual trend of both unity and diversity (Leganger 2001: 53; Hitchcock/Dharmaputra: 2007:2). Therefore no locality remains 
unaffected  by  globalization,  and  it  can  be  observed  that  globalization  results  in  almost  every  dimension  of  life  in  a  creolization  or 
hybridization, and localization of culture. (Yamashita 2003: 5, 15) “Local knowledge seems to be a dynamic form of local culture which is 
most frequently revitalized by those in the new urban environment as they adjust to such global values as individualism, consumerism, and 
materialism”. (Yamashita 2003: 12) Therefore  local societies mediate or acculturate the global influences into particular local forms, 
making each locality into a global locality. 
15 In the 1991 edition of the Oxford Dictionary to New words the term “glocal” and the related processual noun “glocalization” are defined 
as being “formed by telescoping global and local to make a blend”, the notion is modeled on the Japanese concept of dochakuka, which 
was originally used to refer to the agricultural principle of adapting one’s framing techniques to local conditions. (Yamashita 2003:6) Introduction | 14 
Glocalization  presupposes  not  the  opposition  of  globalization  and  localization,  but  their  simultaneous 
occurrence and blending. In this perspective, globalization does not connote a unidirectional homogenizing 
process, but a dual process of hybridization, because localization is viewed as a process caused by globalization. 
The history and the present of Southeast Asia demonstrate the mechanisms at work in glocalizing processes.
16 
(Yamashita 2003) Early Indian and Chinese influences, followed by the intr oduction of Islam and European 
colonialism,  blended  with  indigenous  elements  to  create  the  contemporary  culture  of  the  region.  The 
modernization processes involved extraordinary  transformations, where the old traditional structures of 
polities and communities have been broken up.  
 
In sum, the current events, transitions, and transformations in the region form a laboratory for articulating new 
concepts for the understanding of the dynamism of the area with relevance also for the rest of the world 
(Houben/Chou 2006: 2). Since the region of Southeast Asia provides a field of inquiry for the development of 
theories, John Bowen has shown that the political and cultural history of Indonesia, of the Dutch East Indies, 
and of the many kingdoms and societies in the  archipelago, has given rise to a particular way of studying 
plurality and pluralism. Following Bowen (2003, 2005) and Munoz (2006), I assume in Southeast Asia one finds 
a kind of “internalized or internal pluralism”, “a consciousness of other societies at the core of each society’s 
self-definition”.  (Bowen  2003:  12)  Such  phenomena  are  most  likely  the  result  of  the  region’s  outward 
orientation, its history in commerce, religion, politics, and art of receiving and transforming objects and ideas 
that  have  come  elsewhere,  often  across  the  seas.  (Solheim  II  2000;  Bowen  2003:  12;  Chou  2006:  128) 
“Southeast Asia borrows in order to create what defines it – a paradoxical formulation that one sees across 
nearly all human domains in the area”. (Bowen 2003: 12) In consequence, plurality is a longstanding common 
phenomenon in the histories of South Asia and in the Indonesian Archipelago, which could provide a tool of 
inquiry for developing a theory and models concerned with the organization of religious plurality. (Franke 2006; 
Bowen 2005; Tibi 1995; Madjid 1994) 
 
As  Indonesianists  comprise  the  largest  groups  among  researchers  on  South  East  Asian,  a  large  body  of 
literature exists on the area. There are several publications on Indonesian religious plurality (Franke 2006, 
Bowen  2005;  Smith-Kipp  1987;  Howell  1982).  An  entire  academic  field  termed  Baliology  is  dedicated  to 
Balinese studies and generations of scholars of all disciplines and schools monitored Balinese culture, Balinese 
history, and Balinese Hinduism. With regard to Javanese studies, Antlöv (2005: 13) states that certain topics 
and categories are over studied, while others are excluded. His assessment fully applies to Balinese studies. 
Besides the abundance of Balinese studies,  sparse attention is paid to the broader phenomenon of Hindu 
religious  education,  contemporary  Indonesian  Hinduism  as  a  minority  religion,  and  Hindu  ethnic  groups. 
However, there are a few articles and monographs concerned with formal Hindu religious education, of which I 
like to mention Kelambora 1976, Bakker 1993, Steenbrink 2001, and Nala 2004. 
1.4.3. Indonesia: Kaleidoscopic reality 
Indonesia is a country with highly heterogeneous features and a “kaleidoscopic reality”. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 
23)  The  country  constitutes  a  salient  research  site  regarding  such  complex  contemporary  social  issues  as 
religious diversity, religious pluralism, and RE that have relevance for both the Study of Religion and Southeast 
Asia.  The  geographical  setting  and  environmental  cornucopia  has  influenced  Indonesia’s  socio-cultural 
structure and consequently shapes in an important way the economic and political life. As a result of the geo-
strategic  location  and  the  resulting  deep  integration  into  global  trade,  Indonesia’s  history  may  be 
emblematized in this context as “a hybrid mosaic or tenun of indigenous archipelagic and imported socio-
religio-cultural  practices”  (Bourchier/Hadiz  2003:  2)  that  results  in  the  rich  and  complex  contemporary 
civilization and society. In 1950, the Ministry of Information gives a vibrant self-description, quoted here in 
length to elucidate the elegant diction:  
   
                                                 
16 The rise of the lifestyle among the urban middle class is a particular striking feature of Southeast Asia today. Young, well-educated 
middle-class city dwellers, who only a few decades ago firmly believed that they belonged to national and local communities, now perceive 
that they may have more in common with the middle-class in the older industrialized countries, than with their own fellow countrymen in 
the periphery. (Yamashita 2003: 4) Introduction | 15 
The geographical position of Indonesia on the junction of four main roads of international traffic has 
brought her into contact with outside influences since the very beginning of her history. As international 
traffic (around 100 B.C.) developed and increased, these contacts gained in regularity and frequency. 
Impregnated  with  these  influences,  Indonesia  became  receptive  to  modern  ideas,  even  if  there  is  a 
certain measure of conservativeness which increases as  one goes deeper inland. It may be that this 
receptiveness to modern ideas and the innate conservatism are more or less soundly balanced, resulting 
in certain selectivity towards outside ideas. This finds its expression in all kinds of cultural manifestations, 
which are in the nature of a synthesis between the original culture and the outside cultural influences. 
This aspect of Indonesian society must be taken into account (…). (Kementerian Penerangan 1950: 45) 
 
The Archipelago was not merely a passive recipient of imported influences, rather than being a one-way affair, 
cultural  exchange  led  to  constant  encounters  between  cultures  (faith  communities)  and  to  innumerous 
acculturation processes. (Munoz 2006) In this light, Indonesia constitutes also a research ground for research 
on cross-cultural fertilization processes between East and West. Preceding the begin of the Christian Era
17, 
people have exchanged ideas and goods from the Mediterranean Sea to the South East Asian regio n, therefore 
one may doubt assumed boundaries between the dichotomist distinction of assumed boundaries between 
ideas and concepts originating in ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern thought’, and further investigate into their correlation, 
“acculturation”,  (Sedyawati  2001)  “cross-fertilization”,  (Munoz  2006;  Madjid  2004);  and  “hybridization
18” 
(Tschernokoshewa/Pahor 2005). Nurcholish Madjid (2004: 53, author’s translation) depicts the situation of 
diversity as such  
 
(i)n terms of richness, cultural diversity is comparable with a lavish phyto-genetic growth. By the 
means of cross-cultural fertilization, diversity can be a source for the development of rich and 
strong hybrid cultures. Incidentally, as result of the interaction of trade and politics, Srwijaya, 
Majapahit  and  Aceh  were  such  hybrid  or  acculturated  cultureswhich  emerged  through 
(Southeast) Asian cross-cultural fertilization. 
Precolonial and colonial history 
For  a  better  understanding  how  Indonesia  organizes  religion  in  the  state,  one  should  be  aware  of  the 
Archipelago’s long history in order to recognize the unique solutions (here represented by the five principles) 
that were found and upheld by those concerned to organize the people of Indonesia.The history of the Island 
Archipelago
19  is characterized by a cross -fertilization of archipelagic ideas with South Asian, Sinic, Middle 
Eastern, and Western ideas for two millennia. Archeological evidence indicates the presence of  modern 
humans as early as about 40,000 years ago in the Archipelago, but they may have been p resent much earlier
20. 
By about 5,000 years ago
21, “the circulation of peoples within the archipelago and the absorption of influences 
from outside had begun to create a diverse but related complex of cultures often identified as Austronesian”
22.  
What is today Indonesia lay at or near the center of that nusantao complex
23.The widespread maritime trading 
and communication network   Austronesian or  nusantao  (Solheim  II,  2000:  273)network  begun  to  exist  in 
eastern  Island  Southeast  Asia,  eventually  spread  east  throughout  the  Pacific,  and  west  as  far  as 
Madagascar
24.The early trade, or barter, did not make anyone wealthy, but provided a living for many people 
of varying but similar cultures. It presented a communication network that could pass around ideas, tool types,  
and elements of many different shared technologies. (Solheim II, 2000: 273) 
   
                                                 
17 Cloves, found only in Maluku, had made their way to the Middle East as early as 4,000 years ago. Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: 
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010 
18 Tschernokoshewa/Juric Pahor 2005: Auf der Suche nach hybriden Lebensgeschichten. München/Berlin 
19 Linguistic and archaeological evidence (Adelaar 2005; Bellwood 1996) shows a significant cultural diversity among pre-colonial Western 
Malayo-Polynesian (especially Malayo-Sumbawan) traditions. 
20 Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010 
21 Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010; Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Solheim 
II, 2000: 273  
22 Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010 
23 Solheim II, 2000: 273; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010 
24 The nusantao network covered ‘all of the Pacific Ocean, the coastal areas of the China Sea and Japan, the coastal areas of the Bay of 
Bengal and the Indian Ocean as far as Madagascar, and Island Southeast Asia and the coastal area of Mainland Southeast Asia’ Solheim II, 
2000: 273; Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010 
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The first period encompasses the pre-colonial period (2500 BC until 1550 AD). This period was largely dynamic 
inside the region. After Austronesian settlers arrived in the Western and Eastern part of the Archipelago, they 
diversified into thousands of localized Indo-Melanesian cultures, who stood then in cultural and economic 
exchange  with  the  greater  Sinic  and  Indic  cultural  traditions.  (Bellwood  1996;  Kulke  1991;  Munoz  2006) 
Although Indonesian peoples clearly had contact with the outside world at an early date, physical evidence in 
the archipelago is much later. Sites containing Indian trade goods now date at about 400 B.C., and the first 
inscriptions (in eastern Kalimantan and West Java) at about 375–400 AD. Early external immigrants originated 
from India, China, Turkey, Arab, and later then from Portugal, England, and the Netherlands. 
The main contributors to the diversity of religion and culture in Indonesia were the geographic character of the 
Archipelago and immigration from inside and outside the region (Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006). The geographic 
location of  Sumatra and  Java at the  sea trade road between China and India  made the  ships  waiting  for 
monsoon winds travel further. Therefore, local polities, and especially their early rulers came in contact with 
Indian and Sinic concepts of politics, law, and religion. Prior to the advent of Islam (1100 AD) and Christianity 
(1600 AD), South Asian scholars, adventurers, and traders introduced ideas and concepts of dharmic religions 
(Hinduism and Buddhism) into the Western part of the Archipelago (Kalimantan, Java, Sumatra) between the 
second and forth centuries AD- (Munoz 2006; Fic 2003) With the intensification of trade relations, the first 
Indianized polities and Hindu-Buddhist imperial kingdoms emerged and vanished in the Western part of the 
Archipelago (400 – 1550
25). (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006) 
 
The cross-fertilization of cultural ideas was not a one-way affair, but a bilateral exchange between indigenous 
archipelagic belief systems and dharmic religions. The main agents in the transfer of Indian cultural values and 
concepts were the rulers of the polities in what would become Indonesia. (Munoz 2006) The social organization 
and cultural structures of the people of the Archipelago, the Malays peninsular and the Indian subcontinent 
displayed very similar features and met cognate problems around the first centuries of the last millennium to 
which the dharmic concepts, for example that of a god-king, offered some help concerning the legitimating of 
kingdom and priesthood. (Kulke 1991; Tooker 1996; Fic 2003; Dellios 2003; Munoz 2006) Chinese mercenaries, 
traders, and scholars were also proactively engaged in the exchange, testifyi ng to a very early vast regional 
network. (Dellios 2003; Munoz 2006) 
 
Emphasizing violent, sexual, and magical traits, Shivaite traditions blossomed in Java in the fifth century and 
merged with Vajrayana-Buddhism, resulting in the early medieval Shiva -Buddhism; Balinese Shiva Siddhanta 
(Interview Wiyana 2010) and contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia  –  both  unique  to  the  Archipelago. 
Vishnuite  and  Vedanta  traditions  were  always  present  in  the  region,  but  played  only  minor  or  even 
marginalized roles in Bali from 1300-1999, but they experience a current renaissance (Interview Ida Resi Oka 
2004;  Phalgunadi  2005;  Interview  Ida  Pedanda  Bajing  2006).  In  the  following  centuries  local  dynasties 
established  a  series  of  Hindu,  Buddhist  and  Hindu-Buddhist  kingdoms  (Kutai,  Srivijaya,  Mataram,  Kediri, 
Majapahit). (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006) The Buddhist temple of Borobodur and the Hindu temple of 
Prambanan, both built by the Sailendra dynasty in the 8
th and 9
th century AD and enlisted in the UNESCO world 
heritage  list,  testify  to  the  former  grandeur  of  those  past  kingdoms.  The  Hindu-Buddhist  civilization 
experienced its golden age during the medieval Majapahit Empire (1250-1500) with its heartland or center 
located in Central Java. The feudal kingdom is assumed to have had maintained corvee-relations stretching 
across the entire area of contemporary Indonesia (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006), and thus it constitutes 
the common reference point for the self-confident nationalist pride of the later Indonesian independence 
movement in the 20
th century.  
 
After something like a thousand years of adopting Hindu and Buddhist ideas and influence, Javanese 
began to adopt Islam. The story of that Islamization is complex, full of surprises and over six hundred 
years long. It is far from over today. During those six centuries, Javanese have also found much else to 
adopt, from European, American, Chinese, Middle Eastern, and other sources. (Ricklefs 2006: 5) 
   
                                                 
25 The date 1550 refers to the end of the last Hindu-Buddhist kingdom Majapahit in Java. Only the Balinese Hindu kingdoms continued to 
exist until 1958, but their traditional structure and the traditional social order has been changed by Dutch intrusion into their native 
political affairs in the 1910s.  Introduction | 17 
Islamization found its beginning in the 10
th century, when Islam was spread by Muslim Indian traders from 
Gujarat through the west coast of Sumatra and then disseminated Java. “Whether it was Mideastern Islam 
filtered through the religious experience of India, or preached by Sufis, it appealed greatly to the majority of 
Javanese and Sumatrans whose spiritual life was influenced by the mystical bent of the cult of the divine 
kingship promulgated by the leadership of earlier Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms.” (Purdy 1984: 38) Islamization led 
to a new cultural paradigm in the region that slowly replaced the indigenous and Hindu-Buddhist religious 
practices. In some villages however, local megalithic religious practices continue until today, as in the case of 
the Baduy in Banten and the Bali Aga, for example. Sufism played an important role in the expansion of Islam. 
In the archipelago, “Islam has flourished as an entity enriching a deep cultural web of local cultures and beliefs, 
converting the indigenous people without necessarily remaking them according to the Middle Eastern model of 
Muslims”. (Hilmy 2010: 99) Until the upsurge of Islamist activism and religious-related terrorism since the 
resignation  of  the  authoritarian  Suharto  regime,  “Indonesian  Islam  has  enjoyed  the  reputation  of  being  a 
distinctive and tolerant variant of Islam, compatible with democracy, human rights, civil society, pluralism, 
gender equality, and other traits of modern civilization”. (Hilmy 2010: 99)  
 
One of the main reasons for this positive reputation is that Indonesia is one of the few countries where Islam 
did not supplant the existing religion purely by military conquest. Islam was introduced to the country in a 
relatively  peaceful  way,  even  though  it  is  undeniable  that  military  expansion  accompanied  its 
institutionalization.  (Hilmy  2010:  99)  “(T)he  process  of  Islamization  in  Indonesia  has  been  what  is  termed 
pénétration pacifique, mostly by traders cum missionaries” (Madjid 1994: 59). “The result is the widely known 
Indonesian practice of syncretism”. (Madjid 1994: 59) Similarly, Tibi (1995) states “Asia didn‘t come under 
Islamic influence by means of armed Jihad but through trade relations.” Questioned why political Islam and 
democracy are compatible in Indonesia, Constitutional Judge Prof Zoelva (Interview 2010) replied: 
 
This is related with the cultural history of the Indonesian nation, Islam entered Indonesia in a smart (sic!) 
way not by using weapons and violence but by a slow process of gradual cultural rapprochement. In the 
beginning, many existing cultural tools were used by the Islamic missionaries. What does this mean? 
Islam entered without impinging the given culture. Thus, since the first Muslims entered the Archipelago, 
gradual cultural rapprochement has been the applied model.  
 
Likewise, in 2009 Prof Komaruddin Hidayat, then Rector of Indonesia’s leading Islamic State University Syarif 
Hidayatullah
26, argues  
 
Islam was brought to our shores by traders and traders are known to be hospitable, inclusive and like to 
befriend people, not make enemies through warfare. Moreover, the content of Islamic expr ession that 
was developed here was the more esoteric, Islamic mysticism  – tasawuf – which was more adaptable to 
the Hindu-Buddhist culture that prevailed that time. These two factors helped the peaceful spread of 
Islam in Indonesia, not by the sword or by bloodshed. Because the traders’ mobility and networks, the 
coastal cities all along Nusantara – the Indonesian Archipelago – became centers of trade, of the spread 
of  Islam  and  Malay  language  and  trade  networks  developed  in  synergy,  becoming  the  strength  of 
Indonesia’s cultural cohesion and identity. 
 
By the end of the fifteenth century, several kingdoms with Islamic rulers had been established (Demak, Pajang, 
Mataram,  Banten,  Samudra-Pasai,  Gresik,  Tuban)  marking  a  cosmological  and  cultural-legal  change  in  the 
Archipelago. (Rickleffs 2006) Arab traders, many of Yemenite origin, settled in the coastal trade towns and 
introduced a more orthodox variant of Islam. By the end of the 16
th century Islam was the dominant religion in 
Java and Sumatra. (Rickleffs 2006) Trade relations slowly brought European adventurers and traders to the 
region.  In  this  period  then,  alliances  between  traditional  rulers,  the  nobility,  and  stray  Western  interests 
prevailed. Following the conquest of Malacca in 1512, the Portuguese (1512-1850) were the first Europeans to 
arrive in Indonesia with a clear agenda in the early modern period: to dominate the spice trade, start crop 
growing and to do Roman Catholic missionary work. The proselytizing efforts had sustained success in Flores, 
the Moluccas, and what was to become East Timor in 2001. 
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The Archipelago underwent a period of transition and social transformation from sovereign rule to a colonial 
territory from 1602 to 1949. In 1602, after the Dutch founded the Dutch East India Company  (VOC), they 
became the dominant European power in the Archipelago and spread Calvinist and Lutheran Protestantism in 
eastern Indonesia (Moluccas, North Sulawesi, Sumbawa, Sumba, Papua, and Borneo) and Sumatra. The extent 
to which Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed with each other in a missionary quest led to the 
perception on side of the natives that both religions were fundamentally different, leading to the bureaucratic 
administrative  differentiation  between  Christians  (Protestants)  and  Catholic  in  contemporary  Indonesia. 
(Ramstedt 2004)  
 
In 1800, the VOC was bankrupt and therefore formally disbanded. Since the Dutch government depended 
heavily in financial and emotional matters on the region, it established the Dutch East Indies as  a national 
colony in 1802. In the first decades of the twentieth century, a modern Dutch colonial state extended its 
control to most of the future Indonesia. The introduction of colonial rule led to a period of political and social 
change. The introduction of modern Western capitalism, a money economy, and the implementation of the 
color line led to the collapse or the individuation of traditional polities and institutions and the traditional 
economic systems. (Wertheim 1959) As new-wealthy businessman and Westernized intellectuals challenged 
the alliance between the traditional aristocracy and the new colonial rulers, the common interest of the people 
and the will to posses sovereignty in one territory led to Indonesian nationalism. (Wertheim 1959) Political 
Islam has since then acted as a multifaceted, yet principal ideology of resistance against Dutch hegemony in 
civil means (education, health) and with militias and guerilla tactics. Prof K Hidayat (2009) notices, “Islam and 
armed conflict happened when the European imperialists wanted to grab the wealth of our country. The clerics 
defended  their  motherland  by  using  religious  slogans  to  stir  sentiments  of  solidarity  and  the  spirit  of 
struggle”
27.  
To some extent Islam is therefore less seen as a tradition, but more as  a dynamic vehicle of protest and 
resistance against exploitation, injustice, inequality, and disempowerment. Simultaneously in the early 1900s, 
the first groups learned about nationalism. The Dutch colonizers always feared civil unrest and opposition to 
their reign, thus they limited access to education as a control over their subjects intellectual horizon. The 
handful subjects that succeeded in obtaining Western, that is Dutch, higher education, were then those to train 
their fellows and to become the leaders of the Independence movement. Then, in the 1920s and 1930s various 
modern political organizations and leaders made themselves visible in the restricted public sphere.  
As socio-cultural diversity in the Archipelago posed a major obstacle in a unified struggle for independence, 
contesting visions of what kind of state should be founded, began to arise from the time Indonesia emerged as 
an idea in the early 20
th century. The leaders of the supra-regional and archipelago-wide nationalist movement, 
considered the diversity of Indonesia as the apparent factor to be taken into account. As a result, these leaders 
swore an “Oath of the Indonesian Youth” (Sumpah Pemuda) on the minimal common ground of “one nation, 
one homeland, and one language”. (satu bangsa, satu nusa, satu bahasa) The fault lines of their contesting 
visions, though, have shifted with the vagaries of the nationalist movement. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 2) 
When the Japanese invasion ended the years of Dutch foreign rule in 1942, the animosities between the Dutch 
colonial  government  and  political  Islam  and  the  Indonesian  nationalist  movement  was  in  full  progress. 
Although short-lived from 1942-1945, the Japanese occupation forced the Dutch to leave the Dutch East Indies 
during World War II and enabled Indonesians to organize and arm themselves for the very first time
28.  
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The notion of Local genius 
In a previous section, reference has been made to Bowen’s paradigm of “Southeast Asia borrows in order to 
create what defines it” – the paradigm describes how cultural borrowings are filtered and refined during a two-
stage process of acculturation according to traditional local values in the Archipelago. Studies on Indonesian 
cultural history have revealed the fact that elements of foreign cultures which came to Indonesia have always 
undergone further processes of development or refinement. (Sedyawati 2001) “Indonesian civilization (…) has 
throughout the centuries kept its peculiar character because of the ‘local genius’ of the population”. (Wertheim 
1959)  The  capacity  to  process  various  cultural  elements  in  order  to  produce  creations  with  specific 
“archipelagic” characteristics is known as “local genius” or “indigenous/original creativity capacity”. (Wertheim 
1959; Sedyawati 2001) In this, the layer of the archipelagic socio-religious cultures appears to operate as a 
conservative filtration device for strong and continuous influences from outside. (Wandelt 1989; Franke 2006; 
Hooker 1978; 2003; Munoz 2006) This notion of “local genius” (kearifan local) has been quite enthusiastically 
borrowed by Indonesian intellectuals and is frequently used to denote the process of cultural change due to 
foreign  influences  (glocalization)  but  underlying  this  change  is  the  ability  to  filter,  integrate  or/and  reject 
elements that do not fit into the Indonesian pattern. 
The capacity of local genius is characterized by the existence of creativity in changing or reworking element(s) 
of  a  foreign  culture  within  the  normative  frame  of  one’s  local  culture.  The  term  acculturation  denotes  a 
“phenomenon which happens, if two communities with different cultures meet directly in a long period of 
time, that cause changes in the original patterns of culture on one or both communities”. (Keesing/Keesing: 
1971; in Sedyawati 2001: 435 FN 1) Sedyawati (2001: 435-446) speaks of two stages within the acculturation 
process:  the  stage  of  immediate  acculturation,  and  the  post-acculturation  stage.  Culture  is  undergoing  an 
acculturation process, if the indigenous creative capacity plays its role in selecting the foreign cultural elements 
to be accepted in their original form into one’s own culture. However, this indigenous creative potentiality 
reveals itself most prominently at the post-acculturation stage of cultural development and transformation, in 
which  the  creative  capability  has  an  active  role  in  recreating,  reworking,  or  changing  foreign  elements 
according to local cultural matrix. These elements, however, do not blend mechanistically, but there is a more 
intricate mechanism at work.  
Instead of simplifying Indonesian religious thought as segmented into several strata
29, the current study follows 
a “social processual and holistic perspective” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 8) The current study proposes three 
longstanding historical and one recently emerged socio-religious cultures in Indonesia: 1.) archipelagic cultures, 
which in fact denote the archipelagic Indo-Melanesian megalithic belief practices of animism, pantheism, and 
shamanism that are characterized by ancestral, earth and mountain cults
30; 2.) Hindu-Buddhist culture; 3.) 
Islamic culture, and 4.) national culture/civil religion as represented in the first sila. Those socio -religious 
cultures do not exist on their own, but there are in encounter, interaction, and exchange with each other and 
therefore transform each other. “Looking at Indonesian cultures and religions as transformations of each other 
(…) aims to draw attention to underlying similarities rather than to divide Indonesian cultures into distinct 
categories. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 6) These enlisted four socio-religious cultures are not to be thought of 
as providing essential identities, but they refer to a historical sequence of overlapping socio-cultural encounter. 
Dharmaputera (1989: 29/30 FN 52/54) states in this context, that those longstanding socio-religious cultures
31 
“have never fused and crystallized, hence a central common value and normative system in Indonesia has not 
been established”, – but “it is totally wrong to assume that each of them stands as an independent system 
totally free from the influence of the other*s+.”    
                                                 
29  The  classical  categorization  by  H.  Geertz  (1963:  5-77)  proposes  that  three  categories  of  socio-cultural-religious  groups  could  be 
distinguished across the Archipelago: inland wet-rice areas (Hindu-Buddhist); trade oriented coastal peoples (Islamic), and the ethnic 
groups  of  the  mountainous  interior  regions  (archipelagic  belief  practices).  H.  Geertz  observed  that  the  traditional  value  system  of 
Indonesian culture as a whole would be structured on three basic socio-cultural layers: Indigenous, Indic, and Islamic. As the terminology 
seems inconsequent to me– because 1.) the layers are not closed units, but overlap and acculturate (Dharmaputera 1989; Sedyawati 2001: 
435 FN 1), and 2.) whereas the term indigenous is quite general; Indic refers either to linguistics, script or the Indian subcontinent, and 
Islamic to Islam as a religion, the people that practice Islam and the civilization developed by those people, I refer to three socio-religious 
cultures. (H. Geertz, 1963: 5-77; Dharmaputra, 1989) 
30 In a religious studies approach, the term archipelagic layer can be elucidated in two ways, which complement each other. First, a 
trajectory of megalithic indigenous shamanism and animism is observed throughout the Archipelago at the village level, remarkably, this 
pantheistic view contradicts Semitic absoluteness. (Stöhr, 1965; Stöhr 1976) Second, the conception of Javanese monism, as important 
cultural trajectory (Franke 2006) integrates different even inconsistent ways of life or elements and seeks to find convergence of these 
contradictory elements. The present study hypothesizes that the awareness of religious plurality is rooted in Javanese Monism and the 
pluralism of Austronesian cultures (Munoz 2006).  
31 Following H. Geertz, Dharmaputera speaks of layers, which I reformulated as socio-religious cultures. Introduction | 20 
To allege an instance, archipelagic cults often continued to operate even after elements of the local tradition 
were drawn up into a Hindu (respective Muslim or Christian, A.L.) superstructure (Hefner 1998: 93). Indeed, 
archipelagic and Hindu-Buddhist thought provides a deep-rooted basis for cultural similarity in the Indonesian 
archipelago, despite 87 percent of the population embraces Islam – if one follows the official census 2000. 
Following two tragic tsunami catastrophes that destroyed vast parts of Sumatra, West Java, and Java in 2004 
and 2005, these deeply seated layers surfaced abruptly as Balinese Hindu high priests (pedanda) and lay priests 
(pinandita, pemangku) were called to the Javanese and Sudanese shore in 2005. They were tasked to assist 
local Hindu priests and communities, but also the kyai
32 and the local Muslim community in the performance of 
purification rituals, in which oblations were offered and fowl (animals) and eggs were sacrificed to p ropitiate 
the horrendous queen of the South and East Ocean
33. In consequence, under the condition of restraint, the 
socio-cultural matrixes can be independently activated in order to cope with disaster and crisis.  
In short, the three longstanding socio-religious cultures are compounded in a wide variety of forms, and they 
have been interrelated in their historically sequences  –  because  they  mutually  influence  each  other.  In  a 
dynamic process, elements of archipelagic traditional religious practices have been acculturated with Hindu, 
Buddhist,  Islamic,  Christian,  and  Confucian  elements,  thereby  producing  localized  variants  or  to  a  certain 
degree alternative types and phenomena of religious practices. Likewise, civil religion/national culture has 
influenced the traditional, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic culture in the Archipelago, which in turn to some extend 
and varying degrees have influenced national culture (Franke 2006).  
Considering the geographic expanse of Indonesia, the unification of all socio-religious cultures is a paramount 
challenge. According to the original 1945 Basic Law, the state shall develop Indonesian national culture, but it 
gives room to maneuver for local traditions, since the societies have the right to continue and refine their 
cultural values
34. As previous scholarship (Hitchcock/Dharmaputra 2007: 3; Interview Ida Pedanda Bajing 2007; 
Schulte Nordholt 2007) and I found in Bali a conservative and even resilient traditional local cultural matrix 
working to preserve fundamental units perceiv ed as core elements of Balinese religious -socio-culture, the 
present work understands the concept of local genius ( kearifan lokal) as to refer to the unilateral process of 
acculturation of foreign elements and the ability to filter and even to reject unfitting elements following a 
conservative, to a certain degree resilient core cultural matrix. In this, the process of acculturation is always a 
social construction, because specific agents perpetuate the elements they regard as core cultural properties 
until today. 
   
                                                 
32 A Kyai is a Muslim religious teacher. Traditionally they were the most prominent supra village leaders to whom the peasantry could look 
upon, independent of the local nobility and colonial force. Kyai’ influence spread by the expansion of Muslim boarding schools (pesantren). 
Kyai are linked by ties of descent, marriage and education, creating an Islamic network that extended across Java and the Archipelago.  
33 Personal communication with professional high priest Ida Pedanda Gede Putra Bajing in 2006. Ida Pedanda Bajing has been called for 
ritual performance by Hindu officials in West Java and has spent 10 days there. Also National Television in August 2005.  
34 Historic Basic Law 1945: article 30; Amended Basic Law Articles 18B (2); 28I (1),(3); 32 (1), (2) Introduction | 21 
1.4.4. Indonesia: Fact sheet 
Throughout the pre-nation-state period, a common religious, cultural, or political identity never existed among 
the ethnic groups of the archipelago, despite their sharing of certain common features. Accordingly, what had 
to become the Indonesian nation had to previously imagine her community
35. From the time when Indonesia 
emerged as an idea in the early 20
th century, contesting visions began to arise on what kind of nation-state it 
should be and what role religion could play within the confines of that state. Despite the extreme diversity of 
cultural  and  religious  traditions  in  the  Archipelago,  nation-state  intellectuals  and  politicians  have  been 
preoccupied with exploring what Indonesian cultural identity actually is, and how it should be developed. Thus, 
since the early days of the nationalist movement in 1908, conflict over the place of religion in the state has 
been a constant feature of political life. 
 
Despite traditional and modern socio-cultural diversity, a few general unifying principles may be assumed to 
operate in Indonesia. “Just as Indonesia itself is not a ‘natural’ entity, there are no natural or permanent factors 
that  divide  it”.  (Bourchier/Hadiz:  2003:  2)  Among  others,  such  unifying  principles  are  1.)  shared  Indo-
Melanesian cultural traits (Hooker 1978; Bellwood 1996; Adelaar 2005; Munoz 2006); and 2.) nation-building 
efforts from 1949 onwards. The Indo-Melanesian cultures present basic similarities in more than one respect. 
Beneath all outward differences, throughout the archipelago an unmistakable unity of basic cultural traits is 
revealed. A first similarity may be found in the social form of life, the village is thought to constitute the most 
basic community form. (Darmaputera 1989: 26; Hooker 1978) Albeit rapidly declining, agriculture (wet rice and 
dry rice fields) forms the very foundation of Indonesia’s economy in general. With respect to customary law 
(adat-law)  most  communities  in  Indonesia  present  a  congenial  pattern  (Hooker  1978)
36, whereas from  a 
linguistic point of view all Indonesian languages belong to the Austronesian language family (Wertheim, 1959: 
5; Adelaar 2005) 
 
The nation-state relies to a considerable extent on the nation building efforts of the post -1949 period. These 
have included  an opposition to Dutch colonialism (resulting in paranoia of federalism; Hilmy 2010), the 
invention of one national language, as well as the introduction of the Western -model of schooling; both of 
which have acted to bind together the otherwise diverse peo ples of the region. (Parker 2003; Kingsbury 2001) 
Although all languages belong to the Austronesian language family, only since 1928 the Malay vernacular 
(Bahasa Indonesia), the former lingua franca
37 of the Southeast Asian region, has been adopted as natio nal 
language and is continuously advanced through mass education programs, alphabetization campaigns and the 
national  education  system.  “In  plural  societies,  the  linguistic  groups  typically  fail  to  agree  on  a  national 
language of instruction, but here Indonesia is an exception”. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 51) In  effect, “with 
limited funding and limited personnel” (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 52), the task of establishing universal literacy 
in Indonesian language and maintaining local languages and perpetuating ethnic literature at the same time, is 
a  central  concern  of  Indonesian  educational  policies  up  from  Independence  to  the  reform  era  1999  until 
consequential legislation to the 2003 educational reform. The complex task of the Indonesian education system 
has been and is to promote allegiance to the nation as a unit and at the same time to protect ethnicity, 
language, and religious identity of the separate groups that compose the whole. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 53; 
Parker 2003) 
 
The enormous task to organize a unitary education system becomes obvious, if we take a closer look at the 
geographic and demographic situation of Indonesia. The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is located at 
the geopolitically and economically strategic junction between India, China, and Australia. The country has an 
area of approximately 700,000 square miles, and its geographic dimension parallels the longitude of the USA or 
Europe. The Indonesian archipelago compasses 6099 inhabited (of the total of 17.805) islands, (Weck 2009: 1) 
of which the largest islands are Java, Kalimantan, Sumatera, West-Papua and Sulawesi.    
                                                 
35 The term imagined community was coined by Benedict Anderson. An imagined community describes a national culture whose national 
identity relies on the people's conception of it. Since it proves to be impossible to know all fellow citizens who share this national identity, 
someone must have a commonly acceptable idea of what this national identity constitutes. These ‘imagined communities’ are continuously 
being contested and reconstituted in the contemporary world. (Anderson 1993 in Woodward 1987: 18-19)  
36 In the pre-colonial period the courts developed refined cultures, whereas the villagers continued to live a somewhat culturally divorced 
existence in the countryside. Although rule of law and the complex legal system are highly problematic issues, the general dichotomy 
between former Dutch law and a notion of law and justice rooted in the various local traditions (adat) and Islam exhibits a commitment to 
plural law practices and their recognition and utilization in national jurisdiction, indicates a continuing  plural understanding of law. 
37 Market Malay (Pasar Malay) served as lingua franca in the geographic area between Madagascar, India, the Malaysian Peninsular, the 
Philippines, the Indonesian Archipelago, Australia, and Western parts of Micronesia and Oceania. The Sultans of Yogyakarta and Banten 
send letters in Malay to the Portuguese and English kingdoms. Introduction | 22 
Consequently, Indonesia is a culturally remarkable diverse nation. According to a 2000 census report
38, there 
were 205, 8 million people living in Indonesia’s multi-ethnic society, whereas the Indonesian Country Profile 
estimates 235 million in July 2004. Although ethnicity is a dynamic and not stable identity, there are more than 
1,000 ethnic/sub-ethnic and 350 recognized ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia. Notwithstanding, the size of 
most ethnic groups is small, the population census of 2000 listed 101 ethnic groups, and only 15 groups have 
more than 1 million each
39. The table on top of the next page shows the geographic location and extension of 
Indonesia. In addition, the table demonstrates the demographic distribution on the islands of Indonesia.  
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218.
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Indonesian Statistical Board, http://demografi.bps.go.id/ (February 2009) 
 
 
Induced by the archipelago‘s geostrategic location between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans (east-west) as 
well as between Asia and Australia (north-south), Indonesia’s function as a hub for trade and communication is 
indispensable for the entire region. The state constitutes the world’s  
 
1.)  largest archipelagic nation-state stretching across a geo-strategic area,  
2.) fourth most populous country (after China, India and the US),  
3.) third-largest democracy (Freedom House 2010), and  
4.) largest national community of Muslims with a strong presumptive normative consciousness of the 
majority.  
 
Since Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population, we can regard Indonesia as a Muslim majority 
country, characterized by  
 
1)  an enormous territory situated in a geopolitical strategic location,  
2)  abundant resources  
3)  social, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity.  
 
The Islamic majority and Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian minorities as well as local religious 
systems  shape  the  expression  of  religious  diversity  in  Indonesia.  According  to  the  2000  census  report, 
(Suryadinata 2003) 88 percent of the population is Muslim, 6 percent Protestant, 3 percent Roman Catholic, 2 
percent Hindu, and in total less than 1 percent Buddhist, followers of traditional indigenous religions, Jewish, 
and other Christian denominations were not registered. Christians, Hindus, and members of other minority 
religious groups argued that the census undercounts non-Muslims. This seems to be correct, since the Hindu 
General Directorate of Ministry of Religious Affairs counted around 10 Million Hindus in Indonesia in 2008 
distributed in all provinces. The statistic of 2005 reveals following religious composition: 
   
                                                 
38 The population census were conducted in 1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000, while the between population census were done in 1985 and 
1995. Currently the sixth population census is being conducted in May 2010. The total of 235 Million is a projection of the population of 
2000. In: www.bappenas.go.id (10.05.2010) 
39 The largest ethnic groups are the Javanese, Sundanese, Malay, Madurese, Batak, Minangkabau, Betawi, Buginese, Bantenese, Banjarese, 
Balinese, and Sasak. (Suryadinata 2003: 7) Introduction | 23 
 
www.depag.go.id, 20.05.2010 
 
Politically,  the  Unitary  State  of  the  Republic  of  Indonesia  participates  among  others  in  international 
organizations  as  the  ASEAN,  the  UN,  and  the  UN  Security  Council.  Concerning  international  relations,  the 
Indonesian presidency uses firmly its South-South, East-West bargaining power, yet it has to do justice to both 
her majority Muslim electorate and Muslim solidarity, and to international trade relations. In order to manage 
Indonesia’s kaleidoscopic reality, the state is divided into a hierarchy of  administrational units. Seven new 
provinces were established after the downfall of the New Order Regime. Five of the provinces are given the 
status of special territories, the Capital City of Jakarta, the Exceptional Territory of Yogyakarta, and the Special 
Territories of Aceh, West-Papua, and Papua; Bali is currently striving to achieve special autonomy, which is 
much broader than the regional autonomy. 
 
According to the national conception (wawasan nusantara), the government has to do justice to religious 
minorities, whether Muslim or not, and to its Muslim majority electorate and Muslim solidarity. Since the 
proclamation  of  Independence  in  1945,  the  potential  hazards  of  Balkanization
40,  disintegration,  and 
destabilization  constitute  a  steady  menace  atteste d  in  regular  outbreaks  of  religion -related  violence 
throughout the archipelago. Because the fundamental task of the democratic government is to maintain 
territorial unity and multi-religiosity, while a threat of separation or balkanization seems to be ever  present, 
many voices are heard during decision-making processes. Also, recent events demonstrate how contemporarily 
several religious, secular and liberal schools of thought are represented and proactively engaged in democratic 
bargaining in the public sphere of Indonesian Islam and in Indonesian political and civil society. However, these 
events also show an Indonesian reality, where a faction of anti -liberals and anti-pluralists reacts with violent 
means. Thus, when we keep in mind the contested relationship between Islam and the West (after 9/11), while 
considering that Indonesia‘s government is under continuous pressure of being understood neither as anti-
Islam  nor  as  pro-Islam,  the  dealing  with  those  centrifugal  domestic  vested  interests  may  be  described  as 
balancing act. Indonesia’s striving for national unity, integration, security and stability is the crux of the matter 
in home affairs, as Indonesia muddles herself through improvisational and short termed solutions. The table on 
the next page shows the population of Indonesia by province.    
                                                 
40 Balkanization is a geo-political term originally used to describe the process of fragmentation or division of a region or state into smaller 
regions or states that are often hostile or non-cooperative with each other. It denotes to break up (as a region or group) into smaller and 
often hostile units, to divide or to compartmentalize.  Introduction | 24 
Province  Year 
1971  1980  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Indonesia  119,208,229  147,490,298  179,378,946  194,754,808  205,132,458  218,868,791 
Nanggroe Aceh  
Darussalam 
2,008,595  2,611,271  3,416,156  3,847,583  3,929,234  4,031,589 
Sumatera Utara  6,621,831  8,360,894  10,256,027  11,114,667  11,642,488  12,450,911 
Sumatera Barat  2,793,196  3,406,816  4,000,207  4,323,170  4,248,515  4,566,126 
Riau  1,641,545  2,168,535  3,303,976  3,900,534  3,907,763  4,579,219 
Jambi  1,006,084  1,445,994  2,020,568  2,369,959  2,407,166  2,635,968 
Sumatera Selatan  3,440,573  4,629,801  6,313,074  7,207,545  6,210,800  6,782,339 
Bengkulu  519,316  768,064  1,179,122  1,409,117  1,455,500  1,549,273 
Lampung  2,777,008  4,624,785  6,017,573  6,657,759  6,730,751  7,116,177 
Kep. Bangka Belitung  na  na  na  na  899,968  1,043,456 
Kepulauan Riau  na  na  na  na  1,040,207  1,274,848 
DKI Jakarta  4,579,303  6,503,449  8,259,266  9,112,652  8,361,079  8,860,381 
Jawa Barat  21,623,529  27,453,525  35,384,352  39,206,787  35,724,093  38,965,440 
Jawa Tengah  21,877,136  25,372,889  28,520,643  29,653,266  31,223,258  31,977,968 
DI Yogyakarta  2,489,360  2,750,813  2,913,054  2,916,779  3,121,045  3,343,651 
Jawa Timur  25,516,999  29,188,852  32,503,991  33,844,002  34,765,993  36,294,280 
Banten  na  na  na  na  8,098,277  9,028,816 
Bali  2,120,322  2,469,930  2,777,811  2,895,649  3,150,057  3,383,572 
Nusa Tenggara Barat  2,203,465  2,724,664  3,369,649  3,645,713  4,008,601  4,184,411 
Nusa Tenggara Timur  2,295,287  2,737,166  3,268,644  3,577,472  3,823,154  4,260,294 
Kalimantan Barat  2,019,936  2,486,068  3,229,153  3,635,730  4,016,353  4,052,345 
Kalimantan Tengah  701,936  954,353  1,396,486  1,627,453  1,855,473  1,914,900 
Kalimantan Selatan  1,699,105  2,064,649  2,597,572  2,893,477  2,984,026  3,281,993 
Kalimantan Timur  733,797  1,218,016  1,876,663  2,314,183  2,451,895  2,848,798 
Sulawesi Utara  1,718,543  2,115,384  2,478,119  2,649,093  2,000,872  2,128,780 
Sulawesi Tengah  913,662  1,289,635  1,711,327  1,938,071  2,175,993  2,294,841 
Sulawesi Selatan  5,180,576  6,062,212  6,981,646  7,558,368  7,159,170  7,509,704 
Sulawesi Tenggara  714,120  942,302  1,349,619  1,586,917  1,820,379  1,963,025 
Gorontalo  na  na  na  na  833,496  922,176 
Sulawesi Barat  na  na  na  na  891,618  969,429 
Maluku  1,089,565  1,411,006  1,857,790  2,086,516  1,166,300  1,251,539 
Maluku Utara  na  na  na  na  815,101  884,142 
Irian Jaya Barat  na  na  na  na  529,689  643,012 
Papua  923,440  1,173,875  1,648,708  1,942,627  1,684,144  1,875,388 
 
Including  non  permanent  residents  (homeless  people,  sailor,  boat  people  and  remote  area  communities) 
Source:  1971,  1980,  1990,  2000  Population  Census,  and  1995  and  2005  Intercensal  Population  Census 
(February 2009, http://demografi.bps.go.id; http://www.bps.go.id/) 
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Structure and organization of government 
The structure and organization of regional and local government follows the pattern of national government. 
On the national level, the President is the chief executive and works with a cabinet of ministers. In the four 
successive  sessions  deliberating  the  constitutional  amendments  between  1999  and  2002  the  People’s 
Consultative  Congress  (henceforth  MPR)  adopted  a  series  of  new  regulations.  The  MPR  was  the  supreme 
institution with unlimited power until 2001. In the revised Constitution (Chapter 1, 1) sovereignty is vested in 
the ‘hands of the people’ and shall only be exercised by the MPR. In 2002 the MPR’s power were limited to 
three, to determine the constitution, to compile the Broad Guidelines of State policy (Garis Besar Haluan 
Negara, henceforth  GBHN) and to formally  install the president-vice-president package
41 after their direct 
election and to dismiss that package.  
The  MPR  consists  of  the  members  of  the  Indonesian  Parliament  (People’s  Representative  Council,  Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the newly formed Regional Representative Council (DPD). As both the DPR and 
DPD will be fully elected, there will be no appointed members
42 of the MPR. Constituted as a second chamber 
in a semi-bicameral system, the DPD will shift the weight from the MPR away from Java to the Outer Islands. 
Each of the provinces is represented with the same number of representatives. In 2003 the freshly established 
Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) took over the power of juridical review from the MPR. (Crouch 
2003: 18-19) 
Similarly, the Governor is the chief executive in the province and works with a staff of regional officials. Side by 
side is the provincial legislative, with whom the regional government cooperates on regional legislation and 
decisions on the budget. On the regency (Kabupaten) and municipal (Kotamadya) levels, the chief executives 
are the regency head (Bupati) and the mayor (Walikota kodya). Here the regency head/mayor cooperates with 
the local legislative on matters relating to local government regulation and the budget
43. Both provincial and 
regency/municipality governments are granted autonomy. Like the President is the head of state, the governor 
is the head of the province and represents the central government in his or her region. Similarly, the regency 
head/mayor  is  the  head  of  the  regency/municipality  and  represents  the  governo r  in  his  or  her 
district/municipality
44.  
Below the regency/municipal level the administrative units are not autonomous: the regency administration 
(kecamatan)  and  the  sub-district  (kelurahan).  The  kecamatan  is  an  administrative  sub-division  of  the 
regency/municipality, headed by a district head (camat). The office is responsible for the administration of the 
district, social welfare, and economic affairs. The system of sub-districts (kelurahan) is similar to that of the 
district. The sub-district head is a lurah, who is assisted by a secretary and section heads. Both the district head 
and the lurah are civil servants appointed on merit by a district head on behalf of the governor.  
   
                                                 
41 In 2001, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) had decided that the president and the vice-president –as a package- should be 
elected directly in a nationwide presidential election. This was a consequence of the disgust felt by many at the money-politics that was 
believed influence the choices of the MPR. It is cheaper to buy half of the votes of the MPR members than those of half of the country’s 
registered voters in a direct election. This legislation provides a strong incentive to form firm alliances before the presidential election and 
thus lay the foundation for a more stable government. (Crouch 2003: 18-19) 
42  Until  199,  The  Indonesian  parliament,  the  House  of  People’s  Representatives  (Dewan  Perwakilan  Rakyat,  DPR)  consisted  of  500 
delegates, 400/415 of which were elected under a system of proportional representation every year. A further 100 seats are allocated to 
military representatives who are appointed on the recommendation of the armed forces. The rest of the delegates were appointed from 
ranks  of  the  armed  forces.  During  the  Suharto  regime,  the  armed  forces  had  a  dual  function  (dwifungsi)  first,  security  and  second, 
sociopolitical development (Tap MPRS No. II / 1960; UU No 2 Year 1988 §6), or in other words, the armed forces had the duty to protect 
the state from external aggression and internal subversion. The justification for the armed forces delegates is that since members of the 
military cannot take part in elections, their political rights as a sociopolitical and defense force were served through guaranteed DPR seats. 
The People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) was formally the highest authority of state; it has been the 
highest constitutional body, which met every five years in the year following the elections to the DPR. The principal legislative task of the 
MPR has been to sanction the Broad Outlines of State Policy, a document that establishes policy guidelines for the next five years to come, 
and to elect the President and Vice President. The MPR consisted of 1000 members, comprising the 500 members of the  legislative 
assembly DPR, and a further 500 members appointed by the government – of those seats, the armed forces had again a share of 100 seats. 
In April 1995, the military agreed to reduce this number to 75 effective 1997. In 2002 the dwifungsi was abolished, and there are no 
appointed members in the MPR. (Riesenhuber 2001: 136- 137; http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/84.htm, August 2011 )  
43 Regarding regional finance, the budget for regional administration and development is composed of the following revenue sources: 
Budget allocation from the central government to local governments, Central government grants to local governments, Taxes collected by 
local governments with the approval of the central government, corporate profits of local government enterprises; e.g. credits secured by 
local governments. 
44  Asianinfo.org. 2008: Politics in Indonesia, www.asianinfo.org (March 2008) Introduction | 26 
In  Bali,  villages  are  then  either  classified  into  traditional  (desa  pakraman)  or  administrative  (desa  dinas) 
villages. This distinction emerged during the years of the Dutch efforts to administrative the island. The head of 
a desa is elected by the village’s adult population. The elected candidate is then appointed by the bupati on 
behalf of the governor. In the office of the village head there is a secretary and several section heads. It is 
noteworthy that a Balinese village considered as a legal body in Indonesia, and has therefore the right to 
employ  village  security.  Below  the  village  level,  there  is  the  local  administrative  unit,  the  banjar,  the 
centerpiece of Balinese social order. The table shows the number of administrative units and their population 
number in 2005.  
No.  Provinces  Regencies  Mun.  District  Sub-district  Village  Total population  
1  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam  17  4  241  112  5.853  3.899.290 
2  Sumatra Utara  18  7  326  547  4.924  12.333.974 
3  Sumatra Barat  12  7  158  256  634  4.549.383 
4  Riau  9  2  124  190  1.236  4.546.591 
5  Jambi  9  1  76  117  1.072  2.698.667 
6  Sumatra Selatan  10  4  149  294  2.428  6.798.189 
7  Bengkulu  8  1  73  123  1.071  1.610.361 
8  Lampung  8  2  164  164  1.967  7.161.671 
9  Kepulauan Bangka Belitung  6  1  36  54  266  1.018.255 
10  Kepulauan Riau  4  2  41  105  144  1.198.526 
11  DKI Jakarta  1  5  44  267  0  9.111.651 
12  Jawa Barat  16  9  568  547  5.231  39.130.756 
13  Jawa Tengah  29  6  564  744  7.817  32.952.040 
14  DI Yogyakarta  4  1  78  47  391  3.279.701 
15  Jawa Timur  29  9  654  785  7.682  37.076.283 
16  Banten  4  2  130  144  1.340  9.127.923 
17  Bali  8  1  56  89  602  3.487.764 
18  Nusa Tenggara Barat  7  2  100  91  711  4.161.431 
19  Nusa Tenggara Timur  15  1  194  299  2.300  4.174.571 
20  Kalimantan Barat  10  2  149  80  1.409  4.078.246 
21  Kalimantan Tengah  13  1  93  133  1.179  1.902.454 
22  Kalimantan Selatan  11  2  119  121  1.835  3.245.705 
23  Kalimantan Timur  9  4  122  177  1.201  2.950.531 
24  Sulawesi Utara  6  3  105  253  984  2.159.787 
25  Sulawesi Tengah  9  1  99  133  1.369  2.324.025 
26  Sulawesi Selatan  20  3  244  606  1.964  7.475.882 
27  Sulawesi Tenggara  8  2  117  271  1.342  1.965.958 
28  Gorontalo  4  1  46  83  364  916.488 
29  Sulawesi Barat  5  0  44  47  312  966.535 
30  Maluku  7  1  57  32  842  1.330.676 
31  Maluku Utara  6  2  45  80  676  912.209 
32  Papua  19  1  173  81  2.506  1.841.548 
33  Papua Barat  8  1  74  41  1.154  566.563 
   Total  349  91  5.263  7.113  62.806  220.953.634 
 
Source: http://www.depdagri.go.id/; 2005 
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Bali: ‘Indomitable Gauls’ 
In 50 BC a village of indomitable Gauls, the last hold out against the Roman Empire, sharing mutual respect, 
harmony and understanding…. 
 
 
October 2008, www.asterix.co.nz/ 
 
April 2009, www.lonelyplanet.com 
The Bali land area is 5,632, 86 km² and the population density is 557 km
2. (For an overview see Bakker 1993, 
Pringle  2003)  The  following  shows  the  population  distribution  from  2002  to  2007  according  to  Balinese 
regencies. The data set on the religious demography of Bali from 1930 to 2008 is shown in the second table.  
 
BPS of Bali Province, BPS - Statistics of Bali Province, Bali in Figures 2008, (February 2009, http://bali.bps.go.id), 
Result of Population Registration, 2007, 2005, 2003, (February 2009, http://bali.bps.go.id) 
 
Year  BALI  Hindus  Islam  Buddha  Protestants  Catholics 
1930  1,111,000  1,000,000  -  -  -  - 
1971  2,120,322  1,978,000  -  -  -  - 
1995  2,895,649  2,631,210  275,100  16,037  10,258  11,957 
1999  2,960,966  2,734,912  170,930  16,879  22,294  15,951 
2000  2,998,770  2,752,131  180,401  21,287  24,652  20,299 
2001  3,063,031  2,823,273  183,977  21,550  22,294  24,306 
2005  3.572,965  3,296,155  204,436  21,826  25,290  25,258 
Suryadinata: 2003; www.bps.go.id; www.bali.bps.go.id; and www.depag.go.id (April 2004 and February 2009) 
   
Regency  / 
Municipality 
2002  2005  2007  Districts (2007)  Village 
(2007) 
Number  of 
Banjar (hamlet) 
01. Jembrana  222.243  224 990  264 865  4  51  249  
02. Tabanan  555.717  405 484  414 220  10  123  802  
03. Badung  581.913  374 377  377 480  6  62  536  
04. Gianyar  348.022  383 591  390 698  7  70  545  
05. Klungkung  177.343  170 744  175 430  4  59  244  
06. Bangli  190.666  211 186  212 496  4  70  343  
07.Karangasem  351.321  395 409  427 747  8  77  581  
08. Buleleng  556.851  618 076  643 274  9  148  604  
09. Denpasar  371.216  463 915  466 670  4  43  402  
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A feature of the cartoon series Asterix and Obelix is the magic potion brewed by the Druid Getafix which has 
thwarted the Roman conquest of the village in investing the villagers temporarily with invincible vigor. By 
implication, as long as Getafix stays alive, the indomitable Gauls had strength at their disposal that neither the 
Romans nor any other tribes were capable to defeat. The villagers have shared intricate disputes and were 
involved in complex internal rivalry of everyday village life, some of them even being traitors; nonetheless the 
villagers’ majority pushed aside these internal quarrels to stand united against invaders. In some respect, the 
Balinese remind  me of the indomitable Gaul’s village, as the traditional religio-cultural “core” of ancestor 
veneration  is  maintained  and  continued  throughout  the  ages.  This  megalithic  tradition  is  somewhat 
comparable the indomitable Gaul’s potion.  
Balinese lived religion as an encompassing, holistic way of life until a hundred years ago. As noted above, 
“religious belief” has been an entity separate from the rest of knowledge, and local rituals have not been 
conceptualized as components of a distinct and systematic domain. (Smith-Kipp 1987: 23) In any part of the 
world, contemporary ideas of political and personal liberty cannot be found in the pre-Enlightenment tradition 
and have taken their present form only relatively recently. (Sen 1997) In 1908, Dutch forces subjugated East 
Bali, it was the last territory in the then Netherlands India to be incorporated. Since then Balinese culture is 
undergoing  deep  (social)  changes  from  a  predominantly  primary  and  agrarian  culture  to  technical  and 
knowledge-based home industries. In adapting foreign ideas to their own culture the Balinese have shown 
unusual  logic  and  an  intelligent  power  of  assimilation  (Pringle  2004;  Covarrubias  1965)  or  acculturation 
(Sedyawati 2001).Balinese culture has proven to be very resilient against outside influences and illicit internal 
uproar, but this resilience decreases due to rapid social change related to modernization and globalization in 
the last 30 years. (Hitchcock/Dharmaputera 2005)  
 
During the last century, Bali underwent a dual transition from feudalism to capitalism and rule of law, and a 
rapid  and  drastic  social  and  economic  transition  from  an  agricultural  society  to  a  service  economy  and 
knowledge society. The Balinese became for the first time in their independent history involved in power 
relations largely beyond their control following the colonial occupation of their island from 1846 to 1908. 
(Picard, 2004: 57-9) From 1949 the Balinese kingdoms were incorporated into the Indonesian republic. In the 
1950s,  the  Ministry  of  Religious  Affairs  classified  the  orthoprax  Balinese  religious  traditions  (in  1938  the 
Balinese agreed to term the religious traditions Agama Hindu Bali) as belief system and not as a proper religion. 
This classification excluded the Balinese Hindu community from state-funding and guidance and they were 
made target of Christian and Muslim proselytizing efforts, but the community was also existentially threatened 
in the late 1960s when a person having no proper religion automatically was suspected to be a Communist, a 
dangerous accusation those days that could lead to imprisonment or death.  
In  consequence,  Hindu  policy  makers  re-invented  their  religion  to  meet  the  MORA’s  definition  of  a 
monotheistic creed. (Picard 2004: 57-9; Geertz 1973) Lasting from 1949 to 1963, the acknowledgement process 
of Indonesian Hindu Dharma was drawn-out and painful to  the Balinese and Indonesian Hindus and their 
efforts to label their orthopraxis were as much “conceptual as political”. (Picard 2004) During the Suharto 
regime (1966-1998) capitalism, developmentalism, and nationalism were propagated and naturalized into the 
Balinese citizenry through the vehicle of the national educational system. (Parker 2003) In the last decade, 
reform  and  democratization  led  to  regional  autonomy  and  the  decentralization  of  administration  and 
education. The traditional value-systems of religion, culture, and adat (custom and customary law) have to be 
broadened for taking up challenges of the modern society in which the traditional community participates. 
Therefore they had to broaden their conception and relate it with the Pancasila state’s constitutional and legal 
framework and with the international community of nation states. In this sense, Schulte-Nordholt (2007: 9) has 
stated “Religious arguments were instrumental in formulating a Balinese answer and mobilizing an alliance 
against unwanted outside intrusions”. Today, multiculturalism, pluralism, democracy, and human rights are the 
key themes in the contemporary Hindu education system. As to justify my personal sentiment expressed in the 
indomitable Gaul’s metaphor, in 2001 the working program of the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council (Parisada 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia,  PHDI), set itself the task  of formulating a bhakti (devotion or in the Indonesian 
context following the commands of God) and sraddha (faith in God) nurturing program of ‘I am proud to be a 
Hindu’ at the individual, family, and Hindu community level of all social and societal strata. The program shall 
help Hindus to perform their religious duties properly, to realize Hindu values, and to show and use their Hindu 
identity in everyday life without hesitation. It is interesting to note in this context that after the demise of the 
Suharto  regime  (1966-1998)  the  strictly  ritualistic  oriented  understanding  of  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia 
promoted by the Hindu Dharma Council finally extends into new domains as the social field (charity, gender, 
drug abuse etc) and environmental protection.  
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PART A 
2. Methodology 
This section outlines the methods and materials employed in this study. The subject of the study constitutes 
the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu education system in Bali. Three areas of 
inquiry were identified that translate into research questions, aims, and objectives: 1.) Pancasila as a model?; 
2.) Institutionalization process of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and the legal framework of religious education; and 
3.) a case study at four selected research sites in Bali and Jakarta. In this, the study focuses on specific aspects 
of how to organize teaching religion in Indonesia. As the legal framework provided the room to maneuver, in 
which the Balinese reinvented their tradition and operate politically, the study inquires into four basic fields of 
research:  
 
1.  the Indonesian concept of religion, freedom of religion and religious pluralism;  
2.  the formalization and institutionalization process of Hindu Dharma Indonesia;  
3.  the formal organization of  religious education in national educational policies, and  
4.  the emergence, organization and operation of the Hindu religious education system.  
 
In consequence, the subject positions the  study in the  academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area 
Studies. The method applied has been ethnography combined with an emic approach and an intrinsic case 
study. 
2.1. Ethnography 
As the present study inquires into impacts of the specific Indonesian cultural and political context on religious 
education and therefore focuses on the constitutional and legal framework of the Hindu class and the Hindu 
education system in Indonesia, a qualitative research approach was applied. (Heil 2003: 23) Ethnography is a 
qualitative method employed for collecting empirical data on human communities, societies, and cultures. 
Cultures, religions, and ethnicities are internally plural, and the symbols and values of their various constituent 
groups are open to negotiation, contest, and change. (Jackson, 2003: 11) The values and beliefs a religion as 
cultural system conveys will imprint themselves on each society and person, and influence the choices to be 
made. In consequence, ethnography aims to understand cultural phenomena, as for example, the material and 
spiritual culture of ethnic groups, which reflect emic systems of meanings represented in such culturally and 
ethnically defined groups.  
 
The ethnographer participates, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, 
watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions; in fact collecting whatever data are 
available to throw light on the issues with which he or she is concerned. (Hammersley/Atkinson 1983: 2, 
in Flick 2007: 53) 
 
Following Hammersley/Atkinson and Chou (2005), who  proposes a heuristic approach of data collection, I 
applied the method of data source triangulation within the ethnographic method (Denzin 1989 in Pickel 2009: 
518). This specific type of triangulation concerns “the comparison of data relating to the same phenomenon 
but deriving from different phases of fieldwork, different points of respondent validation, and accounts of 
different participants (including the ethnographer) involved in the setting.” (Hammersley/Atkinson 1983: 199, 
in Flick 2007: 52)  
 
In  consequence,  data  source  triangulation  refers  to  the  collection  of  data  relating  to  one  and  the  same 
phenomena under investigation at different points in time  (time axis includes a three-step  field  work), at 
different locations in space (five different socially and doctrinally embedded institutions in Bali and Jakarta, and 
by interviewing several experts following a predefined theoretical sampling. (Denzin 1989 in Pickel 2009: 518; 
Flick  2004,  2007;  Strauss/Corbin  1996)  In  consequence,  ethnographic  methods  are  characterized  by  the 
collection of relatively unstructured empirical materials, a small number of cases, a writing style and style of 
analysis that are primarily interpretive, involving descriptions of phenomena. (Atkinson/Hammersley 1994) 
Based on preexisting theoretical knowledge of the field, data collection is done through literature review, 
interviews, participant observation, and a questionnaire. PART A | 30 
In an intrinsic case study, the study is undertaken because the case, for example instances of phenomena, or 
social processes, itself is of interest in all its particularity and ordinariness. (Stake 1994: 236) In a single case 
study approach the researcher examines in detail a single case or instance or process of the phenomenon in 
question. With regard to the present study, to case selected was Hindu education in the Indonesian province of 
Bali. By employing an ethnographic methodology and doing an intrinsic case study, I hoped to be able to arrive 
at a comprehensive data set and preliminary theory about the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in 
Indonesia in general and Bali in particular. Thus the methods applied in the case study were chosen before and 
during the ethnographic fieldwork, to match with data gathered, or in other words, methods were subject to 
data. The emergent data set finally pointed to theories elaborated in Part B.  
 
In this, the present study aims to give a thick description (Geertz 1973) of second-order problems that is the 
social and legal context
45 (Heimbrock 2001; Heil 2003) of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in the 
province of Bali. In this, the primary focus was laid on the constitutional and legal framework as main unit of 
analysis, in which the Indonesian Hindu community lives and operates Hindu education, therefore the present 
study did not focus in detail on specific particulars of Balinese history of religion and culture, on which previous 
scholarship has already produced impressive works.  
2.1.1. Ethno-logic 
The culture-nature gap denotes the contrasting of culture with instinctual modes of thought and behavior that 
are not learned, but rather are genetically inherited. (Geertz 1973; Lohmann 2005: 2086-7) If two persons or 
people belong to the same culture, this means that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can 
express themselves, their thoughts, and feelings about the world, in ways which will be understood by each 
other, in the same cultural codes. (Hall 1997:4) Culture is said to appear as a sort of optical or perceptual 
illusion, although always a presence, it can best be seen, when thrown “into relief by the quality of difference”. 
(Avruch 1998: 58, emphasis in original; see Woodward 1997; Hall/Du Gay, 1996) 
When two participants or actors meet who have different models for interpreting and dealing with life-
problems and when their respective models are backed up in their eyes by some sort of special authority, 
authenticity, or feeling of rightness that may range all the way from (…) sacred morality to self-evident 
common sense, then we may begin to speak of cultural differences. (Avruch 1998. 59) 
 
The definition of culture typically implies a distinctive shared perspective or way of life ostensibly held by a 
sociologically defined group (e.g. religious communities, citizenry in a nation-state or ethnic groups). Culture 
becomes widely communicated and shared in social groups, and serves as a foundation for general agreement 
and common acceptance of certain principles and perceptions as valid, normal, and natural. Once cultural ideas 
are  widely  shared,  they  appear  to  acquire  an  added  aura  of  truthfulness,  supported  by  apparent  mutual 
confirmation and elaboration.  
 
In this way, the influences of culture are often masked and it is not automatically apparent that one’s own 
views and beliefs are not simply accurate apprehensions of reality, but are, in fact, artificial and, to a degree, 
arbitrary. As cultural systems place different interpretative lenses between actors and the world, scholars tend 
to automatically judge observed ways of life - insofar as the observed ways differ from his or her own - through 
their own cultural lenses in doing ethnographic research. Or, participants to other traditions or cultures tend to 
look upon their customs and beliefs using their own cultural assumptions, and they can misinterpret and judge 
both thought and action according to foreign standards. Consequently, cultural systems are a difficult subject 
to study, because habitual use makes the cultural lenses that one continually wears disappear from awareness, 
so that what is seen falsely seems to be objective truth. (Lohmann 2005: 2086) In consequence, humans are 
born into a specific cultural matrix, which means that the entire world already has a individually and socially 
distributed specific meaning, the cultural lenses, through which the new born persons will orient him/herself, 
interpret the world and will produce new meaning. New-born humans have to internalize the prevalent social 
and cultural representational systems in order to be able to participate in the world.    
                                                 
45 Context is a combination of time (duration from a specific point) and space (extension in area). Socio-cultural context is understood as a 
specific combination of time and place in which an individual or a community exists. Context decides how all the things perceived are 
interpreted. As long as the context of a phenomenon, a person, a community, a ritual, a book and a political idea remains unknown, it is 
not understood. (Leganger 2001: 58-59) The present study points to a similarity between the concept of context and the Balinese concept 
of desa-kala-patra as both concepts treat the spatio-temporal-situational setting explicitly as foundational to interpretation. The Balinese 
dictum explains diversity and variation of content and shape in terms of space (desa, village), period (kala), and situation (patra), as both 
concepts treat the spatio-temporal-situational setting explicitly as foundational to interpretation. PART A | 31 
For  if  two  actors  meet,  who  share  the  same  model  for  dealing  with  the  power  asymmetry  evident 
between them, then culture is invisible, part of and buried in the deepest, and in this case shared, context 
of their encounter. Of course a Harijan stands, when a Brahmin enters the room. It takes an outsider, on 
who does not share the same schema of millennium-old social and ritual hierarchy we gloss at “caste”, to 
literally see (Hindu) culture here. For Hindus, culture is invisible in this encounter because it is simply the 
way the world is. If the Harijan political activist refuses to stand (…), or if the Brahmin reformer gently 
urges him not to do so (…), then it is because either or both have imagined another, alternative world. 
(Avruch 1998: 58/59) 
 
Culturally  specific  praxis  or  ethno-praxis  describes  all  techniques  utilized  by  actors  on  their  own  will  and 
perceived as meaningful and possible and is linked to culturally specific logics, or “ethno-logics“ (Avruch 1998: 
92). All cultural systems define social structure and normative orders in that the members of cultural groups 
(but also the others) are located.Ethno groups are distinguished from other cultural systems through their 
recourse on and discourse of the fiction of common origin, constituted through language, tradition, religion, 
social praxis, and descent. As a result, ethnicityimplies some degree of identification with an ancestral tradition 
or a sense of shared ‘peoplehood’ (Dashefsky 1972, in Jackson 2003: 7), marked by some form of cultural 
continuity which distinguishes them from other groups around them. As systems of meanings, ethno-cultures 
are  generally  ambiguous  and  therefore  continuously  subject  to  negotiation,  interpretation,  re-definition, 
revitalization, and innovation. This dynamic perspective acknowledges - albeit maintaining the feature of a 
shared ancestry – internal variety within an ethnic group and the possibility of ethnic re-formation. Ethnic re-
formations occur if groups hitherto marginalized by more powerful groups rediscover and reinvent religious, 
cultural or ethnic signs and symbols or if groups “redefine themselves in response to influences or pressures 
from other social groups or institutions” (Jackson 2003: 7). This process was described for Bali as an internal 
conversion by Geertz (1973) and by Howell (1978; 1982). 
Ethnic  identity  is  not  a  fixed  property,  but  defined  contextually  depending  on  insiders’  and  outsiders’ 
ascriptions. ‘Insiders’ may also sometimes have an interest in presenting a closed view of their own ethnic 
group (Jackson 2003: 6). In consequence, ethnic boundaries are socially constructed and changes of these 
boundaries occur, if one group influences another either positively or negatively. Therefore ethno-cultures and 
faith-traditions are evolutionary developed behavior and social constructs, and therefore likewise an adaption 
to the natural surroundings and institutionalized interaction with the social environment. 
2.1.2. Emic approach 
Based on the actor-centered perspective, the emic strategy provides microscopic and context-specific in-depth 
analyses and thick descriptions of the object of study at a certain time, space and situation. By identifying, 
systematizing and utilizing native/indigenous categories, terms and propositions about the subject under study, 
the emic strategy deals with crucial ideas, conceptions and institutions plus patterns of meaning and social 
function inherent to that local culture. Emic approaches aim to acquire the meaning of the inter-culturally 
untranslatable. Only on that base abstraction, a process of inter translatability can proceed, because distilled, 
locally bound cultural categories are offered to comparison which are then used to generate a theory grounded 
in data. The ideal concern of the actor-centered (emic) approach is assumed to overcome ethnocentrism by 
which a scholar is influenced as a result of his or her cultural lenses through the pluralistic perspective, any 
judgment or cultural bias is withheld in an attempt to understand other ways of life according to its own 
perspective (Avruch 1998. 58-59; Lohmann 2005: 2089).  
 
The current study analyzed the emic categories of the Indonesian model of rights-based religious pluralism as 
expressed in the first principle of the state Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa (Principle of One Supreme Godhead), 
agama  (essentialist  definition  of  religion)  and  faith/belief  (kepercayaan)  in  order  to  describe  constant 
processes of intercultural exchanges about shared meanings and values within both Indonesian Hinduism and 
the Pancasila-State. I differentiate between the category of religion used in academic work, various religious 
traditions  and  practices,  and  the  term  agama  used  in  Indonesian  legislation,  national  rhetoric  and  daily 
language to denote what is understood as a ‘religion’ in Indonesia. However, different groups in Indonesia have 
different  interpretations  of  the  term,  but  the  term  still  connotes  a  shared  interpretation  pattern  of 
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2.1.3. The Study of Religion in Indonesia 
Following  Atkinson’s  approach  (1983:  685),  the  current  study  defined  religion  in  the  broadest  sense  as  a 
cultural  system  through  which  fundamental  problems  of  existence  are  expressed  and  managed
46  (Geertz 
1966).This definition of religion transcends the conventional distinction between world religions and traditional 
religions. With reference to his emphasis on symbols, Geertz defines religion as 1) a system of symbols which 
acts to 2) establish powerful, pervasive , and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by 3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and 4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that 5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1973: 90). Systems of symbols are models 
in his understanding– both models of and models for (Geertz 1973d:93). In this, systems of symbols act as 
models of reality and models for reality.  
Geertz regards religions as particular cultural solutions to universal problems of meaning. Since problems of 
meaning are experienced by cultural actors only in the context of social systems, religions as cultural systems 
are impressed by the institutional conditions of their construction. Basically, religions as cultural systems are to 
be understood as adaptation to the environment and as devices for survival and reproduction. “Each religious 
tradition has been influenced by cultural forces which rest in turn upon a complex of geographical, climatic, 
economic,  and  political  factors.”  (Hick  1992:  7)  The  present  study  analyzed  how  national  religious  and 
educational policies enable the establishment of state funded and private Hindu education system in Bali.  
Whereas Hick (1992) and Swami Sivananda (in Prothero 2010: 2) seem to agree that “The fundamentals or 
essentials of all religions are the same. There is difference only in the non-essentials”, Prothero holds to the 
contrary that “The world’s religious rivals do converge when it comes to ethics, but they diverge sharply on 
doctrine, ritual, mythology, experience, and law. Those differences may not matter to mystics or philosophers 
of  religion,  but  they  matter  to  ordinary  people”.  How  those  differences  played  out  in  the  Indonesian 
negotiation of religious pluralism and state funded religious education is exemplified in the current study. 
 
Something is a religion when it shares enough of this DNA to belong to the family of religions. What 
makes  the  members  of  this  family  different  and  (themselves)  is  how  they  mix  and  match  these 
dimensions. (Prothero 2010: 13) The world’s religious rivals are clearly related, but they are more like 
second cousins than identical twins. They do not teach the same doctrines. They do not perform the same 
rituals. And they do not share the same goals. (Prothero 2010: 13) 
Talal Asad (1993) identifies two key problems in the definition of religion: it must be universal, but it might not 
be too broad. Asad suggests that scholars determine what they mean by religion on a case-by-case basis. That 
is religion and religious traditions should be conceptualized as emic category to describe their particular belief 
system bound to its respective locally defined community of practice and social and cultural context in which 
religion is embedded. Thus, the concept of religion has to be properly formulated in order to observe the 
required (academic, legal, civic, political) purpose at hand. Consequently, the current study applies an emic 
(actor-centered) approach to analyze the particularity of the Indonesian fusion between state and religion. In 
order  to  operationalize  the  Geertzian  definition,  I  used  Prothero’s  (2010:  14)  four-part  approach  to  the 
religions. Each religion articulates: 
 
  A problem 
  A solution to this problem, which also serves as the religious goal; 
  A technique (or techniques) for moving from this problem to this solution 
  An exemplar (or exemplars) who chart this path from problem to solution 
   
                                                 
46 As the current study employed the anthropological definition of religion, in order to integrate the socio-biologist argument, religion 
should be interpreted by reference to biological (Boyer 2001, Atran 2004, 2008, Dow 2007) and cultural factors, since culture overlays 
biological substructures with meaning systems that are both motivating and to a certain degree arbitrary. The human capacity for religious 
thought and experience has its foundation in the human biological substructure, but it can only come to full expression with cultural inputs 
and processes as a social structure. Religions contain derivates of experience and systems of knowledge; in this they provide socially 
transmitted and inherited solutions to life problems (survival and reproduction) and specific ways of life. Despite scholarly differences, both 
proponents of the anthropological and the socio-biological definition agree in one central point: culture and religion are to be understood 
as adaptation to the environment and as devices for survival and reproduction. Survival and reproduction of groups are linked with their 
ability to transmit and to learn knowledge. In this light, culture, religion, and modern educational systems inherit a common basic feature, 
namely the human ability of adaptive environmental learning. If considered as environmental learning processes to secure survival, then 
culture, religion and education approximate and unify in their adaptation quality genuine to the human species. PART A | 33 
Thus, I applied Prothero’s approach to analyze and describe the basic tenets of Indonesian Hindu Dharma as 
outlined in the Upadeca (Hindu catechism). In Geertz’s (1973) analysis of religious rationalization in Bali, he 
places “Balinese religious creativity in a social context by exploring its economic and political dimensions.” 
(Atkinson 1983: 694) 
 
It is evident from his analysis that Balinese religion in the 1950s was taking shape through actors’ efforts 
to  grapple  not  so  much  with  ultimate  problems  of  existence  as  with  proximate  issues  of  cultural 
hegemony in the context of the Muslim-dominated Indonesian nation-state. The fact that their struggle 
was  constituted  in  religious  terms  has  cultural,  institutional,  and  historical  significance.  Just  as  the 
symbolic  dimensions  of  that  struggle  cannot  be  collapsed  to  its  social  ones,  so  too  institutional 
considerations are critical to the study of religious meaning in that case. (Atkinson 1983: 694) 
 
Thus  the  case  of  the  institutionalization  of  Indonesian  Hinduism  shows  how  a  culturally  defined  religious 
system owes its shape simultaneously to the cultural constructs and the institutional context in which it is 
embedded. (Atkinson 1983: 694; Tooker 1996) In addition, Atkinson points to the fact that the Balinese case 
suggests that “an inclusive definition of religion as a cultural system must not obscure the significance of 
religion as a historically grounded institution with profound implications for cultural formulations of religion”. 
(Atkinson 1983: 694) Balinese religion is neither a world religion nor an isolated traditional religion. It is a local 
cultural tradition in encounter with  world religious  systems.  The case of Indonesian  Hinduism shows how 
religious systems are influenced by wider social and cultural systems in which they are embedded. 
2.2. Data collection procedures 
2.2.1. Materials collected 
The procedures used to collect, record, and analyze data based on personal experience (Denzin/Lincoln 1994) 
and ethnography (Denzin/Lincoln 1994). Due to the assessed lack of academic literature outside Indonesia and 
the contemporary actuality of the research topic, the ethnographic research design necessitated in a in-depth 
intrinsic case study, as a suitable methodological procedure for data collecting and theory generation. Having 
identified the area of research, the phenomenon to be researched and propositional research questions during 
a  preliminary  fieldwork  in  August  2005,  I  conducted  a  three-step  fieldwork  in  Denpasar  and  Jakarta.  The 
preparatory  fieldwork was conducted in August 2006. The in depth-case study was  conducted in Bali and 
Jakarta between February 2007 and January 2008. In the end I conducted the final two-month fieldwork to 
member-check and evaluate the findings in March and April 2008. The following table summarizes a schematic 
overview of the research steps: 
 
Preparatory Field work   August 2006  Compilation  of  a  preliminary  manual  for  problem  focused  biographic  expert 
interviews which resulted in the selection of the research locations and a theoretical 
sampling defining the experts to be interviewed 
Extended Field work   February  2007  - 
January 2008 
Fieldwork  at  all  selected  research  locations,  expert  interviews,  participant 
observation,  data  collections,  data  analysis,  coding,  data  collection  (circular), 
continuous validation and evaluation in the field with the interviewed experts 
Evaluation   (March 2008)  Validation and evaluation of my findings with the interviewed experts 
 
After discovering the phenomenon of five state enacted religion classes, I inductively arranged my description 
of the emergence, institutionalization, and conception of the state funded Hindu class und education system 
through systematic data collection and analysis/evaluation. In consequence, the study compiles verbal and 
written data collection procedures to investigate into organizational mechanisms and state policies pertaining 
to the state funded Hindu class und education system. Data were gathered through textual analysis, participant 
observation, expert interviews, by studying written policies and documents related to the state funded Hindu 
class und education system, and by observing how those policies were carried out. Diverse materials were used 
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1.  Literature review: primary  sources (Indonesian laws and regulations as Basic Law, strategic plans, 
publications of state agencies, development plans, publications of the Ministry of National Education 
(Kementerian  Pendidikan  Nasional,  MONE),  publications  of  the  Ministry  of  Religious  Affairs 
(Kementerian  Agama,  MORA),  publications  of  Institutions  where  I  conducted  my  case  study,  eye 
witness accounts, other documents as newspapers, curricula; census, statistics and statistical data), 
secondary  sources  (technical  literature,  articles  in  newspapers,  books,  internet,  and  scholarly 
journals), and tertiary sources as dictionaries. 
2.  Expert interviews in Jakarta and Bali 
3.  Participation and field observation 
4.  Questionnaire 
 
Participant observation and expert interviewing were used as strategies to describe the technical knowledge 
and process knowledge of the Hindu expert group in order to generate a preliminary theory of the current 
state of Hindu education in the Indonesian province Bali. In a first step, I identified  key agencies and key 
experts operating in the field of Hindu education. The methodology of a predefined theoretical sampling was 
used to carry out individual interviews, yet the sample has been previously limited to include only professional 
experts  (executives,  lecturers,  teachers,  priests).  As  intended  in  the  open  and  circular  research  design, 
additional questions appeared during the research process and to answer those questions, more experts from 
the selected institutions were selected to be interviewed on particular questions and issues. The individual 
expert  interviews  were  combined  with  participant  observation.  Related  to  that,  I  regularly  participated  in 
workshops on Hindu religious education held by the Directorate General of Hindu Affairs at the MORA aiming 
to brief and educate officials, teachers, and docents on the latest developments of educational reform and 
didactical innovation. The following list gives an overview of the workshops I was invited to:  
 
1.  Workshop “Orientation on compiling Hindu Tertiary Education’s syllabus”, (Orientasi Penyusunan Silabus 
Perguruan  Tinggi  Agama  Hindu),  held  by  The  Directorate  General  on  the  Guidance  of  Hindu 
Congregation, MORA at Inna Hotel, Denpasar 15-18.05.2007 
2.  Workshop  “Orientation  on  Internal  brotherhood  of  Hindu  communities  in  Indonesia”  (Orientasi 
Kerukunan Intern Umat Beragama Hindu), held by The Directorate General on the Guidance of Hindu 
Congregation, MORA at Inna Shindu Beach, Sanur 23-25.05.2007 
3.  National Seminar: “Hinduism in Modern Indonesia”, keynote speaker Dr. M. Ramstedt, held by the World 
Hindu Youth Organization, Mahendradatta University, Denpasar 03.06.2007 
4.  Workshop “Orientation on Workforce Evaluation of Hindu Tertiary Education in the Academic Field” 
(Orientasi Evaluasi Kinerja Perguruan Tinggi Agama Hindu di Bidang Akademik), held by The Directorate 
General on the Guidance of Hindu Congregation, MORA at Inna Shindu Beach, Sanur 04-06.06.2007 
5.  National Seminar: “Pluralism and India”. Keynote speaker Mrs Navrekha Sharma, Ambassador of India to 
Indonesia, held at the Indonesian Hindu University, Denpasar, Bali 07.08.2007 
6.  National  Seminar:  Multiculturalism,  Religion,  and  Ethnicity,  held  at  the  Indonesian  Hindu  University, 
Denpasar, Bali, 10.08.2007 
7.  National Seminar “Comprehension and Application of the Curriculum based on the level of educational 
units  enhances  the  learning  process  quality”  (Pemahaman  dan  penerapan  kurikulum  tingkat  satuan 
pendidikan  meningkatkan  kualitas  pembelajaran),  Indonesian  Hindu  University,  Denpasar,  Bali 
12.09.2007 
8.  Yearly assembly of the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council (Pesamuhan Agung Parisada Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia  Tahun  2007),  held  by  the  Indonesian  Hindu  Dharma  Council  at  Inna  Hotel  in  Denpasar, 
Commission on Education 03-04.11.2007 
9.  National Seminar “Social Philosophy in recent context: Study of the increase of societies social illnesses in 
Bali” (Filsafat Sosial dalam konteks kekinian, kajian terhadap maraknya penyakait social masyarakat), 
State Hindu Dharma Institute, Denpasar, 16.11.2007 
10. Monthly Assembly of Hindu Teachers (Musyawarah Guru Mata Pelajaran Agama), SMA 4, Denpasar, 
22.11.2007 
 
Finally,  I  distributed  five-page  questionnaires  to  fifteen  officials,  religious  experts,  university  docents,  and 
teachers containing 35 questions on Hindu religion and religious education, in which the respondents had to fill 
in short answers. The questionnaire was designed to analyze the opinions on the main tenets and basic beliefs 
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In portraying the process of emergence and institutionalization of contemporary Indonesian Hindu Dharma and 
Hindu  education,  the  textual  and  historical  approach  uses  primary  technical  (laws,  statutes,  statistics, 
development plans, curricula, and textbooks) and non-technical literature from Indonesia, the UN as well as 
secondary  literature  from  the  disciplines  of  religious  and  area  studies.  Textual  documents  were  obtained 
through either research in libraries (Frankfurt, Hamburg and Leiden), investigated online (Internet) or in the 
awkward  process  of  gathering  small  pieces  of  information  at  the  research  sites  in  Indonesia  during  the 
prolonged  field  work.  The  introduction  of  Hindu  religious  education  in  public  schools  and  universities  is 
portrayed by using monographs, articles, and collections of statutes and annals of the Dwijendra foundation 
and  both  universities.  The  conception  of  Hindu  religious  education  is  described  relying  on  data  of  the 
Directorate for the Guidance of the Hindu congregation at the Ministry of Religion and the Balinese Regional 
Office of Religion. 
2.2.2. Sampling 
As the current study employed data sources triangulation, data were collected at different points in time, 
locations in space, and by interviewing several experts following a predefined theoretical sampling. As every 
researcher gets into the field and processes of data collection and interpretation with preexisting ideas and 
conceptions  of  the  problem  (Strauss  1987;  Strauss/Corbin  1996;  Flick  2003;Glaser/Strauss  2005),  I  had 
developed a preliminary manual for problem-focused but open-ended interviews for this purpose in 2006. In 
the first step, I conducted three problem-centered biographic interviews in August 2006 and one interview in 
March 2007. Two modern, secular educated Hindu experts who have considerable influence on the course of 
Hindu  education,  and  two  traditional  Brahmins  who  after  turbulent  biographies  became  professional  high 
priests were interviewed.  
 
Those interviews were recorded, transcribed, and textual units were thematically paraphrased irrespective of 
the sequentiality of statements made by the interviewee during the interview (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009). 
Thereby I gained a first understanding of the field, which provided the background for the selection of the 
samples of the case, the emergent theoretical sampling, and the consecutive steps of emic conceptualization 
and theoretical generalization. (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009) The following tables gives an overview of the first 
four problem-focused biographic interviews used as a starting point to develop guiding codes and categories on 
the Hindu class and Hindu education before going to the next interview or field observation. The following 
table gives a schematic overview of the problem-centered biographic interviews.  
 
 
Thus, two interviews were conducted with professional high priests, Ida Pedanda Gede Putra Bajing; Geriyah 
Tegal Jinga, Denpasar, a former village head and known for his diplomatic and political skillfulness, and Prof 
med.  Ida  Pedanda  Gede  Putra  Telabah,  Denpasar,  who  studied  in  India,  worked  as  medical  doctor  and 
Professor and currently teaches Hindu theology at the Hindu University. He is known for his reasonable nature 
and interest in metaphysics and yoga. The second interview I conducted with I Gede Sura, former rector of the 
Dwijendra Foundation and former Rector of State Hindu Dharma Institute, who is regarded by most experts as 
a “silent” authority in the matters pertaining to the Hindu class. He and a group of teachers are also the 
architects of the curricula of the informal Hindu Sunday Schools. Lastly, I interviewed Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gede 
Yudha Triguna, Director General of Hindu Affairs in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and President of the 
Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar. During this important interview, however, my voice recorder did not 
function and the interview has not been recorded. Fortunately, I experienced such a devastating malfunction 
only twice during the whole course of field periods in Indonesia (2006-2008).  
   
Name  Position  Interview   Location 
Ida  Pedanda  Gede 
Telabah 
Professional High-Priest 
 
26.08.2006 
(58min)  
In the priestly family compound 
I Gede Sura  Retired, active docent  
 
26.08. 2006 
(84min) 
in  his  house,  at  his  open  air  office  in 
front of his library 
Ida Pedanda Bajing  Professional High-Priest  29.08.2006 
(58min) 
Member check: 07.03.2007 
 
In the priestly family compound  
Prof. Dr. Ida Bagus 
Gede  Yudha 
Triguna 
Director General of Guidance for the 
Hindu Congregation in  the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, and President of 
the Hindu University in Denpasar 
15.04. 2007 
Protocol  (voice  recorder 
did not function) 
At the office in Jakarta PART A | 36 
Remarkably, questioned why they chose to work on the religion or education sector, all interviewees referred 
to the central role of their fathers influencing their personal choice of profession. As I was interested in the 
legal context of religious education, and the technical knowledge and process knowledge of the experts, I did 
not analyze those interview parts that revealed great parts of personal motivation and interest, because they 
were less relevant for a description of the institutional context of the Hindu class. However, the personal 
motivations of those actors certainly constitute an interesting field of future research. 
 
With this first step I identified  key agencies involved in the field of Hindu education, in other words, the 
analysis of the first three interviews defined the not representative sample to be studied. Those key agencies 
were  three  research  sites  in  Bali’s  municipality  Denpasar:  the  Dwijendra  Foundation  (Yayasan  Dwijendra, 
hereafter YD), the Indonesian Hindu University (Universitas Hindu Indonesia, hereafter UNHI) and the State 
Hindu Dharma Institute (Institute Hindu Dharma Negeri, hereafter IHDN) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 
Jakarta. YD and UNHI are institutions operated by a private foundation, which is responsible to the Ministry of 
Education, whereas IHDN is state-run und therefore under the authority of the Ministry of Religion. In addition, 
I  inquired  into  the  activities  of  the  representational  bodies  of  Indonesian  Hindu  Dharma  related  to  the 
organization of HRE, that is on the one hand the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta and its regional branch in Bali as 
national decision-maker in the organization of HRE and on the other hand the Indonesian Hindu Council as 
highest civic representative body of Indonesian Hindu Dharma. 
Logically, the next step was to allocate experts within those institutions. Consequently, the selection of experts 
to be interviewed within the predefined sample was guided by theoretical sampling, as further experts were 
interviewed following a chain approach – if specific information was needed, the respective expert who had 
the  knowledge,  the  documents  or  the  competences  to  provide  the  information  and  insight,  was  located, 
contacted, and interviewed, often on base of the recommendation of another expert. A critical sample was 
included. The following list provides a schematic overview of the research sample: 
 
1.  Key  institutions:  Directorate  General  of  Guidance  of  the  Hindu  Congregation  at  the  MORA,  the 
Indonesian Hindu Council, Dwijendra Foundation, State Institute of Hindu Dharma, Indonesian Hindu 
University  
2.  Key agents/Experts: 1.) Representatives of systematization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, compilation 
and implementation of the Hindu class curricula; 2.) Teachers and lecturers as professionals of the 
Hindu  class  and  Hindu  education  at  schools  and  universities;  3.)  Executives  and  officials  as 
representatives of governmental agencies; 4.) Professional high priests 
 
After the theoretical sampling has been defined, I compiled a manual for problem-focused but open-ended 
interviews during the preparatory fieldwork in 2006, which constitutes the base of my empirical research. In 
general, the manual contained six broad areas of investigation  
 
1.)  agama (religion) 
2.)  Hindu class and Hindu education system  
3.)  Hindu curriculum  
4.)  monotheism  
5.)  personal experience 
6.)  the future of the Hindu class and Hindu education system  
 
To  each  of  these  broad  areas,  I  added  a  selection  of  detailed  questions  which  I  posed  selectively  paying 
attention to the expert’s respective area of expertise.  Experts were interviewed because  they represent a 
specific profession or have specific knowledge at their command which they collected through experience in 
their working area. Contrary to other interview and coding techniques, not the persons or their subjective 
motivations, but the technical knowledge and the process knowledge of the experts constituted the primary 
focus  of  analysis  (Bogner  2005;  Meuser/Nagel  2005,  2009).  Thus,  the  focus  of  analysis  was  laid  on  their 
technical  knowledge  and  the  process  knowledge  which  enabled  me  to  reconstruct  conceptions  of  causal 
relations between national legislation and Hindu implementation of those legislations. Subsequent table gives 
an overview of the expert interviews and the type of data obtained. 
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  Name  Sex/ 
Age 
Position, Expert-Area   Period and type of data gathered 
1  Ida  Bagus  
Dosther 
Male 
76 
Retired  
Freedom  Fighter  of  the  1945 
generation,  founding  member  of  the 
Hindu  Council,  former  politician  and 
lawyer  (District  Head  of  Jembrana 
District) 
Documents,  
Interview 15.07.2007 at the Publishing House of the Hindu 
Council with Ida Bagus Djelantik 
 
2  Ida Bagus Gede 
Wiana  
Male 
51 
Chairman of Dwijendra foundation  Documents,  questionnaire,  participant  observation,  two 
informal interviews 2006-2008 
Interview 29 07 2010 
At his office at the Dwijendra Foundation with his wife 
3  I  Nyoman 
Sukerda  
Male 
52 
Head  of  Dwijendra  Junior  Secondary 
High School  
Informal interview, Protocol 18.11.2007 
At his office at the Dwijendra Foundation NOV/DEC 2007 
4  Ni Ketut Sarwi  Fe-male 
45 
Hindu teacher at Dwijendra elementary 
school 
Participant observation in class at Dwijendra elementary 
school,  informal  interviews,  documents,  textbooks, 
Questionnaire  
NOV/DEC 2007 
5  Ny  Gusti  Ayu 
Kartika  
 
Fe-male 
44 
Hindu  teacher  Dwijendra  Senior 
Secondary High School 
documents,  textbooks,  informal  interviews,  protocol, 
questionnaire, participant observation in religion class and 
teacher assembly 
NOV/DEC 2007, 
6  I  Gede  Agus 
Jaya Negara  
Male 
26 
Hindu  teacher  Dwijendra  Senior 
Secondary High School 
documents,  textbooks,  informal  interviewing,  protocol, 
questionnaire, participant observation in religion class  
NOV/DEC 2007 
7  I  Gede  Rudia 
Adiputra  
Male 
42 
Rector at State Hindu Dharma Institute, 
worked at the MORA in Jakarta 
Interview 16.08.2006; 18.12.2007 
Documents,  questionnaire,  participant  observation, 
informal interviews 
At his office at the State Hindu Dharma Institute 
8  Prof Dr I Made 
Titib 
Male 
56 
Dean  of  Brahma  Widya  (theological 
faculty) at State Hindu Dharma Institute  
Studied Hindu theology in India, former 
PHDI representative 
Interview 03.12.2007; 18.12.2007 
Documents, Protocol, Participant observation at his office 
at the State Hindu Dharma Institute 
9  Dr  I  Ketut 
Widnya 
Male 
43 
Head  of  the  IHDN  Master  Studies 
program  
Studied Hindu theology in India, former 
PHDI representative 
Questionnaire, Informal interviewing 2007-2008  
10  Dr I Ketut Tanu  Male 41  Head of Master Studies in Pedagogy of 
Religion  at  State  Hindu  Dharma 
Institute 
Interview  27.11.2007  at  his  office  at  the  State  Hindu 
Dharma Institute, documents, questionnaire 
11  I  Made 
Girinatha 
Male 
41 
Head of Dharma Duta (Teacher training) 
faculty State Hindu Dharma Institute 
Interview  3.12.2007  at  his  office  at  the  State  Hindu 
Dharma Institute, questionnaire 
12  I Made Suweta  -  Assistant I to the Dean of Dharma Duta 
faculty State Hindu Dharma Institute 
Questionnaire 
 
13  Prof  Dr  IB  Gd 
Yudha Triguna 
Jakarta/Bali 
Male 
50 
General  Director  for  the  Guidance  of 
the  Hindu  Congregation,  MORA; 
President  of  Indonesian  Hindu 
University  
1998-2009,  Documents,  questionnaire,  participant 
observations  at  MORA,  Indoensian  Hindu  University 
several informal interviewing during lunch and at campus, 
participant observation 
14  Prof  Dr 
Cokorda  Rai 
Sudharta 
Male 
68 
Head of the Master Study program at 
Indonesian Hindu University 
Interview  18.07.2008  in  his  office  at  Indonesian  Hindu 
University 
15  I  Wayan 
Sukayasa 
Male  
46 
Dean  of  the  Faculty  of  Pedagogy  of 
Religion  
Indonesian Hindu University 
Interview:07.12  2007  in  his  office  at  Indonesian  Hindu 
University 
16  I  Wayan  Budi 
Utama MA 
Male 
49 
Lecturer at Indonesian Hindu University  Documents, informal interviewing, discussions at campus 
UNHI 
17  I Made Sujana   Male 
54 
Director  of  Religious  Education  at  the 
Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta 
 
Interview 26.04.2007; 14.05.2007 (protocol): 07.09.2007, 
Documents, participant observation, questionnaire, in his 
office at MORA and workshops 
18  I Ketut Lancar  
 
Male 
57 
Sub-director  of  Management  at  the 
Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta 
13.05.200, Protocol in his office at MORA and workshops 
19  I Made Santika  
 
Male 
42 
Head  of  the  Curricular  section  at  the 
Directorate  of  Religious  Education  at 
the  Hindu  Directorate  at  at  MORA, 
Jakarta 
Interview: 22. 04. 2007; 13.05.2007, 05.09.2007 
Documents,  participant  observation,  informal 
interviewing,  discussions,  questionnaire,  in  his  office  at 
MORA and workshops 
20  I Made Suma  Male 
44 
 
Planning office at the Hindu Directorate 
at MORA, Jakarta 
Interview:17.03.2008 in his office at MORA and workshops PART A | 38 
21  I  Made 
Sutresna MA 
Male  
44 
Planning office at the Hindu Directorate 
at MORA, Jakarta 
Interview:  17.03.2008  in  his  office  at  MORA  and 
workshops 
22  I  Putu 
Suhartana 
Male 
37 
Official in the Information section at the 
Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta 
questionnaire 
23  I  Gusti  Ketut 
Suka Yasa 
Male 
52 
Head of the Regional Office of Religion 
in Bali (former Head of the Hindu affairs 
section at MORA, Jakarta) 
Questionnaire, Informal interviewing during workshops 
24  I  Nyoman 
Suwastika MA 
Male 
47 
Head of the Hindu pedagogy section at 
the Regional Office of Religion in Bali 
Interview: 17. 12. 2007 
 
25  Dr. Belen  
 
Male/ 
54 
Ministry of Education Jakarta  Interview 10.12.2007, during a workshop held by MORA, 
in his hotel room 
36  Prof Dr Ny Luh 
Suryani 
Female 
57 
Psychatrist   Protocol 26.07.2006 
 
37  Prof  Dr 
Phalgunadi 
Male 
60 
Lecturer at UNHI  
Indian  scholarship,  studied  Hindu 
theology in India 
2005 Protocol, Informal interviewing 
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2.2.3. Data analysis 
The present study employed the 6-step-data-analysis strategy of Meuser and Nagel (2005: 83-90; 2009: 476-
477). All interviews were conducted in Indonesian language with individual experts, not with focus groups. In 
the data set all 18 questionnaires and interviews are included. The interviews have a duration time between 45 
and 2 hours. The first step of data analysis is transcription. Whereas Meuser and Nagel propose a partial 
transcription only of important passages within the interview, the interviews have been transcribed fully by Ny 
Putu  Dharma  Sri.  Breaks  in  speech,  and  non-verbal  elements  of  communication  were  not  included  in the 
transcription. The interviews were conducted and transcribed in Indonesian, but paraphrasing and coding was 
done in English. Quotations have been translated into English. Paraphrasing constitutes the second step of 
analysis during which I described the technical knowledge or process knowledge of the expert in my own 
words. Thereby I ordered the interview transcript sequentially into thematic units. The process of paraphrasing 
followed the sequentiality of the interview. The paraphrasing process aims to exclude emotional and subjective 
contents  of  the  interview,  in  order  to  filter  out  the  technical  and  process  knowledge  and  reduce  the 
information to factual knowledge relevant to reconstruct the conceptions of causal relations between national 
legislation and implementation of those legislations within the Hindu congregation. 
The  third  step  is  coding  of  one  particular  interview.  Coding  refers  to  a  grouping  of  the  paraphrases  I 
constructed out of one particular interview under certain headings which comprise thematically the contents 
contained in the paraphrases. In other  words,  coding refers to a concise summarizing of the paraphrases 
constructed in one interview under one or more headings/codes in order to achieve increased theoretical 
sensibility and theoretical saturation of the data material pertaining to the Hindu class. This type of coding 
provided  me  with  a  summarizing  account  of  the  legal  framework,  factual  information  provided  by  the 
interviewees  and  related  conceptual  frameworks  and  terms  used  by  the  experts  or  applied  in  legislation, 
operation  and  institutionalization  of  the  Hindu  class.  During  coding,  the  sequentiality  of  the  interview 
paraphrases is eliminated because not the individual experts but their knowledge constitutes the focus of 
analysis. During this process in-vivo codes (Strauss/Corbin 1996) emerged. In vivo-codes denote the terms the 
experts used themselves during interviewing or terms which are applied in legislation.  
The forth step constitutes thematic comparison between the codes constructed in the process of coding the 
individual interviews. Therefore, thematic comparison is similar to the process of data analysis during the 
coding process of individual interviews, but it transcends this process, as thematic comparison groups together 
the codes of the individual interviews and the particular headings are unified. Thus, thematic comparison 
constitutes the first step of abstraction from the data material. During thematic comparisons the data set 
increasingly becomes more dense and saturated, but particular information may be lost or neglected, therefore 
I paid special attention to the headings constructed and evaluated those codes continuously in the field during 
member checks. During this step, I remained close to the factual information provided in the interviews and 
the in-vivo codes. 
The fifth step refers to a conceptualizing of the constructed codes and in-vivo codes and a conceptualization of 
those  codes  while  recurring  to  my  own  theoretical  knowledge  of  the  field  and  existing  studies.  The 
development  of  theoretic  conceptualizations  helps  to  generate  a  preliminary  theory  of  the  field,  but  its 
generalization  capacity  remains  restricted  to  the  empirical  data  set  and  the  specific  research  area  under 
investigation.  (Strauss  1998)  The  sixth  step  refers  to  theoretical  generalization  –  the  empirical  data  set 
constructed out of literature, legal documents, interviews, the questionnaire, and participant observation is 
related to existing theories and is formulated as a preliminary theory of the Hindu class and Hindu education in 
Indonesia.  
2.2.4. Role of researcher 
After addressing more specifically the techniques employed, it is relevant to examine the role of the researcher 
in ethnographic research and conducting interviews. (Bogner/Menz 2005: 47-63) As basic elements of field 
work, Fontana/Frey (1994: 366-368) enlist following criteria: 1.) understanding the language, 2.) access and 
entry  to  the  field,  3.)  deciding  how  to  present  oneself,  4.)  locating  an  informant,  5.)  gaining  trust  and 
establishing rapport. In this section I discuss in how far enlisted criteria were met. 
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As minimum requirement, Chou (2006) has recommended, for becoming a researcher on Indonesia, one must 
necessarily include a good mastery of bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian vernacular, and an extended period of 
residence among the people themselves. “Intimate knowledge of a people and of a place cannot be gained 
otherwise”. (Chou, 2006: 133) “It is on the basis of such intimate knowledge that meaningful comparison, 
conceptual innovation, and theoretical sophistication can ultimately be made”. (Chou 2006: 133) Observers 
who place themselves in the same situations as their subjects will gain a deeper existential understanding of 
the world as the members see and feel it. (Adler/Adler 1994: 386) In this sense, empathy is the skill to share 
and  understand  emotions  of  other  human  beings  by  experiencing  what  the  other  person  is  feeling  in 
ethnographic research.  
 
Strauss and Corbin (1985) pointed to the necessity of theoretical sensitivity in qualitative research. Theoretical 
sensitivity is a personal quality of a scholar, who is well grounded in the technical literature as well as from 
professional and personal  experience  in the research area, and this sensitivity is also acquired during the 
research  process  through  continual  collection  and  analyses  of  data.  As  a  sworn  translator  of  Indonesian 
language having graduated in Southeast Asian studies and having long-term field experience, I brought the 
necessary  command  of  language,  theoretical  sensitivity,  and  empathy  and  did  not  encounter  problems  of 
translation, neither linguistically or inter-culturally. 
 
I agree with Martin Ramstedt (1998: 3), who observes that the prolonged process of enculturation imposed on 
the child and the outsider to Balinese culture appears to serve as an effective protective mechanism of their 
cultural capital. In addition, he observes a modern mode or style of the traditional ajawera
47 in the Balinese 
elite, who seems to equate cultural knowledge with power. Ramstedt is right insofar that “insider” Balinese 
often face difficulties to share socio-religious knowledge with “outsiders” on a mutual and profitless basis. This 
abyss between Jaba (outsider, peasant) and Jero (insider, clergy and royalty) among the academia seems to be 
legitimized  by  tradition,  but  also  by  the  continuous  exploitation  of  Balinese  culture  and  religion  by 
international,  national  and  local  elites  and  scholars  to  attract  foreign  investment,  tourists  and  enhance 
expenditures.  
 
Fortunately, I discovered in the previous periods of field work in Bali, that there are four keys to obtain more or 
less free access to Balinese sources, textual or experts: 1.) mastery of Balinese language, especially the polite 
language level, 2.) common religious practice, in other words, being Hindu or being able to practice Balinese 
Hinduism, 3.) possessing a fair amount of intercultural competencies and social capital plus humor in order to 
display refined proper conduct acceptable to Balinese,  - especially in the context of expert interviewing – 
having mastery of technical terms and professional knowledge (Bogner/Menz 2005: 62-63) and 4.) the will to 
barter knowledge and information (“Informationshandel”; Bogner/Menz 2005: 62-63). I failed to fulfill the first 
condition, but I consider myself to have fulfilled all subsequent requirements. As I seem able to swap between 
a Western and an Indonesian identity, this ability gained me access into the corridors of religious power in 
Jakarta and Bali, as well as into the homes of Balinese nobility and commoners. At the same time, in order not 
to  “go  native”;  I  remained  an  outsider  retaining  a  degree  of  skepticism  and  criticism  in  keeping  balance 
between the emic and the etic perspective. (Flick 2003; Pickel 2009) 
 
The access to informants is usually somewhat difficult, even impossible in certain cases, because religion is 
considered to be a hot and sensitive topic in Indonesia, as the following two quotations shall demonstrate,  
 
It  is  not  that  religion  is  a  new  topic  for  academic  reflection  in  Southeast  Asian  universities,  but  the 
widespread view that it is currently a ‘hot’ topic.(Robinson: 2008, 148)  
 
Indonesia’s Religious Affairs Ministry declined to make the official who is qualified to respond on church 
permits available for an interview. In general, Jakarta prefers not to comment on the sensitive subject of 
religion. (Tom Wright: 2008
48) 
     
                                                 
47 In the socio-cultural perspective, ajawera denotes the traditional monopolization of textual sources in Bali by ‘twice born’ Hindus. 
(Hinzeler 1993) 
48 Wright, 2008, Improbable Houses of Worship, (Nov 2008, http://online.wsj.com) PART A | 41 
From the onset with relevance to access and entry to the field, I could rely on a secure academic network in 
Bali and Jakarta because I had previously studied and done field work in Bali (1998-2006). With Prof Dr Yudha 
Triguna acting as supervisor an excellent access to the officials in the Ministry of Religious Affairs is given, only 
at the beginning I encountered minor problems not worth mentioning in gathering data, when not all experts 
were acquainted with me. As I spent one month at the backroom of Prof Yudha Triguna’s office in the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, I gained access to the Ministry’s corridors and book cases. The study thus was heavily 
supported by officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who provided innumerous valuable data and invited 
me to participate in several workshops, without these data this study would not have been possible to conduct. 
When I was invited to participate in six orientation workshops held by the Ministry of Religion, I had immediate 
access to all actors in the field.  
 
During one workshop I arrived late, when I entered the meeting room, Prof Yudha Triguna already delivered his 
opening address. Silently I sat down, took my field notebook and a pen, while paying immediate attention to 
Prof Yudha Triguna’s address. Immediately all eyes focused on me, a white politely dressed Caucasian women, 
a stray tourist probably? Reacting to the confusion, he interrupted, and pointed at me while saying: “This lady 
is from Germany, she is my PhD student, and she works on the Hindu class. I guess, some of you might already 
know her; there is no need to be suspicious, she is no spy, no journalist, and no subversive element. I advise 
you all, if she has questions, to cooperate and to answer these questions.” Thus, after I had been introduced as 
co-expert from another culture of knowledge (Bogner/Menz 2005: 63), and after attaining several two-day 
orientation  workshops,  the  Balinese  experts  became  acquainted  with  me,  and  information  was  easily 
accessible  and  shared.  In  consequence,  following  my  introduction  as  a  co-expert  from  another  culture  of 
knowledge, I was not longer perceived as a lay person or even a potential critic (Bogner/Menz 2005) and trust 
and rapport were established.  
 
During the long term fieldwork, all of the persons I interacted with welcomed me heartily after they had 
recognized  me  as  co-expert  from  Europe  (Bogner/Menz  2005:  43-63).  The  participants  were  open  and 
comforting and seemed just to wait to tell their knowledge and to share information, as it was the case at all 
institutions. Since I could thus rely on a secure academic network in Bali and Jakarta, all participants agreed to 
cooperate and were therefore easily recruited but often also informally met on the campus, or appointments 
were made and then I conducted the interview. Or I contacted experts by phone and conducted the interviews 
at the educational institutes. 
 
This paragraph gives an example of the interaction between me and my interviewees. Having just arrived at the 
MORA in Jakarta in April 2007, I was very just eager to grasp some new information or pieces of the Hindu class 
puzzle. The secretary of Prof Yudha Triguna guided my way through the Directorate toward the Section of the 
Hindu  Education.  Requested  to  sit  down  in  an  office,  I  waited  for  the  Head  of  the  Section,  Mr  Sujana. 
Immediately I spotted an overloaded book case and as there was nothing to do except waiting, I explored 
curiously into its contents. Usually, such overloaded book cases in Indonesian offices and Ministries are an 
ambiguous case as they contain dusty old information material, but more than seldom recently printed books. 
In consequence, I was surprised that this very book case contained a few very valuable books for my study 
which I borrowed, jubilant having found valuable information. After waiting half an hour, I was told that the 
Head of the Section would be busy today and be back only tomorrow. Therefore I borrowed the books without 
permission and let them being copied in the evening. The next day, I walked back to the office to interview Mr 
Sujana. After the interview I remembered the borrowed books and informed Mr Sujana that I am going to 
return them in the next day. Mr Sujana became a bit nervous asking which books I borrowed and when. So I 
told him about yesterday’s event. Then he informed me that this would be his private well managed book case 
and he would feel unhappy if the collection would be reduced. Of course I promised to return his books in 
immaculate shape the next morning, admitting having over reacted out of mere eagerness. This time Mr Sujana 
was bright and since then ever friendly, attentive and supporting. 
 
Besides problems of translation, access, and entry, my status asfemale foreignerneeds to be addressed. Age, 
sex, and all other attributes of a person determine the ambit of the researcher’s access into the object of 
investigation. I need to mention that most of the interviewees were male and above 40 years old. This bias is 
not  due  to  my  preference  for  male  respondents,  but  because  1.)  women  are  underrepresented  in  the 
bureaucratic and religious education sector  and 2.) I did not pay attention to gender balance in the study. 
Hence, a slight gendered flaw and bias might be represented in the data. 
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In  general,  if  my  expert  sample  understood  that  I  am  not  only  entrusted  with  a  research  permit  and 
considerable conceptual knowledge plus appreciate their academic expertise and consider it to be exemplarily, 
they soon “warmed up” because they seemed to feel comforted by the way I presented myself. In locating an 
informant, I had to ask the experts in detail, - or in other words I had to knew in advance, what expertise and 
what expert knowledge they must have, and what where the critical issues within their expertise. Then I had to 
ask specifically whether I did understand a particular fact properly, whether this is the crux of the matter or 
not, for example, how is funding organized? Mostly in this situation the expert would explain a fact most likely 
uncritically. 
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3. Terms and definitions 
The applied concept of religion as cultural system shall demonstrate the social particularity of the Pancasila-
state and its practice of negotiating and constructing national culture. As culture, the academic category of 
religion,  and  several  different  religious  traditions  are  social  phenomena,  which  are  socially  constructed 
(Scheifinger 2009: 3) That is, the meanings attributed to both the category of religion and to various religions 
are  not  fixed,  and  instead  are  constantly  negotiated.  This  is  particularly  important  because  the  constant 
renegotiation of meanings is especially the case within both Hinduism and the Pancasila-State, because of their 
particular diversity.  
 
In  the  United  States,  religion  matters.  (…)  Faith  remains  so  vibrant,  in  fact,  that  any  attempt  to 
understand the nation without understanding its believers is bound to fail. If you want to know what 
moves America, you need to know what moves Americans. And here a prime mover is God in many 
guises, religion in its many manifestations. (Prothero 2006: 1) 
 
This observation certainly holds true for Indonesia, as the present study hopes to demonstrate, and therefore, 
the ethnographic method necessitates an emic approach. To understand how Balinese ideas about religion as a 
solution to life problems (Prothero 2010) have been formulated in response to national religious principles 
(civil religion and public Islam), it is necessary to look at Indonesian civil religion and public Islam itself as the 
outcome  of  a  series  of  intercultural  exchanges.  This  point  is  demonstrated  here  by  an  examination  of 
implementing state funded religious education among the Hindu community in Bali, Indonesia. As has been 
demonstrated, Indonesia can serve as example for the continuing negotiation of values and meaning. 
3.1. The study of religion as cultural system 
What counts as religion remains a fundamental question, because religions hold enormous potential for peace 
and reconciliation, but they are concomitantly a source of tremendous conflict and tension, thereby exhibiting 
a “Janus face” (Casanova 1994: 4). The complexity and difficulty of defining religion are illustrated by vivid 
debates of academics in philosophy and religion. For the purpose of the present study, religion is understood as 
cultural system. Overlaying biological substructures, religion as cultural system is socially constructed according 
to human needs in discursive processes in a particular historical context. The values and beliefs a religion 
conveys will imprint themselves on each society via the channels of cultural transmission and socialization.“A 
religion is a complex of human activity, involving many elements. These elements are sometimes listed as 
(McCann 2006: 917)  
 
1. Creed: what religious people believe 
2. Cult: how religious people worship 
3. Code: how religious people live 
4. Community: how religious people associate with each other 
5. Consciousness: how religious people experience life 
6. Culture: How religious people express human, civic, and social identity 
 
McCann (2006: 917) states “Different world religions lay special emphasis on one or other of these elements, 
though not generally to the exclusion of others”.  
3.1.1. Definition of Culture 
The anthropological definition of culture refers to the universal human capacity to order and communicate 
experiences materially and symbolically. Geertz (1973: 89) provides a classical definition of culture: 
 
[A]n historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed  in  symbolic  forms  by  means  of  which  men  communicate,  perpetuate,  and  develop  their 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life.  
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The current study uses the term culture to describe shared meanings of a sociologically defined group and puts 
emphasis on process and practices. These shared meanings organize and regulate social practices, influence 
conduct and consequently have real-practical effects, since concerns about meaning typify human behavior far 
back into prehistory and therefore meaning is related to values. According to the social-constructionist and 
pragmatic definition
49, in its most basic sense culture is the shared experience and value system of a group, the 
aspect of thought and behavior that is learned and capable of being taught to others. Values as evaluative 
standards represent stable, long lasting beliefs that help to structure behavior (Mariappanadar 2005: 31-48). 
 
Cultures consists of the derivatives of experience,  more or less organized, learned or created by the 
individuals of a population, including images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) 
transmitted from past generations to contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves. (Theodore 
Schwartz 1992: 324; in Avruch 1998: 17) 
 
Schwartz’ pragmatist definition connects culture to experience – to interpreted social action and to practice. 
The definition addresses the structure, agency, and interaction question by noting that individuals not only 
inherit and learn these images from the past and from contemporaries, but are able to create new images by 
themselves (Avruch 1998: 17) and share them with others, thereby changing the images. The ability to learn 
and to socially transmit information and knowledge has been described as a non-genetic survival strategy for 
groups  or  societies  (Clifford  Geertz  1973;  Norris  and  Inglehard:  2003).  In  fact,  cultural  practices  may  be 
interpreted as culturally predefined systems of representation that enable to coordinate activities. Avruch 
(1998; Lohmann 2005: 2087) have identified five inadequate ideas about culture, which are enlisted in the left 
column, the right column shows the working definition employed.  
 
Five inadequate ideas  Working-definition 
culture  is  holistic,  homogenous, 
coherent  
Culture  is  adaptive,  fragmented,  contextual,  and  subject  to 
change, the notion of subcultures is needed 
culture is a thing  Culture is a process and a set of practices  
culture  is  uniformly  distributed  among 
members of a group 
Culture  is  socially  unevenly  distributed  and  never  perfectly 
shared by individuals in a population (socio-genetic and psycho-
genetic) 
an individual possesses a single culture  Culture  is  psychologically  unevenly  distributed.  Individuals 
participate in several sub-cultures. 
culture  is  a  custom,  functionally 
integrated  and  structurally 
undifferentiated  
Culture is functionally in a constant state of flux, integration and 
disintegration, structurally flexible and responsive 
culture is timeless, or ahistoric  Culture is historic and contextual  
 
Avruch (1998) distincts between generic and local culture: Generic culture refers to “universal attributes of 
human  behavior  -  to  human  nature;  it  denotes  a  species-specific  attribute  of  Homo  Sapiens,  an  adaptive 
feature of human beings for at least a million years”. (Avruch 1998: 10; emphasis in original) Generic culture 
provides for and generates the base of local culture; whereas local cultural matrixes are highly specific. Local 
culture  refers  to  complex  systems  of  particular  meanings  (representational  systems)  created,  shared, 
experienced, and socially inherited by individuals in particular social groups. As a result, local cultures provide 
different solutions to life problems and consequently produce distinct social practices, thereby deferring to 
diversity,  difference,  and  particularity.  The  present  work  interprets  local  cultures  as  socially  transmitted 
solutions to life problems, which are situational, flexible, and responsive to the ever-changing environments.  
 
Culture
50 is involved in all those practices which are not simply genetically programmed into us but which carry 
meaning and value for us, which need to be meaningfully interpreted by others, or which depend on meaning 
for their effective operation. Meanings regulate and organize cultural conduct and practices  – they help to set 
rules, norms, and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed.    
                                                 
49 The semantic dimension deals with mere meaning and the syntactic dimension with word order and consequences for meaning, hence 
the  pragmatic  dimensions  of  language  usage  deals  with  the  way  a  word  is  actually  used  in  certain  speech  contexts.  The  Internet 
Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  defines  pragmatism  as  a  ‘philosophical  movement  that  includes  those  who  claim  that  an  ideology  or 
proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, 
and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected’. (http://www.iep.utm.edu/; August.2008) 
50  The subsequent paragraphs draw from Geertz 1973; Wagner/Hayes 2005; Hall 1997: 1 -37; Avruch: 1998; Lohmann 2005: 2086 , 
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The  focus  on  shared  meanings  and  interpretation  patterns  does  not  imply  a  unitary  system  of  meaning, 
because in any culture always exists a great diversity of meanings about any topic, and more than one way of 
interpreting or representing it. Meanings (representational systems) are never objective, but are always the 
result of the instantaneous and creative relation between a person and their environment. Hence, culture is 
socially constructed and representational systems are cultural and subject to negotiation and change. 
 
The pragmatic approach does not focus on one specific set of practices, instead it tries to grasp how learned 
representations and values transform into actions and competences, necessary to participate in today’s world. 
Because things in themselves do not have one single, fixed and unchanging meaning, culture depends on its 
individual members, who give meaning to things, people, objects and events. They  interpret the world in 
broadly  similar  ways;  they  constantly  produce  and  exchange  meaning  in  every  personal  and  social 
interaction.Culture  is  therefore  a  process,  a  set  of  practices  and  interpretational  patterns.  Consequently, 
culture is seen as simultaneously located outside (sociologically) and inside individuals (psychologically). In 
emphasizing  the  concept  of  experience  in  understanding  human  existence,  the  pragmatist  perspective 
understands  culture  as  derivative  of  experience  and  as  social  practice.  Systems  of  representations  are 
differentially internalized by individuals; thus culture is psychologically and socially unevenly distributed within 
a population, no matter how this population is sociologically defined.  
Cultures  and  sub  cultures  mould  thevaluesof  the  individuals  and  groups  and  those  values  influence  the 
individual’s and group’s perceptions and decisions. Hence a change in the material or economic environment 
causes a process in which mental representations are negotiated resulting in an adjustment of meaning, values 
and social order and social institutions. As a result, as mere cognitive structures, representational systems are 
linked through culture’s causal force with the interaction of the actors, with their social practices, because the 
content  of  representations  motivates  actors  to  act,  thus  the  socially  and  culturally  embedded  systems  of 
representation are psychologically motivational. That is to say that culture is rooted deeply in ongoing or past 
social practice, and the more deeply representations are internalized and affectively loaded, the more they are 
able to motivate action that is culture is causal. (Avruch, 1998: 19)  
 
Cultures are subject to change, because they are located in a certain context (time and space) and at a specific 
point  in history.  Accordingly,  Avruch  has  conceptualized  culture  not  as  a  single  unchanging  homogeneous 
complex, but as consisting of many subcultures
51, to change or redefine subcultures means to change culture’s 
meta-reference frame or the reverse. Culture includes sets of practices (customs, traditions) and worldviews 
that provide a mental model (representations) of reality and a guide for appropriate and moral action. The 
system of representation –as derivative of experience - is closely tied up with both identity and knowledge. 
Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as 
produced  in  specific  historical  and  institutional  sites  by  specific  enunciative  strategies.  (Hall,  1996:  4) 
Representational systems and discourses produce identities, of whom we are and with whom we ‘belong’ – so 
it is tied up with the question of how culture is used to mark out and maintain identitywithin and difference 
between groups. (Hall, 1997: 3) 
 
In general two possible perspectives on identity can be discriminated: the essentialist and non-essentialist. 
(Woodward 1996: 11) Essentialist definition of identity would suggest that there is one clear authentic set of 
characteristics which all Indonesians or Balinese share and which do not alter across time. A non-essentialist 
definition focuses on differences, as well as common or shared characteristics between two socially defined 
groups. The non-essentialist claims postulates that identities are fluid, having different elements which can be 
reconstructed in new cultural conditions (Woodward, 1996: 26). The concept of identity I deploy here is a non-
essentialist, ‘a strategic and positional one’ (Hall, 1996: 3), as identities are assumed to be contextual and 
contested.  
   
                                                 
51 Thus, no population can be adequately characterized as a single culture or by a single cultural descriptor. (…) (T)he more complexly 
organized a population is on sociological grounds, the more complex its cultural mappings appear. This is why the notion of subculture(s) is 
needed. (…) Insofar as two individuals do not share the same sociological location in a given population (the same class, religious, regional 
or ethnic background), and insofar as these locations entail (sub) cultural differences, then the two individuals cannot share all cultural 
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The concept of identity is relational, and difference is established by symbolic marking in relation to others. 
Identity is also maintained through social and material conditions (Woodward, 1996: 12; emphasis in original). 
The social and symbolic refer to two different processes but each is necessary for the marking and maintaining 
of  identities.  Identity  politics  constitute  one  dimension  of  the  discursive  process  in  constructing  social 
(religious, ethnic, cultural, national) identities. The celebration of the group’s uniqueness, which is the basis of 
its political solidarity, can be translated into essentialist claims. There are different ways of understanding 
uniqueness: it may involve appeals to biologically given features of identity; to history and kinship. (Woodward 
1996: 24)  
Representational systems are cultural in consequence. If the relationship between a signifier and a signified is 
the result of a system of social convention specific to each society and to specific historical moments – then all 
representational systems are produced within history and culture. They can never be finally fixed but are 
always subject to change, both from one cultural context and from one period to another. Instead of having a 
distinct and fixed cultural identity, individuals, and groups identify with elements of culture, or synthesize new 
culture through bringing different elements together (Jackson, 2003: 10). The internalization of representation 
systems  in  societies,  subgroups,  and  individuals  varies.  The  individual  may  participate  in  several  cultural 
systems  and  subcultures,  expressed  in  certain  groups,  and  respective  concepts  and  ideas  hold  may  be 
contradictory  or  irreconcilable.  This  allows  for  the  individual  cultural  distance  to  use  cultural  patterns  on 
purpose. 
 
Although allowing a wide variation of interpretations, these representational systems are not totally arbitrary, 
because they need to enable practical interactions with the surrounding context. That is to say, as a result 
culture is adaptive. Yet, all adaptation to reality is induced by human needs. (Wagner/Hayes, 2005: 66, quoting 
Wygotski, 1971: 46) Because generic and local culture are connected through this adaptation mechanism, the 
adaptive quality of culture enables humans to adapt to always changing environments and transports socially 
inherited and tested solutions to life’s issues. Then there is no universal logic as basic solution, but context-
related logic, a fluid and fuzzy logicof culture (Avruch 1998:36; Wagner/Hayes, 2005: 73; Nesbitt 2006: 389).  
 
The  present  study  conceptualizes  culture  as  underlying  cognitive  and  social  reference  system  providing 
interpretation patterns for the majority of a given social group. A precondition for these interpretation patterns 
to function is their compatibility amongst the members of a social group. Only if there is expected reciprocal 
predictability of acts among members of a group, the social group shares a common predictable interpretation 
pattern. Therefore, all members of the socio-cultural group under investigation including members of minority, 
sub-cultural or alternative cultural systems need to equally recognize, accept, and understand the specific 
predominant interpretational pattern represented. Only under the condition of such compatibility, defined as 
expected reciprocal predictability of acts among the members of a social group, such interpretation patterns 
provide the motivation or need for action and likewise the proper understanding of such actions. 
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3.1.2. The quest for a definition of religion 
The complexity and the difficulty of defining religion and belief are illustrated by 1.) scholarly debates, and, at a 
more pragmatic level, 2.) problems in the definition of religion in either constitutions that regulate the relation 
between religion and state, or for legal purposes, and 3.) the ongoing history of the protection of freedom of 
religion in the context of international human rights
52. With regard to legal purposes, the UN proposes a broad 
understanding of religion including naturalistic worldviews indicating “no legal definition of religion has yet 
garnered a consensus” (Gunn 2003: 191, 193) and “no convincing general theory of religion exists” (Gunn 2003: 
193). Religion or belief  is  said to encompass “theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs”, as the Covenant 
reassures unequivocally the right not to profess any religion or belief. Therefore Jeremy Gunn has indicated a 
difficulty in the term’s usage for legal purposes.  
The  question  what  is  religion  has  been  endlessly  discussed,  those  debates  show  how  both  the  category 
‘religion’ and faith traditions are socially constructed. (Scheifinger 2009: 3) As culture, the academic category of 
religion and several different religious traditions are conceptualized here as social phenomena
53. Following 
Nesbitt (2006: 389), I use the term religion and faith interchangeably, but since they do not exactly share the 
same meaning, I employ the terms ‘faith traditions’ and ‘religious tradition’ to suggest a less “bounded and 
reified” property them the term ‘religion’ commonly denotes. An interpretation of religion must explain the 
plurality of historical channels of thought and imagination formed by religio-cultural traditions. (Hick 1992: 2) 
“*T+here is no consensus, perhaps there will never be, as to what counts as religion”. (Casanova 1994: 26). 
 
Hick  (1992:  5)  suggests  that  “religion  takes  such  widely  different  forms  and  is  interpreted  in  such  widely 
different ways that it cannot be adequately defined but only described”. According to Talal Asad, it is thus 
required for scholars to determine what they mean by religion on a case-by-case basis. “There cannot be a 
universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically 
specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes” (Asad 1993: 29). 
Thus, Asad (1993) proposes a description of religion on a case-to-case basis and not a universal definition. The 
present study conceptualizes religion as cultural system providing solutions to life problems. (Geertz 1973; 
Prothero 2010) 
 
The modern concept of religion is a European, North American, and particularly a Protestant
54 attempt to 
negotiate diversity (Alles 2005: 7703), since modern Western thinking derives its conceptions of the category 
‘religion’ and ‘religious traditions’ mainly from the European post-Enlightenment tradition (Jackson, 2003: 8; 
Bowen, 2005: 25-6; Alles, 2005: 7703). The concept was used to delineate groups within Christianity and to 
classify  and  encompass  what  were  perceived  to  be  equivalent  phenomena  in  non-Christian  cultures 
encountered by the West in the colonial period (Jackson, 2003: 8).  
 
By the eighteenth century, treatises on religions of the world began to appear, thereby introducing the concept 
of religious pluralism. Consequently, “(t)he plural “religions” is possible only when one thinks of religion as a 
cultural system rather than a person one” (Bowen, 2005: 26). “(T)he processes of defining ‘other’ religions 
reflected  the  unequal  power  relationship  between  indigenous  peoples  and  European  colonialist  writers”. 
(Jackson, 2003: 8) During the nineteenth century, “the term ‘religion’ also changed to include the history of 
‘religions’, and most of the modern names for religions were coined”. (Jackson, 2003: 8). 
 
The emergence of the idea of religion as a distinct sphere of life having a universal essence (universal core of 
religion) heralded the beginning of the reification of religion (Jackson, 2003: 8; Alles, 2005: 7703; Bowen, 2005: 
25-6). Both concepts of a ‘religion’ and ‘generic religion’ were held to embody an essence (Jackson, 2003: 8). 
This  essentialist  view  of  religion  was  perpetuated  in  the  phenomenology  of  religion.  Thus  a  methodology 
emerged for identifying and classifying ‘essences’ in particular religions and in religion generally. (Jackson, 
2003: 8). The phenomenology of religion had a great influence on the development of comparative religion and 
religious studies in higher education (Jackson, 2003: 8).  
                                                 
52 There was one major international effort to explain the underlying rights protected under the concept of religion: The 1981 Declaration 
on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Intolerance  and  of  Discrimination  Based  on  Religion  or  Belief.  In  addition  the  UN  Human  Rights 
Committee issued General Comment No. 22 on article 18 on the scope of freedom of religion and belief within the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights in 1993 
53 For an excellent overview of the genesis of the term religio n and the institutionalization of the study of religion in  a global perspective 
see Alles (ed.). 2008. Religious Studies. A global View. London and New York: Routledge 
54 In the eighteenth century the Protestant reformist idea of  religio as personal piety was largely displaced by a concept of religion as 
systematic, intellectual and ‘exterior’, in which religions were regarded as belief systems. (Smith 1978, in Jackson 2003: 8) The idea of 
religion as a system of beliefs, as opposed to personal piety, did not take hold until the seventeenth century. (Bowen 2005: 25-6) PART A | 48 
The phenomenology of religion paved the way for the study of religion to enter the broader field of research in 
the humanities and social sciences (Strausberg 2008). By the late 1930s, the term world ‘religions’ was being 
used occasionally, and more widely in the 1950s, to denote distinct major religions with a stable set of key 
concepts  and  beliefs  (Jackson,  2003:  8).  In  the  1960s,  there  are  theories  of  “modern”  religions:  which 
specifically modern forms religion may take in the modern world. (Casanova 1994: 26) “Modern” religions refer 
to religions that are not only traditional survivals or residues from a pre-modern past but rather specifically 
products of modernity.  
Jeremy  Gunn  (2003:  193)points  to  two  important  aspects  of  definitions  of  religion.  The  first  involves 
assumptions about the underlying nature of religion (what is being defined). The second aspect involves the 
type of definition that is to be used (how the term is defined). Gunn has identified two principle theories about 
assumptions  about  the  underlying  nature  of  religion.  The  first  is  a  religious  definition  that  acknowledges 
religion  in  its  metaphysical  or  theological  sense:  the  truth  of  existence  of  God,  the  dharma,  and  so  on. 
Naturalistic  definitions  by  contrast,  interpret  religion  as  1.)  it  is  psychologically  experienced  by  people 
(psychological,  cognitive,  and  socio-biological  approaches),  2.)  a  cultural  or  social  force  (sociological  and 
anthropological approaches), or 3.) delusionary (atheist approach). 
 
In addition, Gunn (2003: 194) identifies two important types of definition: monothetical and polythetic. The 
monothetical  or  essentialist  definition  identifies  the  elements  necessary  for  an  observable  behavior  to  be 
designated as a religion. Here the Sacred (Hick 1987; Hick 1992; Alles 2005) and its classifiers dominate the 
debate. The classic Frazerian definition of religion “religion consists of two elements … a belief in powers higher 
than man and an attempt to propitiate or please them” (Sir James G. Frazer 1922: 58 in Stark/Bainbridge 1985: 
5),  or  Spiro’s  definition  of  “religion  as  an  institution  consisting  of  culturally  postulated  interactions  with 
culturally postulated superhuman beings” (M. Spiro, 1966: 66 in Alles, 2005 7703) may serve as examples for 
essential definitions.  
 
The traditional approach has been to treat these constituent parts monothetically: that is, to consider all of 
them as necessary and, when taken together, sufficient to define  religion (Alles, 2005: 7703). Whenever a 
definition is essentialist, it assumes that religion has one or more specific elements in common with all other 
religions.  In  this  context  the  evident  plurality  of  religious  traditions  imposes  problems  of  extending  the 
properties onto specific religious traditions. Thus, any definition of religion is challenged by the problem of 
extension, responding to the question if certain forms of Buddhism, Confucianism or certain ideologies have to 
be included or excluded into the definition. Thus, there might be no essential definition of religion.  
 
In  sum,  for  more  than  a  century,  scholars  have  searched  for  the  essence  of  religion.  “Today  it  is  widely 
accepted that there is no one essence that all religions share. What they share are family resemblances  – 
tendencies toward this belief or that behavior.” (Prothero 2010: 12-13) Philosopher of religion Ninian Smart 
(1996 in Prothero 2010: 13) has referred to these tendencies as the seven “dimensions” of religion: the ritual, 
narrative, experiential, institutional, ethical, doctrinal, and material dimensions. Only the cultural and religious 
dimension of social action might explain why, in response to what appears to be a similar event, people in one 
setting feel their interests threatened while those in another do not. 
 
The  second  type  of  definition,  the  polythetic  does  not  require  that  all  religions  have  specific  elements  in 
common. (Gunn, 2003: 194) Although scholars occasionally define religion in terms of a single property, they 
more often conceive of it in terms of an explicit or  implicit conjunction of properties. (Alles, 2005: 7703) 
Wittgenstein had directed scholarly attention to the possibility of conceiving of religion polythetically rather 
than monothetically
55. Hick has posited ‘there are no characteristics that every member (of the family or the 
cluster) must have, nevertheless there are characteristics distributed sporadically and in varying degrees which 
together distinguish this form from a different family’. (Hick 1992: 4) Polythetic definitions see no particular 
property as necessary to religion and consider the presence of a collection of properties selected from a master 
set as sufficient to make a specific item a member of the class called religion (Alles: 2005, 7703-4). For example, 
William Alston (1967: 141–142, in Alles 2005: 7703-4), has suggested that the presence of an unspecified 
number of any of the following characteristics would make a set of cultural practices a religion: 
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1)  Belief in supernatural beings (gods). 
2)  A distinction between sacred and profane objects. 
3)  Ritual acts focused on sacred objects. 
4)  A moral code believed to be sanctioned by the gods. 
5)  Characteristically religious feelings. 
6)  Prayer and other forms of communication with gods. 
7)  A worldview or a general picture of the world as a whole and the place of the individual therein. 
8)  A more or less total organization ofone’s life based on the world view 
9)  A social group bound together by the above  
 
It may, however, be too simple to see religion as merely a European and North American construct (Alles 2005: 
7703). People in many parts of the globe, not just in Europe and North America, have long recognized different 
religious traditions as belonging to the same broader class, even if they did not explicitly conceptualize that 
class as religion (Alles 2005: 7703).Hence, religion is a local category that scholars, along with others, have 
applied beyond the bounds of its origins. Alles concludes that it may not be reasonable to expect the kind of 
universally acceptable classifications in the study of religions that one finds in a natural science like biology. In 
any case, a consideration of history can only raise questions about the adequacy of a category like religion. It 
cannot answer them. The adequacy of a concept depends upon whether it can be properly formulated and 
whether it serves the purposes at hand. (Alles 2005: 7703) 
Jeremy Gunn opines “(w)hile academics have the luxury of debating whether the term “religion” is hopelessly 
ambiguous, judges and lawyers often do not”. (Gunn 2003: 191, emphasis in original). Thus, on the one hand, 
there exist “important provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights pertaining to “religion”, but on the other 
hand the term itself is left undefined”. (Gunn 2003: 191). As a result, misunderstandings about how to define 
religion and what religion actually is, translate into international and national legal practice, while judges and 
lawyers  “appear  to  have  made  assumptions  about  the  meaning  of  “religion”  on  the  basis  of  their  own 
experiences”.  (Gunn  2003:  192).  But  “judicial  decisions  about  what  constitutes  religion  make  a  very  real 
difference in the lives of persons” (Gunn 2003: 191), the importance of a serious treatment of religion in 
politics and law is obvious, as “Asylum-case ad-judicators, (…) may be called upon to decide whether there is a 
“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of . . . religion” regardless of whether the 1951 Refugee 
Convention offers a definition”. (Gunn 2003: 192, emphasis in original).  
 
By considering which properties a religion requires to be defined as religion (as the belief in the supernatural 
for instance) no understanding of religious freedom in the legal and political context is attained. Thus, legal 
definitions of religion, Gunn remarks, generally appear in the complicating contexts of either (1) protecting 
freedom of religion, or (2) prohibiting discrimination (or persecution) of religion. Other situations where state 
officials (including judges, administrators, and legislators) are called upon to determine whether something is 
religious  include  most  notably  3.)  whether  an  entity  is  a  religion  or  religious  association  for  purposes  of 
granting legal personality, obtaining tax benefits, or limiting the personal liability of the organizers; 4.) whether 
someone has religious beliefs for the purpose of obtaining conscientious objector status; and 5.) whether 
someone should be exempted from a law of general applicability on the grounds of religious belief
56. These 
situations extend to the legal regulation of religious education in public schools. 
Legal definitions do not simply describe the phenomenon of religion, they establish rules for regulating 
social and legal relations among people who themselves may have sharply different attitudes about what 
religion is and which manifestations of it are entitled to protection. Legal definitions, as a result, may 
contain  serious  deficiencies,  when  they  (perhaps  unintentionally)  incorporate  particular  social  and 
cultural  attitudes  towards  (preferred)  religions,  or  when  they  fail  to  account  for  social  and  cultural 
attitudes against (disfavored) religions. (Gunn 2003: 195) 
Legal definitions of religion have significant deficiencies as they have to establish international or national 
standards  for  regulating  the  relation  between  religious  communities
57.  Gunn  clear ly  shows  an  intrigue 
implication in the attempt to develop a legal definition of religion in state law and international law.  
                                                 
56 A Sikh motorcyclist being exempted from a requirement to wear a helmet, or a Muslim, or Jewish slaughterhouse being permitted to kill 
animals in accordance with ritual laws. (Gunn 2003: 217, Endnote 14) 
57 This paragraph draws heavily from Gunn: 2003 and places weight on his judgment. In the article, the term religion is continuo usly put 
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Under French law, for example, if a religious organization is recognized by administration officials as a religion, 
it becomes eligible to receive certain benefit and funding. But in the very process of deciding whether the 
entity should be so recognized, the courts are confronted with the express language of the law: “The Republic 
does not recognize (…) any religion” (1905 Law, art. 2). (Gunn 2003: 217, Endnote 14) Thus, the state provides 
benefits for recognized religions, but concomitantly the state must not recognize religions. However, such a 
“legal schizophrenia in France is only less apparent in other countries”. (Gunn 2003: 217, Endnote 14) As 
Jackson notes “(a) nation state cannot be entirely neutral when dealing with issues of religious and cultural 
diversity”. (Jackson 2003: 5) Whether or not state institutions are competent to determine what is and is not 
religion,  in  the  actual  world  of  law,  judicial  and  political  institutions  are  sometimes  forced  to  make  such 
determinations. In other words, while the universal right to religious liberty is acknowledged and self-evident, 
nation-states’ legal systems have to impose limitations on the freedom of religion. These deficiencies and 
limitations automatically extend to the establishment of religious education systems. 
Legal systems may explicitly or implicitly evaluate (or rank) religions. Depending on the attitudes of the persons 
involved, religions may be described in ways such as proper religion versus deviant religion, or, religion versus 
non-religion.  Probably  some  persons  think  of  monotheistic  religions  in  terms  such  as  universal,  while 
polytheistic  or  non-theistic  religions  may  be  perceived  as  primitive  or  superstitious.  Persons  with  broader 
sensibilities might expand universal religions to include not only Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and 
Hinduism — but nevertheless find that other groups (…) are “not really religions” or are “sects” or “cults” and 
thus are not deserving of the label of religion either for purposes of receiving benefits or being protected 
against discrimination. (Gunn, 2003: 196) How Indonesia limits religious freedom will be discussed in the next 
chapters. 
3.1.3. International human rights definition of religious freedom 
Since the present study assumes multivocality of religious traditions (Stepan 2001; Esposito 2009; Hilmy 2010), 
all religious traditions include concepts that deal with human rights and religious liberty. To mention four 
examples, there are the Edicts of Asoka the Great (ca.250 BCE), the Constitution of Medina drafted by Prophet 
Muhammad (622 BE), the Verdicts of the Ottoman Empire, and the Din Ilahi of Sultan Akbar from the Indian 
Mughul Empire (1555-1605). Today, “The language of international ethics is ‘human rights’.” (Moran 2006: 43, 
emphasis in original) With all its limitations, the UN has had some  success in establishing the idea of an 
international ethics. International human rights documents identify two aspects of religious freedom: first, the 
realm of a person’s subjective beliefs (forum internum), and secondly an external realm, where beliefs are 
manifested in many forms, such as teaching (forum externum). (Schreiner 2006: 859) Contrary to the first 
aspect that is interpreted in international human rights documents “as being ‘absolute’, being an area in which 
governments are prohibited from interfering in any way” (Schreiner 2006: 859), the second aspect of external 
manifestation of religion and belief may be limited under specified and narrow conditions. (Schreiner 2006: 
860) 
 
During the process of an internationalization of human rights, the freedom of religion and belief evolved as 
basic right and civil liberty
58. Indonesian human rights groups and promoters of pluralism refer frequently to 
the Comment, therefore it frames the  parameter of religious freedom  used in their reasoning and in the 
present study. Although no definition of religion is provided, the universal right  to  “freedom  of  thought, 
conscience,  religion,  and  belief”  is  acknowledged  in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights.
59  The 
Declaration  distinguishes  between  religion  as  the  realm  of  a  person’s  subjective  beliefs  (forum  internum; 
private, individual level) and an external realm, where beliefs are manifested in many forms, such as teaching, 
practice, and worship (forum externum; public, group level). (Schreiner 2006: 859) Thus a distinction is drawn 
between  the  individual  right  to  hold  and  change  religion  in  the  private  sphere  and  the  right  to  manifest 
religious practices in the public sphere and public space. Although religious freedom was historically the first 
freedom in the evolution of human rights, efforts to develop an enforceable international human rights law 
pertaining to freedom of religion remain unsuccessful. Marshall (1998: 18) states, “Such freedom may at times 
have more to do with the growth of democracy than a direct focus on political activity”. 
   
                                                 
58 The United Nations issued declarations and conventions pertinent to these rights, additionally there are European, Inter-American and 
African declarations and conventions on religious freedom.  
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
60 (henceforth ICCPR)  guarantees equality
61 (§2.1) by 
prohibiting discrimination
62 (§26) and hatred
63 (§20.2) on grounds of amongst others, religion or belief. The 
instrument had recognized the importance of freedom of religion and belief in article 18, of which paragraph 1, 
2 and 3 are quoted here in full length:  
 
§18.1: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall 
include the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice, and   freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his or her religion or belief 
in worship, observance, practice, and teaching. 
§18.2: No one shall be subject to  coercion, which shall impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice. 
§18.3.  Freedom  to  manifest  one’s  religion  or  beliefs  may  be  subject  only  to  such  limitations  as  are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.  
 
Here an important qualification to the right to freedom of thought, conscious and religion is mentioned, the 
rights of states to limit mentioned freedom. But each and any limitation has to follow legal procedure having 
the purpose either to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.An  limitation  on  base  of  morals,  however,  must  base  on  principles  that  do  not  derive  out  of  one 
exclusivist understanding. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter CRC) imposes analogous to the 
ICCPR a crucial limitation to the freedom of religion and belief according legal procedure to protect public 
safety, order, health or moral, or the fundamental rights and freedom of others. Regarding community or 
minority rights, the ICCPR states that minority groups are entitled to profess and practice their own religion and 
protects members of minorities from being marginalized or converted. The same protection is enjoyed by 
holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.  
(§27) In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 
Within the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee published a General Comment No. 22
64 on Article 18 of the 
ICCPR on the scope of freedom of religion or belief on a shared basis for a ll. Religious and naturalistic 
worldviews are equally permitted and protected, but their manifestation may also be limited. The General 
Comment 22 (§1) applies a broad definition of religion or belief by including the right not to hold religious but 
naturalistic convictions, and allows for a manifestation individually or communally.  
 
§1 The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the freedom not to hold 
beliefs) in article 18.1[of the ICCPR, XXX] is far -reaching and profound; i t encompasses freedom of 
thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested 
individually or in community with others. The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the fact 
that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom of 
religion and belief. The fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this 
provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public emergency (…) 
   
                                                 
60  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  (ICCPR);  Comment  22  on  article  18  of  the  CCPR: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15 
61 ICCPR § 2 (1) ‘Each State Party (…) undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.  
62ICCPR § 26. (…) ‘all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this 
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. 
63 ICCPR §20.2. (…) ‘prohibits incitement of hatred against others because of their religion: Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. The UNHRC General Comment 22 (7) 
states, ‘in accordance with article 20 (of the ICCPR), no manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy 
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. As stated by the Committee in its 
General Comment 11 [19], States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts. 
64  International  Cov enant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  (ICCPR);  Comment  22  on  article  18  of  the  CCPR: 
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(§3) distinguishes between the unconditional right to the freedom of conscience and religion and the right to 
manifest this freedom.  
 
§3Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom to 
manifestreligion or belief. It does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and 
conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’'s choice. These freedoms are 
protected unconditionally, as is the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference (…) no one 
can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief. 
 
(§5) guarantees the freedom to retain, choose or replace one’s religion or belief, or to adopt atheistic views 
and prohibits forced conversion.  
 
§5The Committee observes that the freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails 
the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief 
with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18.2 
bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat 
of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious 
beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Policies or practices having the 
same  intention  or  effect,  such  as,  for  example,  those  restricting  access  to  education,  medical  care, 
employment or the rights guaranteed (…) are similarly inconsistent (…). The same protection is enjoyed 
by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature. 
 
(§8) allows for limitations only if it follows legal procedure and is necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Limitations for the purpose of protecting 
morals must base on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition, to ensure manifold climates of 
thought are represented. The freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of 
parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted.  
 
§ 8 Article 18.3 permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief only iflimitations are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. The freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the 
liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted. (…) The 
Committee observes that the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical, and religious 
traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of 
protecting moralsmust be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition. (…) 
 
(§9) holds if a religion is recognized as state religion, or established or if the followers comprise the majority of 
the population, may not result in limitations or in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or 
non-believers. Regarding community or minority rights, the ICCPR states that minority groups are entitled to 
profess  and  practice  their  own  religion  and  protects  members  of  minorities  from  being  marginalized  or 
converted. The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.  
 
(§27) In those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 
 
The concept of religious liberty used in the present work is the one put forward by the 1981 Declaration and 
the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee’s  General  Comment  No.  22  on  Article  18  of  the  ICCPR
65.  Religious  and 
naturalistic worldviews are equally permitted and protected, but their manifestation may also be limited. The 
right of negative religious freedom (to reject religious claims or force by the state) and the right to positive 
religious freedom (to adopt religious claims) are thus enshrined equally in the human rights instruments. The 
General Comment 22 (§1) applies a broad definition of religion or belief by including the right not to hold 
religious but naturalistic convictions, and allows for a manifestation individually or communally.  
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(§3) distinguishes between the unconditional right to the freedom of conscience and religion and the right to 
manifest this freedom. (§5) guarantees the freedom to retain, choose or replace one’s religion or belief, or to 
adopt  atheistic  views  and  prohibits  forced  conversion.  (§8)  allows  for  limitations  only  if  it  follows  legal 
procedure and is necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. Limitations for the purpose of protecting morals must base on principles not deriving 
exclusively from a single tradition, to ensure manifold climates of thought are represented. The freedom from 
coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and 
moral education cannot be restricted. (§9) holds when a religion is recognized as state religion, or established 
as  official  or  traditional  or  that  its  followers  comprise  the  majority  of  the  population,  may  not  result  in 
limitations or in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. 
There is only one non-binding international directive, which explains the underlying rights protected under the 
concept of religion or belief. The Vienna Declaration and program of action and the Oslo Declaration emphasize 
the necessity to put the 1981 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
based on Religion or Belief’ (henceforth 1981 Declaration)
66 into practice. The 1981 Declaration represents the 
key document protecting religious rights by constituting a paradigm to advocate for mutual respect and to 
prevent  discrimination  based  on  religion  or  belief.  While  lacking  any  enforcement  procedures,  the  1981 
Declaration remains the most important contemporary codification of the principle of freedom of religion and 
belief. 
The document contains eight articles, of which two (§1, §6) define specific rights of faith communities. The 
remaining  articles  act  in  a  supportive  role  by  outlining  measures  to  promote  tolerance  or  prevent 
discrimination. While human rights are above all individual  rights, certain rights related to states, religious 
institutions, parents, legal guardians, children, and groups of persons are also identified. A distinction between 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and its manifestations in public is drawn. Articles 1 
and 6 provide a comprehensive list of rights regarding freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and its 
manifestation either individually or collectively, in private or public, to realize a religion or belief through 
worship, observance, practice and teaching. The articles are quoted in full length. 
§1.1.  Everyone  shall  have  the  right  to  freedom  of  thought,  conscience,  and  religion.  This  right  shall 
include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practices and teaching. 
§1.2.   No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of 
his choice.  
§1.3.  Freedom  to  manifest  one’s  religion  or  belief  may  be  subject  only  to  such  limitations  as  are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
§ 6 In accordance with article 1 of the present Declaration, and subject to the provisions of article 1, 
paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief shall include, inter alia, the 
following freedoms: 
 
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places 
for these purposes;  
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions; 
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the 
rites or customs of a religion or belief;  
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas; 
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;  
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;  
(g)To train, appoint, elect, or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements 
and standards of any religion or belief;  
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of 
one's religion or belief;  
(i)   To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion 
and belief at the national and international levels. 
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Article 2 covers classifications of discrimination and identifies categories of potential discriminators, affirming 
the right not to be subject  to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Potential discriminators 
include (1) States (national, regional, local government); (2) Institutions (governmental, non-governmental, and 
religious); (3) Groups of individuals; (4) Individuals. Article 3 declares that discrimination based on religion or 
belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the UDHR, and shall be 
condemned as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. States and all sectors of civil society 
are entitled in Article 4 to take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination based on religion or 
belief. Article 5 covers individual rights of parents, guardians, and children. (§5.5) sets out the parameters for a 
State to limit practices injurious to child’s development or health. Article 7 on national legislation declares that 
all of the rights at stake in the 1981 UN Declaration need to be accorded in national legislation. However, 
Article 8 specifies the 1981 UN Declaration is non-binding on States so as to ensure that the Declaration does 
not negate existing legal protections of freedom of religion or belief, though rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Declaration shall be accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail 
himself or herself of such rights and freedoms in practice. The Indonesian human rights Charter is discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
3.1.4 Religion and freedom of religion in the modern nation state 
Since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation state is the main agent in world politics, economics, and 
social dealings. (Moran 2006: 41) The nation state is currently the main protector of rights, including the right 
to practice one’s religion and religious education. (Moran 2006: 43) The debate whether Islam and democracy, 
are compatible cannot be touched upon here, but as the example of Muslim majority Indonesia shows, the 
country adopt fully electoral democracy and freedom of religion in a fashion of authoritarian pluralism or 
delimited pluralism (Howell 2003). 
 
The consensus seems that the precondition to establish religious freedom is the separation of state and church 
(religion). Developed in modern Western Europe, the idea of separation of state and religion was advocated by 
John Locke to ensure toleration and religious freedom. According to this view, when the power, prestige and 
financial support of the government are placed behind a particular belief, indirect coercive pressure is placed 
on religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion. (Hosen 2005: 421) In this case, 
the  absence  of  an  established  religion,  and  separation  of  political  authority  and  religious  authority,  is 
considered a prerequisite for the right to freedom of thought, conscious and belief. This argument became the 
basis of the separation of church and state in the United States (secularism) and France (laicité). Nevertheless 
the ways of implementation of separation and institutionalized religion vary in Europe. (Casanova 1994; Stepan 
2001; Nipkow 2006: 582) 
 
As states are required to regulate the relation to religion within their boundaries in order to secure justice and 
stability, an investigation in the nature and relationship between religion and the nation-state should be, as I 
propose,  a  key  element  in  the  field  of  religious  studies  and  a  fundamental  item  in  the  study  of  religious 
plurality, religious liberty and religious education. Freedom of religion as legal concept is historically related to 
but  not  identical  with  the  separation  of  church  (understood  as  religious  institutions)  and  state,  or 
laicité/secularism, and religious toleration.  
 
Casanova identifies three basic options for a liaison between political authority and religious authority, but 
“(n)one of these options (…) can permanently resolve the tension between “religion” and “world”. (Casanova 
1994:49. The first option of Caesaropapism - secular ruler over church - and the second option of theocracy - 
church over state - pertain to a pattern that conflates governmental and religious authority. The first option, 
Caesaropapism refers to the “Alliance of throne and altar” (Casanova 1994: 22), to “the world’s control and use 
of  religion  for  its  own  purposes,  most  frequently  to  legitimate  political  rule  and  to  sanctify  economic 
oppression and the given system of stratification”. (Casanova 1994: 49) A secular leader, who is the prime 
religious leader, combines spiritual and worldly authority or controls the established institutions of the Church. 
The second option sees a unity of state and religion, “the power to influence and shape the world according to 
God’s way”. (Casanova 1994: 49) Yet, paradoxically, “the more religion wants to transform the world in a 
religious direction, the more religion becomes entangled in “worldly” affairs and is transformed by the world”. 
(Casanova 1994: 49)The third option, distance, detachment, and separation, “protects the world from religion 
and religion from the world”. (Casanova 1994: 49) It is the predominant option.  
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Czermak  (2008)  distinguishes  two  basic  interpretations  pertaining  to  freedom  of  religion  in  constitutions: 
Einheitslösungen  (alliance  solutions)  or  Trennungslösungen  (separation).  The  first  type  describes  the  unity 
between state and religion, and religious truth is the truth of the state. The second model always puts forth the 
separation of religious and political authority. This institutional dualism, however, in no means implies that 
political authority might not be religiously justified or a strong normative religious commitment is excluded 
from political authority. Generally, mixed types between Trennungs- und Einheitslösungen prevail: on one end 
of the spectrum, there are state-churches (UK) and at the other end is the laicist separation of state and church 
(France) (or the communist approach that abolished RE at all)  
 
At all, there seem to be two options pertaining to freedom of religion in constitutions: The first option would 
be the unity of religious and political authority. In this model, religion functions as integral part of the state, 
examples are theocracy
67 or an Islamic State
68. Such a unity between state and  religion is held to be deeply 
discriminatory for adherents to other religions. Within the second option of “separation”, we can differentiate 
two  related  yet  different  conceptions  with  regard  to  freedom  of  religion  in  constitutions:  laicism  and 
secularism. The second interpretation maintains that the state should not establish, or fund, religious activities 
and  assumes  that  governmental  practices  or  institutions  should  exist  independent  and  autonomous  from 
religion to protect religious liberty.  
The term laicité is in fact used to contrast European with American secularism, because the US-Constitution 
does not mention the term. The first term, laicité
69 or laicism, “refers to an anticlerical worldview and ideology” 
(Karakas  2007:  7)  that  rejects  establishment  state  funding  of  religious  institutions  and  practices.  Laicism 
assumes that governmental practices or institutions should exist independent and autonomous from religious 
institutions to protect freedom of religion. Laicism accommodates “a strict institutional separation of state and 
religion, i.e. of political and religious authority” (Karakas 2007: 7f) to guarantee such civil liberty, and the 
absence  of  religious  interference  in  government  affairs  and  government  interference  in  religious  affairs. 
Accordingly, at least in theory - the laicist state keeps completely out of all religious matters unlike under 
secularism.  
Contrary to laicism, the third interpretation secularism or secularization (Hosen 2005: 422), sees separation of 
religion and state as a notion related to, but separated from, freedom of religion. As distinct from theocracy, 
many secular states officially endorse a state religion, state church or official religion and thus fund a specific 
national  stream  of  Christianity.  Although  countries  with  an  official  religion,  state  church  or  state  religion 
guarantee and practice freedom of religion, critiques from the liberal school of thought sees this model as to 
threaten freedom of religion. In consequence, secularism denotes a less strict model of separation, and rather 
a distance or even interpenetration between religious authority and state. Generally, a secular state is held to 
treat its citizenry equally and not to give a particular religion preferential treatment over other religions but 
reality shows another pattern. We can interpret this pattern as a residual of former specific historical relation 
patterns  between  political  and  religious  authority.  (Casanova  1994)  In  this  context,  Casanova  (1994:  50, 
emphasis in original) observes “the historically unique character of the modern state cannot be understood 
unless one sees it as a secularized, “transformed church””. 
 
In  this  context,  a  state  recognizes  and  respects  cultural  and  religious  heritage  of  its  social  groups,  „by 
developing a policy of benevolent neutrality towards religious groups, [which] requires the government to treat 
religious groups with a policy of impartiality”. (Hosen 2005:421) In this sense, religion has its place in the 
private domain, but it can also play its role in the public sphere. Secularism holds that religion is a fundamental 
and essential part of many moral and ethical values, and that the removal of public displays of religion from 
government is a form of religious discrimination in that it prohibits the exercising of  religious views in the 
public sphere (Hosen 2005: 422).  
   
                                                 
67 The theocratic type of government establishes religious authority as secular authority to govern the state. In a monist theocracy the 
administrative governmental hierarchy is identical with the administrative religious hierarchy. But theocracy may have two wings; the 
religious hierarchy may be superior to the state administrative hierarchy. Theocracy differs from secular types that either establish a state 
religion or church, or are influenced by theological or ethical concepts, and monarchies held “By the Grace of God”. 
68 In Islamic states, Islam is established as official and only religion, the Islamic State of Iran, the United Emirates of Arab, and Saudi Arabia 
may be grouped under this type. Islamic law does not distinguish between matters of religion and matters of state; Islamic sc holars 
function as both theologians and jurists. In practice, Islamic rulers frequently bypassed the Syari’ah courts with a parallel system.  
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Casanova  (1994:  55-58)  finds  several  organizational  models  of  separation
70, likewise  Stepan found several 
varieties of democratic patterns of state-religion relations, since every nation may develop its specific pattern. 
“They  show  that  there  can  be  democratic  and  nondemocratic  secularism,  democracies  with  established 
churches, and even democracies with a “very unfriendly” separation of church and state”. (Stepan 2000:42, 
emphasis in original). By implication, if we delve into European state-religion relation patterns, the concept of 
the secular state is highly heterogeneous, and we find that “an apodictic separation of state and religion is not 
a prerequisite for a functioning democracy”. (Karakas 2007: 8). In this light, Alfred Stepan (2000: 43, emphasis 
in original) argues for the introduction of twin tolerations as “the defining characteristics of democracy vis-a-vis 
religion, whereas “secularism” and the “separation of church and state” are not an intrinsic part of the core 
definition of democracy.” The notion of twin tolerations denotes “the minimal boundaries of freedom of action 
that  must  somehow  be  crafted  for  political  institutions  vis-a-vis  religious  authorities,  and  for  religious 
individuals and groups vis-a-vis political institutions“(Stepan 2000: 37). The conclusion that can be drawn from 
Western European experience is that the first objective is not  separation, but it is “the constant political 
construction and reconstruction of the “twin tolerations”.” (Stepan 2000: 42, emphasis in original).  
 
Stepan’s argument comprises two points, which we should consider, when observing a specific state-religion-
relation. First, “(w)e should beware of assuming that any religion’s doctrine is univocally pro-democratic or 
antidemocratic”(Stepan 2000:44). When analyzing the relationship of non-Christian or non-Western religions to 
democracy, “it would seem appropriate not to assume univocality but to explore whether these doctrines 
contain multivocal components that are usable for (or at least compatible with) the political construction of the 
twin  tolerations“(Stepan  2000:  44).  This  is  to  say  that  all  religions  and  belief  systems  are  multivocal,  and 
contain some verses or scriptures supporting democracy while others would reject it. Stepan’s second point 
concerns the fallacy to assume a unique constellation of specific founding conditions “that were present at the 
birth of such phenomena as electoral democracy” (Stepan 2000: 44), and therefore we should not “confuse the 
conditions  associated  with  the  invention  of  something  with  the  possibility  of  its  replication,  or  more 
accurately,its reformulation under different conditions”
71(Stepan 2000: 44). 
Hence,  we  observe  numerous  examples  of  interactions  between  religious  institutions  and  nation-states  in 
secular nations that confuse the conception of Weber’s “wall of separation” (Geertz 1993; Casanova 1994; 
Stepan 2000; Bowen 2005) between political and religious authority. Virtually no Western European democracy 
now has a rigid or hostile separation of church and state, thus in most Western democracies a democratically 
negotiated freedom of religion from state interference emerged. (Stepan 2000:42) and religious groups are 
guaranteed both aspects of religious freedom: the right to private religious practices (forum internum) and to 
manifest religion in public(forum externum). 
 
The absence of an unambiguous definition of religion has important implications in the field of political science, 
political practice (politics) and legal practice. First, in the field of social science and political science, whereas 
religion is seen to belong to the sphere of culture, theories tend to ignore religion altogether and “remain 
therefore  incomplete  since  they  neglect  the  public  dimension  of  modern  religion”.  (Casanova:  63f).  In 
consequence, this stance translates into the field of politics, where first a separation of religion and state and 
secularism have been accepted as a normative model and integral part of the modern constitutional state – 
and are widely assumed to be “core features not only of Western democracy, but of democracy itself.” (Stepan 
2000: 40). The debate on compatibility of democracy to non-Western, non-Christian countries, for instance, 
identifies state support for religion in any means as a major problem for the consolidation of democracy
72.  
   
                                                 
70 American dualism for instance, prohibits establishment of religion, but at the same time it allows for free exercise of religion. Whereas a 
strict  separationist  reading  rejects  government  support  and  government  regulation  of  religion  as  represented  in  radical  sectarian, 
libertarian, or liberal “neutrality” principles, the “benevolent” separationist interpretation demands governmental support of religion as 
represented in a principle of historical tradition and original intent or functionalist argument of the positive societal forms of religion. A 
merely secularist reading then, favors government regulation of religion while denying religions any governmental support, since it is 
suspicious of religious negative functions, accepts formal separation, the interpretation is consistent with caesaropapist principles to 
fostering both governmental support and government’s absolute control of religion. (Casanova 1994) 
71 „We should beware of falling into the fallacy of “unique founding conditions” when we examine whether polities strongly influenced by 
Confucianism, Hinduism, Orthodoxy, or Islam can emulate or recreate, using some of their own distinctive cultural resources, a form of 
democracy that would meet the minimal institutional conditions for democracy (…).” (Stepan 2000: 44, emphasis in original). 
72 “In the liberal conception religion is and ought to remain a private affair. The liberal fear of the politicization of religion is simultaneously 
the fear of an establishment which could endanger the individual freedom of conscience and the fear of a deprivatized ethical religion 
which could bring extraneous conceptions of justice, of the public interest, of the common good and of solidarity into the “neutral” 
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A recent Pew study and the author, however, consider government support for religious groups a restriction 
only if it involves preferential treatment of some group(s) and discrimination against others. Second, although 
human rights instruments guarantee the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, what is actually 
meant  with  the  term  religion  remains  ambiguous  in  international  human  rights  conventions  and  national 
constitutions. 
 
Concerning a similar debate on the compatibility of specific religions to human rights, Sen (1997: 7-31) claims 
that modern ideas of political and personal liberty cannot be found in the pre-Enlightenment traditions in any 
part of the world. In consequence, concepts of individual freedom and equality of freedom are to be found in 
all faith traditions
73. Sen discriminates between a general and a legal dimension in the idea of human rights. In 
the most general form, the conception of human ri ghts builds on our shared humanity and transcends local 
legislation, and the citizenship of the person affected. In other words, human rights are not derived from the 
citizenship  of  any  country,  but  taken  as  entitlements  of  every  human  being.  Thus  they  dif fer  from 
constitutionally created rights guaranteed by governments for specified people.  
 
Sen (1997: 31) questions the appropriateness of the thesis of a contrast between East and West His study on 
the genealogy of those values does not sustain the “thesis of a grand dichotomy between Asian values and 
European  values”,  although  “the  view  has  been  championed  by  both  Asian  authoritarians  and  Western 
chauvinists.” (Sen 1997:27) Sen finds it hard to make any sense of the view that the basic ideas underlying 
freedom and rights in a tolerant society are Western notions or traditional commitments of Western cultures, 
and somehow alien to Asia, or other cultural regions. Important antecedents of those commitments in the form 
of advocacy of tolerance and individual freedom can be found plentiful in Asian as well Western cultures. In 
consequence, oversimplifying generalizations like “Western civilization” or “Asian values” only would add to 
the divisiveness of the world we live in.  
 
However, one still has to remember that China, India, and Indonesia host the largest populations in the world, 
hence all regional trajectories of political and cultural concepts on diversity and pluralism should be proactively 
discovered by Western and Arabic countries that propagate universal notions and exclusive worldviews. It is 
exactly  this  light,  in  which  a  closer  look  at  Indonesia  gains  its  relevance  in  the  study  of  religion  because 
Indonesia is neither a theocracy, nor an Islamic Republic, nor a laicist, or secular state, but it is defined as a 
religious state based on belief in One Supreme Lordship.  
   
                                                 
73 This claim is composed of two distinct components, to wit, 1) The value of personal freedom: that personal freedom is important and 
should be guaranteed for those who ‘matter’ in a good society, and 2) Equality of freedom: that everyone matters and should have similar 
freedom. These two components entail that personal freedom should is guaranteed on a shared basis for all. This leads to the idea of 
universal human rights and the freedom of religion. Another useful distinction is between (1) The value of toleration: there  must be 
toleration of diverse beliefs, commitments, and actions of different people, (2) Equality of tolerance: the toleration that is offered to some 
must be reasonable ordered to all (except when tolerance of some will lead to intolerance for others). A government can, of course, 
dispute a person’s legal right not to be tortured, but that will not amount to disputing what must be seen as the person’s human rights not 
to be tortured. Sen 1997: Human Rights and Asian Values. [16
th Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy] New York, 
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3.2. Religious education: A basic Human Right? 
The fact that religious education varies from country to country and from region to region more than any 
other academic subject indicates that it is dealing with issues that touch raw nerves. (Levitt and Pollard 
1998: 815) 
 
For its controversial status and due to the fact that religion is embedded in all social practices, the organization 
of RE can evolve into a hotly debated political issue. But public or social disapproval of certain types of faith-
based  education  case  can  be  muted  by  the  thought  that  people  have  a  right  to  practice  their  religion, 
regardless of its truth or falsity, and that the right properly includes the liberty to teach the faith to one’s 
children.  So  a  wide  variety  of  forms  of  religious  education  must  be  tolerated  as  a  matter  of  parents’  or 
children’s rights. The moral force of the appeal to group rights, as well as the difficulties it may address, can be 
explored through the example of religious rights and educational policy in a pluralistic society.  
 
National  policies  and  interests  beyond  the  area  of  education  and  religion  can  play  a  decisive  part  in 
constructing  or  revising  RE  curricula  and  laws  on  RE.  Politicians  or  national  policies  try  to  use  RE  as  an 
instrument  for  political  purposes  by  demanding  that  RE’s  ethical  potential  be  turned  against  social 
disintegration. (Heimbrock 2001: 14) Political initiatives that focus on RE can as well be motivated by the date 
of the next elections and are seen as the best way to gain votes from particular supporters. (Callan 1998: 534)  
3.2.1. The religion class and faith-based education in Human Rights 
Since the establishment of the modern education systems, any systematic training of the people organized 
according to age is called education and conceived of as basic right and fundamental freedom. (Moran 1987) It 
should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  UDHR  distinguishes  between  religion  as  belief  (individual  level)  and 
manifestations of belief as teaching, practice and worship (group level). (Schneider 2006) Hence the UDHR 
introduces  discrimination  between  1.)  individual  rights  and  group  right,  and  2.)  the  right  to  embrace  and 
change a religion and belief and the right to manifest these  beliefs in public spaces. Thereby the right to 
religious education in public and private schools, or in private or in public spaces is established.  
In  1960  the  UNESCO  Convention  on  Discrimination  in  Education  has  statedthat  the  establishment  or 
maintenance of separate educational institutions for religious reasons is not discriminatory, if it is in keeping 
with the wishes of parents or legal guardians, and providing that these institutions conform to educational 
standards  developed  by  competent  authorities,  and  are  directed  to  the  full  development  of  the  human 
personality and to strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is remarkable that the 
current Indonesian education system is in full compliance with this Article. The former 1989 Education Act still 
allowed private faith-based schools to provide obligatory participation in their confessional religion class for 
adherents to other religions. This was the crucial concern for the introduction of paragraph 12 of the 2003 
National Education System: to provide each adherent to a state funded religion with religious instruction in the 
religion taught by a teacher who is of the same faith tradition. 
The ICCPR had recognized the importance of freedom of religion and belief (§18.4.) which reads:  
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity 
with their own convictions. 
Interestingly,  the  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child  (hereafter  CRC)  ratified  with  qualifications
74  by 
Indonesia in 1990, sees the rights of the child to freedom of religion or belief as to exist independently from the 
parental right or duty. The CRC (§14, 1) guarantees that “states shall respect the right of the child to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion”.  
   
                                                 
74 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines a child as anyone below the age of 18 years.  
Reservation of the Indonesian government to the CRC: The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia guarantees the fundamental 
rights of the child irrespective of their sex, ethnicity or race. The Constitution prescribes those rights to be implemented by national laws 
and regulations. The ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the Republic of Indonesia does not imply the acceptance of 
obligations going beyond the Constitutional limits nor the acceptance of any obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed 
under the Constitution. With reference to the provisions of articles 1, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22 and 29 of this Convention, the Government of the 
Republic  of  Indonesia  declares  that  it  will  apply  these  articles  in  conformity  with  its  Constitution.  (August  2008, 
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Remarkably, the CRC (§14, 2) differs from article 5 of the 1981 UN Declaration in that it respects the rights and 
duties of parents or legal guardians, but places an emphasis on providing direction in a manner consistent with 
the evolving capacity of the child, and calls on states to limit practices of religions or beliefs that may be 
injurious to the child, as elaborated in (§ 18, 3)of the ICCPR. For their congenital ability to learn and to process 
information, children are able to and in need to acquire knowledge and values; consequently, the right to 
obtain education is regarded as a universal human right and fundamental freedom.  
In the context of religious education, Articles 4, 6 and 10 of the General Comment No. 22 are of interest to the 
present study. General Comment No. 22 (§4) ensures the realization of religious practice and its teaching 
includes the founding of religious schools.  
§4 The freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised “either individually or in community with 
others  and  in  public  or  private”.  The  freedom  to  manifest  religion  or  belief  in  worship,  observance, 
practice, and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. (…) In addition, the practice and teaching of 
religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the 
freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or 
religious schools, and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications. 
§6 The Committee is of the view that article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the 
general history of religions and ethics, if it is given in a neutral and objective way. The liberty of parents or 
legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with 
their own convictions, set forth in article 18.4, is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a 
religion  or  belief  stated  in  article  18.1.  The  Committee  notes  that  public  education  that  includes 
instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18.4 unless provision is made for 
non-discriminatory  exemptions  or  alternatives  that  would  accommodate  the  wishes  of  parents  and 
guardians. 
The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action and the Oslo Declaration emphasize the necessity to put the 
1981 Declaration into practice. While lacking any enforcement procedures, the 1981 Declaration remains the 
most  important  contemporary  codification  of  the  principle  of  freedom  of  religion  and  belief.  Article  1 
establishes the right to realize a religion or belief through teaching and Article 6 (e) establishes the right“to 
teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes”. Article 5 covers individual rights of parents, 
guardians, and children as the right (1) of parents or legal guardians to bring the child up in their religion or 
belief; (2) of the child to education in religion or belief, in accordance with the wishes of parents, and the right 
not  to  be  compelled  to  receive  education  against  their  wishes;  (3)  of  the  child  to  be  protected  from 
discrimination and to receive education for tolerance; (4) of the child’s own wishes when not under the care of 
parents or legal guardians; (5) of the State to limit practices injurious to child’s development or health. 
§5.1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the right to organize the life 
within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in 
which they believe the child should be brought up.  
§5.2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in 
accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be 
compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, 
the best interests of the child being the guiding principle. 
§5.3. The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. He 
shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal 
brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others, and in full consciousness that his energy 
and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.  
§5.4. In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due 
account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of 
religion or belief, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle. 5. Practices of a religion or 
belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full 
development, taking into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present Declaration. 
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As has been mentioned earlier, ASEAN does not yet provide any regional agreement or approach on religious 
education. Schreiner (2006: 862) outlines four core areas that can serve as guidelines for an approach on 
religious education at the national level:  
 
1.  the right of parents to decide about the provision of religion education of their children 
2.  the public educational aim of promoting tolerance and non-discrimination 
3.  the right of the child to education and to the development of its personality to the fullest extent 
4.  the right of various groups, including religious bodies, to establish private schools in addition to the 
public school system 
 
Indonesia provides for six compulsory confessional religion classes in public schools and six private faith-based 
religious education systems. Not funded religions may not organize teaching in schools but only in private – 
therefore members of not approved religions must partake in one of the six state funded religion classes and 
therefore are forced to receive teaching in a religion they do not adhere to. In this the state forces adherence 
to one of six state funded religions. As according to human rights instruments, a child has the right to receive 
religious  instruction  which  is  non-discriminatory  in  public  schooling,  and  it  may  not  be  forced  to  attain 
confessional religious instruction against the wishes of his or her parents, the regulation is in conflict with 
human rights instruments, but because of its uniqueness it merits attention.  
3.2.2. Religion in schools: teaching, models, and classroom methodology 
Teaching people religion 
As it is difficult to draw a line between educational and non-educational practice, or between living religiously 
and  being  educated  religiously,  a  definition,  standard  form  and  an  encompassing  conception  of  religious 
education into which the contents of the various religious traditions could be placed cannot be abstracted. 
(Moran  1987)  Since  practices  of  faith-based  communities  are  defined  as  religious,  the  instruction  in  any 
religious practices of the youth in schooling can be called religious education.  
Moran  (1987:  318-320)  differentiates  between  two  general  understandings  of  RE:  a  narrow  and  a  broad 
outlook. Either, religious education is understood as confessional or interfaith instruction confined to schools 
and communities. This quite recent use of the term religious education in its narrow understanding emerged in 
the twentieth century, mostly confined to places strongly influenced by modern Western Christianity. (Moran 
1987: 318-320) Today, most European nations have worked out a relation between one or several churches 
and the educational apparatus of the state in the organization of religious education. Or, employing the broad 
understanding, religious education is seen to embrace the variety of practices in all faith traditions throughout 
the centuries. As modern societies have discovered the limits of education acquired in youth and have been 
trying to add adult education to their educational systems of youth schooling, the question is whether religious 
education is only to be linked with schooling or with life-long training. (Moran 1987: 320) In this light, the 
statement of the American theologian William Myers, announced in 1925, still proves actuality. 
While religious education, as a separate discipline, is new, it is sometimes forgotten that the practice is as 
old as the race. People from the remotest antiquity have had and have taught their religion to their own 
groups at least, particularly to the succeeding generation. .... It aim always is a kind of life, and the 
problem is to cultivate and develop this life. The ideas of religion may vary as widely as can possibly be 
imagined, and the methods employed may have no apparent relation to each other, but yet he central 
objective remains the same. (A.J. William Myers 1925: 277) 
In each religion, teaching means to show someone a way of life. The agent of the teaching is the community, 
which  is  represented  by  individuals  functioning  as  teachers.  (Moran,  1987:  322)  One  commonality  across 
religious  traditions  is  thus  the  nature  of  teaching.  However,  the  agent  of  teaching  is  not  necessarily  an 
individual person called the teacher. In fact, every individual who teaches is within a (human) community and a 
(non-human) environment that are the ultimate sources of teaching. (Moran 1991: 256) Moran clearly points 
out that “the distinction between religion as area of scholarly interest, as a subject taught in school and the 
general name for practices that a Buddhist, a Hindu, or a Muslim performs on the one hand, and being religious 
as an individual in a particular way on the other hand, relies upon a difference in connotation”. (Moran 1991: 
256)  
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Following Wardekker and Miedema(2001: 29-30), the present work assumes that the religious domain should 
not primarily be seen as a separate social practice among other practices but as possible aspect of all human 
experiences  and  activities  with  consequences  for  other  practices.  Although  religion  often  develops  into 
distinctive practices, the artificial separation or exclusion of religion from other social and cultural activities is a 
disturbing  and  counterproductive  factor.  This  thesis  implies  that  the  religion  class  teaches  not  primarily 
participating in a particular faith community, but the way and the quality of participation in all types of socio-
cultural activities. A natural by product is the acquirement of religious knowledge and competence. Hence, it 
might be concluded that the aim of religious education is to pass on the complex set of beliefs, rites, and 
practices that constitute the religious  community’s way  of life and to enable the individual to participate 
competently  in  this  way  of  life  (experience  and  practice)  and  in  all  types  of  socio-cultural  activities.  In 
conclusion,  religious  education  is  here  interpreted  as  learning  to  participate  in  a  religious  community  of 
practice.  
Religion in school: Models and classroom methodology 
A systematic overview of religious education in Europe is not easy to establish, since only a few comparative, 
qualitative, and quantitative studies about the actual position of religious education in schools and universities 
have been made. (Skeie 2001; Nipkow 2006) If there is an assessed lack in the Western context, one can easily 
imagine  how  this  difficulty  translates  into  the  contemporary  situation  worldwide.  In  addition  to  this,  in 
heterogeneous societies with competing ethical systems that define themselves in opposition to each other, as 
it is the case in Indonesia, the teaching of values through religious education is problematic and has been 
tackled in different ways.  In consequence, as the system or the organization of religious education depends on 
the dominant discourses in the field of religion, the religious, political, and educational culture in question. 
(Levitt/Pollard 1998: 810) Under the condition of religious pluralism, the problem to solve is if only one or all 
religions are taught in public schools and how religious teachers are trained.  
There are broadly speaking two general models of organizing RE in schools, the secular model, and the religious 
model. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 809-812) Another way to systematize models of RE, as proposed by Levitt and 
Pollard  (1998),  could  be  using  the  confessional  or  non-confessional  distinction.  Every  nation  state  offers 
individual solutions or varieties of this general model. Levitt and Pollard identify four models of RE in school: 
 
1.)  Religious education and worship is excluded from schools;  
2.)  Religious teachings are available as an option in some schools;  
3.)  Religious education as part of the curriculum; and  
4.)  Religious education and worship as part of the curriculum 
 
The provision of religious worship in school is rare and depends upon the relationship between the state and 
the religious communities. Worship is an expression of personal faith and might be regarded as a natural 
extension of religious education in schools which have children from the same faith background. (Levitt/Pollard 
1998) The Indonesian approach corresponds to the forth model: confessional religious education and worship 
as part of the curriculum, but organized in a pluralistic manner. Nipkow (2006: 583) identifies a few European 
approaches to religious education following the distinction between the negative and the positive aspect of 
religious freedom, however, none of these models is followed in Indonesia.  
 
1.)  the laicist solution with no RE at all (France) 
2.)  RE in all schools in a multi-faith approach (England and Wales) 
3.)  several  separated  forms  of  RE  combined  with  mutual  exchange  and  institutional  cooperation 
(Germany) 
4.)  moral education (ME) as a substitute for religious education in the curriculum or as an alternative 
option 
 
Aiming  to  conceptualize  the  situation  of  RE  in  schools,  Skeie  (2001:  242-243)  bases  his  provisional 
systematization of different European national solutions on two typical strategies of organizing the relationship 
between school and RE. According to Skeie, European states are divided into two groups: the first type can be 
categorized as centralized, uniform, or strong solution. Here the state imposes one solution for all, whether the 
solution is confessional or not.  
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TYPE 1: Uniform or ‘strong’ solutions 
Religion  is  part  of  the  school 
curriculum 
  Religion  is  no  part  of  the  school 
curriculum 
 
Religion based system for all  RE as a public school system for all  NO RE in school 
 
The second type represents decentralized, plurifom, or weak types of relationship between religion and school. 
Here the state provides no common solution to the entire population.  
 
TYPE 2: Pluriform or ‘weak’ solutions 
Mixed systems    Secular systems 
 
Parallel  system  were  many  or 
most  of  the  schools  are  religion-
based 
Secular  system  with  RE,  but  also 
significant  private  sector  of 
(religion-based) schools 
Secular  system  with  religious 
groups  cooperating  about  RE,  or 
running RE within schools.  
 
Applying above described models to systematize strategies and models of organizing religious education in 
schools,  the  present  study  found  that  the  strategy  followed  by  Indonesia  may  be  identified  as  pluriform. 
Indonesia provides a dual option for students. We find a secular system with six compulsory religion classes, or 
in  other  words,  a  public  secular  school  system  in  which  six  religion  classes  and  worship  are  part  of  the 
curriculum. In addition to this secular system with religion class and worship, we find a significant private and 
state sector of religion-based schools and universities. It is interesting to note, that these confessional schools 
are established by religious communities or by the state. Since 2005, all these confessional schools adopted the 
national standard curriculum, including the religion class and worship but they offer additional faith-based 
modules  specialized  in  theology,  law  and  ritual  in  the  religion  they  are  based  on.  In  case  more  than  ten 
students of a particular religion differing from the confession the school is based on visit this confessional 
school, the school or university is required by Law to provide a religion classes for those students held by a 
teacher of the same belief. (Indonesian Education Laws of 1954 and of 2003)  
As the present study aimed to generate a thick description of the legal and social context of contemporary 
Hindu education, a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies to religious education in 
general is beyond scope of study. In this context, the issue to solve is rather in how far the curricula of the giant 
private Islamic school system integrate a pluralist paradigm along Islamic concepts or religious pluralism and 
values of brotherhood, mutual respect, and tolerance.  
 
Moran (1991: 256) holds that religious education is composed of two sharply contrasting processes. Yet, both 
processes are described as teaching people in the sense of transferring knowledge to human species with a 
special ability to learn and transform information. 
 
1.)  Teaching people religion;  
2.)  Teaching people to be religious in a particular way  
 
Remembering  Nipkow’s  (2006:  583)  distinction  between  the  negative  and  the  positive  aspect  of  religious 
freedom in classifying approaches to RE, I differentiate between two general classroom methodologies, 1.) the 
naturalistic, phenomenological, or interfaith/multifaith approach, that teaches people religion with the aim to 
understand the various phenomena of religious belief and practice
75; and 2.) the confessional, religious or faith 
based approach.    
                                                 
75 In the first process, the religion that is studied and taught in classrooms is necessarily abstract and plural. In the process of teaching 
people religion, the aim is to understand. To understand religion is always to step back and compare religion with religion (even if the 
comparing is of two versions of the same religion). (Moran 1991: 256) The phenomenological or explicit approach aims “to study the 
phenomenon  of  religion  in  an  objective  [and  descriptive;  A.L.]  way  in  order  to  increase  knowledge  and  understanding  of  religions, 
suspending  commitment  to  any  particular  tradition”.  (Levitt/Pollard  1998:  809)  This  approach  depends  on  a  distinction  being  made 
between seeking to convert children to a faith and giving them knowledge and understanding of faith. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 812) 
Exponents of the phenomenological approach argue, RE shall not only be descriptive and objective, but also experiential. The experiential 
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In this, the classroom methodology in religious instruction can be structured and organized according to two 
general approaches: 1.) teaching people religion; or 2.) imparting a particular faith tradition in people. The first 
approach comprises the phenomenological, experiential, implicit and inter-religious/ multi-faith methodology. 
The second approach entails the confessional and neo-confessional methodology. (Levitt/Pollard 1998) This is 
the case in Indonesia. The child-centered methodology is employed by both general approaches. Therefore, 
methodologies relevant in the context of my study are the confessional, neo-confessional and child-centered 
methodology.  
 
In the second process, the aim of teaching is the nurturing and enculturation of a religious way of life or being 
religious in a particular way, that is, observant Buddhist, devout Hindu, or practicing Muslim. The teacher 
(community and environment) teaches people to pray before explaining what prayer is. “The word before 
implies that such explanations will be forthcoming, yet throughout history, people have often attained only a 
limited understanding of their own religion”. Here is the crucial change in the modern world that presses the 
issue of “understanding” on increasing numbers of ordinary people. (Moran 1991: 256-257) 
The  child-centered  approach  describes  education  that  begins  with  the  child’s  own  life  experiences,  taking 
account of moral and faith development theories. Confessionalreligious education denotes “instructing in one 
religious tradition with the aim of nurturing agreed upon beliefs, values, and practices”. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 
808) The particular religion(s), which are confessed, will depend on the religious map of the country. In most 
cases of confessional religious education the school takes on the role of a church, mosque, or synagogue and 
teaches religion as true, in order to strengthen and develop the child’s faith. The teachers’ role is then to 
nurture in faith into the child. The success of religious teaching would be measured by the way the child lives or 
his/her future life rather than by qualifications or knowledge. The teaching of confessional religious education 
defined in these ways depends upon a supply of teachers committed to the faith which is to be taught, and 
support from the school community as a whole. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 811)  
Neo-confessional religious education describes an approach that takes into account the children’s interests and 
stage of psychological/moral development in order to make religious education more relevant to them in 
content and methods, while still holding to the aim of inculcating one religious tradition. Modern versions of 
confessional religious education take account of changes in educational theory and practice which put more 
emphasis on the needs and capacities of the child. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 811) The influence of research on 
children’s religious development has particularly altered the approach with younger children where it was felt 
that too much cognitive content has been taught too soon. Instead religion must be relevant to the child’s 
development. Therefore acts of religious worship may also be devised especially for children in whom they can 
take an active part.  
Critics of confessional religious education label the approach as indoctrination rather than as education. There 
are  practical  and  ethical  problems  in  maintaining  confessional  religious  education  in  societies  that  are 
multicultural and multi-faith. Children might be divided for religious education according to their parents’ faith 
or divided into separate schools. And hence the school becomes a ground for the nurturing of distinctness and 
may impart an exclusive attitude in the student
76. If the religious leaders do not support a pluralist perspective, 
and religious education is taught in an exclusiv e way by eventually sowing hatred, such cases may certainly 
produce conflicts in the respective society. (Callan 1998: 534)  
                                                                                                                                                         
(Levitt/Pollard 1998: 809) Religious education teachers help children to experience a faith different from one’s own and what it means to 
those who practice it. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 813) Children do not only study other religions as academic subject but observe, meet and talk 
to their members and participate in their rituals. The ideal way to experience might be live for a time in another faith community, to 
members, and to take part (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 813) In this context, Moran states (1991: 256) a person needs not to participate in any 
particular religious way for an understanding of religion. However, it is very difficult to see how a person can understand a phenomenon 
unless he or she has some feeling or sense for it. Especially in regard to religion, the “most inner of experiences, one has to know at least 
what it would be like to be a practitioner of a particular religious way”. (Moran 1991: 256) For those concerned about the effects of 
studying faiths on children other  their own, the experiential approach  holds more dangers than other multi-faith approaches, those 
opponents fear that children will be confused by those alien rituals, or even be led away from their own faith and culture 
(Levitt/Pollard 
1998: 813-4). The implicit approach aims to assist the child in their personal search for meaning in life and therefore focuses on experience 
and insight rather than information about religious phenomena. 
Multi-faith religious education allows the study of a variety of faith traditions either discretely or thematically using common areas or 
aiming to promote knowledge and understanding without necessarily suspending belief. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 815) Multi-faith religious 
education is an attempt to work with pluralism and difference rather than to combat a multiplicity of religious truth by nurture in one. Such 
education incorporates the skills of dialogue and conflict resolution, and promotes imaginative visions of peaceful societies. One of the 
difficulties  it  must  overcome  is  the  deeply  felt  beliefs  of  those  who  hold  that  the  study  of  a  religious  tradition  outside  their  own 
compromises their own faith and dilutes commitment.
 (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 815)  
76 See Charlene Tan 2011: Islamic Education and Indoctrination. The case in Indonesia. New York: Routledge PART A | 64 
However, Nipkow (2006) reminds us that “One must not forget that the pupils will be instructed together in all 
other subjects and that the separating influence of a two-lessons subject on attitudes and behavior should not 
be overestimated”.  
 
In  Indonesia,  the  historical  and  social  context  in  the  1960s  resulted  in  the  compulsory  education  class  to 
counter secularization of Islamic values basically based on the transmission paradigm of education. After the 
downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998, during the reform area, educational reform became a major concern. 
Then politicians and reformers felt the need to replace the former transmission paradigm of education with the 
contextual transformation paradigm. The following paragraphs follow Wardekker and Miedema (2001: 25-27; 
29-30) in sketching both educational paradigms. Grounded on the premises of an ontological subject-object 
split, the transmission modelrequires the student needs to master the objective world of meanings, facts or the 
(cultural) stock of knowledge (accumulated culturally based insights and facts) and the general procedures. 
Knowledge is viewed as being an objective property. The teacher’s role is to prepare information and to act as 
an mediator of the information that needs to be transferred to the student. The students’ role is to receive, 
store, and act upon this information in a passive and an active mode in order to socialize and participate in 
society. Students are required to learn these facts and procedures precisely in the way as they are represented 
in the curriculum documents of the subject matter. This model rests not only on a specific view of knowledge 
as representation, but also on a specific view of humans as rational beings who act on the basis of properly 
evaluating existing knowledge. The fundamental value incorporated in this model is the view that humans have 
the will and ability to act rationally, that is, guided by knowledge. Those elements of culture that are more in 
the  realm  of  emotions  and  affects  tend  to  be  excluded  from  the  curriculum.  Personality  development  is 
restricted to the extra-curricular domain.  
 
In contrast, constructivism views learning as a process in which the learner actively constructs or builds new 
ideas or concepts based upon current and past knowledge. The constructionist transformation model grounds 
on  a  holistic  or  transactional  perspective  on  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  skills,  norms,  and  values.  By 
definition, transformation takes place in a specific social context or setting, which is not to be understood as 
limiting, but as constitutive for all conduct which is situated and structured through/by society and culture. 
Knowledge is understood as a mode of experience. The learning processes’ core aspect is not the transmission 
of teachable contents (subject matter) of knowledge, skills, values, and norms, but rather the transformation of 
these contents into a heuristic base for acting as modes of being, knowing, feeling, and acting. Thereby the 
transformation of content and student becomes an active process on the part of the student.  
 
The idea of participation is fundamental in the transformation model. Learning is defined as increasing capacity 
or growing competence of students to participate in culturally structured practices.  The teacher acts as a 
facilitator  who  encourages  students  to  discover  principles  for  themselves  and  to  construct  knowledge  by 
working to solve realistic problems. During the process the subject-matter, being the starting point, becomes 
the personal property of the pupil. In other words, to demonstrate that one masters the subject matter is not 
the main criterion for a successful learning process; it is only the starting point for real learning processes in 
which both the subject-matter and the learner are transformed. It is necessary that the students take this step 
in order to acquire their own personal identity. In the semiotic view then, the task of education, especially the 
school, is to assist young people in the double process of socialization and individuation that is becoming 
competent members of communities of practices. Thus, the aim of school is to built up competence, that is, to 
enable pupils to participate in socio-culturally structured practices that take place at a certain time and that are 
located within a particular societal setting (context).  
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PART B 
4. Spirited politics: the fusion of politics and religion 
The Introduction and PART A described the methodology applied in this study for selecting the research sample 
and linking the methodology to the research questions. This section discusses key terms in the context of 
national unity and religious policies to provide the historical and political background information necessary to 
fully grasp the dimensions of the emic Indonesian religious, political and socio-cultural thought and discourse 
which in the current policies on religious education. How did Indonesia integrate religious plurality? It asks 
further how a non-Western majority Muslim democracy does organize the relation between state and religion? 
Why does it seem necessary to the Indonesian government via its Ministry of Religious Affairs to define religion 
at all? In how far can the Indonesian model of organizing religious plurality and religious freedom provide a 
model and contribute to the global debate on pluralism or religious freedom? What are the limits of the 
Pancasila and such a model function? The present work analyzed the concept of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esaas 
the core category in the Indonesian strategy of managing diversity. The present work conceptualized religion as 
cultural system to be path-dependent, and according to the essential definition, the concept of the Sacred 
discriminates  the  religious  from  other  social  systems,  how  then  is  this  One  Supreme  Lordship  defined  by 
Indonesian legislation? 
4.1. Spirited politics and spiritual education in Indonesia 
This chapter is concerned with the role of religion in the public sphere, and the fusion of politics and religion. In 
the confrontation between political Islam and the “secular” nationalists following the founding of the state, 
Muslim doctrine and belief (aqidah and iman) compels Muslims to respond to Indonesia’s civil religion or 
political culture as codified in the five principles of the state in the way as they do. (Purdy 1984: 44) 
4.1.1. Religion in the public sphere 
Until the “sudden eruption of religion into the public sphere, not only in Europe but Latin America, Asia, and 
the Middle East” (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) in the 1980s, there  was relatively widespread consensus in 
theory that processes of industrialization and modernization
77 would eventually lead to secularization
78, or 
religious differentiation, decline and privatization
79. “Only then did many realize that differentiation did not 
necessarily mean that religion would remain its assigned place in the private sphere and not enter the public 
arena”. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 97)  
 
Regarding the role of religion in the public sphere in modern societies, Robert N. Bellah and José Casanova 
argue  that  “religion  can  be  a  force  for  collective  action,  social  unity,  and  political  mobilization”. 
(Furseth/Repstad  2007:  97)  In  consequence,  rather  than  being  defined  as  a  process  of  desacralization, 
secularization  is  better  thought  of  as  a  differentiation  process  of  religious  and  non-religious  spheres  that 
naturally need not exclude one another. (Casanova 1994)  
                                                 
77  The  process  of  modernization  ideally  involves  two  key  stages:  (1)  the  transition  from  an  agrarian  to  an  industrial  society  (2)  the 
development  from  an  industrial  to  a  postindustrial  society.  The  representational  system  undergoes  mismatches  between  traditional 
normative  systems  and  the  real  world,  known  from  first  hand  experiences.  The  representational  system  and  the  worldview  of  the 
established religions are no longer persuasive or compelling as they were in the original setting. These profound changes in people’s daily 
experience lead to changes in the prevailing cosmologies. The move from subsistence rural farming to moderate-income manufacturing 
generally  helps  to  lift  the  most  vulnerable  population  out  of  dire  poverty  and  commonly  improves  standards  of  living,  bringing 
urbanization,  better  nutrition,  sanitation,  and  access  to  clean  water.  This  development,  combined  with  the  diffusion  of  mass 
communications, gradually creates a more informed and politically aware public. The stages of societal modernization transform the living 
conditions for many humans by reducing their vulnerability to sudden, unpredictable risks. Rising affluence has a high probability to bring 
about important changes in mass belief systems and social structure, because modernization makes it necessary for religions to explain its 
plausibility on the level of the individual. (Norris/Inglehart 2005: 1-56) 
78 The secularization thesis of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim postulates that modernization would include a 
gradual decline in levels of religiosity and a fade of the importance of religious authority. (Norris/Inglehart 2005: 41) The  central claim in 
the argument has been that the spr ead of scientific knowledge and rising levels of education would bring a universal trend towards an 
increasingly rational worldview. The process of secularization would then bring about the systematic erosion of religious practices, values, 
and beliefs. 
79 The notions of the “public“ and the “private” spheres refer here to the traditional dichotomous model of social relations that posits a 
separation between the domestic sphere of the individual, the family, and leisure, and that of dominant institutions, such as economic, 
legal, and political institutions. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 97) The present discussion of religion in the public sphere in Indonesia focuses 
following Furseth/Repstad (2007: 97) mainly on the political sphere, “including collectives that operate at different levels, such as the 
nation, state, and civil society”.  PART B | 65 
This is substantiated by current trends of repoliticisation and deprivatization of religion in Western society and 
Christianity, and other religious traditions, such as Islam and Hinduism. 
(Hosen 2005: 421, Willford/George 
2005; Prothero 2006) Casanova notes “the private/public distinction is crucial to all conceptions of the modern 
social order
80 and religion itself is intrinsically connected with the modern historical differentiation of private 
and public spheres”. (Casanova 1994: 40) Accordingly, functional differentiation of modern secular spheres is 
the characteristic of modernity, and today, “modern science, capitalist markets, and modern state bureaucracy 
manage to function “as if” God would not exist“(Casanova 1994: 40, emphasis in original).  
 
(T)he privatization of religion is intrinsically related to the emergence of the modern social order. To say 
that  in  the  modern  world  “religion  becomes  private”  refers  also  to  the  very  process  of  institutional 
differentiation which is constitutive of modernity, namely, to the modern historical process whereby the 
secular  spheres  emancipated  themselves  from  ecclesiastical  control  as  well  as  from  religious  norms. 
(Casanova 1994: 40)  
 
Casanova observes a simultaneous process of privatization and deprivatization
81 of religion in the modern 
world. (Casanova 1994: 231) As a result, theories of secularization can only inadequately answer the empirical 
fact that “religious institutions often refuse to accept their assigned marginal place in the private sphere, 
managing to assume prominent public roles; that religion and politics keep forming  all kinds of symbiotic 
relations”(Casanova 1994:41). “*O+nly in modern times and predominantly western societies religion has been 
categorically separated from the rest of culture” (Beckford 2000: 167 in Scheifinger: 2009: 4), and this may be 
especially true for what Peter Berger coined the term “Eurosecularity” (Prothero 2010; Casanova 1994). In the 
US (Prothero 2010), India (Scheifinger 2009), and Indonesia (Hilmy 2010), commonly the life of the citizenry is 
inextricably bound up with religion – religion is however entirely differently integrated into the state and the 
constitution (for an overview see Stepan 2001).  
 
Case studies from Christian contexts (Prothero 2006; Casanova 1994) and Southeast Asia (Franke/Pye 2006; 
Wilford/George  2005)  show  that  thesecularization  thesis  premised  on  particular  Western  historical 
circumstances referring to the decline of Christianity in its institutionalized form in Western Europe. In this, the 
thesis is not transferable into Southeast Asian contexts or the contemporary world as a whole (Casanova 1994; 
Willford/George 2005: 1-32; Norris/Inglehart, 2005). On the contrary, “albeit experiencing constant dynamic 
transformation processes, religion is an enduring and significant dimension of Southeast Asian politics and 
public  life  in  general”,  as  religion  defines  and  legitimates  contemporary  political  and  cultural  orders  in 
Southeast Asia. (Willford/George 2005)  
 
Furseth and Repstadt (2007: 97-109) identify five forms in which religion is represented in the public sphere. Of 
relevance to the present study are primarily two such forms of religion in the public sphere, as we find those 
forms  in  Indonesia:  civil  religion  (Bellah  1967;  Atkinson  1983,  Purdy  1994;  Schindehütte  1996)  and  public 
religion (Casanova 1994, Hosen 2005, Hasan 2008, Hilmy 2010).  
Civil religion 
The concept of civil religion has its origin in Rousseau’s “The Social Contract”, in which he outlines the basic 
units  of  analysis  of  civil  religion:  the  existence  of  God,  the  life  to  come,  the  reward  of  virtue  and  the 
punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance. (Bellah 1967: 4; Furseth/Repstad 2007: 103) It 
was then further developed by Bellah (1967) and on this basis Purdy (1994) and Schindehütte (2006) conducted 
their study on civil religion in Indonesia.  
Civil religion refers to a “public religious dimension … expressed in a set of common beliefs, symbols and 
rituals…a genuine apprehension (on the political level) of a universal and transcendent religious reality” (Bellah 
1979: 179 in Purdy 1984: 5, 11) Civil religion is thought to have several functions: it offers legitimation and 
carries the potential for the renewal of this function (Bellah 1980 in Furseth/Repstad 2007: 103), and it has a 
potential for both integration and division (Bellah 1976 in Furseth/Repstad 2007: 103)  
                                                 
80 “The understanding of religion “as a private affair”, is constitutive of Western modernity in a dual sense. First, it points to the fact that 
religious freedom, in the sense of freedom of conscience, is chronologically “the first freedom” as well as the preconception of all modern 
freedoms. Insofar as freedom of conscience is intrinsically related to the “right to privacy” – to the modern institutionalization of a private 
sphere from governmental intrusion as well as free from ecclesiastical control – and inasmuch as “the right to privacy” serves as the very 
foundation  of  modern  liberalism  and  of  modern  individualism,  then  indeed  the  privatization  of  religion  is  essential  to  modernity.” 
(Casanova 1994: 4, emphasis in original) 
81 Deprivatization connotes the process of religions assuming and maintaining a role in the public sphere of modern states. PART B | 66 
In consequence, the evolution of a viable politico-religious value synthesis attainable through the acceptance of 
a shared symbolic system called civil religion (political culture) has been hypothesized as likely to emerge in a 
nation characterized by pluralism
82. The emergent generalized beliefs and symbols of the civil religion (or 
political culture) would transcend particularistic religious worldviews, linguistic affiliations, and ethnic loyalties 
(Purdy 1984: 24)  – and thereby tie together diverse social groups and legitimate the authority of the state. 
Following Berger and Luckmann (1967: 43 in Purdy 1984: 24), civil religion may be identified as a legitimating 
symbolic universe: “Symbolic universes are socially objectivated systems of meaning that refer, on the one 
hand, to the world of everyday life and point, on the other hand, to a world that is experienced as transcending 
everyday life.”  
Critics  of  the  civil  religion  concept  see  it  as  “socially  constructed  myth”  (Fenn  1974  in  Purdy  1984:  27), 
representing rather a phenomenon responding to episodic crisis of legitimation than an overarching enduring 
legitimator of power and authority in a polity. Although “partial ideologies may serve the interests of certain 
groups  in  modern  societies,  the  possibility  of  a  “total  ideology”  which  could  “mobilize  the  passion  and 
intelligence of an entire population” is remote (Fenn 1974: 16 in Purdy 1984: 28) As a functional claim for civil 
religion is that of “legitimacy”  – the current study critically notes that civil religion  in Indonesia does not 
necessarily function as integrator – more as legitimator of authority or the common Grundnorm (Habibie 2011, 
Zoelva 2010) to cement the power of the ruling elites and to balance the social forces that seem to drift apart 
at points of crisis.  
In 1945, the official stance on religion as codified in the first principle emerged as a compromise between 
proponents of political Islam and those who had secular-nationalist visions of the state - although they were 
Muslims as well for the most part. “The compromise entailed making Indonesia an expressly religious nation 
without  making  any  particular  faith  the  religion  of  the  state.”  (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers:  1987:  16-17)  In 
consequence, since Indonesian independence, a new element has been introduced into the traditional and 
colonial religious picture in Indonesia. Atkinson (1983: 686), Purdy (1984), and Schindehütte (2006) call the 
result of this policy a “civil religion”.  
For the purpose of this study, I define the Pancasila, and especially the first principle, the state motto (Bhinekka 
Tunggal Ika), and all efforts undertaken by the governments to implement the principle in policies, legislation, 
and education, as civil religion or national culture. As Pancasila seems to provide the glue that guarantees 
public order, the principles have been understood here as a civil religion (national culture) that functions to 
legitimize the authority of social and societal institutions in the Indonesian nation state. (Atkinson 1983; Purdy 
1984; Steenbrink 2001; Schindehütte 2006) However, one has to be aware, that in 1945, 1966 and 1998-1999, 
“there  was  a  willingness  to  relinquish  one’s  particularistic  religious  or  regional  identity  in  support  of  the 
nation’s motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, unity in diversity, yet there were and are deviations from this tendency.” 
(Purdy  1984:  19)  Purdy  (1984)  and  Steenbrink  (1990  in  Schindehütte  2006:  75)  point  to  the  diverse 
interpretations of Pancasila during national history.  
Public religion 
There are two different meanings of the concept of public religion: first, as a form of civic faith, and second, as 
expression of religion in the public sphere. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) Of relevance to the present study are 
both meanings of the term. Similarly to the American founding fathers, but with an entirely different socio-
cultural background and motivation, the Indonesian founding fathers believed that unless moral values were 
present in society, the constitution would be ineffective. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) As religion is concerned 
with the common good, this common good was to be part of the public religion, which was to be demonstrated 
in the education system and in citizens’ voluntary actions (Marty 1999: 393-4 in Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107). As 
the role of religion is “to help form good citizens and shape the common life” (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107), this 
function of public religion is exemplarily demonstrated in the first principle and in the educational policies, 
which set a spiritual and religious goal of education in Indonesia.  
   
                                                 
82 “Until fairly recently, many scholars believed that religious diversity destabilized religious faith and with it the social and political order. 
Only in societies with a common faith would religion function as a sort of social glue, binding a nation and its people around shared myths, 
theologies, and rites”. (Prothero 2006: 8) In modern societies, where religions compete within traditional and contemporary plurality, any 
given religion would undergo a crisis of credibility, because “*r+eligions can legitimate the state and stabilize the social order only when 
they  carry  with  them  the  transcendent  power  of  the  sacred”  (Prothero  2006:  8)  -  in  theory,  religious  plurality  results  in  a  crisis  of 
legitimacy. However, Prothero shows how pluralism and plausibility can go hand in hand and that religious diversity does not lead to 
inevitably secularization. PART B | 67 
The second concept of public religion refers to one side of the distinction between public and private in social 
research. “Public religion has to do with expressions of religious faith or behavior in the public sphere made by 
individuals,  communities,  voluntary  associations,  or  governmental  agencies  (the  state)”.  (Furseth/Repstad 
2007: 107) “The novelty of modernity derives precisely from the emergence of an amorphous complex, yet 
autonomous sphere, the “civil society” or “the social”, which stands “between public and private proper”, yet 
has expansionist tendencies aiming to penetrate and absorb both”. (Casanova 1994: 42, emphasis in original) 
Using a historical approach, Casanova (1994) divides society into three spheres – the state, political society, and 
civil  society
83. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107)  Those three spheres are characterized by highly porous and 
constantly shifting boundaries. “Indeed, each of the three spheres may be said to have both private and public 
dimensions”. (Casanova 1994: 42)  
 
In this, a modern polity is conceptualized here as consisting of three differentiated public arenas: the state, 
political society, and civil society. The public sphere provides a broad arena for action. Because the public space 
is a constitutive dimension of each of these arenas, we can locate religion in each of the three public spheres of 
the polity; as a consequence, public religions can perform in every sphere or arena - but this is not necessarily 
true for all societies. (Casanova 1994; Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) The term public sphere refers to “the site 
where contest take place over the definition of the obligations, rights, and especially notions of justice that 
members of society require for the common good to be realized”. (Eickelmann/Salvatore 2004: 5 in Hilmy 
2010: 213) This definition assumes the participation of all segments of society, including Islamists, along with 
the process of defining the common good. However, the concept of the public sphere has been commonly 
conflated with the concept of civil society. (Hilmy 2010: 213) Civil society entails a public sphere, but not every 
public sphere entails a civil society (Eisenstadt 2002: 141 in Hilmy 2010: 213)  
 
Christian state religions or churches, serve as well known example of public religions in the sphere of the state, 
whereas in the arena of political society public religions are institutionalized in political parties competing with 
other religious or secular parties or are mobilized as a movement against other religions or secular movements. 
In the economic arena, public religion may protest against exploitation and claim morals to be introduced into 
the regulation of the free (from God and morals) and capitalist market. And, in the family, religion belongs to 
the private sphere. (Casanova 1994; Stepan 2001; Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) 
 
In Indonesia we find at the level of the state a civil religion as expressed in the first principle of Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa. At the level of the political society we find the Pancasila, political Islam, institutions of all six state 
funded religions, whereas in civil society religion went public expressed in public Islam, political Islam, and all 
associations and institutions of all six state funded religions and not state funded religions. (Smith-Kipp 1982; 
Howell 1978; 1982; 2003) Whereas “the religious remains … a separated area of life in the West” (Pocock 1973: 
xiii, emphasis in original, in Scheifinger 2009: 4; see also Casanova 1994; Stepan 2001), this separation between 
the secular sphere and the religious sphere is not to be found in the Pancasila State
84. The idea of making the 
public sphere more Islamic is driven mainly by the basic nature of Islam as a communal religion. (Hilmy 2010: 
217) 
 
In post-New Order Indonesia Hefner (2000) sees an effort reinvigorating the old paradigm of the state with a 
new spirit of public Islam. (Hilmy 2010: 67) Despite thirty years of authoritarian rule, Hefner emphasizes that 
“Indonesia can develop a democracy of its own, not a secular or liberal one as it is commonly understood in the 
Western literature” (Hilmy 2010: 66) Rather than relegating Islam to the realm of the private, Indonesian 
Muslims use a “middle-path between liberalism’s privatization and conservative Islam’s bully state. The path 
passes by way of public religion that makes itself heard through independent associations, spirited public 
dialogue, and the demonstrated decency of believers.” (Hefner 2000: 18 in Hilmy 2010: 67)  
   
                                                 
83 In this context, Stepan (2001) identified five interconnected, mutually supporting arenas to consolidate democracy during democratic 
transition: Civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic society. 
84 “Although there is the tendency to interpret “the “deprivatization” of modern religion as anti-modern fundamentalist reactions to 
inevitable processes of modern differentiation”(Casanova 1994:43), Casanova decidedly argues for a role of religion in the public sphere, 
and the benefit of religious critiques in modern public life “some forms of “public religion” may also be understood as counterfactual 
normative critiques of dominant historical trends, in many respects similar to the classical, republican, and feminist critiques”(Casanova 
1994: 43). Therefore it is insufficient to measure the “public impact of those religious critiques (…) in terms of the ability of any religion to 
impose its agenda upon society or to press its global normative claims upon the autonomous spheres”(Casanova 1994: 43).  PART B | 68 
In other words, Indonesia’s democracy will be characterized by the integrality of religion and public life. Secular 
democracy assumes the retreat of religion from the public stage to the privacy of personal belief. Therefore, 
the political discourse, Muslims are forging is not identical to that of Western liberalism. The questions to be 
addressed then are according to Hilmy (2010: 68-9), “how or in what ways Islam might be promoted as a 
source for ethical values in public life”, and about “the significance of Islam in forging good governance or 
democracy at state level”.  
 
The emergence of Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia in one way or another signifies the emergence of 
public Islam. In contrast to what Hefner categorizes as “Civil Islam”, which tends to denote civil society, “public 
Islam” in the context of Islamism refers to the Islamist struggles to put Islam at the centre of the public domain. 
Central to the notion of public Islam is the Islamists’ quest for the implementation of the Syari’ah law, believed 
to be the quintessence of Islam, in the public sphere, either by means of existing political structures, namely 
the state and its apparatus, or non-political structures, that is, society at large. As far as Indonesian Islamists 
are concerned, there will always be deliberate efforts by the Islamists to champion Islam as the only blue-print 
for the whole society amid the various public discourses over what constitutes the common good. (Hilmy 2010: 
213; Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2010) Under these circumstances, democratic participation becomes necessary 
for all elements of society to negotiate and interact with one another concerning the definition of the public 
good. In this context, civil society can serve as a watchdog element in democratic societies, to give checks and 
balances and too see that public matters in the public sphere are properly dealt with by government. (Hilmy 
2010: 214) 
Spirited politics and spirited education 
The intersection of religion, ethnicity, and nationalism in Southeast Asia and Indonesian public life shows how 
religion and politics serve each other and how religious plurality can be constructed retaining credibility and 
plausibility. “In Indonesia, debates and attempts to reform the state imply a broad and deep-seated view of the 
state as the desired public arbiter and defender of religious values
85. (Wilford/George 2005) Religions and 
people who think that religion has to play a role on the political agenda are provided a room to maneuver in 
the Indonesian nation state. If seeking room for maneuver is interpreted as attempt to find political footing, it 
does not naturally imply opposition or resistance, because individuals and groups are calculating or complicit in 
using the state to advance their interests, when working publicly for legal and cultural change in li ne with their 
religious concerns. (Wilford/George 2005) 
“Although  there  is  the  tendency  to  interpret  “the  “deprivatization”  of  modern  religion  as  anti-modern 
fundamentalist  reactions  to  inevitable  processes  of  modern  differentiation”(Casanova  1994:43),  Casanova 
decidedly argues for a role of religion in the public sphere, and the benefit of religious critiques in modern 
public life “some forms of “public religion” may also be understood as counterfactual normative critiques of 
dominant  historical  trends,  in  many  respects  similar  to  the  classical,  republican,  and  feminist 
critiques”(Casanova 1994: 43). Therefore it is insufficient to measure the “public impact of those religious 
critiques (…) in terms of the ability of any religion to impose its agenda upon society or to press its global 
normative claims upon the autonomous spheres”. (Casanova 1994: 43).  
A common feature of Southeast Asian everyday politics is that the dimensions of religion and religious reform 
which are used by elites in various public arenas to articulate and re-articulate the hierarchies and boundaries 
of shifting class and kinship relations. Religious discourse is not only a feature of private life worlds, but a facet 
of the public sphere and politics, “both in colonial settings and in the “derivative” postcolonial nationalisms”. 
(Willford/ George 2005: 16, emphasis in original) In this light, nation-state and public sphere are proactively 
used as arenas for religious and social reform. (Hilmy 2010)    
                                                 
85  On  the  integration  of  political  Islam  in  Indonesia,  see  Hilmy  2010:  Islamism  and  Democracy  in  Indonesia.  Piety  and  pragmatism. 
Singapore: ISEAS; Pepinsky/Liddle R. William/Mujani, Saiful: 2009. Testing Political Islam’s Economic Advantage: the case of Indonesia, 
www.lsi.or.id (25.04.2010); Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2010. Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam, www.lsi.or.id 
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The public sphere of religious discourse is a hierarchical arena in which elite figures attempt to speak for public 
interests, projects, and values and so install themselves as authoritative class of moral, political, and cultural 
interpreters. Notably these elites can dominate sites of religious discourse, such as courts, schools, universities, 
art galleries, publications or broadcast media means that they are able to control the ideological and discursive 
traffic within and between nation-states and across transnational religious communities. (Willford/ George 
2005: 16, emphasis in original) 
The politics of religion has a long history in Indonesia (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers 1987: 15), leaders in both the New 
Order and the old have used religion to legitimize or to attain their goals. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 20) 
Spirited  politics  and  spirited  education  are  two  salient  features  characterizing  Indonesian  contemporary 
politics. Religionis a dominant factor in the everyday life of Indonesians and the diverging system of values has 
a  long  history  in  which  almost  all  world  religions  left  an  imprint.  Starting  with  the  Indonesian  national 
movement  and  independence  up  to  the  era  of  democratization,  the  process  of  modernization  and  social 
change questions the validity of traditional values and communal conditions. (Howell 1978) Hence, a value-
vacuum or/and conflicts of values arise concurrently with an intense quest for answers to such value-related 
conflicts.  This  implicates  that  competing  systems  of  values,  public  religion,  and  a  religious  dimension  of 
education  are  determining  factors  in  national  politics,  as  the  Basic  Law  and  national  development  plans 
position religion to be the first national value to be realized in society, nation, and state. 
Spirited politics refers to the neat intertwinement of state and religion as basic feature of Indonesian society 
and its political culture, as religion, tradition, and law do not follow the separation of state and religion as in 
the European model, but found their own model to organize the liaison between state and religion. (Zoelva 
Interview  2011)  Religion  served  a  central  social  function  of  integration  in  the  spirited  communal  Indo 
Melanesian cultures, and it plays a significant and vital role in contesting and supporting national unity and 
integration today. Another feature of spirited politics is a tendency to acculturation in religious issues. It is a 
well-known topic that Javanese culture assimilated foreign religious influences to a point that it melted with 
the autochthonous underlying tradition which was pertained in an acculturated manner (Franke 2006). In other 
words, the encounter of resilient local religious traditions with Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and the nation 
state  results  in  contemporary  “spirited  politics”  (Willford/George  2005)  or  “spiritualized  politics”.  (H￤user-
Schäublin 2011) A result of  spirited politics is spiritual  education as the specific Indonesian conception of 
education outlined in the Basic Law and legislation pertaining to education and the religion class. 
4.1.2. Note on Indonesian Islam 
“We must consider, too, the politics internal to Islam and internal to those ethnic groups that define 
themselves as Muslims.” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 25) 
 
The current study is not about Islam or Indonesian Islam. Yet, given the religious demography of Indonesia, an 
understanding of the cultural variants within Islam and Indonesian Islam is crucial to an understanding of 
religious education. The Islamic Shafi’i culture resulted in various interpretations of Islam as the examples of 
Islamic  mass  organizations  Nadhlatul  Ulama,  Muhammadiyah  and  the  Indonesian  Council  of  Ulema 
demonstrate.  Dutch  colonialism  led  to  the  politization  of  Islam  and  religion  in  general,  a  tendency  that 
continues until today. The post-1949 nation-building efforts introduced the discrimination between religion 
(agama) and belief (kepercayaan). The discrimination is entirely Islamic, as agama is a revealed religion and 
kepercayaan is interpreted as man-made.  Following years of De-Islamization and depolitization during the 
Suharto regime, Islam went public again in the 1970s. In the Indonesian political and public space today, we 
find public Islam and political Islam.  
The present study suspects all religions to be multifaceted and multivocal. (Stepan 2000; Hilmy 2010: 30) 
Esposito stresses that Islam is not a monolithic bloc. (Esposito 2009) According to Esposito, in doing research on 
Islam, the question “whose Islam” has to be answered first because Islam is presented through the voices and 
representatives of Muslim groups and individuals. In this light, Moosa (2003 in Hilmy 2010: 30) and al-Azmeh 
(1993 in Hilmy 2010: 30) note that “there are many ‘islams’ with a small ‘i’, and many Muslims with differences 
in their practices and understandings, since each person or Muslim community appropriates the discursive 
tradition  differently.”  Thus,  Olivier  Roy  (2004:  9  in  Hilmy  2010:  30)  holds  that  “the  many  Islams  (liberal, 
fundamentalist, conservative) with which we are familiar are more a construction than a reality”. However, all 
Muslims regard the al-Quran to be the central religious text which has been revealed to Prophet Muhammad. 
So, which Islam do we encounter then in Indonesia?  
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Since Islam is in itself multivocal, so is Islam in Indonesia. The established liberal Muslim intellectual Madjid 
notes, Indonesia is in religious terms the largest Muslim nation located at the very East of the Islamic belt 
stretching  from  Morocco  to  South  East  Asia.  But  the  state  is  “the  least  Arabicized  of  the  major  Islamic 
countries, in addition from being geographically farthest from the Holy Lands”, (Madjid 1994: 59), thus one 
may not overlook “the cultural diversity within the unity of Islamic civilization”. (Tibi 1995) “Apart from its core 
center in the Middle East, Islamic civilization has given rise to different cultural zones in West and East Africa, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Europe
86”, but all “these cultural zones are 
religiously and culturally very much influenced by the Middle Eastern core region.” (Tibi 1995)  
Tibi sees this caused by the fact that the al-Quran was revealed in Arabic language and Arabia was the place 
where the revelation took place. As a visible sign non-Arab Sunnites (90 percent of all Sunnites) have an Arab or 
Arabic name. (Tibi 1995, Madjid 1994) The majority of Indonesian Muslims are Sunnite. Most Indonesians 
belong to the Shafi’i school of law/confession of Sunnism
87. (Tibi 1995) 241 million Indonesians (Lumbard 2010: 
50) are Muslims and also part of 300 different ethnic cultures. That is  why the great cultural variety is a main 
characteristic of Indonesian Islam. 
To demonstrate the significance of the Indonesian liaison between state and religion, I found it helpful to 
present Indonesian Islam in a global context. Today, worldwide 1.57 billion Muslims live, who represent 23% of 
an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion (Pew Oct 2009). Whereas the majority (62%) of the global 
Muslim population is located in the Asia-Pacific region
88, only 20% live in the Middle East and North Africa, the 
region with the highest percentage of Muslim -majority countries (Pew October 2009: 1). Of the total Muslim 
population the majority are Sunnis, while an estimated 10 -13% percent belong to the Shiite minority
89. The 
graphic gives on overview of the distribution of Muslims on the globe.    
                                                 
86 Like other religions, Islam is a multivocal religion that can provide institutional and intellectual resources in support of democracy and 
vice versa (Hilmy 2010: 29; Stepan 2001) This multivocal nature of Islam means at any point in time, the dominant voices in Islam might 
prove more or less receptive to the basic principle of democracy. (Hilmy 2010: 29) Thus there might be no “Islamic exceptionalism” when it 
comes to democracy but probably “Arab exceptionalism” (Stepan/Robertson 2004: 140-146 in Hilmy 2010: 29) Stepan/Robertson’s (2004: 
140-146 in Hilmy 2010: 29) statistical assessment shows that “a non-Arab Muslim-majority country was almost twenty times more likely to 
be ‘electorally competitive’ than an Arab Muslim-majority country. Of the forty-seven Muslim majority countries, six (non Arab) were 
found to be “electorally competitive”: Turkey, Senegal, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, and Niger”. Given the remarkable achievements in 
developing its democracy, Indonesia is considered a “semi-democracy in the World Values Survey, a category used to describe fourty-seven 
countries around the globe that have experienced democracy for less than twenty years and have current Freedom House ratings of 3.5 to 
5.5. (Hilmy 2010: 65) Freedom House describes them in 2009 as free to indicate that these countries subscribe to “full-fledged democracy”. 
(Freedom House 2009; Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2009: 20) According to Hilmy (2010: 65), the assumption that Islam, as the majority religion 
in Indonesia, is responsible for the slow process of democratization is theoretically unfounded. (Hilmy 2010: 65) 
87 Sunni and Shiite Islam comprise the two main streams within Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed around a dispute ov er 
leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Gradually  the political divide between both groups 
broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices. While the two sects are similar in many  ways, they 
differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants. For readers 
seeking more detail on categories commonly used, Sunnis include followers of the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence as well as the Wahhabi or Salafi movement. Shia include Ithna Asharis (Twelvers), Ismailis, Zaydis, Alevis and Alawites. There 
also are a few Muslim groups that are difficult to classify as either Sunni or Shia. (PEW October 2009: 1-2, 8-9; Esposito, John/Kalin, Ibrahim 
2009: 11-19) 
88 The Pew Center includes 51 Asian and Pacific countries into the Asia-Pacific region: East Asian countries as China, Taiwan, Japan, South- 
and Southeast Asian countries, Polynesia and Oceania, but also countries located west as Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey. For a c omplete 
breakdown of countries by region, see Pew October 2009: 12 and 27 
89 Data on sectarian affiliation have been infrequently collected or, in many countries, not collected at all. Therefore, the Su nni and Shiite 
numbers reported here are expressed as broad ranges  and should be treated as approximate. Pew Center finds that most Shiite people 
(between 68% and 80%) live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq. Between 116 million and 147 million Shiite s live in Asia, 
representing about three-quarters of the world’s Shiite population (note that Iran is included in the Asia-Pacific region). Meanwhile, nearly 
a quarter of the world’s Shiite (36 million to 44 million) live in the Middle East-North Africa. (PEW Research October 2009: 1) PART B | 71 
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Muslims  living  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  constitute 
62%  of  all  Muslims  worldwide.  About  half  of  the 
Muslim  population  within  Asia  lives  in  South  Asia 
(50%)  and  the  remainder  are  somewhat  equally 
divided  between  Southeast-East  Asia  (26%)  and 
Central-Western Asia (24%). The six Asian countries 
with  the  largest  Muslim  populations  are:  Indonesia 
(241  million  (Lumbard  2010:  50
90),  Pakistan  (174 
million), India (161 million), Bangladesh (145 million), 
Iran (74 million), and Turkey (74 million). (PEW Oct 
2009: 5) Together these six countries are home to 
about  85%  of  Asia’s  Muslim  population  and  more 
than  half  (53%)  of  the  global  Muslim  population. 
(PEW Oct 2009: 6;13). Indonesia is the nation with the 
world’s largest Muslim population; this is to say that 
about  13%  of  all  Muslims  in  the  world  live  in 
Indonesia.  Indonesia’s  Muslim  population  accounts 
for about 80% of all Muslims living in Southeast-East 
Asia. (Pew Oct 2009: 13)  
 
http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Muslim-Population-of 
Indonesia.aspx 
In the third edition of the 500 most influential Muslims (Lumbard 2010: 31-33), incumbent president Dr Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono ranks at top 9, among others following the king of Saudia-Arabia, the Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan, Ayotallah Khomeini, the king of Jordan, and the Grand Imam of the Al Azhar Mosque Prof. el-
Thayeb. Top 19 is held by Dr KH Said Aquil Siradj, who “guides millions through his work” (Lumbard 2010 : 70) 
as  Chairman  of  Nahdlatul  Ulama
91,  Indonesia’s  movement  of  traditional  Sunni  thought  with  30  million 
members. It exaggerates influence in administration, politics, and education.  
   
                                                 
90 PEW (Oct 2009) states 203 million, but the data refers to the 2000 census.  
91 In 1926, the Nadhlatul Ulama (Awakening of Ulama) was established as an organization for traditional orthodox Muslims opposed to the 
policies  of  the  modernist  Muhammadiyah  organization,  which  explicitly  rejected  pre-Islamic  Javanese  traditions.  According  to  their 
website, membership amounts to estimated 40 million members. The network covers 30 regions with 339 branches, 12 special branches, 
2,630 representative councils, and 37,125 subbranch representative councils across Indonesia. (Lumbard 2010 : 70) This network practices 
the doctrine of Ahlas Sunnah w’al Jama’ah, which is Arabic for “people of the Sunna (practices of the Prophet Muhammad) and the 
community”. They base their practices on the traditional sources of Islamic jurisprudence — mainly the Qur’an, Hadith, and major schools 
of law. Therefore the NU is commonly described as the example of Indonesian Islamic Traditionalism. With a mainly rural membership 
base, the Nahdlatul Ulama distinguishes itself from other Islamic organizations in Indonesia by positioning itself as a premier organization 
of traditional Islam—with an emphasis on education and political engagement based on Islamic principles. (Lumbard 2010 : 70) PART B | 72 
The NU may be characterized as “Indonesia’s largest independent Muslim organization and one of the world’s 
most influential Islamic organizations“. (Lumbard 2010: 70) Dr M Din Syamsuddin, who acts as Chairman of the 
Muhammadiyah
92, the second largest socio-religious organization in Indonesia, and as vice general chair of the 
Indonesian Council of Ulama 
93 (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) ranks top 39. MUI is an organization consisting 
of  Islamic  clerics  and  Muslim  intellectuals  who  aim  to  reach  the  common  goals  of  Islam  in  Indonesia. 
Syamsuddin‘s opposition to religious pluralism has guided his work, taking the Muhammadiyah on a more 
conservative track. (Lumbard 2010: 90)  
 
Since the downfall of Suharto, there is ample proof for a quite un-pluralistic fraction or hard-liners in the 
Indonesian Muslim community splitting the whole nation in factions. The Islamic fundamental movement and 
its organizations that are working towards an Islamic state in Indonesia constitute a hindering aspect for the 
development of  religious pluralism and delay to some extent the efforts in promoting religious pluralism. 
(Nahrowi 2005; Yang 2005) In Indonesian Islam a classic distinction is made between traditionalist-contextual 
and modernist fractions. The traditionalist fractions tend to practice contextual Islam. (Hooker 1978; 2003; 
Hosen 2005; Hasan 2008; Hilmy 2010) In the modernist Islamic community,  ukhuwah Islamiyah, there are 
broadly speaking two fractions, those with pan-Islamic purist to fundamental interpretations (Wahhabites and 
Salafis) and those with a nationalist or Pancasilaistic understanding.  
 
The first comprises people that emphasize the priority of solidarity within the pan-Islamic community. They call 
on the state to protect this community against violations and intrusions that come in the form of efforts to 
convert Muslims, to urge them to marry outside the community, or to break up Islamic organizations under 
pretence of antiterrorism actions. (Bowen: 2004) Supporters of the second line of thought, are aware of  a 
critical  way  of  thinking  and  have  an  alternative  notion  of  ukhuwah,  understood  as  the  community  of  all 
Indonesians  rather  than  just  Indonesian  Muslims  by  referring  to  the  Constitution  of  Medina  of  prophet 
Muhammad, under which Jews and adherents to other religions lived together with Muslims, as a charter for 
an Islamic theory of religious pluralism. (Bowen: 2004) 
 
Following the peak of religiously legitimated violence after 1998, the government, human agents, and NGOs 
put  the  task  to  redefine  “harmony  of  religious  life”  (Hasan  2008:  26)  or  the  co-existence  of  religious 
communities into action. This effort faces opposition from Islamist understanding. The Indonesian Council of 
Ulama issued 11 fatwa (religious decrees) in July 2005. These decrees arouse controversies and heated debates 
because three of these fatwa were highly controversial as they banned secularism, pluralism, and religious 
liberalism. The Indonesian Ulama’ Council considered these things as bad because they only employ rational 
ways of thinking freely, not religious-based thinking. (Nahrowi 2005) The Council defined secularism as concept 
that  considers  religion  only  to  be  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  religion  and  God,  while  the 
relationship  among  humans  is  not  a  religious  concern.  Additionally,  the  Council  defined  pluralism  as  the 
concept that every religion is the same, and characteristically relativistic so that no one can claim the truth of 
the religion. (Nahrowi 2005: 10) A controversial issue is primarily about the definition that the Council uses to 
define pluralism.  
   
                                                 
92 The Muhammadiyah represents the modernist Sunni school of thought and the organization has over 28 million members. It operates in 
the health and education sector, maintains 5,754 affiliate schools, and 5 Islamic universities, and runs numerous medical clinics and 
hospitals across the country. (Lumbard 2010: 90) 
93 To strengthen its hegemony over society and expand its power and control, the New Order attempted to domesticate the social force of 
religious Muslim scholars (ulama) during the early 1970s. They proposed the creation of a semi-governmental body, the Indonesian Council 
of  Ulama  (Majelis  Ulama  Indonesia,  MUI)  assigned  with  the  function  of  issuing  religious  legal  opinions  (fatwas)  and  religious  advice 
(tausiyah). In 1970, the Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation (Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia), a body established by the  
Ministry of Religious Affairs announced this idea to the public during a national conference. During a second national conference, Minister 
of  Religion  Mukti  Ali  facilitated  another  conference  of  Muslim  preachers  in  1974.  “Suharto  delivered  the  opening  address  at  this 
conference, in which he insisted on the need for a nationwide body of ulama that could serve as, among other functions, the translator of 
the concepts and activities of development as well as the mediator between the government and ulama”. (Ichwan 2005 in Hasan 2008: 26). 
At this time, MUI was expected to be the representative of Muslims in inter-religious dialogues. Launched by Minister Mukti Ali, those 
interreligious dialogues aimed to build ‘the harmony of religious life’, that is, the peaceful coexistence of religious groups (Mujiburrahman 
2006 in Hasan 2008: 26). The Indonesian Ulama’ Council was founded as an organization on July 26, 1975. The nature of the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia as a body whose creation was instigated by the New Order regime was soon visible. It was involved in polemics and issued a 
number of (controversial) fatwa legitimizing government policies (Mudzhar 1993 in Hasan 2008: 26). On the early fatwa see Hooker 2003; 
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Practicing contextual Muslims argued, the Council could not ban Muslims from thinking, because pluralism, 
liberalism, and secularism are not ideologies but ways of thinking and they hold that these fatwa are against 
freedom of expression and human rights in general
94. (Nahrowi 2005: 10) On top of that the Council banned 
Ahamadiyah’s doctrine and forbid collective inter-faith prayer
95. Although these fatwa are not legally binding in 
Indonesia, they are an important source of guidance for many Muslims and “the inclination to follow these 
decrees without any critical thinking has undeniably occurred” (Nahrowi 2005) and there is a tendency towards 
increasing support of Islamic radical groups and even religiously motivated violence.  
 
A tiny but voiced minority of Muslims is involved with fundamentalist organizations that use violence. There 
are dozens of militia-type organizations, the most prominent have been the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and 
Laskar Jihad. The underground radical Islamic network that allegedly cooperates with the Al-Qaeda network, 
which is classified as terroristic by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, at the U.S. Department 
of State, is Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI)
96. (Crouch 2003: 23) Although JI remained underground, in August 2000 Abu 
Bakar  Ba’asyir  established  the  ‘above-ground’  Indonesian  Mujahedin  Council  comprising  various 
fundamentalist  groups,  of  which  nevertheless  not  all  advocate  violence.  (Crouch  2003:  23)
97  The religious 
radicalism in society can be explained through a trend to literally interpret the Al -Quran hence ignoring the 
context, to be syari’ah (Islamic law) minded and anti-pluralist. Considering that, it is a tough task to establish 
religious pluralism within the exclusive Islamic radical community. (Nahrowi 2005; Yang 2005; Hasan 2008) 
 
According to the liberal Muslim Ulil Abshar Abdallah (JIL) the claims to establish a Islamic states are not to be 
taken to serious, “they are a mouse which roars like a tiger” (Schindehütte 2006: 77; 77 FN 81) Likewise, Zoelva 
(Interview  2010)  whose  party  advocated  the  Jakarta  Charter  (the  constitutional  obligation  for  Indonesian 
Muslims to follow the syari’ah) in 1999, rejects my suggestion that Indonesia would drift slowly towards an 
Islamic State as “Impossible!”. First, in 1945 during the foundation of the state, the issue was actually not 
whether a state based on Islam shall be established, but that a state based on belief in One Supreme Lordship 
shall be established, which regulates the obligation for the Muslim population to follow Islamic law (syari’ah). 
Second, because Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s “ultra-right” model of Mujahidin only has a few followers and therefore 
no influence at all. “Even if he travels the country and holds speeches everywhere, still, he has no considerable 
influence”.  (Zoelva  Interview  201o)  The  fractionalization  of  Indonesian  Muslims  exemplarily  shows  that 
“religion is an area of power contestation over religious meanings and truth”, as “the process of reconstruction 
and deconstruction play an integral part in the making of religious dogma. In other words, religious concepts 
are subject to public contestation” (Hilmy 2010: 31) “The process of confirmation, challenge, and validation of 
religious concepts will continue as long as an institutional mechanism for such processes exists.” (Hilmy 2010: 
31) 
   
                                                 
94 The Jakarta Post 2005: MUI’s fatwa encourage use of violence, in: The Jakarta Post.com, August 1, 2005 in: Nahrowi 2005: 10 
95 MUI considered that such prayer is  halal (allowed) only if the leader of the prayer is Muslim. Yet, if another religious leader leads a 
prayer, it is prohibited for Muslims to participate. 
96 Compare from the terrorism designation list at (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/); for additional detailed information on Indonesia n Islamic 
networks see International Crisis Group reports and briefings (http://www.crisisgroup.org/) 
97 See also Hasan 2008; Hilmy 2010; International Crisis Group reports and briefings (www.crisisgroup.org/); Conboy, Ken 2006: The Second 
Front. Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous terrorist Network. Jakarta: Equinox; Manullang, A.C. Terrorism & Perang Intellijen. Behauptung ohne 
Beweis.  Jakarta:  Manna  Zaitun;  Rohan/Gunaratna2003:  Inside  Al  Qaeda.  Global  Nework  on  Terror.  New  York:  Berkley  Books; 
Ramakrishna/Tan 2003: After Bali. The threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia. Institue of Defense and Strategic Studies: Singapore; Liddle, 
William 1996: The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, in: Journal of Asian Studies, 55: 3 (Aug. 1999), 613-634; Liddle, 
William/Mujani, Saiful 2007: Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behaviour in Indonesia, in: Comparative Political Studies 40 
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4.2. Indonesia: Between Public Islam and Civil religion (1945-2009) 
The Indonesian government’s religion policy stands as a significant example of the diversity that actually exists 
in the Muslim world in the handling of religion-state relationships, notwithstanding the ideal that for Muslims 
God’s truth as revealed in the Quran should shape every aspect of social life. (Howell 2003: 1) 
 
The religious charter of Indonesia is a cultural model for inclusiveness; but in a profound way its application is 
exclusive. The policy covers only world religions presumed to be monotheistic, to possess a written scripture, 
and to transcend ethnic boundaries.  
(Atkinson 1983: 688) 
This chapter discusses the specific Indonesian pattern of organizing the state-religion liaison. The Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI) is neither a country based on one 
religion (Indonesia is neither a theocracy, nor an Islamic republic) nor is it a laicist or secular state that fosters a 
separation between state and religion. As Islam was important in mobilizing resistance to the colonial Dutch 
government, this role of Islam has been recognized in the 1945 Constitution, which commits the state to 
supporting religion.In consequence, Indonesia is a religious state. However, considering ethnic and religious 
diversity, Indonesia’s founding fathers did not use the Arabic term ‘Allah’ to refer to ‘God’ in the Constitution, 
(Howell 2003: 1) and over several decades, ‘religion’ (‘agama’) has beenlegally and administratively concretized 
in  six  specific  religions:  Islam,  Protestantism,  Catholicism,  Hinduism,  Buddhism  and  Confucianism.  Thus, 
according to Howell (2003: 1), the country implements a policy of what might be called “delimited pluralism” – 
or  authoritarian  pluralism  -  since  the  inception  of  Indonesia’s  New  Order  (1966-1998),  which  imposes  on 
citizens the obligation to acknowledge one out of “a limited number of world religions”. (Howell 2003: 1) 
Whereas Indian law courts have faced difficulties regarding the nature of religion, (Scheifinger 2009: 4) in 
Indonesia, the  Ministry of Religious Affairs had formalized the Indonesian concept  of religion in the term 
agama in 1952, Parliamentary Decision in 1960 (KetetapanMPRS No. II/1960) defined agama as to be universal, 
Presidential Decision 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration guaranteed state funding to six 
religions,  and  this  legislation  has  been  has  by  the  Constitutional  Court  in  April  2010.  The  debates  and 
discussions evolving around the retaining of the contested legislation to acknowledge only six religions and to 
propagate a state-sponsored version of each faith tradition, in order to secure public order, show the problems 
states and law systems face regarding the term religion. In the following, a list of regulations pertaining to the 
definition and management of religion in Indonesia is provided. 
 
1.) The amended 1945 basic law is the highest law of the Republic of Indonesia. In its preamble five principles 
(Pancasila)  are  enshrined  as  national  basic  norm  (Grundnorm,  Habibie  2011,  Zoelva  Interview  2010)  -  all 
consequential  legislation  must  be  in  line  with  those  principles.  The  first  principle,  faith  in  One  Supreme 
Lordship, “inspires (menjiwai) other four principles” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 15), and it “lays out the moral 
base for state and government and guarantees national unity basing on religiousness”
98; thereby it prescribes 
national monotheism or monism and a religious, but not a confessional base for the state.  
 
2.) In similar fashion to the first principle, Article 29 (1) on religion of the 1945 Basic Law states “the state is 
based in faith in One Supreme Lordship” and in this, again national monotheism and a religious base for the 
state are codified by the Basic Law. During the second amendment, the parliament approved retaining the 
original language of Article 29 on religion, thereby rejecting efforts to establish a constitutional basis for an 
Islamic state. Further, as a crucial part of the Basic Law, Article 29 (2) imparts the right to freedom of religion 
and belief. It states that the state guarantees every citizen (penduduk) the freedom to embrace a respective 
religion (memeluk agama masing.masing) and to do religious service according to that agamaor belief system 
(kepercayaan). The Article, however, introduces a specific Islamic discrimination between revealed religion 
(agama) and man-made faith or belief system (kepercayaan). Thereby it limits religious freedom as it is codified 
in Human Rights instruments. “Religious freedom is guaranteed to all Indonesian citizens who subscribe to an 
officially  sanctioned  faith.”  (Atkinson  1983:  689)  Local  systems  of  ritual  and  cosmology  are,  with  several 
exceptions,  among  those  the  case  of  the  Balinese  from  1950-1965,  denied  the  status  of  a  religion.  In 
consequence, freedom of religion entails only positive, but prohibits negative freedom of religion in Indonesia.  
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The legal process of defining the first principle began in 1952. 
 
3.) In 1952, the Ministry of Religions defined a monothetical Indonesian concept of religion in the term agama; 
(see chapter on agama) (Atkinson 2003) The Indonesian word agama translates roughly as the English word 
religion. “The phrase calls to mind the ways people use religious rationales to build unity and loyalty within a 
polity, to explain conflict, and to legitimate authority.” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 14) 
4.) In the 1960s, the national parliament specified the meaning of religion.In 1960, the second decision of the 
national  parliament  (KetetapanMPRS  No.  II/1960)held  that  “religions  (agama)  deserving  full  government 
legitimation were to be understood narrowly as ‘religions long recognised by the world’.” (Howell 2003: 4) The 
decision restricted agama to those religions already recognized in the world, thereby dissociating religious 
traditions from particular ethnic group heritages and universalizing them. (Howell 1978; 2003: 4-5) But the 
decision clarified doctrinal implications of the first principle only by stating a belief  propounded by world 
religions that becomes a source of pure spirituality and noble and pure character. (Howell 1978, 2003: 4-5) This 
decision and political tension in international and national politics in the early 1960s clearly influenced the 
Hindu Council’s decision to change the name of Balinese religion from Hindu Bali to Hindu Dharma in 1964. 
(Howell 2003: 5) 
 
5.) The government formally approved of six named agama in the elucidation to Paragraph 1, Presidential 
Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of Agama. Thereby the government removed 
support and protection from any other groups that might claim to be religions. (Howell 2003: 5)The Decision 
recognized faith in One Supreme Lordship as expressed in those agama of whichthe principal teachings are 
known to the Ministry of Religions, e.g. the creeds of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Confucianism
99. Moreover, a separate paragraph advised “each to return to its source *in one of the 
recognized religions+”. (Howell 2004: 3) “Further, ‘good’ Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, Muslims, and Christians 
were to submit exclusively to the requirements of their separate faiths, as defined by their respective religious 
authorities and approved by the Ministry of Religion.” (Howell 2003: 5, emphasis in original) Acknowledgement 
of a religion is thus a basic obligation of citizenship. The same act rules that those six religions receive state 
funding, benefits and protection according to 1945 Basic Law Paragraph 29.  
 
Other  religions  as  Judaism,  Zarathustrianism,  Shintoism,  and  Taoism  were  mentioned  in  the  Presidential 
Decision. Those religions are not forbidden, as they were granted freedom of association, but on the grounds 
of their small numbers, they are simply not eligible to state-funding and their adherents face social and legal 
restrictions in spreading their teachings or disseminating their symbols openly. (Howell 2003: 5) Later in 1969, 
the government adopted Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1965 into Act No 5/1969. (UU No 5/1969) Recently in 
April 2010, the 2003 established Constitutional Court dismissed a petition for judicial review of the Act and 
thereby  strengthened  “the  ‘high  modern’  construction  of  religion  that  undergirded  the  formulation  of 
Indonesian law and administration of religion in the 1960s and 1970s”. (Howell 2003: 3) 
 
6.) Criminal Code 156a regulates a maximum five years imprisonment for verbal or physical expressions of a) 
religious hatred against, abuse or desecration of one of the six state sanctioned agama; b.) aiming to persuade 
people to leave a respective faith in One Supreme Lordship (Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa)
100.  
 
7.) During the constitutional amendments from 1999 up to 2002, Article 29 and its discrimination between 
religion and belief system were confirmed. In addition to Article 29 amended Basic Law, Article 28 on human 
rights manifests the Indonesian interpretation of freedom of religion. For comparison, Article 28 E, subsection 
(1) states “all persons (orang) have the right to embrace a respective religion (memeluk agama) and to do 
religious service according to their respective agama”. Note, if we consider the wording of Article 29 and 28, it 
seems the usage of the generic term person (orang) in Article 28 on human rights implies that Indonesia 
formally acknowledges the rights codified under this Article to be universal rights. As Article 29 uses the word 
citizen (penduduk), it implies that the universal application of those universal rights is limited for Indonesian 
citizens.  
                                                 
99 Act 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of Agama, Elucidation. In contrast, mystical groups claiming to be Islamic, but 
having a guru and new revelation, would be prosecuted for ‘insulting’ religion by false representation and syncretic mystical groups could 
be charged with not accepting the scriptures of one of the funded universal religions. (Howell 2003: 5 FN VI)  
100 On the historical context, see the chapter on Guided Democracy and New Order, but also the educational policies in the 1960s  and 
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Then, Article 28 E, subsection (2)reads: “all persons (orang) are entitled to freedom of being convinced about a 
belief system (kepercayaan), and to express their thoughts and attitude, in accordance with their conscience.” 
In addition, whereas adherents to one out of six state fundedreligions may freely hold religious service in 
public, this right is severely restricted for adherents to kepercayaan, and relocated to the private sphere as 
persons may only express their thoughts and attitudes. 
 
8.) The Indonesian Act No. 39/1999 on Human Rights, Chapter III on Human Rights and Freedoms, rules in 
Section 3 on Right to Self-development, Article 16 that “every person (orang) has the right to undertake social 
and  charitable  works,  to  found  organizations  for  this  purpose,  including  organizing  private  schooling  and 
education, and to raise funds for these purposes, in line with prevailing legislation”. This clause provides the 
legal basis for private faith-based education system.  
 
9.) The second constitutional amendment elaborated in section XA on Human Rights, article 28E on religion 
that 1.) every person (orang) is free to embrace a religion (memelukagama) and perform religious service 
according to his/her embraced religion (agama); to choose education and teachings; (…) 2.) every person 
(orang) has the right to adhere to a belief-system (kepercayaan) , and to express his or her thoughts and 
attitude in accordance with his or her conscience (hati nurani) and 3.) every person (orang) has the right to 
freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinion. Artilce 28 I, subsection 1) states: “The right to life, 
the right not to be tortured, the right to freedom of thought (pikiran) and conscience (hati nurani), the right to 
embrace a religion (beragama), (…) are fundamental human rights which cannot be diminished under any 
circumstance. In my view, this legislation allows actually for positive and negative religious freedom and for the 
performance of religious service which is not limited to state funded agama. But, those fundamental human 
rights are restricted in article 28J, subsection 2) which reads: “In carrying out rights and freedoms, every person 
is obliged to obey the limitations which are laid down in law with the sole purpose of guaranteeing recognition 
and respect of other people’s rights and freedoms and to fulfill just requirements in accordance with moral 
considerations (pertimbangan moral), religious values (nilai agama), security (keamanan), and public order 
(ketertiban umum) within a democratic society.” This clause is somewhat problematic as limitations based on 
moral considerations (pertimbangan moral) or religious values (nilai agama) are not provided for in human 
rights  instruments.  It  seems  that  Indonesia  limits  the  freedom  of  religion  by  putting  congreagtions  under 
surveillance for reasons of public order and to avoid social hostilities. 
 
Since it is approved that all six sponsored religions possess specific teachings and practices according to their 
respective faith, inter-faith relations in the state’s legislation are based on the value that all devotees are equal 
before God and therefore they are equal members of the human community. The right and duty of every 
citizen  to  embrace  a  sponsored  religion  and  to  perform  religious  service  according  to  his  or  her  faith 
established in the constitution and the first principle as the right to religious liberty, which is however limited 
to a freedom of choice between the sponsored religions in order to keep the balance between public order and 
individual freedom.  
 
In  Indonesia’s  courts  and  elsewhere,  then,  a  balancing  act  takes  place.  (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers:  1987:  20) 
Indonesia  is  neither  an  Islamic  state,  nor  an  “entirely  secular  one”  (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers:  1987:  20)  as  it 
guarantees freedom of religion while it promotes the belief in One Supreme Lordship. This sets up a logical 
tension that has surfaced in a number of conflicts. In some of these, arguments about terms and definitions 
have been central, with a stress on what agama is and whether a particular practice cult or belief is or is not 
agama. The world’s named religions - Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam -present no definitional 
problems.  Disputes  arise,  rather,  over  how  to  regard  beliefs  and  practices  that  fall  outside  these  named 
categories. Two ambiguous situations arise. First there are people who do not have a religion yet, i.e. peoples 
whose religions are unnamed and uncodified, and who usually live in relatively isolated regions. A second 
ambiguity arises from people who belong to one of the recognized religions but also carry out practices or hold 
believes  that  other  adherents  of  the  same  faith  judge  heretical  at  worst  or  superfluous  at  best  (Smith-
Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 21) – one might add as too exclusive as in the case of the Salafi community which was 
attacked in Lombok in 2009 (SETARA 2010).    PART B | 77 
4.2.1. Construction of a national Grundnorm 
What had to become the Indonesian nation had to ‘imagine’ her community
101 in the first place: It had to assert 
a proactively constructed political and cultural ‘Indonesianess’ in the first half of the 20
th century. In 1959, 
Wertheim (1959: 1) observes the assertion of Indonesianness as imagined in the five principles or the state 
motto “expresses a strong desire, not only among political leaders, but among the broad layers of population 
(…), to achieve unity despite the heterogeneous character of the newly built state”. Wertheim argues this 
“common  will  presupposes,  in  its  turn,  the  existence  of  common  cultural  characteristics  underlying  the 
apparent heterogeneity”. (Wertheim 1959: 1) 
 
Logically,  any  assertion  of  an  Indonesian  identity  required  some  authenticity  through  reclaiming  a  great 
moment  in  history  as  a  point  of  common  reference,  acceptable  for  all  ethnic  groups  in  the  archipelago. 
Interestingly, the largest, but at the same time loose hegemony, the first President Sukarno referred to in order 
to legitimate the proposed new nation in the 1930s and in his “Birth of the Pancasila” speech on June 1
st, 1945 
was the Sumatran Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya (7
th-14
th century) and the Javanese Hindu Buddhist kingdom 
of  Majapahit  (13
th-15
th  century)  and  not  the  medieval  Islamic  sultanate  Mataram  II.  (Purdy  1954:  58)  An 
explanation might be that already during the reign of Amangkurat II (1677-1703), ruler of Mataram II, the 
dynasty  was  accused  of  collaborating  with  the  Christian  “Dutchmen”  (Ricklefs,  2006:  62)  by  Islamic  rebel 
Trunjaya, who wrote in response to one of the letters he received from Amangkurat II: 
 
It is not seemly for Your Highness to reign as king and mix and go about with Christians, for even Your 
Highness’ dignitaries have an uncommon aversion to this. (…) Your Highness’ servant humbly requests 
that you make your court at Majapahit, so that the whole island of Java might know that Your Highness 
has established his court there and in future you must have nothing to do with heretics.” (Ricklefs, 2006: 
62-3; Trunjaya to AR II, transl. Surabaya, 11 Jan. 1680, under the date 19 Jan 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 
1681)) 
Rickleffs (2006: 63) comments the passage as follows “A court at Majapahit would represent the long tradition 
of Javanese royal grandeur (and would symbolize reconciliation of East and Central Java as well), while an 
aversion to Christians would demonstrate a firm and exclusive commitment to Islam”.  
In this, the imagination of Majapahit as the precursor of the modern Indonesian nation-state by the men who 
shaped Indonesian nationhood, their selection of the five principles (Pancasila) and state motto (Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika) intended to promise the overcome of the ‘kaleidoscopic reality’ expressed in compromises and 
divisive allegiances to region, religion, or political party by alluding to common and shared cultural traits in the 
Indo-Melanesian cultures compatible to Javanese and Islamic values. The first principle of the state, Belief in 
One Supreme Lordship, and the state motto seem to continue a Majapahit tradition, because “(i)n the opening 
passage of the Nagarakrtagama, composed by the Buddhist author Prapanca in 1365 AD, the king was equated 
to both Siva and Buddha and depicted as “the highest divinity or form or truth, no matter what religions or 
philosophical school of thought one belongs to”.” (Robson, 1994, VKI vol. 169, p. 97 in Ricklefs, 2006: 12) In this 
context, Kingsbury (2003: 99) notes 
In a state as geographically and culturally diverse as Indonesia, it was always a rhetorical, if not actual, 
tenet of faith that ‘national’ cohesion could only be achieved through embracing difference. This led to 
the nationalist catch-cry of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. In one sense, Indonesia had little choice but to adopt 
such a policy if it was to survive united. In another sense, the idea of achieving consensus from disparate 
cultures well matches a syncretic Javanese world view, which seeks to find a convergence of otherwise 
contradictory elements.  
 
In consequence, the solution to enforce unity is to cite the Indo-Melanesian tradition and the Hindu-Buddhist 
pedigree of values as expressed in the Pancasila – thereby the Pancasila becomes a patrimonial instrument of 
authority  – used by a quite exclusive  majority to pacify and propitiate the many minorities of  whom the 
integration and unity of the state depends. In this, the Pancasila indeed functions to bind together the people 
of the archipelago and functions as civil religion.  
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The Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit-connection of Pancasila and Bhinekka Tunggal Ika is supported and accepted 
energetically by Balinese Hindus. (Hitchcock/Dharmaputra 2007: 131) As the kingdoms of medieval Bali were 
closely allied with those of Java, and many elements of their respective cultures have been similar
102 as both 
were part of the same coastal  pasisir culture (Schulte-Nordholt 1991 referring to Vickers 1987), their socio-
cultural practices share a common heritage from the eleven century onwards (Swellengrebel 1957),  
“when gods and sages established a new religious cum political order in Bali”. (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 36 FN 
31) Only later, those gods and sages were replaced by Majapahit nobles in Balinese manuscripts.  
 
Following Hinzler, Schulte-Nordholt (1991: 36) assumes that the great court of the Gelgel period (1550-1630) 
made no attempts to trace its descent explicitly to Majapahit, as the “Majapahit fever” as Hinzler calles it, was 
to come only after 1700. “External threats between 1550 and 1670, combined with an internal reorganization 
of power relationships between 1650 and 1730, may have helped to develop a new conceptual framework in 
Bali in which Majapahit became explicitly the point of origin of the Balinese political order.” (Schulte-Nordholt 
1991: 36 FN 31)  
 
Schulte-Nordholt (1991: 36) and Ricklefs (2006: 50-80) observe that after the fall of Majapahit, Balinese rulers 
had to cope with the emerging and expanding Islamic power centers in Central Java and Makassar (Sulawesi) 
that threatened and damaged Balinese economic interests. The tensions between the Balinese and Mataram II 
resulted in a protracted battle for Blambangan in East Java, while Lombok and North Bali were threatened by 
Bugis raids from Makassar. However, Balinese and Islamist rebels in Surabaya and Madura fought as cousins 
against the rulers of Mataram II who collaborated with the Dutch based on anti-Christian and anti-heretic 
rhetoric (Ricklefs 2006). Despite the anti-Hindu rhetoric among the Islamist Surabayan and Madurese rebels 
and the “firm anti-Islam sentiments among the Balinese nobility” (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 36) in the 17
th and 
first half of the 18
th century, the former kingdom of Majapahit “became the exemplary model of the old Hindu-
inspired order and may have helped to formulate a more distinct Balinese identity” (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 
36), but it was certainly also a exemplary Javanese realm for the Javanese Islamist rebels, as the Trunjaya 
quotations shows, on which their new Javanese Islamic identity could base. (Ricklefs 2006) In fact, during the 
period  of  national  awakening  both  ethnic  groups  referred  to  the  legendary  greatness  of  Majapahit  as  a 
common point of reference. 
 
Indeed,  the  acceptance  of  common  historical  past,  may  it  be  constructed  or  autochthonous,  indicates 
awareness of a shared common history from the Majapahit era onwards, but this awareness is rather obvious 
in the central regions of the Archipelago, namely Java and Bali, then at the periphery of the nation state. In this 
context, Kingsbury (2003: 111) notes “(a)s far apart as Sulawesi, Flores, Bali and Sumatra, ordinary Indonesian 
people resented what they often saw as the Javanese dominance of Indonesian politics, and in most cases 
identified themselves primarily on the basis of their cultural group”. In consequence, the attempts to recall the 
greatness of the Majapahit Empire have been less successful on a national level, (Kingsbury 2003: 111) but this 
recall has been accepted by Balinese Hindus. This is demonstrated in a 1968 statement of the Hindu Council, 
which sets the strategy to reinstall the Agama Hindu ritual, as it has been inherited from the Majapahit period, 
for all adherents to Hindu Dharma according to the contextual concept of desa-kala-patra. (location, time, and 
situation)   
                                                 
102 Hildred Geertz (1963, 29-31) states “because Bali has close cultural and historical ties with Java, its present-day social structure may 
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Theosophical society and Javanism 
To show processes of mutual cross-fertilization of socio-religious cultures in the Archipelago and ideas and 
concepts originating in Western and Eastern thought, a side note on the influence of the Theosophical Society 
(henceforth  TS)
103  in the Dutch East Indies is made here. The term Javanist was coine d by R.W. Hefner, 
designating those strands of the Javanese population who believe “that even while embracing Islam one should 
qualify  or  neglect  many  of  its  formal  strictures  in  favor  of  High-Javanese  traditions”.  (Ramstedt,  2004:  3) 
According to Hefner, this tradition has been grounded on Javanese court etiquette, ritual, language, aesthetics, 
which again are rooted in a kind of mysticism (kebatinan) that displays Hindu-Buddhist, Sufi Islamic influences, 
and  what  have  often  been  called  ‘animist’  traits.  (Ramstedt,  2004:  3)  The  Javanese  mystical  tradition  or 
Javanese Monism is known for its ‘syncretism’ or acculturation ability, in other word the contextualization of 
Indic concepts in Javanese medieval culture. “(I)t is precisely the characteristic of the Indonesian syncretism (…) 
that no foreign element is allowed to remain in its original form which cannot be reconciled or even molded 
into its Weltanschauung’”. (Anderson 1975: 1, in: Darmaputera1989: 26) In the course of its history, Javanese 
religious culture absorbed elements of all faith traditions that reached Java and gave it its own interpretation. 
The aim of the Javanese mystical tradition is experiencing unity with the Lordship through self-control and yoga 
techniques. 
 
Theosophical influence in the Dutch East Indies spread among the Dutch as well as the Javanese, the Balinese 
and the ethnic Chinese in the East Indies between 1900 and 1916, through informal mediation in Javanist 
(kejawen,  kebatinan)  circles,  Chinese  and  Buddhist  circles,  and  the  Hindu  movement  in  Bali  and  Java  (de 
Tollenaere 2004: 42) and continued into the 1950s and 1960s. (de Tollenaere 2004: 35-44; Brown 2004: 45-55) 
The dissemination of and the ideas on Hindu concepts by the TS
104 in the Dutch East Indies from 1880-1942, or 
the interdependent influence Western mystics extended on Asian concepts of religion and vice versa is 
remarkable
105. (Brown 2004: 46)  
 
Albeit Dutch and Javanese East Indies TS members were often nominal Christians or Muslims, (de Tollenaere 
2004: 38) they felt a gr eat affinity to Hinduism and Buddhism, due to the common ideal of religious and 
philosophical tolerance, rather than exclusiveness and orthodoxy. (Brown 2004: 46) It was predominantly 
through their agency that images of India, Hinduism, and Buddhism were d isseminated among the wider 
population of the Indies. (de Tollenaere 2004: 38) A number of specifically Hindu and Buddhist ideas came to 
be adopted by the Theosophists, e.g. the laws of karma and reincarnation. The appreciation of Indian 
philosophy by the  TS subsequently inspired not only Indian Hindus or Singhalese and Burmese Buddhists to 
(re)turn to their own religious traditions; but it also stimulated a new interest of the Javanese learned elite to 
revitalize and reconstruct their Hindu -Javanese past in what has became known as the Javanese national 
movement (Budi Utomo). (Ramstedt, 2004: 3; Purdy 1984: 52)  
 
Budi Utomo endeavored to realize Javanist aspirations rather than pan-Indonesian ones, emphasizing the pre-
Islamic tradition of Java and underlining the continuous Hindu-Buddhist influence in ancient Java. (Ramstedt, 
2004: 3) It is in this context that the link between Budi Utomo and the TS acquires its meaning. (Ramstedt, 
2004: 3) Yet, amongst the members of the TS the radical position of the liberation of the Indies from Dutch 
colonial rule was not advocated. This ‘reactionary’ attitude alienated Indonesian nationalist leaders, who had 
initially been quite close to  the TS, like Sukarno and Hatta from the TS. (de Tollenaere 2004: 39-41) This 
nationalist fervor continued to grow in the 1920s with the establishment of the Taman Siswa, an educational 
organization by KH Dewantoro.  
   
                                                 
103 The term ‘theosophy’ in a broad sense refers to various ways within different religions to acquire knowledge of God or of ‘higher 
realms’. Theosophy was defined as ‘Divine wisdom’, an amalgamation of ‘ancient Egyptian magic’, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christian 
mysticism and Social Darwinism. TS’ main objectives were the general recognition of the universal brotherhood of mankind without any 
distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or color, the comparative study of religions, philosophies, and science; and the investigation of 
unexplained laws of nature an the powers latent in man. In 1875 the TS was founded in New York by the Russian Madame Blavatsky and 
the American Mister Olcott. They established 1879 a lodge in Adyar, India and the German Baron von Tengnagell founded the first lodge in 
Pekalongan, Java between 1880 and 1883. (de Tollenaere 2004: 35-44; Brown, 2004: 45-55) 
104 The first TS-lodges were all located in Java, supporting the participation of educated members of the native nobility in the political 
affairs of the Indies. A significant part of its membership was drawn from the Dutch upper class, Javanese nobility, and Chinese merchants. 
(de Tollenaere 2004: 35-44) 
105 Olcott is credited with being the creator of the Buddhist banner. (Brown 2004: 46) PART B | 80 
The TS linked the glorious Hindu-Javanese past of the time of the empires of Mataram, Kediri, Singasari, and 
Majapahit  (which  was  then  being  reconstructed  by  the  DutchIndologues)  to  Dutch  colonial  rule.  The 
representatives  attracted  to  this  argumentation,  mainly  Javanese  nationalists  and  Balinese  Hindus, 
rediscovered Bali as the crucial key to the golden past of their Hindu-Javanese ancestors. The reference to 
Majapahit during the Youth Congress in 1928, leading to above mentioned Youth Oath, supports this fact. 
Furthermore, the first two Javanese Theosophists, who visited Bali, viewed Bali as religiously purer than Java 
and supported ‘Balinese religion’ as a counterweight to orthodox Javanese Islam. Then an Adnjana Nirmala 
Lodge had been founded in Singaraja with the Balinese aristocrat I Gusti Ketut Djelantik appointed as president 
in 1937. During the 1950s the lodge was still active. (de Tollenaere 2004: 39-41; Bakker 1993)  
 
Besides the cross-fertilization of Western and Eastern thought and the agency of the TS, the point is that 
President Sukarno, Dr Radjiman as well as Prof Soepomo were all linked to Budi Utomo and the Theosophical 
Society. However, during the constitutional deliberation process, they had to make several concessions to the 
more  orthodox  Muslim  reformers,  in  this  the  conception  of  state  has  been  more  accommodating  to  the 
demands  of  political  Islam,  then  they  actually  envisaged.  (Ramstedt  2004:  3)  “Javanese  nationalism  and 
political Islam presented two conflicting lines of conceptions of the state. (…) This rift between orthodox Islam 
and Javanists was admittedly caused by Dutch contrivance, because they used Javanese culture and elite as a 
buffer  against  pan-Islamic  and  Communist  ideas”.  (Ramstedt  2004:  3-4)  Hence,  the  current  study  likes  to 
underline  that  the  1945  Basic  Law  as  well  as  the  Pancasila  and  the  state  motto  jointly  drew  from  the 
(constructed) Hindu-Javanese legacy and actually put forward to some extend Indo-Melanesian and Hindu-
Buddhist values.  
In essence, ethnic Javanese traditions or Javanism (a Javanized version of the Indic state model) influenced to 
some  extend  conception  of  the  state.  Since  the  Javanese  constitute  the  largest  ethnic  group  and  a  large 
amount of the government apparatus have been ethnic Javanese, it is safe to say therefore that the ethnic 
Javanese exaggerate to some extent cultural supremacy in Indonesia. Although most Indonesians are Muslims, 
and  most  of  the  Javanese  are  Muslims,  there  is  a  difference  in  interpretation  between  modernists  and 
Javanists.  
Modernist  Muslims  embrace  a  pure  understanding  of  Islam  and  tawhid
106.  The  Javanists’  understanding 
promotes the traditional, archipelagic way of life, continues the tradition of Javanese monism, as characterized 
by  a  practice  of  contextual  Islam
107.  At the turn to the twentieth century, those mystical groups were 
increasingly disassociated from Islam since Muslim Modernists began t o repudiate the Sufi traditions of Islam. 
Under greatest pressure to dissociate from Islam were the heterodox, independent -minded mystics who 
increasingly incorporated elements of the Javanese Hindu -Buddhist heritage, Christianity, and Theosophical 
representations  of  other  religious  traditions  into  their teachings.   (Howell  2003:  4)  After  Independence, 
especially during the 1960s and 1970s those Javanist mystical groups were targeted for surveillance (REPELITA 
I). (cf. Howell 2003)  
Pancasila 
From 1945 to 1959, the question of the basis of the state led to a confrontation between political/public Islam 
seeking to  establish an Islamic  state, or at least a  state basing on Islamic  values,  and religious minorities 
together  with  the  majority  of  Indonesian  Muslims  which  did  oppose  the  idea  of  a  state  based  on  Islam 
(socialists, secular nationalists and cultural nationalists)  - they were concerned that such a decision would 
alienate Christians and other religious minorities of the Eastern Islands from joining the Indonesian Republic. 
(Müntz 1965; Mujiburrahman 2006) To guarantee a religiously neutral position of the state, Christians and 
religious minorities wanted to establish a state in which religious and secular affairs were separated in order be 
able to bind all ethnic and religious groups in the archipelago into the nation-state. (Mujiburrahman 2006:118-
119)  
   
                                                 
106 tawhid, Arabic: Unity. The doctrine of the unity or oneness of Allah (God), which is stressed in the Qur’an (there is no God but Allah), 
refers to a cardinal principle in Islamic theology.  
107 Contextual Islam is used by Hooker to describe Indonesian Islam.  Hooker, MB (ed) (1983)  Islam in South-East Asia. Leiden: EJ Brill; 
Hooker, MB (1984) Islamic Law in South-East Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press; and Hooker, MB (2003) Indonesian Islam: Social 
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The men who wrote the Indonesian constitution realized that national cohesion and integration could only be 
achieved, if the unity of all ethnic and religious groups was strengthened through a basic consent on common 
values  (Grundnorm,  Kelsen  2007;  Wiratnata  2007;  Habibie  2011;  Zoelva  Interview  2011)  understood  as 
autochthonous Indo-Melanesian cultural values supposedly rooted in historically grown traditions of diversity, 
plurality, mutual help and collegial-consensual negotiation. This Grundnorm resulted in a state based on five 
principles (Pancasila) embedded in the Preamble of the 1945 Basic Law. The five principles are, 
 
1.  Principle of the One Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) 
2.  Principle of just and civilizedhumanity(Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab)  
3.  Principle of Indonesian national unity(Persatuan Indonesia) 
4.  Principle  of  democracy  guided  by  wisdom  and  prudence  through  deliberation  and 
representation(Kerakyatan  yang  dipimpin  oleh  hikmat  kebijaksanaan  dalam 
permusyawaratan/perwakilan) 
5.  Principle of social justice for the entire Indonesian population (Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat 
Indonesia) 
 
As it is imperative to the Indonesian multicultural and multi-faith society to find ways in dealing with the 
traditional and contemporary plurality, the fundamental idea is to manage diversity with the help of Pancasila. 
Thus  these  principles  underwent  different  stages  of  interpretation,  political  weight,  popularity,  and  public 
awareness during the last decades since their becoming the focal point of Indonesia’s Basic Law. (cf. Purdy 
1984; cf. Schindehütte 2006) The first principles shall help to structure religious plurality in such a way that 
peaceful coexistence of the Muslim majority and the religious minorities (Franke 2006: 62) or religious freedom 
in a Muslim majority state is attained. The first principle demonstrates a sustained cultural continuity with 
Majapahit.  One  might  say,  Pancasila  is  the  product  of  negotiation  processes  between  Indonesian  social 
fractions with sometimes opposing opinions and interests on how to integrate religion in the state, and about 
the definition of religion itself. The increasing importance of religion in contemporary legislation and national 
education indicates that those processes are still ongoing. (Hosen 2005; Hasan 2008; Hilmy 2010; Raillon 2011) 
 
While political Islam considered the Jakarta Charter as a compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and 
a secular one, for  Christians and Hindus the compromise was only to be found in the  Pancasila that still 
designates a religious nature for the state, but not a specifically Islamic religious one. In order to protect 
themselves  Christians,  Hindus,  and  Buddhists  were  always  strong  Pancasila  supporters,  since  as  religious 
minorities they fear that their status is not clear in an Islamic state. It has to be recalled that the five principles 
of the state and the state motto are two key concepts addressing Indonesia’s plurality which have important 
continuities with the Indo-Melanesian and Hindu-Buddhist past. Both concepts recognize the diversity and 
plurality  inherent  to  the  Archipelago,  and  I  interpreted  them  as  guarantors  of  a  normative  standard  of 
commitment to pluralism.  
 
But is it important to note that an Islamic framework has been imposed on the  Pancasila state which led 
obviously to a narrow definition of religion as promoted by the Department of Religion since 1952. Whereas 
the legal status of the Pancasila has been preserved in the era of reform and the constitutional amendments, 
the principles are less popular in contemporaneous political discourse, since the ideology of Pancasila is still 
regarded as an instrument of power formerly used to manipulate Indonesian citizens. The Indonesian pluralists 
currently prefer to refer to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, as it offers the same substance but a different wrapping: It is 
regarded politically neutral, truly pluralist and it has never been exploited as the Pancasila has been during the 
New Order. (Triguna Protocoll 2007) 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika 
The state motto was introduced in December 1949, passed by Presidential Decree No 66/1951; dated October 
17
, and implemented on November 28 1951. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is translated here Diversity in Unity, but it is 
often referred to as Unity in Diversity. After the demise of the Suharto regime, the notion of Pancasila was 
merely  that  of  a  manipulative  instrument  related  to  indoctrination  and  exploitation  of  meanings.  In 
consequence,  Bhinneka  Tunggal  Ika  ascended  as  immaculate  national  democratic  formula  interpreted  as 
minimal consensus. (cf. Raillon 2011: 101) In 1945, 1966 and 1998-1999, “there was a willingness to relinquish 
one’s particularistic religious or regional identity in support of the nation’s motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, unity in 
diversity, yet there were and are deviations from this tendency.” (Purdy 1984: 19)  Religious minorities and 
Indonesian Muslims of all schools of thought tend to refer to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as paradigm of peaceful 
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The ideal of compromise, of seeing and forging unity from diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) should be the 
sustaining principle not only for Indonesia and India but for the human race as a whole. Sharma, Navreka 
(Ambassador of India to Indonesia)
108 
Just like the State principles and the heraldic animal, the Indian mystical bird Garuda, the vehicle of Hindu God 
Vishnu, the state motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika was drawn from the bubbling resource of Indo-Melanesian and 
Hindu-Buddhist  heritage  to  inspire  national  unity.  To  be  precise,  it  was  taken  from  Kakawin  Sutasoma,  a 
fourteenth-century Buddhist epic composed by Mpu Tantular, who was one of the foremost poets in the 
Majapahit kingdom.  
 
 
Rwâneka  dhâtu  winuwus  Buddha  Wiswa, 
Bhi  bêki  rakwa  ring  apan  kena  parwanosen, 
 
Mangkang  Jinatwa  kalawan  Siwatatwa  tunggal, 
Bhi nêka tunggal ika tan hana dharma mangrwa. 
It is often said that the eminent Buddha and Siwa are 
two different essences, 
Indeed different from each other at a quick glance, 
But the essence of the Jina and the reality of Siwa are 
identical,  
Diverse, yet identical, as there are no two Truths
109 
(Ramstedt 2004: 1) 
 
Of course, the Balinese are in support of the slogan. The Hindu minority tends to refer to the state motto 
Bhinneka  Tunggal  Ika,  because  it  does  not  share  Pancasila’s  history  of  manipulation  and  exploitation  of 
meaning. (Triguna Protocol 2007) The recent “Dharma Implementation Pattern for society and state” of the 
Indonesian Hindu Council” states that the Hindu community proactively supports social solidarity, strengthens 
national  unity,  supports  intactness  of  the  nation,  improves  inter-communal  harmony  between  societal 
congregations with the formula Bhinneka Tunggal Ika by use of dialog and cooperation basing on the principles 
of  togetherness,  equality,  mutual  trust  and  mutual  respect  which  are  based  on  the  doctrine  of  Tri  Hita 
Karana
110 (the harmonic cooperation between human beings, their environment, and God). 
Agama 
Turning to Indonesia to consider problems of state-imposed definitions of religion, John Bowen has elucidated 
despite the fact that there is no essential definition of religion and that religious practices differ in what they 
include in their particular definition, “many modern states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have drawn their 
ideas of religion from Western, Christian, and, to some extent, Islamic models”. (Bowen 2005: 29) He then 
suggests that “they adhere to a model of religion that does not fit with local beliefs and practices of some 
people within their borders, and may place pressure on them to conform to this model.” (Bowen 2005: 29) 
 
The Indonesian term for the category religion employed in legislature and national discourse is agama. Agama 
is actually a Sanskrit borrowing with a twofold meaning:  
1.)  it  denotes  “a  traditional  precept,  doctrine,  body  of  precepts,  collection  of  such  doctrines”  (Gonda 
1973[1952]:499 in Atkinson 1983: 686), “a sacred work in general”. (Ramstedt 2004: 9); in short, “anything 
handed down and fixed by tradition” (Gonda 1973*1952+:499 in Atkinson 1983: 686) 
2.) Agama is a generic name for certain scriptures or texts associated with the sectarian worship of the Hindu 
deities Vishnu, Sakti and Siva. (Sarma 1953:7-10 in Atkinson 1983: 686; Ramstedt 2004: 9; Bowen 2005: 29) 
 
When  the  western  islands  in  the  archipelago  came  to  serve  as  critical  junction  of  the  nusantao  network 
(Solheim II 2000), a trade network linking China, India, and the Middle East (Atkinson 1983: 686; Ramstedt 
2004:  9),  the  term  agama  had  found  its  way  into  the  Old  Javanese  language  at  some  point  during  the 
Indianization of ancient Java, which began in the first centuries CE (Atkinson 1983: 686; Ramstedt 2004: 9). The 
use of the word agama in Old Javanese was still general enough “to apply to a body of customary law or a 
Dharma-book and to religious or moral traditions”. (Gonda 1973: 499, in: Atkinson 1983: 687) 
   
                                                 
108 Sharma, Navreka (Ambassador of India to Indonesia). Pluralism and India. Speech delivered at UNHI, Denpasar, at the national seminar 
on Multiculturalism, Religion and ethnicity. Denpasar, 07.08.2007 
109. Ramstedt’s Translation of Kakawin Sutasoma, Canto CXXXIX, 5 
110  In the anthropocentric Balinese world view, the concept of  Tri  Hita  Karana  denotes  three  dimension  of  life  and  their  possible 
interactions: the sphere of the divine (parhyangan), the sphere of humanity (pawongan) and the sphere of earth (palemahan). (Triguna 
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(…)  during  this  period  an  awareness  of  something  called  agama,  an  attribute  of  a  rich  and  foreign 
civilization, took hold in insular Southeast Asia. Agama, one may speculate, had associations with literacy-
a new and probably impressive introduction. It was associated as well with power, wealth, sophistication, 
and a tradition beyond the experience of local peoples. (Atkinson 1983: 687) 
 
In sum, in Sanskrit and Old Javanese agama implies a textual source as the basis for ritual and worship. The 
agama of a person was the set of texts from which he or she derived teaching and religious direction: the 
books of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and others. (Bowen, 2005: 29) However, the idea of a central text does 
not  require  that  the  religion  have  exclusive  boundaries  (Bowen,  2005:  29);  that  idea  came  during  the 
Islamization of Sumatera and Java from the 9
th century onwards
111. Likewise, Atkinson (1983: 687) states that 
proponents of both, Islam and Christianity (and their variants) have adopted the term agama and thereby have 
shaped some new associations for it, while reinforcing others, until the term has “taken on the qualities that 
Indonesians today associate with that word”. (Atkinson 1983: 687) 
Islam, like Hindu-Buddhist traditions, entered the archipelago along trade routes with the West, and had been 
present in pockets of Sumatera for several centuries before in the fourteenth to sixteenth century many rulers 
began converting to Islam. In this period, the term gradually lost its Hindu connotations and acquired a more 
Islamic  understanding.  Islam  does  insist  on  absolute  exclusivity  and  on  the  idea  of  one  and  only  true 
foundational text, the al-Qur’an. As “People of the Book”, the Muslim reformers most likely reinforced the 
association of agama with learning and literacy. Further, as long-distance traders, those Muslim reformers 
probably “consolidated notions of agama as an attribute of both the wealthy and the cosmopolitan. The link 
between agama and political authority may have been strengthened as local rulers found conversion to be 
politically and economically expedient”. (Atkinson 1983: 687)  
Christianity arrived at about the same time shares these ideas. (Bowen 2005: 29) Christian reformers likely 
carried similar associations of agama with foreign powers, economic and political privilege, internationalism, 
and education. Certainly an emphasis on a Supreme Deity and the absolute necessity of conversion to a foreign 
doctrine were features of both Christianity and Islam in Indonesia. Another association that may trace its roots 
to the latter period of Dutch rule is a link between agama and societal progress. (Atkinson 1983: 687) Religion 
is  associated  in  Indonesia’s  political  culture  with  education,  cosmopolitan  orientation,  sophistication,  and 
progress. (Atkinson 1983: 689)  
The 1945 Basic Law accorded legitimacy to any religion other than Islam. (Howell 2003: 4) However, what those 
other religions might be was not specified within the Basic Law. In consequence, this left the definition of 
agama with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In 1946, this Ministry had been founded principally bind orthodox 
Muslims  into  the  young  republic  and  to  advance  Muslim  interests.  Accordingly,  most  of  the  Ministry’s 
operations served the Muslim community, but there were two separate directorates general offices established 
for Protestantism and Catholicism. (Howell 2003; 2004) In the absence of clarifying provisions in the Basic Law, 
the  structure  of  the  Ministry  of  Religious  Affairs  implies  that  the  understanding  of  agama  referred  to 
Indonesia’s major ‘religions of the book’ (Howell 2004: 3): Islam and Christianity.  
The Ministry could extend limited financial support on religious groups or targeted those groups it branded 
‘animists’ or heretics for proselytizing. (Howell 2003: 4) Those religious traditions targeted for proselytizing 
included mystic groups and other religious traditions of non-Muslim and non-Christian ethnic groups like the 
Balinese and Indonesian Chinese. (Howell 2003: 3-4) “While the majority of ethnic groups associated with non-
state societies in past times could do little to resist the discrediting of their religious traditions, the Balinese and 
Indonesian Chinese, as well as Javanese proponents of heterodox mystical and other metaphysical groups, 
organised to promote their traditions and identities, and even to claim the status of ‘religions’.”(Howell 2003: 
4)  
 
Those that  succeeded in gaining recognition as religions formed organisations that constructed their 
traditions  with  a  number  of  common  features  strongly  resembling  Islam  and  Christianity:  highly 
rationalised (that is, codified) beliefs relating to a transcendent deity; exclusive membership open to 
people of any ethnic background; congregational organisation with regular weekly services in a public 
place of worship; and formally organised governing and representative bodies. (Howell 2003: 4) 
   
                                                 
111 According to Prof Tauchmann, personal communication in 2005, the Islamization of Java began in the late 9th and early 10th century.  PART B | 84 
In the 1950s, the MORA undertook to catalogue other beliefs and practices to determine where proselytizing 
activities needed to be directed and where surveillance of deviant groups was required. Amongst the former 
was  Balinese  religion,  which  the  provincial  government  of  Bali  managed  to  save  from  state-sponsored 
proselytizing activities by establishing a Hindu section in the Ministry of Religion in 1958 (Geertz 1973; Howell 
1978, 1982: 513).  
 
In the early 1950s, the Ministry of Religious Affairs equated the term agama with the full meaning of the Arabic 
word din
112 as used in the al-Qur’an. (Atkinson 1986; Howell 1978, 1982, 2003, 2004; Ramstedt 2004: 9; Bowen 
2005: 29; Abalahin 2005: 121) Hereupon agama was defined in a narrow sense, as religious system agama 
must fulfill following catalogue of criteria: It must have codified a  
a.  a sacred book (kitab suci);  
b.  a monotheistic substructure, that is teach belief in the existence of One Supreme Lordship; a 
codified law system for its followers that is exclusive boundaries;  
c.  have a prophet (nabi),  
d.  have international recognition,  
e.  its  congregation  must  not  be  limited  to  a  single  ethnic  group,  that  is  transcends  ethnic 
boundaries and not being essentially an aspect of a hereditary culture  
 
As the duty of the MORA is to impose an official model of religion and to implement programs to raise public 
awareness  of  the  first  principle,  this  official  model  translates  into  implications  for  (non-Islamic)  religious 
practices as well as for currents inside the officially sanctioned religions. Eventually, this model caused an 
Agamanization (Abalahin 2005: 122) of indigenous religious practices and traditions. Indonesia makes a specific 
Islamic  distinction  between  officially  funded  and  supervised  “revealed”  religions  (agama)  and  non-funded 
“man-made”  belief-systems  (kepercayaan)  on  legal  grounds.  During  the  amendment  of  the  Basic  Law, 
Indonesian executives and officials continued to exclude the local archipelagic beliefs and practices from the 
category of religion.  
 
The Indonesian government adds a transnational dimension required for the category religion in  drawing a 
distinction between proper or universalistic religion (agama) and particular belief practices (kepercayaan). An 
officially approved religion may neither be limited to ethnic religious practices defined as belief systems nor to 
Indonesia. For a citizen, it is not sufficient to adhere to a belief system, but his or her religious affiliation must 
be confirmed by declaring adherence to one of the universal state-funded religions. In addition, this religious 
adherence must be accounted for in identity documents. For all the belief systems the government does not 
consider  as  agama,  official  jargon  employs  the  term  kepercayaan,  ‘belief-system’
113.  (Abalahin  2005:  121) 
“These “wild” religions are considered, in the classical Muslim distinction between “peoples of the Book” and 
“religions of ignorance”, as threats to true piety and fair game for conversion.” (Geertz 1973: 187) 
The sharp distinction that certain authorities seek to draw between agama and kepercayaan extends 
even  to  the  terms  covering  their  adherents:  an  agama  has  penganut  (those  who  submit  [to  it])  or 
pemeluk (those who embrace [it]), while kepercayaan has penghayat (those who comprehend or practice 
[it]). The further distinction reinforces the notion that an  agama is transcendent, coming from some 
higher source outside the individual, outside humanity, while a kepercayaan
114 is subjective, arising from 
within the individual, within humanity. (Abalahin 2005: 121 FN 7) 
This distinction is entirely Islamic, as only Islam is considered to be the true religion. “In its definition of an 
agama, the state through the Ministry of Religious Affairs adopts the Islamic notion of tolerating “Peoples of 
the Book” (ahl al-kitab) and “invites” religious communities to define themselves as “Peoples of the Book” or 
risk falling outside the Pancasila’s version of the dhimma” (Abalahin, 2005: 121, emphasis in original), the 
“indefinitely  renewed  contract  through  with  the  Muslim  community  accords  hospitality  and  protection  to 
members of other revealed religions, on condition of their acknowledging the domination of Islam”. (Abalahin, 
2005: 121) He concludes that “(t)his is only a partial restoration of the dhimma, as the Pancasila state accords 
theoretical equality to all the religions it recognizes. (Abalahin, 2005: 121-122, emphasis in original)  
                                                 
112 True religion, religion of the books (Torah, Bible, Koran): Arabic din, Indonesian agama. 
113 Ramstedt (2004) propose the translation of kepercayaan as inner conviction, faith. 
114 Kebatinan is a generic term for the, different strands of Javanese, syncretistic mysticism.  Batin is an Arabic loanword: inner feeling, 
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To sum up, agama is explicitly defined along the lines of the Islamic conception of religion. However, the 
political and cultural context in Indonesia resulted in an Indonesian advancement of the dhimma, as Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism are not recognized as religion of the book in classical Islam. (Tibi 1995)In essence, 
tawhid was  made the base  of the religious  state grounded-on-the-Belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship, and all 
acknowledged religions have to reinvent their belief system according to the MORA’ Islamic understanding of 
the first principle. In consequence, as Hindu, Hindu-Buddhist, and Buddhist religious practices never were fully 
codified in a sacred text body as the abrahamitic religions, those religious systems faced serious problems to 
receive state funding in the first place. Those congregations founded modern organizations, which were given 
the mandate to reinvent and rationalize their religious practices to comply with the MORA’s catalogue of 
criteria for agama. It could be further said that the 1945 Basic Law only recognizes Islam, but tolerates certain 
other religions by funding them. Still this is only partially true, as the image of One Supreme Lordship may be 
conceptualized  as  immanent  or  transcendent,  which  is  not  compatible  with  Islamic  tawhid.  However,  the 
Islamic discourse serves as a standard setting tool in the management of the remaining six sponsored agama 
after  Suharto’s  Islamic  turn  in  1989  and  the  transition  to  Indonesian  Islamic  democracy.  (Liddle  1996; 
Mujani/Liddle 2009)  
Kutuhanan Yang Maha Esa 
Unlike  the  US,  where  the  First  Amendment  prohibits  the  federal  government  from  establishing  religion 
(Prothero 2006: 1-2), the first state principle of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia has established faith in One 
Supreme Lordship as the noblest statutory obligation of the Indonesian citizen. The concept of One Supreme 
Lordship is said to be the Indonesian answer to religious plurality (Wandelt 1989; Tibi 1995; Dharmaputera 
1989, Franke 2006: 75). The Indonesian model of religious pluralism as manifested in the first state principle 
merits much attention, as it is a specific political answer of Southeast Asian, particularly Indonesian, Islam to 
the  social  condition  of  religious  plurality.  The  Indonesian  model  is  unparalleled  in  other  Muslim  majority 
countries and reflects the stance on religious freedom and tolerance of the traditional Ottoman Caliphate. 
(Abalahin 2005) 
 
The term for God in the Pancasila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa
115, has provoked various translations – belief in 
the One and Only God (Bolland 1971 in Smith-Kipp 1987: 17), the Divine Omnipotence (Howell 1978: 274), the 
Absolute  Lordship  (Hadjiwijono  1967  in  Smith-Kipp  1987:  17),  One  High  God  (Howell  2004:  5)  and  All-
Embracing God (Mahadi 1987 in Smith-Kipp 1987: 17). Scholars have also debated whether this term for God 
represents a “de-confessionalized” Muslim concept (Niewenhuisje 1958) or a neutral (although monotheistic) 
concept for God (Sidjabat, cited in Boland 1971).” (Smith-Kipp 1987: 17) 
Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of Agama formally approved of 
six agama in the elucidation part. The Decision recognized faith in One Supreme Lordship as expressed only in 
those agama, of whichthe principal teachings are known to the Ministry of Religions
116, e.g. the creeds of Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The same act rules that those six religions 
receive state funding, benefits and protection according to 1945 Basic  Law Paragraph 29. Later in 1969, the 
government adopted Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1965 into Act No 5/1969. (UU No 5/1969) Recently in April 
2010, the Constitutional Court rejected judicial review of the Act and strengthened the official religious 
policy
117. Confucianism was recognized as faith from 1946 to 1967, but then banned under Suharto. The ban 
was lifted by Wahid in 2001. In 2011, the Confucian congregation is under the supervision of the Buddhist 
Directorate General
118. Therefore, all the major world religions - with the exception of Judaism
119 - in addition 
                                                 
115 The Indonesian language makes use of the circumfix “ke-an” to achieve an abstract noun formed from a substantive root. Tuhan means 
God, and keTuhanan means “Godness” in an abstract sense. (Purdy 1984: 61 FN 2) 
116 Act 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of Agama, Elucidation 
117  The debates and discussions evolving around the retaining of the contested legislation to acknowledge only six religions and  to 
propagate a state-sponsored version of each faith tradition, in order to secure public order, show the challenges the Indonesian state and 
law system faces regarding the term religion and the issue of religious traditions. Two examples of such a renegotiation of t he national 
values in consequential legislation were two decisions of the Constitutional Court to retain discriminative legislation concerning religion. 
The prohibition to disseminate the religious teaching of the  Ahmadiyyah interpretation of Islam, increasing social hostilities towards the 
group and numerous violation of religious rights under Blasphemy Law 1/1965 led to the petition of promoters of pluralism and human 
rights organizations, among them the former president Abdurrahman Wahid, to abrogate or revise the law. The law was considered by the 
petitioners to be outdated and in conflict with the amended 1945 basic law. The Constitutional Court however decided to maintain the Act, 
in order to secure public order and morals. In March 2010, the Constitutional Court rejected a petition to repeal the controversial anti-
pornography  and  porno-action  law.  The  court  considered  both  Laws  to  be  indispensable  for  public  morals,  provoking  a  raged  and 
disappointed outcry within society.  
118 The problems the Confucians community faces in the interaction with the state are described by Abalahin: 2005 and Yang: 2005.  PART B | 86 
to a wide range of archipelagic belief practices are notably alive and vividly represented in the Indonesian 
society. (Howell 2003) 
 
Other religions as Taoism, Shintoism, or Judaism are not forbidden, they are simply not eligible to state-funding 
and their adherents face social and legal restrictions in spreading their teachings or disseminating their symbols 
openly. It is noteworthy, that Indonesia does not officially fund Judaism  - despite the fact that Judaism is 
historically acknowledged by Muslims to be a proper religion and that its adherents are people of the book, but 
it funds the Asian religion Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.  
Remarkably,  Indonesia  does  not  discriminate  between  Sunni  and  Shiite  Islam
120, but due to colonial past 
betweenCatholics and Protestants. Although Indonesia does not discriminate between Sunni and Shia, those 
very same authorities who declare Mohammed to be the final prophet ban the  Ahmadiyyahh  faith  who 
believes Mohammed was not the final prophet. This fact indicates that Indonesia does not succeed in getting 
any basic tenant of Islam ratified. Or, that all these debates are due to their crescendo manipulated by certain 
interest groups fighting or struggling over resources and contracts. Another point to note is, in Indonesia there 
is a dual administration for Muslims and others, Muslims are required to register with the Bureau of Religious 
Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA) whereas all others have to register birth, marriage, divorce, and death at 
the civil registry office (pencatatan sipil). The regulation that religious affiliation must be mentioned in identity 
cards has been retained in 2006. 
Indeed, it is surprising, how reformers of Hinduism, Mahayana Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism, and especially 
Confucianism  defined  their  One  Lordship.  (Bowen  2005)  In  this  context,  Wandelt  (1988:  168)  has  drawn 
attention  to  how  the  idea  of  monotheism  and  the  image  of  Godhead  (Gottesbild)  are  conceptualized  in 
Indonesia.  Unlike  transcendental  images  of  Godhead,  based  on  separation  between  the  sacred  and  the 
profane,  the  ambiguous  principle  of  One  Supreme  Lordship  combines  the  absolute  with  the  relative 
perspective  as  well  as  immanent  or  transcendent  understandings.  Absolute  monotheism  based  on 
transcendentalism is represented in the Islamic theological doctrine of tawhid that considers the Oneness of 
God as absolute and transcendent and therefore as opposed to polytheism, pantheism, or animism. Relative 
monotheism is based on immanence that considers the God as represented in creation or the creation itself to 
be Divine. This argument provides the link to integrate Balinese ancestor worship as a form of the immanent 
Divine. (Triguna Protocoll 2007) 
The absolute interpretation of the principle refers to the Islamic understanding of tawhid. By contrast, the 
relative  concept  of  monotheism  denotes  the  concept  of  One  Supreme  Lordship,  which  is  divided  into  its 
constituent parts without losing its holistic character at the same time (parts of the ensemble). This line of 
interpretation combines  contradictory views, thereby mirroring the integrative ethos of Javanese  monism. 
Despite the notion of Islamic tawhid found its way into the Basic Law, contrary to the Islamic transcendental 
concept of God based on a separation between God and the world, the Indonesian concept of monotheism 
makes a distinction between relative and absolute.  
   
                                                                                                                                                         
119 The indigenous Jewish population is microscopic and I am not aware of any academic research on Jews in Indonesia. The World Jewish 
Congress states that Dutch Jews played an active role in the development of the so-called Spice Islands. In the 1850’s, at least 20 Jewish 
families of Dutch and German origin lived in Jakarta and other parts of the country. In successive years Jews from the Netherlands, 
Baghdad and Aden settled in Indonesia. By the 1920’s there were several thousand Jews in the country and communities were established 
in Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and elsewhere. In the 1930’s Jews fleeing the rise of Nazism also found sanctuary in Indonesia. Jews, 
particularly those with Dutch citizenship, faced political surpression during the Japanese occupation. After the war, and later, upon the 
country’s independence, nearly all Jews left the country. A few Jewish families, all of Iraqi origin, live in Surabaya. They  continue to 
maintain a small synagogue, but there is neither a rabbi nor a teacher. There are also individual Jews living in Jakarta. The Jewish People 
Policy Planning Institute publishes that about 25 families still live in Indonesia. 
 (http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/communities/asiaoceania/comm_indonesia.html)  
Another reason is that to a certain degree, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism play a role in contemporary political debates and climate. Sabili, 
a widely read Islamic magazine, continued to publish anti-Semitic articles. An account of a possible interest in investing in Aceh by the 
well-known financier George Soros prompted some Muslim political parties in Jakarta to issue statements about a ‘hidden agenda’ and 
warning the government against Jews enticing the country to be weak on the Palestinian struggle. One Member of Parliament was quoted 
as saying: “Tell the Jews there is no place for their investment in Indonesia.” (US Dep. of State 2007: Indonesia Country Report on Human 
Rights 2007, in: http://www.state.gov (June 2008) 
120 Which has left her being derided and insulted by the rest of the Muslim world; as for example in Saddam Hussein’s famous speech, in 
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Depending on the position taken, if the first principle is interpreted as a call to monotheism, it imposed an 
Islamic framework on all faith communities. Despite the concept of Christian Trinity is heavily criticized by 
Islamic theologians as apostatizing from the doctrine of tawhid, Christianity faced minor problems with the 
Department’s catalogue of criteria as they have been immediately approved as proper religions – a reason 
might be the strong role of Christianity in the colonial period and the Christianization of certain elites. (Howell 
1987) During the colonial period, Christian thought and Western enlightenment traditions shaped “the forms 
the new religious constructs assumed and the fortunates of the groups that espoused them” (Howell 1978: 
272), whereas during the republican period and in the contemporary democracy political Islam and public Islam 
influence those constructs and their proponents. If the first principle is understood as a call to integral monism, 
it imposes a Javanese framework on all faith communities. The Javanese framework allows ethnic communities 
to integrate monistic, deistic, dualistic, pantheistic, and animistic concepts into the first principle – and in this 
the  practice  of  ancestor  worship.  The  case  of  ethnic  religions  (Smith-Kipp  1987)  and  the  Balinese  case 
demonstrate that in both periods state policies also had considerable impact on transformations of religions in 
Indonesia. 
In consequence, religious minorities have to shape their theology and practice along the lines of Islamic tawhid 
and Javanese monism, that is to say, Hindus, Buddhists, adherents to ethnic belief practices (kepercayaan) and 
recently  Confucians  are  obliged  to  give  the  first  principle  a  meaning  that  first,  corresponds  to  their  own 
understanding  and  second,  is  in  line  with  the  catalogue  of  criteria  of  the  MORA.  Accordingly,  modern 
Indonesian Hindu Dharma underwent a process of re-invention, rationalization and systematization to meet 
that definition which will be described in detail in the current study.  
Buddhists, Confucians, and Hindus most likely understand ‘Ketuhanan’ as basic principle of religious pluralism 
in order to protect their right to freedom of religion. (Bowen 2005) In their view, the Indonesian history has 
culminated in the neutral and inclusive concept of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, which includes not only Islamic 
but also Hindu, Buddhist and Indo-Melanesian traditions. Therefore it should not be understood primarily in 
terms of the Islamic concept of monotheism (tawhid) but rather as a universal, inclusive, and neutral concept. 
Actually,  the  original  perception  of  the  principle  would  enable  all  religious  communities  to  interpret  the 
concept  in  terms  of  their  respective  beliefs,  but  also  gives  them  the  right  to  do  so.  (Bowen  2005)  In 
consequence, in the first place the notion of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa did not refer not to a narrow and 
particular  image  of  Godhead,  but  rather  to  the  commonality  of  veneration  and  worship  of  One  Lordship 
according to individual religious tenets among varying religious practices in an esprit of pluralism, and was 
imagined to sum up the traditional Indonesian attitude in the sphere of religion. This understanding has been 
limited by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as one of the tasks assigned to it was to define and promote the 
understanding of the image of Lordship, necessitating a conscious re-definition of faith communities along the 
lines set forth by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.  
Christian,  Hindu,  and  Buddhist  conceptions  interpret  One  Supreme  Lordship  as  the  absolute  principle, 
transcending  its  creation  and  being  immanent  in  its  creation  at  the  same  time.  In  other  words,  the  first 
principle combines immanent and transcendent perspectives, as Ketuhanan differs from the Islamic concept of 
God based on transcendentalism, for the reason that Ketuhanan may as well incarnate in its creation at will in 
any shape and at any time. Indonesian Hindu Dharma speaks of Trimurti (Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva) that is 
unlike the vertical Christian trinity a horizontal concept of the Lordship’s functions observable in the material 
world, thereby integrating “megalithic” traditions of ancestor worship and blood sacrifice into the conception. 
Both Hinduism and Christianity perceive Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa as the solemn principle of creation and 
therefore  there  is  no  difference  between  the  primordial  absoluteness  and  the  subsequently  emanated 
relativity of that Omnipotence. Hinduism announced Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa as One Supreme Lordship, 
Buddhism solved the issue in declaring Adibuddha to be that One Lordship. (Bowen 2005: 29; Wandelt 1989)  
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In conclusion, since a concept of absolute religious truth is not stipulated in legislation, the principle of belief in 
One  Supreme  Lordship  left  loopholes  for  religions  other  than  Islam  to  define  their  interpretation  of  that 
Lordship. In consequence, how a religious community arrives at this definition is up to the creativity of the faith 
community in question. To be officially approved, each a congregation had to codify the Kutahanan Yang Maha 
Esa and become institutionalized in an representative organization and a state office. Here, intellectuals and 
religious  experts  rule  out  what  is  and  what  is  not  to  be  included  in  the  reinvention,  rationalization  and 
systematization of their faith practices and how their image of Lordship is represented, thereby creating a gap 
between  theological  dogma  and  everyday  practices.  However,  the  institutionalization  of  religious 
congregations  has  been  frozen  with  Presidential  Decision  No.  1/1965  on  the  Prevention  of  Abuse  and 
Desecration of Agama and the decision of the Constitutional Court to retain Presidential Decision 1/1965. 
Thereafter all strategic developmental plans purport the ambiguous strategy to fund and guard acknowledged 
religions, whereas all other belief systems are not funded, and guarded, in order to avoid that new religions 
may be formed. In my view, the institutionalization of new congregations would lead to organizational and 
administrational issues, problems of public order, and increased social hostilities. In addition, as the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs has a very large budget, ranking at top 4 or 5 of the state expenditures, this also involves large 
amounts of financial support to the acknowledged religions, which would then be severely curtailed. 
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4.2.2. Historical tipping points 
The Birth of Pancasila (1945-1949) 
In 1928, the Second Indonesian Youth Congress met in Jakarta and formulated its solemn vow: One Nation, 
One People, One Language, “which was to become the rallying cry for independence” (Purdy 1984: 52). During 
Dutch rule, Islam had been viewed as a rallying symbol for anti-colonial resistance, remained under strict 
control, and was viewed with unrelenting suspicion.” (Purdy 1984: 53) In 1942, the Japanese forces defeated 
the Allies and occupied the Indonesian archipelago. Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese strengthened the 
Muslim position through three organizations: an office of Religious Affairs (which came to be the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in 1946), a Muslim council (Masyumi), and a sort of military organization for young Muslims 
(Hizbu’llah). (Purdy 1984: 54)  
Independence seemed to be within reach at the very end of Japanese occupation. On April 29, 1945, the 
Japanese had established the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence
121 to 
specify the common terms to be enshrined in the constitution  of a future independent Indonesia. The 62 
Committee  members (henceforth Committee of 62) were intended to represent all major political and 
ideological factions of the Independence movement. In fact, they had been all selected and appointed by 
Sukarno (Ramstedt, 2004: 2). As result, political Islam was underrepresented in the Committee of 62, because 
Sukarno had ensured that the values of the like -minded intellectuals
122 were to form the ideological basis of 
the state and of the education of its people by app ointing them in key position during the early years of the 
republic (Ramstedt 2004: 13). The deliberations on the philosophical foundation of the state were heated and 
tedious. They show in an exemplarily way how Muslim politicians’ understandings of Islam inform the process 
of state formation and the role of Islam in the state or the Islamization process of the five principles.  
In general, there were two basic fault lines on the nature of the future Indonesian state and the role religion 
should play in it. The first debate, two camps maintaining mutually exclusive concepts on the political and legal 
system  of  the  nation-state  competed  for  dominance.  That  is,  the  camp  around  M.  Yamin  and  M.  Hatta 
supported  the  concept  of  rechtsstaat
123,  while  the  camp  around  Prof.  Supomo  advocated  the  (Javanese) 
organic or integraliststaatsidee (machtstaat)
124. The system outlined by Yamin and Hatta included a number of 
the rechtsstaat principles as laid down in international human rights instruments. Although Prof. Supomo’s 
integralist  conception  of  state  was  backed  by  Sukarno,  the  Committee  of  62  did  not  opt  for  it,  and  a 
constitutional  democracy,  even  though  with  a  strong  presidency,  was  endorsed.  (Mujiburrahman,  2006; 
Stockmann, 2004, Kaelan, 2004) 
The second debate concerned the religious dimension of the state: Islam had been used to varying degrees in 
different regions as a weapon against the Dutch colonial state, and had also played a significant role in grass-
roots education and empowerment of rural areas during colonial rule. 
   
                                                 
121 Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI). The committee built subcommittees to work on special 
tasks and details on the Constitution. The chairman was Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat, one of the leaders of the Javanese nationalist 
movement Budi Utomo and member of the Theosophical Society. Sukarno and Dewantoro had also close links to the Theosophic society. 
(Ramstedt 2004: 2; Purdy 1984: 53) 
122 Yamin and Supomo, who were together with Sukarno the most enthusiastic proponents for a national Pancasila state. All three h ave 
been influenced by the Theosophical society. 
123  Concerning the  rechtsstaat  (rule  of  law),  the  Elucidation  of  the  1945  Basic  Law  reads:  I.1. The  Indonesian  state  is  based  on  law 
(rechtsstaat), it is not merely based on power (machtstaat). II.2. Government is based on a constitutional system (basic law) which is not 
absolutist in nature. (Stockmann 2004: 27) 
124 For a discussion see the chapter on organicism and Asian values. According to the integralist understanding of the state, “there is 
basically no dualism between ‘state and individual’, no conflict between the state and organization on the one hand and the legal order of 
individuals on the other, no dualism of state and society-without-state (Staat und staatsfreie Gesellschaft). There is no need to guarantee 
the fundamental rights and liberties (Grund- und Freiheitsrechte) of the individual against the state, because the individual is an organic 
part of the state, with its own position and obligation to help realize the state’s greatness (…).” (Stockmann 2004: 27; Parker, 2004: 8. 
Stockman translates from Supomo 1945: 191. Parker quotes Bourchier 1996: 81-82. I have merged both slightly divergent translations 
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Representatives of political Islam wanted to establish an Islamic state or at least see a strong role for Islam in 
the independent state, whereas the nationalists pleaded for a secular nation state, either modeled after a 
rechtsstaat or an integralist machtstaat. “Hindu Bali surely would have been adverse to governance by an 
Islamic state. Much of Eastern Indonesia, especially the Moluccas, Timor, Sumba, Flores, would have rebelled.” 
(Purdy 1984: 66) Political Islam, however, had difficulties to befriend with the idea of nationalism since it was 
seen  to  contradict  pan-Islamic  sentiments  and  was  associated  with  fascist  regimes  in  Germany  or  Japan. 
(Madjid  1994)  This  ideological  split  in  the  Committee  of  62  is  referred  to  as  the  golongan  kebangsaan 
(nationalist group comprising nationalist Muslims, cultural Javanists, Christians, Hindus) vs.  golongan Islam 
(Muslim group). (Purdy 1984) In essence, the debates of the foundation of the state led to the confrontation 
between Islamic and Islamist groups which sought to establish an Islamic state or at least a state basing on 
Islamic values, whereas the secular and cultural nationalists and the socialists, concerned that such a decision 
would alienate Christians and other religious minorities, wanted to establish a state in which religious and 
secular  affairs  would  be  kept  separate  in  order  to  maintain  a  religiously  neutral  position  of  the  state. 
(Mujiburrahman, 2006:118-119) 
Between May 29 and June 1, 1945, the Committee of 62 summoned its first meeting. During the session, five 
proposals  on  the  philosophical  base,  intended  to  be  written  into  the  preamble  of  the  constitution,  were 
deliberated.  There  is  considerable  controversy  over  exactly  who  made  the  first  formulation  of  the  five 
principles. (Purdy 1984: 57, 64) M Yamin proposed the state of Indonesia should have a religious basis. It seems 
that M Yamin proposed two proposals, each having five principles, on May 29. In his first proposal, the formula 
“pertaining  to  Lordship”  (peri  ketuhanan)  ranked  third  after  nationality  (kebangsaan)  and  humanity 
(kemanusiaan), whereas his second suggestion was using the formula One Supreme Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa) as first principle. He proposed a draft Constitution which later emerged as the 1945 Basic Law. 
Article 29 on religion reads as follows: “(1) the state shall be founded on the Belief in Ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa; (2) the state shall guarantee the freedom of every inhabitant to profess his own religion and to worship 
according to his religion or faith”. (Purdy 1984: 64) On May 30, Prof Soepomo made a differentiation between 
the school of thought which advocated an Islamic state, and that which advocated a “national unitary state”. In 
his proposal he suggested as the third principle a relation between state and religion (hubungan negara dan 
agama) that is in favor of the multi-religious nature of the state.  
On June 1 1945, Sukarno proposed a solution to the controversy on the basic principles of the state. Today, this 
address to the Committee of 62 is recollected as the ‘Birth of Pancasila’ key note speech. Sukarno is credited 
with the invention of the term Pancasila. (cf Purdy 1984: 57 FN 1) Searching for a neutral term to label a 
collectively acceptable ground, Sukarno followed the advice of a linguistic expert to denote the five principles: 
Instead of Panca Dharma, Sukarno employed the Sanskrit term  Pancasila
125, (Wandelt 1989: 15-16; Franke 
2006) because he fathomed Dharma as duty or obligation and regarded this connotation to be inadequate. In 
this,  Sukarno  himself  most  likely  conceived  of  Pancasila not  as  a  compromise  but  rather  as  a  collectively 
acceptable rational consensus on a philosophical ground, in other words, an agreement in principle, a common 
term, or a national Grundnorm which all delegates in the Committee of 62 could endorse. (Wandelt 1989: 15-
16; Madjid 1994)  
In this way, the Pancasila were to be understood simply as basic principles of the state (Pancasila state). In this 
address, he enunciated five fundamental concepts (dasar pikiran) as a ground of the future Indonesian state 
(dasar  negera).  First  and  foremost,  the  nation-state  should  root  in  values  and  ideals  genuine  to  the 
Archipelago, which should form a congruent national thought and value system, the Weltanschauung
126of the 
state, and could be collectively accepted as the state’s philosophical ground. (Wandelt 1989)  
   
                                                 
125 ‘Panca’ is the Sanskrit word referring to number five. ‘Sila’ can either mean base, fundament, or principle (syila), or rules for proper 
conduct (syiila). The term Pancasila is rooted deeply in early Buddhist doctrine and explored in the sacred Buddhist scriptures Tripitaka. 
Buddhism was spread in Indonesia from the first century onwards; the University of Sriwijaya in Sumatra was particularly renowned for its 
Buddhist exegesis. The Pancasila is mentioned in the chronics of Negarakertagama written by Javanese Mpu Prapanca in 1365 (translated 
by Slametmulyono). Since Buddhism strives to raise the moral standards of society and to teach people to live rationally, Pancasila denotes 
five moral standards that laypeople have to meet in their lives: refrain from killing, theft or robbery, committing adultery, lying, and 
psychotropic substances. Similarly, a Buddhist Theravada monk has to observe ten moral standards. During and after the Islamization of 
Indonesia, these moral standards underwent an acculturation process and are still remembered in Java as the five interdictions (lima 
larangan or M5: do not kill, do not rob, do not commit adultery, do not drink hard alcoholics or smoke opium, do not gamble). (Hirakawa, 
1990: 39; Kaelan 2004: 22; Franke 2006; Wandelt 1989) 
126 Sukarno used the German word Weltanschauung in the Birth of Pancasila Speech on June 1, 1945.  PART B | 91 
The five principles were: Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy, Social Justice, and ‘a civilized  Lordship’ 
(ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan). (Purdy 1984: 57; Stockmann, 2004: 30) Sukarno indicated in the Pancasila 
speech, that the five principles could be further reduced to three principles (Trisila): socio-nationalism, socio-
democracy, and belief in One Supreme Lordship. These three principles could be further simplified as one 
single  guiding  concept  (Ekasila)  of  gotong-royong,  or  mutual  cooperation,  “all  for  one  and  one  for  all”. 
(Stockmann, 2004: 30; Müntz 1965: 81- 82; Purdy 1984: 62; Franke 2006)  
 
The  fifth  principle  ‘a  civilized  Lordship’  (ketuhanan  yang  berkebudayaan)  (Stockmann,  2004:  30)  made 
representatives of political Islambelieve that the role of Islam would be neglected in the future constitution. 
Sukarno made use of the abstract generalized notion of Ketuhanan “which is actually an untranslatable term 
that  incorporates  a  sense  of  divinity,  the  Godhead,  Lordship-concepts”  (Purdy  1984:  61).  Because  of  the 
abstraction,  the  term  should  have  appealed  to  all  religious  traditions  in  the  archipelago.  “Sukarno  thus 
explicitly invested a political statement with religious authority, but his choice of terminology was not to the 
liking of Muslims representatives who would have preferred a more specific reference to the Islamic term, 
Allah.” (Purdy 1984: 61) 
 
Sukarno then emphasized that both the Prophet Mohammad and Jesus Christ had shown sufficient proofs 
of  tolerance  and  challenged  the  nation  to  likewise  exhibit  mutual  respect  for  all  religious  views.  He 
proposed an era of religious tolerance in independent Indonesia, a proposal which has met with only 
qualified success and which continues to be a major concern in the political and religious arena to this 
day. (Purdy 1984: 61-62) 
 
The Islamic/Islamist group’s protest of Sukarno’s Pancasila yielded a temporary victory, as a Committee of Nine 
was formed to solve the debate between the nationalists favoring a Pancasila state and the advocates of an 
Islamic  state.  Then  the  Committee  of  Nine  went  revise  the  principles  in  order  to  find  a  compromise 
formulation. (Stockmann 2004: 30; Ramstedt 2004: 4; Purdy 1984: 66) On June 22, 1945 the Committee of Nine 
“managed  to  come  to  an  agreement”  (Purdy  1984:  66)  and  drafted  the  Jakarta  Charter  (Piagam  Jakarta) 
including  the  obligation  of  the  Muslim  citizens  to  observe  Islamic  law  (Ketuhanandengan  kewajiban 
menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya). Certainly, the compromise was to be found in those 
seven words “including the obligation of the Muslim citizens to observe Islamic law”. Moreover, the document 
stipulated that the future president has to be a Muslim, and it proposed a reformulation of the Pancasila 
starting  with  the  Koranic  formula  in  Arabic,  whereas  the  first  concept  –  and  not  the  last,  as  intended  in 
Sukarno’s draft, introduced ‘Belief in One Lorship’. (Stockmann, 2004: 30; Ramstedt, 2004: 4)  
 
The Committee of 62 held its second meeting between July 10 and 16, 1945. On July 11, Sukarno appointed a 
sub-committee (panitia kecil) with Supomo acting as chair, to work out the details of the statutes of the Basic 
Law.  Having  accomplished  this  task,  the  Jakarta  Charter  constituted  the  preamble  in  the  final  drafted 
constitutional statues. Concerning religious freedom, article 29 of the drafted statues read the state would 
guarantee religious freedom for every citizen in the sense that everybody would be free to choose his or her 
religion (agama), and to hold religious services according to one’s religion (agama) or religious conviction 
(kepercayaan)
127.  (Ramstedt  2004:  5).  The  whole  article,  which  put  syncretistic  mysticism  ( kebatinan, 
kepercayaan) on a par with religions of the book, arose again fierce protests from the Muslim representatives. 
(Ramstedt 2004: 5; Mujiburrahman: 2006) Article 29 was therefore to be amended and according to its new 
version, the state would guarantee that the adherents of each religious community would be free to practice 
their religion in accordance with its respective rules.  
This draft of the Basic Law was presented to Committee of 62 which met again in pleno from July, 14-16 1945. 
While Islamic groups considered the Jakarta Charter as a compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and 
a  secular  one,  for  the  religious  minorities  the  compromise  was  only  found  in  the  five  principles  and  a 
constitution that designates a religious nature for the state, but not a specifically Islamic one. When during the 
month preceding the Declaration of Independence, representatives from outside Java (Bali, and the Eastern 
islands of Indonesia) arrived in Jakarta, it became increasingly clear that the provisional Basic Law with the 
Islamic formulas contained in it were “from the point of view of many non-Muslims, too extreme.” (Purdy 
1984: 68) 
                                                 
127 Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agama 
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Resulting out of the negotiation of the state’s structure and constitution between the secular and the Islamic 
factions, especially the discussions about the Jakarta Charter, the order in which the five principles are listed 
today varies from that used in Suakrnos original Birth of the Pancasila address, the fifth principle ‘belief in One 
Lordship’,  to  wit,  ranks  first  today.  In  the  controversy  between  nationalists  and  political  Islam,  the  third 
principle of “nationalism” was amended to run “Unity of Indonesia”, considered to be more a “neutral but 
dynamic term than a solution” following the objections of political Islam to the term nationalism. (Madjid 1994: 
57) For political Islam, the term “contradicted Islamic universalism and cosmopolitanism, and reminded them 
of  the  chauvinistic  types  of  nationalism  that  have  existed  in  Germany  and  Japan”.  (Madjid  1994:  57) 
“Democracy led by wisdom through deliberation and representation”, the fifth principle, should be understand 
as a common term between secular-national and Islamic ideas of statehood or nation. (Madjid 1994: 58; Zoelva 
Interview 2011) “Wisdom through deliberation” is a paraphrase of an adage (hikmah) ascribed to Prophet 
Muhammad
128.  M  Hatta  (the  first  vice  president),  H  Agus  Alim  (prominent  Muslim  intellectual),  Ki  B. 
Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah, modernist organization), ‘Abd al-Wahid Hashim (Nahdatul Ulama, traditionalist 
Muslims) were the delegates most accredited with an Islamization of the Pancasila, thereby it was eventually 
made acceptable to Muslims. (Madjid 1994: 58)  
Then in August 1945, on August 6 and 9 respectively, two U.S. atomic bombs marked the defeat of Japan in 
World War II. Seizing the opportunity of the US American bombing in Japan on August 17
th, Sukarno and Hatta 
proclaimed the Indonesian Independence on behalf of the Indonesian people. Both are therefore credited as 
the founding fathers of the Pancasila state. Precisely one day after, on August 18, the Basic Law was passed; 
the unbridgeable discrepancies in opinion on the nature of the state between the two major lines of conflict 
between political Islam and the broader national discourse found thus their expression in the world’s “shortest 
constitution”. (Stockmann, 2004: 29) It is noteworthy, however, that the 1945 Basic Law promotes religious 
freedom and women’s suffrage.  
One day later on August 18, the Preparatory Commission of Indonesian Independence (PPKI, Panitia Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia), ratified the 1945 Basic Law. As Hatta read out the Basic Law in public, the previously 
ratified provisions of the Muslim delegates had been omitted. The Preamble of the Basic Law introduced 
Pancasila as national philosophy, but it did neither contain the Koranic formula in Arabic, nor the obligation for 
Muslims to follow the Islamic law, nor was the religious affiliation of the future president regulated. Instead, 
the preamble began with a supplication to God Almighty (Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa) and Sukarno amended his 
initial  proposal  of  the  principle  of  ‘Belief  in  Lordship’  (ketuhanan)  into  ‘Belief  in  One  Supreme  Lordship’ 
(Ketuhanan  Yang  Maha  Esa)  -  “a  slight  but  crucial  change”.  (Hefner  2000:  42f.  in  Stockmann  2004:  30; 
Ramstedt  2004:  4;  Mujiburrahman,  2006:  Chapter  3;  Kaelan,  2004:  Chapter  X,  Ramstedt,  2004,  3-6)  This 
principle appears to be line with the core principle of Islamic faith tawhid, the belief in the indivisible oneness 
of  God,  or  in  other  words  monotheism,  without  making  Islam  the  official  or  even  privileged  religion,  but 
implicitly sanctioning principally monotheistic religions as being in accordance with the philosophical basis of 
the state. (Hefner 2000: 42f. in Stockmann 2004: 30; Ramstedt 2004: 4) 
Thereby the temporary success of political Islam was defeated, and one might rightfully ask, why the Islamic 
representatives  put  aside  their  own  principles  on  the  philosophy  of  the  state  and  accepted  the  1945 
Constitution despite the omission of the crucial parts in the Jakarta Charter.  
First, in view of the Japanese control, with the Allied Forces landing
129, allowing Dutch colonialist to re-colonize 
the country, “the dangers threatened (…) state and nation”
130, therefore the days of revolution were neither 
the appropriate time for the Islamic group to press on the realization of Islamic ideas, nor for a deep discussion 
of the matter. Second, both representatives of the nationalist and Islamic lines wanted to avert a separation of 
the Christian Eastern Islands and Bali, since they threatened not to join the Indonesian Republic, (Anshari 1985; 
Ramstedt 2004: 5; Mujiburrahman 2006; Zoelva Interview 2011) if the basis for the state would be Islamic. 
Third, political Islam was waiting for a secure and safe future, when the situation would permit to deliberate on 
the Constitution again, if the climate would be more conducive to Islamic claims. (Zoelva Interview 2011) Forth, 
the principle of tawhid had indeed become the basic principle of the state expressed in the first principle and 
Article 29 of the 1945 Basic Law. (Ramstedt 2004: 6; Mujiburrahman, 2006) 
                                                 
128 Ra’s al-hikmah al mashúrah (the trunk of wisdom is deliberation) (Madjid 1994: 57) 
129 Allied Forces (mostly Bristish and British Indian troops) arrived in late September 1945 
130 Letnan-General H. Soedirman in Zaini Z. 1971 in Anshari 1985: 221 PART B | 93 
The 1945 Basic Law thus was seen to have temporary character with a preliminary status, and the international 
recognition of Indonesia as sovereign state was first ranking. Sukarno himself has emphasized the temporary 
character, and his thoughts were held by the Islamic group as a national promise (Anshari 1985: 221; Zoelva 
Interview 2011) Hence, it was hoped that in later times there were more options to amend or change the 
Constitution according to Islamic requirement, since national sovereignty, independence, unity, and stability 
were the primary objective to be realized and to fight for. (Anshari 1985: 221; Zoelva Interview 2011) 
Between the proclamation of independence in 1945, and the final transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the young 
Indonesian nation was a heavily contested one: it had to safeguard independence against external (Dutch 
troops,  British  troops)  and  internal  (Darul  Islam
131)  factors.  When  Dutch  and  Allied  troops  arrived  in  late 
September 1945, the Dutch tried to reinstall themselves in Kalimantan, the Moluccas, Sulawesi, Bali, and the 
remaining  Lesser  Sunda  Islands,  retaining  control  over  large  parts  of  Sumatra  and  Java.  But  by  then  “the 
Republic had begun to establish itself and nationalist pride had burgeoned”
132. When the Dutch returned and 
tried to reestablish colonial rule between October-December 1945, armed Indonesian guerillas resisted. The 
period  was  “filled  with  violent  conflict  in  which  Indonesians  made  it  clear  they  would  defend  their 
independence with their lifeblood“
133 
Since the Islamic provisions were left out, this did not support national unity and the nationalist’s cause and 
representatives of political Islam were left with discontent about the loss of the Islamic provision and the 
absence of a Ministry of Religion claimed during the meetings of the Committee of 62. To counter Islamic 
resurgence, these feelings of Muslim discontent were channeled into support for the national cause through 
the establishment of the Ministry of Religion on January 3
rd, 1946. The Cairo-educated modernist Muslim H.M. 
Rasjidi  had  been  appointed  the  first  minister.  This  move  enabled  the  revolutionary  government  in 
Yogyakarta
134 to bind or co-opt factions of political Islam into the government. In contrast, the Ministry of  
Education remained under Javanese secular nationalist influence. The first appointed Minister in 1945 was the 
founder of the  Taman Siswa movement Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, therefore the Ministry and the Minister were 
influenced by ideas of Budi Utomo, the Theosophical Society and the pedagogic concepts of the Taman Siswa 
movement in early years. Today, the Ministry of Religious Affairs remains oriented towards more orthodox 
Islamic values and the Ministry of Education appears to be rather secular.  
 
Prior  to  their  withdrawal  in  late  1946,  the  British  forced  the  Dutch  to  negotiate  with  the  Indonesian 
revolutionary government for an end to hostilities. After four years of revolutionary war and guerilla tactics 
against the Dutch and an internal communist rebellion, The Hague formally recognized the sovereignty of a 
Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949
135. In the new Constitution of 1949, 
article 18 granted every citizen the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, includi ng the right to 
change one’s religion. “Everyone has the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief; this right 
also covers the freedom to change one’s religion and conviction”. (Ramstedt 2004: 7) 
Having won formal independence from the Dutch, Indonesians made big concessions to their former colonial 
emperors. The new Indonesia adopted a federal system of governance comprising 16 federal states, since the 
Dutch  ensured  federalism  would  form  the  overall  framework  of  the  political  organization  rather  than  the 
format of a Unitary-Nation State as opted for by Indonesians. To protect the non-Muslim population of their 
former strongholds, the Dutch made sure that the Jakarta Charter would not be implemented. (Ramstedt 2004) 
This Dutch intrusion in national and religious affairs left the concept of federalism tainted until the present day 
(federalism trauma) as either something which furthers foreign imperialist interests to the detriment of the 
Indonesian people or lies in discrepancy with asserted ‘cultural’ traditions and Islam. (Parker 2004; Hilmy 2010)  
 
                                                 
131 The Darul Islam movement had an orthodox Middle East oriented understanding of Islam. The Darul Islam movement was ignited by 
S.M Kartosuwirjo, who had proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia in West Java on August 17
th 1949. The Darul Islam movement refers to 
the spread of Islamic dissident groups in Central Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi, which were seen as not loyal to the young republican 
government. The government was only able to crack down those groups by 1965, after they shot Kahar Mazakar, leader of the South 
Sulawesi branch of the movement.  
132 Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, (March 2010) 
133 Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, (March 2010) 
134 The revolutionary government was forced out of Batavia and the exile capital was located in Yogyakarta from 1946 to 1949. In  this, the 
young republic and its revolutionary government had with the exception of some areas in Java and Sumatra no territory. 
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As first consequence, political Islam continued to feel that they had not achieved full independence, because 
the Dutch had been instrumental in preventing the Jakarta Charter to be included in the 1949 Constitution. 
Second, the foundations were laid for the existence of a phenomenon which “actually exists alongside and 
rather clearly differentiated from the churches (and the mosques): an elaborate and well-institutionalized civil-
religion” (Purdy 1984: 69; cf. Bellah 1967).  
With regard to the fusion of religion, politics and state or the role of Islam in the Constitution, Mujiburrahman 
(2006: 118-119) differentiates three stages of Muslim ideological  struggle to illustrate the triple failure of 
political Islam in implementing an Islamic state. However, members of the more radical Muslims factions have 
been unsatisfied with the constitution and the Pancasila, and they continue to argue for a state, which is based 
on Islamic values. (Hosen 2005; Hilmy 2010) First, the idea to make Islam the ideology of the state has been 
eventually  opposed  by  the  nationalists  and  was  rejected.  Second,  the  Islamic  groups  tried  to  negotiate  a 
compromise with the nationalists, as agreed upon in the Jakarta Charter, but the obligation for Muslims to 
observe Islamic Law was dropped in the Preamble. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: Chapter 3; Kaelan, 2004: Chapter X, 
Ramstedt, 2004, 3-6) The issue of the Jakarta Charter and debates whether to implement the obligation for 
Muslims to follow the syari’ah did resurface during the Sukarno presidency and rather prominently in the 
recent constitutional amendments after the downfall of the Suharto regime. The ratification of the Charta was 
three  times  rejected.  In  1956,  1958  and  1959  the  syari’ah  issue  emerged  again,  Islamic  groups  tried  to 
implement the Charter but failed as in 1945. From 2000- 2002 four amendments to the 1945 constitution were 
passed; yet in a People’s Consultative Assembly session the proposal to introduce the Jakarta Charter was not 
even put to the vote. (Crouch, 2003: 23; Hosen 2005; King Blair 2005; Zoelva Interview 2011) Yet, since 1959 
the  Jakarta  Charter  is  recognized  as  an  historical  document,  this  recognition  was  upheld  in  2002. 
(Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 5; Ramstedt 2004: 13-14; Zoelva Interveiw 2010)  
 
Third, Muslims gave an Islamic meaning to the Pancasila by re-interpreting ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’ as the 
Islamic theological concept of monotheism or tawhid. In other words, as Muslim delegates in the parliament 
“care for religion” (Sukarno Birth of the Pancasila Speech, in Purdy 1984: 59), they automatically issue “Islamic 
laws” (Sukarno Birth of the Pancasila Speech, in Purdy 1984: 59) as for example, the Presidential Decision 
1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration, or the 1974 Marriage Act, or the Anti-Pornography and 
Porno-action Act. All these consequential legislation can be said to base on an exclusive understanding of Islam. 
In  consequence,  the  question  of  religion  remains  a  vital  source  of  controversy  today  (Picard  2004:  56; 
Mujiburrahman  2006:  106-109)  and  in  this  context,  the  importance  of  religion  in  politics  and  education 
achieves its relevance. 
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Parliamentary democracy (1950-1959) 
The just formed government of the Federal Republic needed one year to bring about the desired unitary nation 
state
136. Having been assigned the third time president, the unitary nation-state was proclaimed by Sukarno on 
August 17, 1950. The state adopted a new Constitution of 1950 and a liberal system of government. (Zoe lva 
Interview 2011) The Unitary State put in place a parliamentary democracy in which a plethora of large and 
small parties competed for support. The period of parliamentary democracy was remarkably open and religious 
affiliation was dealt with quite laxly. Article 18 of the 1949 Constitution was likewise included in the 1950 Basic 
Law, and runs “everyone has the right to freedom of religion, conscience, and thought”. (Ramstedt 2004: 8) 
The part which granted the right to change one’s religion had been omitted, leaving the issue somewhat 
lingering in the air. (Ramstedt 2004: 8) 
Again, the 1950 constitution was not accommodating Muslim demands, because the image of the loyal Muslim 
groups was considerably tainted by what was commonly interpreted as the betrayal of the Darul Islam. The 
nationalists saw a major threat to national unity in the Darul Islam movement that had spread over parts of 
Java,  South  Kalimantan,  Aceh,  the  Moluccas,  the  Lesser  Sunda  Islands,  and  South  Sulawesi.  The  powerful 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in which Javanists were prominent, was entertaining close links with the 
kebatinan groups that practiced a kind of  mysticism based on a Javanese interpretation of the  Pancasila. 
(Ramstedt, 2004: 8) This mysticism did not accord at all with Darul Islam’s orthodox Middle East oriented 
understanding of Islam. The Darul Islam movement was ignited by S.M Kartosuwirjo, who had proclaimed the 
Islamic State of Indonesia in West Java on August 7, 1950. Darul Islam refers to the spread of dissident groups, 
which were seen as not loyal to the government. They were using a quite premature rhetoric of an Islamic state 
and syari’ah to justify their anti-national and separatist objectives. Only in 1962 the National Army was able to 
crash down on the outspread movement. 
The first democratic general election Indonesia ever had was held in 1955. Political Islam gained 43 per cent of 
the  total  vote.  (Ananta  2005:  21)  The  Islamic  parties  obtained  230  seats,  while  other  parties  (nationalist, 
protestant,  catholic,  socialist,  and  communist)  obtained  284.  Since  the  ratio  between  two  groups  was, 
therefore, around 4 to 5, Anshari argues, therefore it would be evident, that “the Islamic faction was not 
properly  represented  in  either  the  1945  Investigative  Committee  (25%),  or  in  the  Preparatory  Committee 
(12%)
”. (Anshari 1985: 222) It would have been “only in the Committee  which had composed the Jakarta 
Charter that the Islamic group has been represented adequately”. (Anshari 1985: 222)  
In  November  1956,  Sukarno  inaugurated  a  newly  elected  Constituent  Assembly  to  renegotiate  the 
philosophical basis of the Republic. Remembering the heated debates on the degree of conflict, similarity and 
tolerance  between  Islam,  its  fundamental  teachings,  and  Pancasila  within  and  between  the  Islamic  and 
nationalist groups in the public sphere between 1945 and 1955, it was consequently a hot atmosphere in which 
the Assembly began its work of writing a new democratic constitution between 1956 and 1959.  
At the beginning three proposals for the basis of the state came to fore: Pancasila, Islam, and the Social 
Economy, since politicians were divided into three main ideologies: nationalism, Islamism, and communism or 
socialism. (Anshari 1985) The nationalists and minorities argued for Pancasila as basic principles, the Islamists 
were in favor of the idea of an Islamic state, and the communists imagined a Marxist state modeled after the 
Soviet Union. The first proposal was supported by 273 representatives, the second by 230 members, whereas 
the third proposal had 9 supporters only. (Anshari 1985: 224) It is therefore fair to say, that the debates on 
political and philosophical principles related to a writing of the Constitution were split into two major camps: 
One seeking an Islamic basis for the state, the other claiming the acceptance of the Pancasila
137. (Anshari 1985 
224) 
   
                                                 
136 The founding fathers’ drive to build a Unitary Nation may be derived out of a Islamic general assumption of Oneness, the communal 
nature of Islam, and/or a Javanese cultural concept that Oneness eventually expresses human nature, as outlaid in the integralist model. 
137 “By Pancasila here were meant all forms of Pancasila, except the Jakarta Charter, despite the Charter being the first official formulation 
of the Pancasila. Not only do we see in the discussion of the Constituent Assembly’s references to several different forms of the Pancasila, 
but also a variety of interpretations of specific terms and widely different emphases.” (Anshari 1985: 224) PART B | 96 
The content of the first principle ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’ was the most problematic one. Proponents of the 
Islamic group problematized the place of God and revelation in the Constitution, since the first principle does 
not specifically reflect the Islamic concept of God (tawhid). As Sukarno argued for a relative concept of God 
according to the development of social (and individual) life from one stage to another, it seems that he had an 
secular-scientific-enlightened understanding of the principle, holding that one who still lives in the phase of the 
agrarian, needs God, whereas after becoming industrialized, the same person would not need God anymore. 
(Anshari 1985: 224) 
Further, since national territorial integrity (wawasan nusantara) was his first objective, he wanted to include all 
religious traditions. The following chapters show that this tradition is followed up until today. Sukarno’s stance 
was presumably confusing for an orthodox Muslim, and this confusion is reflected in the heated debates on the 
principle. The question asked by M. Natsir (Masyumi) was certainly paradigmatic for Muslim concerns and 
doubts “How can we maintain in this way the idea of revelation which is independent upon any temporal 
influences (…)?”(Anshari 1985: 224) Since in the eyes of a secularist, the principle of Ketuhanan would merely 
be a man-made principle, it is subject to change and has nothing to do with wahyu (revelation). (Anshari 1985: 
224) On the contrary, supporters of Pancasila expressed their view, religion would be something supreme and 
sacred, which they held in high esteem, and exactly for these qualities, Soewirjo, President of PNI argued “we 
do mind whether religion is to be used as the basis of the state “
138. (Anshari 1985: 225) “Then he quoted a 
statement signed by Soekarno and Hatta on September 14, 1957: That the Pancasila which is inserted in the 
Preamble  (…)  is  the  real  guarantee  for  whole  people  of  Indonesia  to  live  continuously,  freely,  justly  and 
prosperously”
139. The Islamic group was of the opinion that “the  Pancasila is an empty formula which still 
needs contents. If (…) the first Sila (…) is filled by the people who consider a stone as God, the Lordship in the 
Pancasila then will be filled in with a stone. If it is filled in by tree worshippers, it will be filled in with a tree
140.” 
M Natsir elucidated Islamic discontent and appealed to the supporters of Pancasila as follows:  
Pancasila as a state philosophy is for us obscure and has nothing to say to the soul of Muslim community 
which already posses a definite, clear, and complete ideology, one which burns in the hearts of the 
Indonesian people as a living inspiration and source of strength, namely Islam. To exchange the Islamic 
Ideology for Panca Sila is, for Muslims, like leaping from the solid into empty space, into a vacuum. (…) 
Your intended silas exist in Islam, not as a sterile ‘pure concept’ but as a living value which has real and 
distinct substances. By accepting Islam as the philosophy of the state the defender of Panca Sila will not 
lose anything at all. Both the supporters of the Panca Sila and the adherents of religion will have a living 
philosophy with distinct and strong contents. No one of the five silas formulated in the Panca Sila will fall 
and be lost by your accepting Islam as the basis of the state
141. 
The Assembly then tended to seek points of agreements, as both Pancasila and Islam seek to realize “a just and 
prosperous state, a democratic government, a life of a world economy which is formed in a family spirit, a 
happy  life  of  the  nation’s  household  having  high  ethical  values”
142.  The  balance  of  power  between  the 
nationalist group and Islam, also reflected in the election results, made it an absolute necessity for the General 
Chairman of the Assembly Wilopo “to produce a compromise, a resultant of parallelogram of strength within 
trends which is existing in our society”
143 “Since both Islam and Pancasila desire our nation to be happy, is it 
impossible to find points of meeting?”
144 In the third session in 1957, the Assembly established a Formulating 
Committee on the Basis of the State, consisting of 18 members that presented a concrete proposal for a new 
compromise formula
145, a draft a mixture between Islam,  adat, and Pancasila. It seems, that after three years 
of deliberation, a great degree of unity seemed to have existed between the two faction in the Assembly, and if 
“it were given the chance to finish its task to form the permanent Constitution, it would have been accepted 
and sustained by all living groups in Indonesian society”. (Anshari 1985: 226) 
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Beginning in 1956, Sukarno was deeply dissatisfied with the parliamentary system. Opposing unrest, rebellions, 
and separation efforts triggered by political Islam and the Darul Islam movement, Sukarno feared national 
disintegration and gave the central military command wide martial law powers in 1957. Thereafter, the centre 
of political gravity shifted away from the parties and the parliament to the Army.  
In 1959, president Sukarno, backed by the military, disbanded the Constitutional Assembly and forced the 
return to the 1945 Basic Law and Pancasila as national philosophical principles, which he declared shall be seen 
as the historical continuation of the Jakarta Charter. At this time the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai 
Komunis  Indonesia;  henceforth  PKI)  gained  strength  in  Indonesia’s  political  realm,  growing  from  a  small 
organization in the early 1950s to an enormous mass movement in 1965, the PKI was at first associated with 
the Soviet Union, but in the mid-1960s became bound far more intimately to mainland China. (Sudijarto/ 
Thomas et al. 1980: 53, 58) 
Guided Democracy (1959-1965) 
When Sukarno developed the Guided democracy, he often emphasized that liberal democracy would be not in 
line  with  Indonesian  culture,  somewhat  supporting  Supomo’s  integralist  perspective  on  the  nation-state. 
(Mujiburrahman 2006: 144) Some foreign and Indonesian observers believed that the PKI would gain control 
over the parliament by legal constitutional means in 1959. (Parker 2003: 69) Thus the Army requested the 
election to be postponed. On July 5
th, 1959 Sukarno replaced the parliamentary system with an authoritarian 
regime with the active backing of the Army and proclaimed ‘Guided Democracy’, a system in which he held 
wide-ranging executive powers and in which the parliament would comprise representatives of ‘functional 
groups’,  such  as  workers,  woman,  youth  and  farmers.  Feeling  that  the  nation  was  still  unstable,  Sukarno 
declared the 1950 Provisional Constitution void and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution. The pending issue of 
the Jakarta Charter was solved by recognizing it as a historical document. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 5; Ramstedt 
2004: 13-14)  
The 1945 Basic Law provided ample opportunity for Sukarno to balance and appease three political powers - 
the PKI, the Army and himself
146. During the period the Guided democracy (1959-1965) Sukarno announced his 
‘synthetic ideology’ of nationalism, Islam and Communism (NASAKOM), and as result the Manipol Usdek
147, the 
PKI  could  introduce  Communism  at  every  level  of  society.  As  the  government  was  further  determined  to 
deprive local elites from wealth and power who had co-operated with the Dutch, political polarization between 
the PKI and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indoensia), henceforth PNI) also developed apace 
in  rural  areas,  especially  in  Java  and  Bali.  (Bourchier/Hadiz,  2003:  5-6;  Robinson  1995;  Parker  2003)  In 
consequence, the early 1960s era was one of hot politics, open class conflict, and eventual mass violence.  
In the first half of the 1960s, Sukarno leaned toward the left. The PKI increased its power and influence, giving 
way  to  a  left-right  polarization  mirroring  the  Cold  War  struggle,  in  which  Indonesian  politics  became 
increasingly involved. On domestic politics, Sukarno was trying to balance the communists and the Army; on 
the international stage he was establishing himself as leader of a new world, free from Cold War antagonism. 
But economic decline and mounting conflicts, especially those between communists and non-communists, the 
latter was backed by the Army, causing him to lose control over the situation
148. By the mid-1960s political 
tensions increased between 1) left -wing forces gathered around the PKI and  2) their opponents among the 
military, the PNI, religious parties and college students and staff members. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 58)  
As the Army moved into an increasingly hostile relationship with Sukarno, it appropriated the corporatist mode 
of organization and made the ‘functional groups’ (golongan karya) the basis of its own political vehicle, Golkar. 
In 1964, Golkar was established as an umbrella organization of anti-communist civilian associations and trade 
unions in order to balance the increasing influence of the PKI. In 1965, the Army, fearing the powers of the PKI, 
the  third  largest  communist  party  in  the  world,  developed  an  alliance  with  the  anti-communist  forces  in 
Indonesia and also the US Administration, which saw the military as their strongest guarantee against the 
growing power of PKI. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 4-6) 
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147 Starting in 1959, Sukarno reiterated the five central concepts of the Indonesian revolution: First, Basic Law of 1945; second, socialism ala 
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concepts, the acronym USDEK evolved. Manipol is the acronym of Indonesian Political Manifest, the new state doctrine hence became 
known as Manipol Usdek. 
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Under Sukarno, Indonesia increasingly reduced the role of foreign investment in Indonesia, accusing European 
and American imperialists to be responsible  for the  exploitation of Indonesian human capital and natural 
resources. Over the decade 1955-1965 the Indonesian economy declined at accelerating pace. Between 1964 
and 1965, the tension between the PKI and the Indonesian government, along with some Islamic organizations, 
resulted in the worst mass murders of the twentieth century. 
New Order (1966-1998) 
Significant changes in the area of religion happened during the New Order era. Religious affiliation became a 
matter of life and death, since the government supported by Muslim groups tried to suppress the supporters of 
PKI, by applying a policy that everyone must choose a religion and thereby identified the idea of being anti-
religious  with  being  a  communist,  which  could  threaten  a  person’s  existential  security.  As  a  result,  every 
Indonesian  citizen  was  required  to  carry  personal  identification  cards  indicating  their  religion.  The  policy 
resulted in mass conversions. The compulsory religious class became established after the abortive coup of 
1965 and the rise of the New Order.  
In the month between September 30, 1965, and March 11, 1966 precise, Suharto rose to power in the midst of 
a  bloodbath  of  incomprehensible  scale.  (Stockmann  2004:  28)  September  30,  1965  was  a  watershed  in 
Indonesian history: Under unclear circumstances Major-General Suharto had used his troops from the Army 
Strategic Reserve to assert  control in Jakarta. In one of the worst  episodes of  mass  murder, hundreds of 
thousands  of  members  of  the  PKI  and  its  mass  organizations  were  killed  by  parts  of  the  Army  hostile  to 
Sukarno. The abortive coup took the lives of seven high-ranking Army generals, followed by a pogrom of 
communists, a moderate estimate ranges between 300 thousand and 500 thousand alleged members of PKI. 
The PKI and dozens of its affiliates were completely destroyed. The official Army version insists that the PKI was 
behind the coup attempt, while the communist version asserts that the coup was an internal matter of the 
Army. In fact, several members of the PKI central bureau were involved, as well as many Army officers and 
personnel
149.  
Again under unclear circumstances, on March 11, 1966 Sukarno put his signature to a document (March 11 
Letter of Instruction) reportedly transferring wide -ranging state power to Suharto
150. On March 27
th, 1968 
Suharto was finally assigned full presidency, after having been appointed acting president the year before. 
Consolidating his power under a new regime called the  New Order, Suharto launched a regime cleansing 
against the Old Order
151. Suharto himself was steeped in Javanese mysticism and was known to meditate a t 
different  historical  sites,  to  collect  powerful  magic  heirlooms  ( pusaka  sakti)  in  order  to  accrue  power 
(kesaktian). (Ramstedt, 2004. 16) The New Order in its early years is best thought of as an alliance between the 
military  and  a  range  of  civilian  groups  that  included  students,  secular  intellectuals,  professionals,  anti-
communist party leaders, and large numbers of rural and urban Muslims. These groups had been united by 
their fear of communism and by their perception that Sukarno was to blame for the economic crisis that had 
been eroded their material interests. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 11; Ramstedt 2004: 15) By glorifying the 1965-
massacres as a heroic  mission, the Suharto regime demonized Communism to the  extent that it  was not 
possible for young people to see Marxism or the PKI in a positive light, “they have been brainwashed”. (Parker 
2004: 68) 
During the purge in 1965-1966 approximately 50.000 teachers lost their lives, and a second lack of teachers 
(the first appeared in the founding years and the 1950s), not to speak of qualified teachers, emerged. (Müller 
1974: 324) In the beginning of Suharto government, about 60 percent of the adults could not read or write and 
close to 65 percent of the country’s population lived in absolute poverty, since the average Indonesian earned 
only roughly US$50 a year, and over 80 percent of the population lived on tiny, fragmented, and scattered 
farms. They had little or no access either to rudimentary health care or to basic amenities of life such as safe 
drinking  water  or  adequate  shelter.  Therefore  the  Suharto  government  began  economic  rehabilitation  by 
reassessing economic objectives
152. (Tambunan 2004)   
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During the beginning of the New Order era there were serious debates on the Jakarta Charter versus Pancasila. 
Then communism was banned and Pancasila was implemented as basic principle of the state and supreme 
base of jurisdiction
153 in 1966. In consequence, as the Suharto regime arose to power the times of dealing laxly 
with religious affiliation were definitely determined. The Suharto regime forced the population to affiliate itself 
clearly to one of the acknowledged religions. Adherents to traditional religious belief systems, those ‘who did 
not  have  a  religion  yet’  (belum  beragama),  were  suspected  to  be  atheists  and  consequently  probably 
communist. To be suspected of being a communist, put a person into mortal danger. Separatist inclinations 
based on ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, race or any other kinds of factionalism
154 were strictly prohibited. 
Suharto was determined to bring about economic development by modernizing infrastructure of the country 
and to create the necessary manpower in form of the  so-called Pancasila human (manusia Pancasila). He set 
up the trilogy of development: political stability, economic growth, and equality.  
The  New  Order’s  main  political  machinery,  Golkar,  operated  legally  not  as  a  political  party,  but  as  an 
association of functional groups, although in fact the Regime developed it into a government sponsored party. 
Society was highly depoliticized as mass organizations were disbanded into this state-backed corporatist bodies 
purporting to represent such broad ‘functional groups’. In accordance with the regime’s organicist ideology, all 
components of Golkar were expected to subordinate their particular interests to the national interest. While 
the regime was generous with grants to Muslim schools and mosques, it soon made clear its opposition to any 
attempt to reassert Islam through politics (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 12-13; Mujiburrahman, 2006: 140) and from 
1966-1989 political Islam has been silenced.  
During the 1970s, Islam emerged as the most potent opposition force. By 1973 the New Order has finally taken 
shape, and Suharto tightly controlled politics; not even the slightest room was available for opposition
155. A 
large-scale reorganization of the political system was introduced in 1974, nine oppositional parties were fused 
into two government sponsored bodies, PPP (United Development Party) which brought together four Muslim 
parties and the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) which was an amalgamation of the remaining Christian, 
socialist, and nationalist parties There were several cases of serious opposition
156, but in 1978 Suharto enjoyed 
an  incontestable  position.  Muslim  discontent  intensifie d  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  when  the 
government launched a major campaign to indoctrinate Indonesians with the state ideology of  Pancasila. 
(Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 14)  
In 1978 Suharto’s personal assistant Ali Murtopo has established a think tank, called CSIS (Centre of Strategic 
Studies Institute) that should resemble the RAND Corporation. Murtopo then published the book ‘Strategy of 
Culture’ introducing the integralist-organicist view on culture by claiming that the archipelago had one single 
history, destiny, culture, territory and spiritual foundation, therefore Indonesian culture could be traced back 
to the early history in which people believed in animism and already in One Supreme Lordship. In brief, the 
core  of  the  original  Indonesian  culture  survived,  even  though  enriched,  through  manifold  acculturation 
processes  and  is  embedded  in  the  Pancasila.  The  advent  of  the  Westerners  caused  a  cultural  dualism 
eventually paving the way for Indonesian independence. In this context, Pancasila is the true manifestation of 
Indonesian culture in the sense that the principles of family-ism, cooperation, and harmony are embodied in it. 
(Mujiburrahman, 2006: 147)   
                                                 
153 Communism ban: Ketetapan MPRS no. XXV/MPRS/1966; Pancasila: Ketetapan MPRS no. XX/MPRS/1966 
154 Then referred to as SARA, an acronym of suku (ethnic group), agama (religion), ras (race) and antargolongan (intergroup action) 
155 The Jakarta Post, Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in:  www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007); Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 10 
156 In January 15
th, 1974 when students protested against Japanese investments in Jakarta, added by political rivalry between Gen. Sumitro 
and Maj. Gen. Ali Murtopo, their protests turned into serious riots, known as Malari disaster, led to a crackdown marked by the final break 
between the pluralists and the organicists. The second serious opposition movement came in 1978; again students protested Suharto’s bid 
for a second term in office. In 1978 several retired Army officers backed the students, while factionalism was apparent within the Armed 
Forces. Suharto moved fast to crush the movement. Hundreds of opposition and student leaders were arrested; dozens of newspapers and 
magazines were closed down. The movement lost its momentum, and after that Suharto enjoyed an incontestable position. The Jakarta 
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But the indoctrination efforts were apparently not enough, controlling the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, MPR
157), the regime produced a Broad Guideline of State Policy (GBHN) in 1983, 
which  specified  that  all  political  parties  have  to  acknowledge  Pancasila  as  their  sole  foundation. 
(Bourchier/Hadiz  2003:  14;  Mujiburrahman  2006:  149)  In  consequence  Law  No.  8/1985  on  Societal 
Organization stipulated that all social organizations were required to accept Pancasila as the sole basis (azas 
tunggal)  in  their  societal,  national,  and  political  activities.  Non-compliance  resulted  in  disbanding. 
Undoubtedly,  Law  No.  8/1985  can  be  seen  as  the  “apex  of  Gleichschaltung  in  the  civil  society  realm”. 
(Stockmann 2004, emphasis in original) 
When his azas tunggal policy became law, Suharto saw it as a great, even an epoch-making, achievement of its 
administration. Uniting all political forces under the Pancasila, he believed, enabled Indonesia to put behind it 
the ideological and religious conflict that had torn at its fabric in the past. No longer would it be acceptable to 
advocate any ideology that conflicted with the Pancasila as defined by the government. The Islamic party (PPP), 
the  Indonesian  Hindu  Council  and  the  Christian  associations  therefore  had  to  take  Pancasila  and  not  the 
doctrines  of  their  particular  faith  as  their  basis.  There  has  been  much  criticism  of  the  law  of  1985  by 
representatives of faith communities and liberal democracy. The forced acceptance of Pancasila as the single 
basis  in  their  statutes  and  constitutions  was  felt  as  an  attack  on  their  self-understanding  by  religious 
organizations. Yet, the law refrained from demanding a “Pancasila theology” or anything along that line. It was 
limited to the societal, national, and political spheres, and did not trespass onto theological or religious ones. 
(Schumann, 2001: 31) King Blair (2004: 16) comments critically:  
President Soeharto and the military held the 1945 Constitution essentially sacred, not least because it 
granted broad powers and tremendous flexibility to the president and created a weak legislature and 
judiciary, facilitating their authoritarian project. Proposals to amend the Constitution were considered 
tantamount to treason and all political and social organizations were required to include loyalty to the 
Constitution in their charters. This sacralization of the 1945 Constitution was especially ironic given that 
originally  it  was  meant  to  be  a  provisional,  emergency  document  whose  main  function  was  to  help 
generate some modicum of legitimacy and structure for the Indonesian state in the aftermath of the 
hasty declaration of independence.  
 
From  1973  to  1988,  Indonesia  was  able  to  steadily  expand  the  state  spending  on  education,  health, 
infrastructure projects, the armed  forces and the bureaucracy. This facilitated an increase in employment 
opportunities and a rising standard of living for both urban and rural dwellers. A prolonged period of economic 
growth and stability had produced a substantial middle class and a rapidly expanding urban working class. This 
processes  caused  society  to  change;  compared  with  the  late  1960s,  Indonesians  were  more  educated, 
healthier, more mobile, and more prosperous than ever. But, while the economy grew, the period was marked 
by  an  increasing  concentration  of  political  power  and  an  attenuation  of  civil  and  political  rights 
(Bourchier/Hadiz,  2003:  13)  resulting  in  a  depoliticized  and  demobilized  civic  society.  As  Parker  pointedly 
noted, the younger generations were free of the 1965 trauma but they were indoctrinated with the paranoia of 
Communism and that open democracy is dangerous because it can lead to blood in the streets. (Parker 2004: 
99) In brief, during the New Order, diversity was sacrificed in favor of uniformity or conformity to protect 
Indonesian unity. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003; Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 16-17; Mujiburrahman 2006: 221) 
Following a regime split in 1988, Suharto’s absolute dominance eroded, thereby causing the character of the 
New Order to change. All things considered, the New Order began to lose its coherence because its political 
architecture could no longer accommodate the tremendous social changes, which had taken place over the 
past two decades. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003) In an attempt to regain the initiative, Suharto reached out to 
the Muslim community his government had marginalized in the 1970s and 1980s, as the establishment of the 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) in 1990 illustrates. The new orientation portrayed Islam not 
as an ideology opposed to Pancasila, but as the spirit within the national culture. Consequently, nationalism 
and Islam were seen as compatible. In 1989, which marked the Islamic turn (Liddle 1996) in Indonesian politics, 
the Suharto clan went to Mecca to perform the hajj.  
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With the ending of the Cold War, Suharto eventually signaled his support for increased political ‘openness and 
transparency’ (keterbukaan) analogous to the Soviet glasnost, and democracy was a favorite topic of debate in 
this period. In 1993, the National Commission on Human Rights was set up, yet Indonesia maintained that 
‘Western’ standards could not be applied in the Indonesian ‘integralistic state’ inspired and guided by the 
indigenous Indonesian values of harmony and cooperation. The ability of a small core of ‘radical’ activists to 
organize  large  student/worker  protests  during  1989-1994  helped  to  revive  mass  protest,  which  had  been 
suppressed by terror in 1965 as legitimate political action. Another sign of the New Order’s waning authority 
and of the increasing relevance of mass politics was Megawati Sukarnoputri’s
158 surprise election as the chair of 
the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1993. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 18) The PDI as successor of the PNI has 
its national stronghold traditionally in Bali. The openness of the political space did much to pave the way for 
the demonstrations that weakened the Suharto regime between 1996 and its end in 1998. It also helped 
convince a wider circle of activists of the efficacy of mass action. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 17)  
Organicism and Asian Values 
Organicism 
The organicist model of thinking accords well with the Asian value debate. Certainly, this cultural relativist 
model of thought has enjoyed a very bad reputation and is more or less in disgrace in the ‘West’, since it is 
associated with patrimonalism, exploitation, and fascism. But reminding the significance of Indonesia as a 
laboratory for social research, there is the responsibility to take claims for indigenous political models seriously, 
which may not suit liberal Western sensibilities. (Bowen 2004:153; Parker, 2004: 8 FN 15, 9; Houben/Chou 
2005) Both integral and pluralist lines of thought are in my understanding represented in Indo-Melanesian 
traditions and the Hindu-Buddhist legacy and Javanese monism. Those lines of thought are vital and creative in 
contemporary discourse in Indonesia, accounting for their effective repercussions in the public and political 
arena. In general, the integralist model emphasizes the communal and ethical element and does not only grant 
rights but imposes also duties on the community members, or in other words communal rights are given the 
same weight as individual rights. These lines of thought also accord with the more orthodox Islamic notion of 
monotheism and communalism.  
The  integralist  model  backs  the  Constitution  of  1945,  which  had  been  drafted  largely  by  the  trained 
constitutional scholar and Javanese aristocrat Prof Supomo
159. Prof Supomo had found three main concepts of 
state: liberalism, emphasizing individual rights, Marxism basing on class analysis, and the integralist approach, 
in which individuals or class do no t matter, because state and people are considered as organic parts and 
united as a family. Prof Supomo preferred the integralist approach, because it was the most suitable system to 
the given Indonesian socio-political culture to him. “In that system the attitude of a citizen is not ‘what is my 
right’ but ‘what is my duty as a member of the large family”
160. According to the integralist understanding of 
state “there will be no dualism between state and individual’s, (…) there will be no dualism between state and 
stateless societies (Staat und staatsfreie Gesellschaft), there will be no need to guarantee basic rights and 
human rights (Grund- und Freiheitsrechte) for the individual against the state, because individuals are organic 
parts of the state, with its own position and obligation to help realize the state’s greatness (…)”
161.  
The Suharto Regime fully developed Supomo’s idea that Indonesia was an integralistic state, inspired and 
guided by indigenous Indonesian values of harmony and cooperation, and that Western standards could not be 
applied in Indonesia. In 1968 the New Order referred to Prof Supomo’s integralist ideas as the appropriate 
source for understanding the 1945 constitution.    
                                                 
158 Megawati Sukarnoputri is the daughter of the first Indonesian president and architect of Pancasila, Sukarno. She is of Sumatran-
Javanese-Balinese descent.  
159 Born 22.01.1903 – died on 12th September 1958. Supomo was influenced by Javanese ethics and admired the Japanese and German 
totalitarian regimes. His doctoral project was conducted at the law faculty of the Universiteit Leiden, The Netherlands. His promoter has 
been Cornelius van Vollenhoven, who was not only the ‚architect’ or father of Indonesian adat law, but also an renowned expert of 
international law as he was one of the legal advisers to the League of Nations, the precursor of the United Nations. Supomo was appointed 
first Indonesian minister of Justice. (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soepomo) 
160 Supomo as quoted in Reeve 1990: 158, in: Parker 2004: 8 
161 Stockmann 2004: 27; Parker 2004: 8, Speech by Soepomo, 31.5.1945, Parker quotes Bourchier 1996: 81 -82. Stockman translates from 
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Governmental promotion of religion and revitalizing useful traditional values and culture were to provide a 
bulwark against destructive foreign ideas, as Liberalism (Sukarno situation), Federalism (Federalism, out of 
traumatic experiences from first the revolutionary period with Dutch colonialism from 1945 to 1949), Marxism-
Leninism and Communism, partly also Islam, that were considered by the New Order ideologues to be opposed 
to Pancasila. (Parker 2004: 8; Antlöv/Hellmann 2005: 12) The New Order state ideology then developed its 
“idea  of  the  individual  (or  particular)  being  dependent  on  the  family  (or  a  whole)”  into  the  vision  of  an 
integrated nation and state within the ideological framework of kekeluragaan (family principle). (Parker 2004: 
8; Antlöv/Hellmann 2005: 12) The new state was a family, an organicism, a village, a gamelan. (Parker 2004: 8) 
The organicist/integralist perspective led to criticism of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in several 
points  during  the  Suharto  regime  (1966-1998).  The  main  point  of  concern  has  been  a  presumed  lack  of 
codification of basic human obligations (KAM, kewajiban asasi manusia) – this point has been made most 
recently by former President B.J. Habibie during his honorary speech of the birth of Pancasila on 1.06.2011. In 
this context, it is central to note that obligation, mutual help, and ritual are main features in traditional Indo-
Melanesian judicature. (Hooker 1978) The emphasis laid on obligation instead of individualism may refer to a 
shared trajectory of legal practices and concepts in the Archipelago. 
As the UDHR does not codify the equality between right and obligation, and only individual rights but no shared 
duties are proclaimed, the Suharto regime (1966-1998) regarded the treaty as a mere commitment to the 
equality of human beings before God. The preamble of the 1945 Basic Law recognizes sovereignty of the state 
and implements equality of the people before law and the legitimate government. (Kaelan 2004: 132-136; 
Wandelt 1989: 166-169) But, the underlying anthropology of human nature is constructed as bi-polar (dwi-
tunggal) in the document, because humans are seen as related to and dependent of their social and natural 
environment. Because human nature is defined by expansion and boundaries, the state may constrain or limit 
its citizenry’s rights in order to facilitate their advancement according to their specific nature. Because the 
institution of sovereign states regulates the rights and obligation of the people in their territories, human rights 
may therefore only be formulated in particularistic, nation-state specific that is cultural relativistic concepts 
and models. (Wandelt 1989: 170) This necessary limit or restrain was seen as God-given by the Suharto regime, 
and society and state have to take responsibility for it.  
To exemplify the persistency of organicist thought in post-Suharto Indonesia, the current study has analyzed 
two recent editions of reformed textbooks on post-Suharto Pancasila instruction at the tertiary level, compiled 
by Prof Dr Kaelan in 2004
162. Pertaining to the relationship between God, individua l and/or society and the 
state, in essence, the textbook outlines the integralist perspective of the relation between humans/society and 
state.  
In  the  Indonesian  perspective  thus,  a  state  is  neither  the  manifestation  of  mere  individual  interests 
imperatively bound by a system of legislation as it is proposed by liberal countries, nor a societal group totality 
which is neglecting individual rights at all as it is the case in socialist -communist countries. Consequently, 
Indonesia bases neither on the declara tion of individual liberty as it occurs in liberal countries, nor on 
communism as it is the case in socialist-communist countries.  
What is the Indonesian nation state then? Since the underlying (Javanese) anthropology understands human 
beings as structured bipolar: as mono-dualistic, mono-pluralistic or  dwi-tunggal (two-unitary) (Kaelan 2004: 
132-136; Wandelt 1989: 166-169), human beings are endued with a physical and psychical body structure, 
characterized as individual and social beings expressing the status of God’s creatures and as individual persons 
at the same time. Being created by One Supreme Lordship, humanity has the bi-polar nature of being an 
individual and a social being at the same time (dwi-tunggal). As a result human beings can neither exist nor 
survive on their own behalf; it is intrinsic to their nature that they always need others. In consequence, nation-
states  manifest  this  characteristic  human  nature  in  realizing  human  standards  and  values.  Therefore,  the 
Indonesian nation state manifests both, namely the true nature of its citizens as individuals and as social 
beings, which all have been created equally by One Supreme Lordship.  
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This  fundamental  anthropology  is  expressed  in  the  five  principles  of  the  state,  in  the  amended  1945 
constitution and in the state motto ‘Diversity in Unity’. As far as society and state are concerned, the Pancasila-
based Indonesian nation state is an integral unity characterized through brotherhood, family, and religiosity.  
The essential idea of the Pancasila state’s basis is represented in One Supreme Lordship as creator of the entire 
existence, thus the fundamental underlying characteristic of the state has to be faith in One Supreme Lordship. 
The innateness of nature  - that is the harmony between micro and macro cosmos  - sets up God’s entire 
creation as indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent unity or in other words integral unity. Consequently 
any  individual  as  a  society  member  is  God’s  creature,  therefore  society  and  nation-state  as  their  natural 
extensions  built  an  integral  totality  obliged  to  believe  in  One  Supreme  Lordship.  In  conclusion,  the  state 
principles  and  motto  foster  the  synthetic  concept  of  reciprocal  assistance  or  mutual  cooperation  (gotong 
royong)  in  order  to  integrate  linguistic,  ethno-cultural,  and  religious  diversity  as  national  asset  and  divine 
characteristic of the Pancasila-state. The graph shows the structure of human nature according to Sunoto: 
 
In context of national values, the pivotal virtue of Indonesian citizens is defined repeatedly as akhlak/susila or 
moral/ethics. This virtue is then interpreted either vertically or horizontally. In its horizontal interpretation it is 
concerned with encounters between human beings and related to social norms or morals represented in a 
specific community, whereas the vertical perspective focuses on encounters between human beings and One 
Supreme Lordship and points to universal imperatives or ethics represented in religion. (Agung: 1991)  
Interestingly, Prof Amitav Acharya (2007: 87) has called for Western nations to strengthen Indonesia’s organic 
capacity: “(A)s a developing country, Indonesia is making a painful transition to democracy facing a myriad of 
problems. If handled properly, Indonesia can become a model for other Islamic countries by demonstrating 
that democracy and Islam are not incompatible”. He opines a “way of engagement for the ‘West’ would be to 
help Jakarta with development and governance assistance to strengthen its organic capacity to deal with its 
internal  problems,  including  threats  from  terrorism”.  Bourchier/Hadiz  (2003:  23)  argue  that  the  organicist 
impulse is still clearly present among some of the most powerful groups in contemporary Indonesia. 
The  integralist  model  has  shaped  political  discourse  for  about  one  century  and  ever  since  then  has  been 
remodeled by executives, politicians, and lobbyists in discourse to cement their authority. The genealogy of the 
integralist model traced organicism either back to Asian trajectories as the Indic theory of varnasramadharma, 
the Indic mandala concept and the Javanese Kaula-gusti relationship or back to European trajectories as the 
Leiden Law School, Nazi German and the German romantic movement. (Parker 2004: 17 FN 13; Stockmann 
2004: 30- 34) Therefore I propose that organicism is neither an indigenous concept nor a foreign-import but 
the outcome of a drawn out discursive cross-fertilization process used by Indonesian politicians to manipulate 
values and exploit human and environmental resources in order to gain and cement personal and group profits 
and privileges. 
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Asian Values 
The historical background of the Asian Values debate dates back into the early 1990s and to developments 
culminating in the 1993 World Conference in Vienna. In the 1990s the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee 
Kuan Yew, and the PM of  Malaysia, Mohamad bin Mahathir, started a debate  whether human rights are 
universal or a pivotal Western idea and whether democracy as political system is viable in Asia. They proposed 
a culturally autonomous set of Asian Values to legitimate either a difference between the Western model of 
Universal Human Rights or  universal inapplicability of international norms of Human Rights. Their cultural 
relativist argument claimed Asian Values would not only significantly differ from Western values, but that 
notions of power and politics in Asia radically differ from European or Christian conceptions. Consequently, 
Asian Values would place a greater emphasis on the communal and ethical element in religion; therefore they 
do not only grant rights but also impose obligations upon their people and communities. Indeed, foregoing to 
personal freedoms, Asian values would allegedly include a sense of communal loyalty for the sake of social 
stability and prosperity. As result, in Asia the authoritarian style of government was supposed to be more 
appropriate than democracy. (Bowen 2004: 3; Parker 2003: 8 FN 15) 
In the run-up to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, several regional meetings had been 
held. The results of the Asian regional meeting have been laid down in the so-called Bangkok Declaration
163, 
which positions have been frequently criticized. The signatories of the Bangkok Declaration acknowledge the 
universality of human rights, but qualify that statement by adding a relativist clause 
§8 ‘human rights must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-
setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds’. 
The Bangkok Declaration reaffirmed the  Asian commitment to principles contained in the UDHR  (§1), but 
simultaneously  expressed  “concern  that  these  mechanisms  relate  mainly  to  one  category  of  rights”  (§ 
introductory remarks) and thereby the “non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure” (§5) 
and  “any  attempt  to  use  human  rights  as  a  conditionality  for  extending  development  assistance”  (§4)  is 
emphasized. Here the Bangkok Declaration critically comments on the allocation of developmental aides and 
on a perceived ambiguous double standard promotion of human rights on the globe referring to asymmetries 
of power between the West and “the rest”. Further the Bangkok Declaration (§7) stresses “the universality, 
objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to avoid the application of double standards in 
the  implementation  of  human  rights  and  its  politicization”.  Applying  the  specific  integralist  style,  the 
Declaration points further to the “interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social, cultural, civil, and 
political rights, and the inherent interrelationship between development, democracy, universal enjoyment of 
all human rights, and social justice, which must be addressed in an integrated and balanced manner”.  
In context of religious education the Declaration recognizes in Article 23 “the rights of the child to enjoy special 
protection  and  to  be  afforded  the  opportunities  and  facilities  to  develop  physically,  mentally,  morally, 
spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity”. Interestingly, 
the Bangkok Declaration sees the spiritual or religious sphere as a critical dimension in the development of the 
child. In human rights instruments, the child has the right to religious education, but a spiritual dimension of 
education is usually neglected. In consequence, one might suppose the spiritual dimension of education to be a 
highly valued one in Asia.  
Adopted  by  the  171  participating  states  by  consensus,  the  Vienna  Declaration  and  Program  of  Action 
(henceforth VDPA) has sought to reaffirm human rights as universal and relevant standard. Nation-states are 
duty-bound to “respect (…) the principle of equal rights and self -determination of peoples, peace, democracy, 
justice, equality, rule of law, pluralism, development, better standards of living, and solidarity”.  
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The document (I, § 5) accepts national and regional particularities, in other words, historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds but negates cultural relativism. 
I, § 5. All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with 
the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic, and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
The relativist qualification of the Bangkok Declaration that somewhat enunciated Asian Values was attenuated 
in the VDPA, particularities must be borne in mind, but it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. In short, 
the VDPA embraces the universality concept without the qualifications mentioned in the Bangkok Declaration. 
(Stockmann 2004: 202) 
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4.2.3. Muslim Majority Democracy in Indonesia 
Given  the  fact  of  the  parallel  processes  of  democratization  and  decentralization,  a dramatic  reworking  of 
Indonesia’s administrational, political, and educational landscape has been under way since the demise of the 
Suharto regime in 1998
164. The decentralization process, regional autonomy, and the education system are 
three formative components of a contextual shift in Indonesia’s plural management of authority that much 
burdens  the  regions  in  financial  means.  The  enactment  of  Law  No.  24/2003  on  the  establishment  of  the 
Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) enables individuals to seek the review of the constitutionality of 
any act, including on matters relating to discrimination. In the arena of education, the reform era introduced a 
shift from the transmission model to the transformation model. 
The downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime initialized the era of reform (reformasi) and the country’s 
“kaleidoscopic reality” reasserted itself. (Bourchier 2003: 23; Aspinall/Fealy, 2003: 2) As the currency crisis 
wrought havoc across Asia in late 1997 and in 1998, Indonesia turned out to be the most vulnerable of the 
Asian economies. The crisis worsened with the scheduling of the People’s Consultative Assembly’s General 
Session in March 1998, with the main agenda being to elect a new national leadership
165. Nationwide protests 
and mass demonstrations arose following the appointment of incumbent President Suharto to the Presidential 
office and B.J: Habibie to the office of the Vice President.  
 
From March to June a number of student activists were kidnapped and never reappeared. Then, inciting 
nationwide bewilderment, six students of the elite Catholic University  Trisakti were shot dead following a 
peaceful demonstration in Jakarta on May 12. Immediately hundreds of thousand students, the impoverished 
urban youth, and members of the public poured into the streets, propelled by either democratic ideals or 
manipulated through certain elites by monetary means who then wished to retain or cement their position and 
vested interests. Thereafter, for three days, from May 13 through to May 15 six of the largest cities were hit by 
massive riots, killings, and rapes of ethnic Chinese, and the burning down of entire city districts. Many ethnic 
Chinese and Christians fled from Java and Jakarta to Bali, frightened, terrified, and deprived (own observation 
in  1998).  Days  later,  thousands  of  students  demanding  total  reform  (reformasi  total),  marched  to  the 
parliamentary complex in Jakarta, and occupied it for five-days
166. The basic demand of the reform-movement 
was democratization of the political structure. 
 
Following two weeks of violence in the capital Jakarta and vast mass protests, on May 21, 1998 Suharto agreed 
to resign and handed over power to his vice-president and long time close friend B.J. Habibie. (Bourchier/Hadiz 
2003: 19). Hence, what brought the New Order down, was neither “the memory of the 1965 massacre, nor the 
discovery of mass graves in Aceh, or the murder of independence fighters in the mountains of New Guinea, nor 
the attempted genocide of two-hundred-thousand Timorese, but the shooting of six University students in 
Jakarta.”  (Aspinall/Fealy  2003:  2)  Since  I  have  been  in  Indonesia  during  the  reform  era,  I  agree  with 
Aspinall/Fealy (2003: 2): “the New Order government shot six children of its own middle-class and asset to the 
future and lost the loyalty and faith of a nation”.  
 
The sameness of (Indonesian) identity was a product of lived experience and the commonalities of everyday 
life, which Indonesians have shared during the Suharto regime. The disjuncture between the unity of a national 
identity and a regional one in daily lives creates some confusion for the citizenry. Hence, Suharto’s fall triggered 
a dramatic and at times chaotic transformation by contesting the political order in almost every sphere: the 
cultural  expression  as  expressed  in  the  trend  towards  ethno-nationalism  has  flowered  and  the  formal 
separation of Islam and the state was being challenged. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 1) Beginning with Suharto’s fall, 
vast  communal  violence  has  broken  out  in  several  regions  of  the  archipelago  and  a  tendency  of  ethno-
nationalism  or  ethno-religious-nationalism  emerged.  National  unity  was  at  stake,  political  scientists  and 
regional observers feared Indonesia would experience a process of Balkanization and simply disintegrate and 
fall apart. In consequence, the current government regards the four pillars (1945 Basic Law, Pancasila, Unity of 
the  State  [Negara  Kesatuan  Republik  Indonesia],  and  the  nationalconception  [wawasan  nusantara]) 
multireligiosity and to be crucial tools in order to maintain unity and avoid separatism and the outbreak of 
violent conflicts.   
                                                 
164 This chapter draws from asianinfo.org: Politics in Indonesia, in: http://www.asianinfo.org, (March 2008) 
165 The Jakarta Post, “A Nation in Transition”, in: www.thejakartapost.com (March 2007) 
166 The Jakarta Post, “A Nation in Transition”, in: www.thejakartapost.com (March 2007); Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 19 PART B | 107 
As a result of the New Order politics, the Armed Forces were split into roughly spoken two major camps. On 
one side the nationalist oriented camp around General Wiranto, an officer with nationalist learning, and on the 
other side the Islamic oriented camp around Suharto’s  son in law, Prabowo  Subianto
167, who entertained 
relations  to  radical  Islamic  groups.  A  few  hours  before  Habibie  was  sworn  in  as  President,  Susilo  B. 
Yudhoyono
168 and F. Tanjung
169 struck a deal that would provide a crucial power base for the political weak 
Habibie: Armed Forces support for Habibie, who was disliked by the nationalist faction inside the Army because 
of his Islamic modernist learning, in exchange for keeping General Wiranto in the position of Armed Forces 
Commander-in-Chief.  
 
Almost immediately the new democratic Habibie Administration of the reform era (May 1998  – October 1999) 
diffused  opposition  to  its  government  and  consolidated  support  by  opening  up  political  space  with  the 
continuation of the keterbukaan policy (policy of openness and transparency) thereby demolishing at a stroke 
some features of the New Order system. Furthermore the Habibie Administration revoked laws governing the 
licensing of the press as well as most restrictions on forming political parties, unions and professional bodies 
and manifested press freedom and the right for information. In addition to it, Decree No. XVIII/MPR/1998 
revoked  the  1978  Decree  on  the  compulsory  Comprehension  and  Practice  of  the  Pancasila  (Program 
Penghayatan  dan  Pengamalan  Pancasila)  by  ruling  that  the  government  must  stop  the  compulsory  P4 
propagation  program,  finally  causing  the  retraction  of  Pancasila  as  sole  basis  for  all  social  and  political 
organizations in Indonesia in 2000. (Kaelan 2004: 10; Interview Triguna 2005) These laws triggered immediately 
the mushrooming of political parties, interest groups, and other civil society organizations (Bourchier/Hadiz 
2003: 20; Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 2; King 2004: 24-25) and fostered thereby an open political and public space for 
discourse. This opening of political space finally stabilized the weak Habibie presidency, because Indonesians 
founded  parties  and  organizations,  instead  of  fighting  the  regime  they  struggled  with  each  other  over 
programs, support and then finally over funds. (Stockmann 2004: 72)  
 
The regions had neither influence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs 
during 40 years. “Local politics and power constellations reflected the interests of the centre rather than those 
of the regions”. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 2) With adopting Act No. 22/1999 on Decentralization and Actr No. 
25/1999
170  on  Regional  Autonomy,  the  Habibie -administration  then  introduced  the  most  radical 
decentralization program attempted anywhere in the world. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3) It radically changed the 
relationship between the central government and the regi onal governments. Under the new structure, the 
central government transferred full autonomy not to the first tier of regional governments that is provinces but 
to the second tier, sub-provincial regency-levels (kabupaten) to manage vital areas as education, health, the 
environment, labor, public works and natural resource management, local investment and local transportation. 
(Prasetyo 2005: 21; Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3-4)  
The role of provinces is confined to such areas as mediating disputes between districts, facilitating cross-district 
development, and representing the central government within the region. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 4) The central 
government is to focus on certain key areas: foreign policy, defense and security, monetary policy, the legal 
system and religious affairs. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3) As a result, extensive powers have been devolved to 
regional governments, new struggles for political and economic power have erupted at the local level and 
novel forms of politics based on local identity are emerging. (Aspinall/Fealy, 2003: 1)  
   
                                                 
167 Prabowo is accused to be responsible for various human rights violations: he is suspected to be mastermind behind the May riots and 
the operation that instigated violence in the hope that martial law would be declared. Prabowo himself admitted to be responsible for the 
kidnapping of activists during the last month of Suharto rule. Wiranto sacked him from his Strategic-Commando-Command and disarmed 
him as he tried to march in the Presidential Palace (Stockmann 2004: 66-67; Stockmann: 2004 66 FN 7) 
168 Currently holding the office of the 6
th president in his second term, former Lieutenant General, SBY acted as Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Political and Social Affairs in 1998, Minister of Mines and Energy in 1999; and was appointed minister for security from 1999-2004. In 2001 
he was proposed as vice president by secular nationalists in the MPR. For further reading see Ananta 2005: 123-128 
169 General F. Tanjung, former Armed Forces Commander, appointed as Co-ordinating Minister of Political Affairs, Security and Defence in 
1998-1999. (Stockmann 2004: 67) 
170 Both laws were passed by the national parliament in August 1999 and came into effect on January 1 2001. Law No. 22/1999 deals  with 
the devolution of political authority and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal balance set out a new system of fiscal ar rangements under which the 
regions would gain a far larger share of the revenue generated within their borders. Both new laws promoted decentralization  of power 
and decision-making, as well as a shift towards greater autonomy and authority to the regions,  and increased power and responsibility is 
granted to the regional governments to administer laws and enact policies, as the central government maintains responsibility for drafting 
new laws, yet it is up to the regional governments to determine how the laws will be implemented. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3) PART B | 108 
Habibie provided Indonesia’s first free general election after 44 years on June 7
th, 1999. In terms of ideological 
orientation out of the fourty-eight parties contesting parties to the 1999 election, eighteen or more than one 
third were Islamic parties, and the rest were Pancasila parties.(Ananta 2005, 10) Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-
P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) gained the most votes in the election (33, 7 per cent). After PDI-P, 
Golkar, which had survived the reform era, ranked second (22, 4 per cent) and the Muslim parties favoring the 
introduction of syari’ah obtained only about 14 per cent of the vote. (Ananta 2005: 13) The fourth largest party 
was the PPP, a loyal opposition party which managed to survive the New Order, chaired by Hamzah Haz
171 and 
having support from non-Javanese Muslims (10, 7 per cent). The PPP declared it was an Islamic party and not 
longer based on Pancasila. (Ananta 2005: 12) After much backroom deal-making, the Muslim parties teamed 
up with sections of Golkar to defeat Megawati, who some feared would promote a secular nationalist agenda 
at  the  expense  of  Islam.  Instead  they  chose  Abdurrahman  Wahid
172,  who  took  over  as  Indonesia’s  first 
democratically  elected  president  on  October  20
th  1999,  while  Megawati  had  accepted  the  role  as  vice-
president. 
 
On  July,  23  2001  Wahid  was  voted  out  and  Megawati  was  sworn  in  as  Indonesia’s  fifth  and  first  female 
president.  (Bourchier/Hadiz  2003:  20-21,  Crouch  2003:  15)  The  Megawati-Administration  had  been  stable, 
Crouch has remarked, but she had failed to provide effective leadership and seemed to have little mastery of 
the complex issues facing the government. (Crouch 2003: 15) Megawati included all major political groups in 
her  cabinet
173, gave speci al attention to the loose Muslim grouping Central Axis ( Poros  Tengah)
174  and 
supported the election of Hamzah Haz, as vice president in 2001. The cost of this inclusiveness was a lack of 
cohesion in the cabinet.  Furthermore, in the absence  of strong leadersh ip  from the president, Crouch 
elucidates, policy differences quickly appeared, and many issues
175 were announced and then revised or even 
abandoned a few months later. The parties and the cabinet were deeply divided. (Crouch 2003: 16) 
 
Moreover, during the Megawati presidency the government did not take firm action against violent Muslim 
radicals because they had influential sympathizers in the government, particularly vice -president Hamzah Haz, 
who himself often denied that terrorists were operating in Indon esia and openly met leading radicals as Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir and Ja’far Umar Thalib. Megawati dreaded to alienate political Islam and wanted to gain voters 
and  support  from  Muslim  parties  and  lobbies.  Eventually,  Megawati  admitted  Indonesia’s  radical  Islamic 
terrorism threat publicly only after the first Bali blasts in October 2002, saying “once again remind us that 
terrorism is a real danger and potential threat to national security”.
176 
 
The  election  April  2004  has  been  the  most  complicated  election  as  Indonesians  had  to  vote  for  their 
representatives in the national (DPR), provincial (DPRD I) and regional (DPRD II) parliaments. This was a first 
step in a series of votes that culminated in the country’s first direct election of the president and the vice 
president. In terms of ideological orientations, out of the 24 parties that contested in the 2004 elections, 16 
parties were based on the  Pancasila, 5 on Islam, and 3 parties had other orientations. Of interest to the 
question of the commitment to pluralism is the proportion of votes between the Pancasila parties and the 
Islamic parties. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the majority was always Pancasila parties, as Ananta has stated, 
and a comparison between the numbers of Islamic parties in 1999 and 2004 shows a relative stability – political 
Islam remains a minority in the Indonesian political scene.  
                                                 
171 Hamzah Haz, a Kalimantan-born Muslim, chair of the Muslim United Development Party (PPP, P3) campaigned with General Syaifrudin 
Syamsul against Megawati in 1999, first, because as a woman she may not lead a nation and second, she would attend prayers in Hindu-
temples, both facts that are regarded as not proper by a certain interpretation of Islam in Indonesia. Hamzah Has also retained a public 
relation to Ba’asyir, alleged leader or Amir of the Jemaah Islamiah, and visited him in jail. Jemaah Islamiyah is said to be the responsible cell 
behind the Bali bombing. For further details see ICG reports on http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ 
172 Once Wahid acted as general chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, under his leadershi p NU opposition to Pancasila decreased, and he is 
quoted as saying that Pancasila was the last form of Indonesian ideology. The PKB (National Awakening Party) was only established in 1998 
and evolved as the third largest party in the 1999 election, a political organization with the NU as main constituent, embracing Pancasila as 
ideological basis, and having mainly (East)-Javanese voters. (Ananta 2005: 11-12) 
173 She appointed only three senior leaders from PDI -P, three from Golkar, 4 from Muslim parties, two  NU members, the military was 
represented with 4 retired officers, the rest consisted of non-party professionals. (Crouch 2003: 15-16) 
174 Poros Tengah was a Muslim grouping headed by the Javanese Dr Amien Rais, who was a major figure in mobilizing the masses to force 
Suharto to step down and became a reform leader. The Poros Tengah had played a decisive role both in having Wahid elected in 1999 and 
bringing  him  down  in  2001.  Amien  Rais  acted  once  as  chairman  of  the  Muhammadiyah,  and  his  party  PAN  (7,1  %  in  1999)  with 
Muhammadiyah as main constituent declared it was based on Pancasila rather than Islam, as it was interested in getting support from 
Muslims and Non-Muslims alike. But it appears that the support gained was due to Muslim voters. As result of the 1999 election, Rais was 
elected and served as chairman of the MPR from 1999-2002. (Crouch 2003: 15; Ananta 2005: 12-13) 
175 Draft on Anti-terrorism Law, Draft on Anti-Pornoraphy and Pornoaction Law to name just two examples.  
176 LaMoshi, Gary. Indonesia bombed into awareness. (February 2002, www.atimes.com/)  PART B | 109 
Note, PAN and PKB officially declared themselves as Pancasila parties, but because their main constituents 
were Muslims, these two parties are often seen as Islamic parties. In the 1999 election, the combined votes of 
Islamic parties was only 17, 7 per cent, or, if the PKB and the PAN are included, their combined votes were 37, 
4 percent, still lower compared to the 1955 election during which the combined votes for Islamic parties were 
about 43, 5 percent. While in 2004, the combined vote of the 5 Islamic parties formed 21, 2 percent – or 39, 4 
percent if the PAN and the PKB are included. In brief, nationalist and secular parties are still more favored by 
the voters, and the domination of political Islam remains to be seen
177.  
With  the  formation  of  the  National  Coalition  ( Koalisi  Kebangsaan)  supporting  the  Megawati-Hasyim 
nomination  and  the  formation  of  the  People’s  Coalition  (Koalisi  Kerakyatan)  backing  the  Yudhoyono-Kalla 
team, the binary divide between the Pancasila and Islamic parties became blurred, as both coalitions consisted 
of both types of parties. This may be interpreted that Pancasila as a pluralist ideology had been accepted by a 
majority of the Indonesian voters. (Ananta 2005; Zoelva Interview 2011) However, due to the process of De-
Pancasila-zation, the commitment to Pancasila and to Bhinneka Tunggal Ikaas national Grundnorm needs to be 
renewed and actualized individually and in society as the minimal consensus of values in a continuous process 
of negotiation. (Yudhoyono 2006; Habibie 2011) 
On July 5, 2004, the first directly elected team of Susilo B. Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf-Kalla
178 was sworn in as 
president and vice-president. In 2009, SBY has been inaugurated as President for his second term.  
Order of Priority of Law 
Indonesia  has  established  a  hierarchy  of  law  or  an  order  of  priority  of  Law  in  order  to  simplify  the 
understanding of the legal system. The higher-level law must be followed by the lower-level one and the lower-
level law shall not contradict the higher-level one. As rule of thumb, Thomas and Soedijarto (1980: 22, in: 
Wandelt,  1989:  201)  have  stated  that  “High-level  statements  usually  describe  values,  ideals,  and  general 
purposes. The lower the level of a statement, the more specifically it tells how the policy is to be carried out, 
and the less it allows for varied interpretations about what practice should result from it”. Their rule of thumb 
may be still applied today, as the five Principles continue to be the “source of all sources of Law” and the 2003 
established Constitutional Court decides on fundamental basic values or “Staatsfundamentalnormen” on a high 
profile level. Those fundamental basic values are then realized in strategic plans and implemented practical 
policies in the lower tiers of national administration. (Wiratraman 2007
179; Zoelva Interview 2011) In this, 
Indonesian legislation and order of priority of Law follows Kelsen’s Stufenmodell
180 (1945; Wiratraman 2007; 
Zoelva 2011) 
 
A norm the validity of which cannot be derived from a superior norm we call a “basic” norm. All norms 
whose validity may be traced back to one and the same basic norm form a system of norms, or an order. 
The basic norm constitutes, as a common source, the bond between all the different norms of which an 
order consists. (…) The quest for the reason of the validity of a norm (…) is terminated by a highest norm 
which is the last reason of validity within the normative system (…). (Kelsen 2005/1945: 111) 
The basic norm of a religious norm system says that one ought to behave as God and the authorities 
instituted by him command. Similarly, the basic norm of a legal order prescribes that one ought to behave 
as the “fathers” of the constitution and the individuals – directly or indirectly – authorized (delegated) by 
the constitution command. (…) This is schematically formulated, the basic norm of the legal order of a 
single State, the basic norm of a national legal order. (Kelsen 2005/1945: 115) 
                                                 
177 This paragraph is drawn from Ananta 2005: 13; 15; 21 
178 Jusuf Kalla, a Golkar veteran from South Sulawesi, and under Megawati the Coordinating Minister of Social Welfare. 
179 Those Laws order the Indonesian hierarchy of Law: 1.) 1945 Basic Law; 2.) Congressional Decision No XX/ 1966 on the order of priority of 
laws and regulations in the Republic of Indonesia, (T AP MPRS No. XX/MPRS/1966  tentang Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundangan RI); 3.) 
Congressional Decision No III/ 2000 on Sources of Law and Order of Priority of Laws and regulations (TAP MPR No. III/MPR/2000 tentang 
Sumber  Hukum  dan  Tata  Urutan  Peraturan  Perundang-undangan);  4.)  Act  No  10./  2004  on  the  establishment  process  of  laws  and 
regulations (UU No. 10 Tahun2 004 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan); 5.) Congressional Decision No I/ 2003 on 
consideration of material and status of Congressional Decisions 1960- 2002 (TAP MPR No. I/MPR/2003 tentang Peninjauan terhadap 
Materidan Status Hukum TAP MPRS & TAP MPR RI Tahun1960-2002) (Wiratraman: 2007) 
180 “The basic norm merely establishes a certain authority, which may well in turn vest norm-creating power in some other authorities. The 
norms of a dynamic system have to be created through acts of will by those individuals who have been authorized to create norms by some 
higher norm. This authorization is a delegation. Norm creating power is delegated from one authority to another authority; the former is 
the higher and the latter the lower authority. The basic norm of a dynamic system is the fundamental rule according to which the norms of 
the system are to be created. A norm forms part of a dynamic system if it has been created in a way that is – in the last analysis – 
determined by the basic norm.” (Kelsen 2007: 113) PART B | 110 
Revising Congressional Decree No XX/1966 on the hierarchy of laws, Congressional Decree No III/2000 on the 
Source  of  Law  and  the  Hierarchy  of  Law  and  Regulations  adopted  on  18  August  2000  by  the  parliament 
(People’s  Consultative  Congress,  MPR)  regulates  the  hierarchy  of  law  in  Indonesia  (Wiratraman  2007; 
Congressional Decree No.III/2000): 
1.  Preamble of UUD 1945 (Pancasila) 
181 (Staatsfundamentalnorm) 
2.  1945 Constitution (basic norms of law, Verfassungsnorm)
182 
3.  The People’s Consultative Assembly’s Decrees (Congressional Decree) (Ketetapan MPR, Tap-MPR); 
4.  Laws (Undang-Undang); 
5.  Government Regulations substituting a Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, Perpu) 
6.  Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah, PP); 
7.  Local regulations (Peraturan Daerah, Perda) 
International commitments: Human Rights 
The concept of human rights is not new to the Indonesian society who had to wage a protracted struggle in the 
course of 350 years of colonial rule in order to exercise their right of self-determination, one of the most 
fundamental human rights. In this context, it is noteworthy that Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution predated the 
adoption of the UDHR. At first Indonesia ratified the UDHR on September 28, 1950. Yet, by letter of January 
201955, Sukarno announced its decision to withdraw from the United Nations “at this stage and under the 
present  circumstances”.
183  It must be kept in mind that he was one of the founders of the Non Aligned 
Movement. One year after the Coup d’ Etat on September, 19
th 1966, Suharto announced by telegram its 
decision “to resume full cooperation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities”
184. 
On September 28 1966, the General Assembly of the UN took note of this decision and the President invited 
representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the Assembly. After resuming full cooperation with the UN in 
1966, the Suharto Regime finally set up a National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM, Komisi Nasional 
Hak  Asasi  Manusia)  to  demonstrate  some  compliance  with  the  Vienna  Declaration  and  Plan  of  Action  in 
1993
185.  
The Presidential Decree No. 50 Year 1993 on the National Commission on Human Rights considers in the 
prologue “(a) indeed the human being, as a creature of God, lives in a society, nation and state, and is naturally 
endowed with inalienable rights so that he can develop his personal self, and role and contribution to his 
society,  country  and  the  world”
186.  The  government  agreed  to  cooperate  with  the  newly  founded  United 
Nations  High  Commissioner  of  Human  Rights  in  1994.  (Stockmann  2004:  202)  Complying  with  the 
recommendation  stated  in  the  Vienna  Declaration,  the  Suharto  government  formulated  the  first  National 
Human  Rights  Action  Plan  for  the  period  1998-2003,  which  was  enacted  by  the  Habibie-administration  in 
August 1998
187. (Stockmann, 2004: 203) 
The era of reform had put forward the human rights issue as a central topic, and the Habibie administration 
was called upon to bring about reform, and to put an end to corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This call was 
addressed during a Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly, held in Jakarta on November 10-13, 
1998. The session adopted 12 decrees, among them Congressional Decree No XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights 
- with the exception of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families. Stockmann observes “while its members were giving the last polish to a document 
called ‘Human Rights Charter’ outside the gates of parliament people were killed while exercising some of 
those very rights”. (Stockmann 2004: 203)    
                                                 
181 Congressional Decree No.III/2000 on the Source of Law and the Hierarchy of Law and Regulations, Chapter I, Article 2 reads: Pancasila is 
the source of all sources of Law. (Pancasila merupakan sumber dari segala sumber hukum negara) 
182 Congressional Decree No.III/2000 on the Source of Law and the Hierarchy of Law and Regulations, Chapter I, Article 3 (1) reads: the 1945 
Basic Law of the Republic of Indonesia constitutes basic law of Laws and Regulations. ( Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 
Tahun 1945 merupakan hukum dasar dalam Peraturan Perundang undangan) 
183(www.un.org/members/list.shtml);( www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/HumanRight/nataction.htm) 
184(www.un.org/members/list.shtml);( www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/HumanRight/nataction.htm) 
185 Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 17; OHCHR (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/IDIndex.aspx) 
186 Asian Legal Resource Centre Internet Site, http://hrli.alrc.net/mainfile.php/indonnhriact/ 
187 It must be critically recognized that  the implementation of human rights programs in Indonesia is organized by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and therefore a critical junction between the planning of such implementation and foreign aid must be assessed, as financial 
support by the OHCHR amounted US$ 952,000. (Stockmann 2004: 203 FN 1) PART B | 111 
In consequence, one of the first official acts undertaken by the Habibie Administration was passing a Human 
Rights Charter that requires 1.) all state institutions to enforce and respect human rights; and 2.) the President 
and House of Representatives (DPR) to ratify all United Nations conventions on human rights. Attached is, 
however, the qualification clause, “as long as they are not contradictory to Pancasila and the Constitution”. 
(Stockmann 2004: 203 FN 6; MPR Decree XVII/1998, §2) 
 
Congressional Decree No XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights acknowledged the universality of Human Rights, but 
the formulation in the action plan accords with the qualifications of the Bangkok Declaration, which are not 
adopted  in  the  Vienna  Declaration.  (Stockmann  2004:  207,  208)  The  first  Humans  Rights  Action  Plan  has 
covered  four  different  areas
188.  Concerning  the  third  point  of  “implementation  of  human  rights  that  are 
considered a priority”, Stockmann restates her impression that the first action plan appears to be aimed to a 
considerable extent at an international audience.  
“(A) number of measures can be interpreted as having been taken also with an eye on the international donor 
community” (Stockmann 2004: 70-71, emphasis in original) as “the Action Plan shows that the expenses arising 
from the plan are covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget”. (Stockmann 2004: 207) She argues that 
the authors of the action plan believed that non-compliance with fundamental human right could be classified 
by observers as gross violations of the HR and could in turn damage the nation’s image. She concludes that the 
“concern about the violation of rights as such does not seem to worry the authors of the Action Plan as much 
as the possible consequences resulting  from the fact that gross human rights violations taint the nation’s 
image”. (Stockmann 2004: 212)  
Act  No.  39/1999  on  Human  Rights  has  been  ratified  and  enacted  on  September  23,  1999.  Protection, 
promotion, and implementation of human rights are primarily the responsibility of the central government. A 
few passages out of the Indonesian Human Rights  Charter are quoted here in length to demonstrate the 
specific dictum of the Indonesian formulation
189:  
 
 
CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS  
WITH THE MERCY OF ONE SUPREME GOD  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,  
   
Considering: 
a.  whereas  human  beings,  being  creatures  of  God  Almighty  charged  with  the  task  of 
managing and protecting the universe, following the commands of God ( ketaqwaan) and 
responsibility for the welfare of humanity, are bestowed by their creator with basic rights to 
guarantee their human dignity and worth, and harmony with their environment; 
b. whereas human rights are basic rights which stick to human nature, universal and eternal 
in nature, and for this reason must be protected, respected and upheld, and may not be 
disregarded, diminished, or appropriated by anyone whosoever;  
c. whereas besides basic rights, humans also have basic obligations to one another and to 
society as a whole, with regard to society, nation and state;  
d. whereas as a member of the United Nations, the nation of Indonesia has a moral and legal 
responsibility to respect, execute, and uphold the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
promulgated by the United Nations, and several other international instruments concerning 
human rights ratified by the Republic of Indonesia;  
   
                                                 
188 (1) Preparation for ratification of international human rights instruments, (2) Dissemination of information and human rights education, 
(3) Implementation of human rights that are considered a priority, (4) implementation of already ratified HR instruments (Stockmann 2004: 
208) 
189 All translations from text documents in Indonesian are translated into English by the author. Some were compared to translations done 
by other scholars, the World Bank or Asian Devel opment Bank, the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC). Asian Legal Resource Centre 
(ALRC): Republic of Indonesia Law 39/1999 on Human Rights, in:  http://hrli.alrc.net/mainfile.php/nhriacts (May 2008); Original document 
in : http://www.depkumham.go.id/attachments/article/170/uu39_1999.pdf; (March 2011) PART B | 112 
Chapter I: General Provisions  
Article 1 
Terms used in the Act have following meanings:  
(1) Human rights mean a set of rights bestowed by God Almighty contained in the nature and 
reality of humanity as creations of God which must be respected, held in the highest esteem 
and protected by a rechtsstaat (negara hukum), the Government, and all people in order to 
protect human dignity and worth (harkat dan martabat manusia).  
(2) Human basic obligations refer to a specific type of obligations. If those obligations are not 
carried  out  [first],  then  the  accomplishment  and  assertion  of  human  rights  cannot  be 
achieved.  
(3) Discrimination means all limitations, affronts or ostracism, both direct and indirect, on 
grounds  of  differences  in  religion,  ethnicity,  race,  group,  faction,  social  status,  economic 
status,  sex,  language,  or  individual  or  collective  political  belief,  that  results  in  the 
degradation, aberration, or eradication of recognition, execution, or application of human 
rights and basic freedoms in political, economic, legal, social, cultural, or any other aspects of 
life. 
 
Chapter II Basic Rights 
Article 2  
The Republic of Indonesia acknowledges and respects the rights and freedoms of humans as 
rights which are bestowed by God and which are an integral part of humans, which must be 
protected, respected, and upheld in the interests of promoting human dignity, prosperity, 
contentment, intellectual capacity, and justice.  
Article 3  
(1)  Everyone  is  born  free  with  equal  dignity  and  status,  bestowed  with  intelligence  and 
conscience to life in society, nation, and state in the spirit of brotherhood.  
(3)Everyone  has  the  right  to  protection  of  human  rights  and  obligations  without  any 
discrimination. 
Article 4 
(…) the right to freedom of the individual, to freedom of thought and conscience, the right to 
have agama (beragama) 
Article 7  
(2)Provisions set forth in international law concerning human rights that have been ratified by 
the Republic of Indonesia, have to be implemented in national legislation. [that is, they are 
recognized under this act as legally binding] 
 
Chapter III Human Rights and Freedoms  
Section 3: Right to Self-development 
Article 12  
Everyone has the right to protection of their personal development, to receive education, to 
educate their selves, and to improve their life quality in order to become a faithful (beriman) 
human  who  follows  the  commands  of  God  (bertaqwa),  is  responsible,  has  high  morals 
(berakhlak mulia), is content, and prosperous in accordance with human rights.  
Article 13 
Everyone has the right to develop and benefit from scientific knowledge and technology, arts 
and culture as befits human dignity, in the interests of their personal, their national and 
global welfare.  
Article 16 
Everyone has the right to undertake social and charitable works, to found organizations for 
this purpose, including the operation of education and schooling, and to raise funds for these 
purposes in line with prevailing legislation. [this sanctions legally the private education sector, 
and provides a strong legal basis for private faith-based education] 
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                Section 5: Right to freedom of the Individual 
Article 22 
(1) Everyone has the right to freely choose their specific agama and to perform religious 
service (beribadah) according to their religion (agama) and beliefs (kepercayaan).  
(2) The state guarantees everyone the freedom to choose their respective  agama and to 
perform religious service according to their religion (agama) and belief (kepercayaan).  
Article 23 
(1) Everyone has the freedom to choose and hold their political convictions. 
(2)  Everyone  has  the  freedom  to  hold,  express,  and  widely  disseminate  their  opinions 
according with their conscience, orally or in writing through printed or electronic  media, 
taking  into  consideration  religious  values  (nilai-nilai  agama),  morals  (kesusilaan),  order, 
public interest, and national unity (keutuhan).  
 
Section 10: Children’s rights 
Article 55  
Every child has the right to perform religious service his religion (agama), and to think, and to 
express himself as befits his intellectual capacity and age under the guidance of a parent or 
guardian.  
Article 60 
(1) Every child has the right to receive education and schooling as befits his interests, talents, 
and intellectual capacity.  
(2) Every child has the right to seek, receive, and share information as befits his intellectual 
capacity and age in the interests of his own development, insofar as this meets moral values 
and appropriateness. 
 
Chapter IV: Basic Human Obligations 
Article 67 
Everyone  within  the  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Indonesia  is  required  to  comply  with 
Indonesian legislation and Indonesian Law, unwritten law, and international human rights law 
ratified by Indonesia.  
Article 69 
(1) Everyone is required to respect the human rights of others, morals, ethics, and the order 
of society, nation, and state. 
(2)  Every  human  right  gives  rise  to  the  basic  obligation  and  responsibility  to  uphold  the 
human rights of others, and it is the duty of government to respect, protect uphold and 
promote these rights and obligations. 
Article 70  
In executing their rights and freedoms, everyone shall observe the limitations set forth in the 
[national]  legislation,  in  order  to  guarantee  that  rights  and  freedoms  of  others  are 
acknowledged and respected, and in the interests of justice, taking into account the moral, 
security, and public order of a democratic society 
 
The Human Rights Act 39/1999 includes the freedom  to have, express, and spread opinion as well as the 
freedom  to  have  a  political  conviction.  The  freedom  to  express  an  opinion  in  public  and  the  freedom  of 
information  are  codified  as  rights.  Stockmann  (2004:  249-250)  concludes  other  than  in  the  constitutional 
amendment, the freedom of expression is in the HR Law qualified by the stipulation that one has to take into 
consideration religious values, morality, order, public interest and the “intactness of the nation” (§23.2). The 
corresponding article in the ICCPR also allows for certain restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, 
which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. Reference to religious values 
and national unity are not expressis verbis covered by ICCPR provisions (Stockmann, 2004: 249-250), though as 
those only allow for a limitation based a morals if they are not exclusively rooted in one religion. Interestingly, 
in the Indonesian Law here no mention of national security is made.  
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The legally binding right to freedom of the individual (II §4) grants everyone the freedom to adhere to one’s 
religion and to worship according to one’s religion and faith. This is in a weakened form the constitutional 
article on religious freedom, as the latter explicitly states that the state guarantees every resident the above 
mentioned freedoms. The explicit freedom to change one’s religion or belief or not to adhere to a faith as 
stipulated in the corresponding UDHR article is not included in the Indonesian Charter, nor is the freedom to 
teach one’s religion. (Stockmann 2004: 233) The freedom to teach one of the approved religions is enshrined in 
Law 20/2003 on National Education System and in the 2008 Law on the religion class and faith-based education 
systems. Subsequent HR regulation include Law No. 26/2000, which has established the Ad Hoc Human Rights 
Court,  and  it  states  in  a  similar  fashion  as  the  constitutional  article  (§  21,  23)  that  the  Attorney  General 
appoints the ad hoc investigators at the Human Rights Court, who all shall take an oath or pledge in accordance 
with their embraced religion. Stipulated in Presidential Decree No. 40/2004, Indonesia formally launched the 
Second National Plan of Action on Human Rights on August 25, which contains concrete programs and plans 
the Government will undertake during the period from 2004 to 2009
190.  
In 2005, Indonesia ratified all human rights conventions (with the exception of the ICMWR), then in 2008 she 
ratified the International Convention on Discrimination and passed an act o n racial and ethnic discrimination, 
of which articles 3 and 4 prohibit discrimination based on belief, values or rituals that characterize a specific 
group. So, in principle, the religious freedom of the individual has always been and still is strongly ens hrined in 
the legal foundations of the Indonesian state. But in practice the state via legislation and MORA approves of six 
religious communities only and thereby limits the civil rights of adherents to religions not funded by the state. 
Democracy experienced several outbreaks of religious-related violence, terrorism, and events in which those 
laws and policies were not respected or even contradicted.  
 
Indonesia succeeded in securing membership of both the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Security 
Council in 2006
191, and these would be the signs, as Human Rights Watch interprets, that Indonesia wants to be 
accepted as a rights-respecting member of the international community
192. Officially the government declares 
that the promotion and protection of HR are es sential to build a peaceful, secure, and equitably prosperous 
social welfare state and world. Hence, the promotion of HR principles is central to the mission and vision of the 
Indonesian Government and people. In sum, with regard to norm -setting and legislation on HRs and their 
institutionalization, Indonesia has ratified and acceded to a number of international HR instruments and has 
enacted several national HR laws, one of which created the Human Rights Court while another ensures the 
independence of the National Human Rights Commission. Indonesia has also established independent national 
commissions the rights of women (komnas perempuan) and child protection (komnas anak). 
As Prof Dr Triguna is responsible for the implementation of state policies within the Hindu community, it is 
interesting to consider his opinion about human rights. Because humans are created and liberated by One 
Supreme Lordship, all human beings share the same ability to develop ethical systems of which particular 
values  are  indeed  universal,  whereas  others  are  generated  in  terms  of  local  socio-cultural  abundance. 
Contemplating on the Indonesian  situation, he  continued, that there  would be no  need to be “afraid” of 
universal values as formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, because neither are 
these universal values in conflict with Hindu Dharma nor the Indonesian nation-state. But, no society or nation 
should  disguised  behind  these  universal  rights  or  manipulate  them  unlawfully  in  order  to  pursue  own 
interests
193.  
                                                 
190Under the second action plan, regional administrations are to set up human rights committees that will disseminate information and 
educate bureaucrats and professional groups on human rights. In addition, in a White Paper titled “Vision, Mission, and Programs”, 
President SBY and Vice- President Kalla outlined their program for justice, law, human rights, and democracy. The Department of Social 
Affairs, the Department of Law and Human Rights and other related institutions are tasked with enhancing to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination on racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural grounds and undertake efforts to harmonize domestic laws with international human 
rights instruments. [Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 2008: Consideration of Reports submitted by state 
parties  under  article  9  of  the  Convention.  Concluding  observations  of  the  CERD.  Indonesia.  CERD/C/IND/CO3,  in: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf  (August  2008);  United  Nations: 
www.undg.org/archive_docs/8086-Indonesia.doc  (August  2007);  http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/New  Statements/3c110404.htm 
(August 2008) ] 
191 Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2007:  Indonesia, pp. 277-283; in: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf (August 2008) 
192 Human Rights Watch’s Submission to the Human Rights Council 2008: Universal Periodic Review of Indonesia, (April 7
th, 2008) in: 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/10/global18495.htm  (August  2008)  United  Nations  2008  (January  7
th):  Conference  of  the  States 
Parties  to  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption.  United  Nations  CAC/COSP/2008/13 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session2/V0850069e.pdf (August 2008) 
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Amendment of Basic Law and provisions relevant to freedom of religion 
After  more  than  four  decades  of  authoritarianism  and  dictatorship,  Indonesia  has  completed  a  successful 
transition to democracy. (Prasetoyo 2005: 17; Mujiburrahman 2006: 144; Ananta 2005: 135; Hilmy 2010) From 
1999 to 2002 the appointed People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) has 
endorsed four constitutional amendments to the 1945 Basic Law. In October 1999, August 2000, November 
2001, and August 2002, the Assembly passed the First, Second, Third and Fourth Amendments, respectively. 
The Assembly is the sole body empowered by the 1945 Constitution to amend it. (King Blair 2004: 4) “The 
amendments were (…) noteworthy for what they did not include; the most important proposed change that 
failed  to  garner  significant  support  was  an  attempt  to  assert  the  primacy  of  Islamic  law  for  Indonesian 
Muslims“. (King Blair 2004: 4) 
 
With regard to religious freedom, the first principle Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa and Article 29 of the original 
version  of  the  1945  Basic  Law  have  established  the  “framework  of  the  state’s  stance  with  regard  to  the 
relationship between the state and religions”. (Yang 2005: 6) Notwithstanding, the religious question remains a 
vital source of controversy until today, and consequential legislation as the strategic development plans and 
the Act on the Indonesian Education System continue an “Islamization” of Indonesian policies. Constitutional 
Article 31 sets out the strategy of promoting science and technology in order to improve humanity’s civilization 
and welfare by holding values of religion and national unity in high esteem.  
In 1959, the five principles have been recognized by Sukarno as a historical continuation of the Jakarta Charter, 
which itself was recognized as an historical document, (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 5; Ramstedt, 2004: 13-14) and 
this  recognition  was  upheld  during  the  constitutional  amendments  in  2002.  “(T)he  People’s  Consultative 
Assembly Decree on the order of the legal system displays notable continuity with the New Order“, Stockmann 
2004: 200) because Pancasila is still accorded the status of a “source of all sources of state law
194” side by side 
with the Body of the Constitution – “reduced in status from being the “source of all sources of law” only by 
degrees it seems.” (Stockmann 2004: 200). Note that current legal framework rules that “a maximum penalty 
of 20 years in jail is stipulated for any person who publicly and unlawfully, in written or spoken word or via any 
other media declares to wish to annul or substitute Pancasila as the basis of the State, which results in social 
unrest, loss of life or damage of property”. (Stockmann, 2004: 246) 
Prior to its amendments, the 1945 Basic Law, Section XI, article 29 on religion, subsection (1) prescribes a sort 
of (Islamic)national monotheism or integralist monismand subsection (2) guarantees religious freedom – albeit 
limited to the Belief in One Supreme Lordship
195. As can be seen, religion ( agama) and belief (kepercayaan) 
have been separated in the article. In the amended Basic Law, Article 29 has been retained. 
 
(1) The state is based upon Belief in One Supreme Lordship 
196(Principle of monotheism) 
(2) The state guarantees the Indonesian citizen the freedom to embrace a respective religion and to 
perform their religious duties according to their embraced religion or belief (the right to embrace and 
worship according to their embraced religion)
197(Principle of religious freedom) 
 
The first principle and Article 29 (1) confer the absolute ob ligation on every citizen to embrace an agama- any 
one of the funded agama - and to believe in One Supreme Lordship. This principle indicates therefore that 
nothing is absolute, except God and humans are not totally free. Article 29 (2) allows for religious freedom of 
the  individual  and  groups,  and  for  manifestation  of  one’s  religious  service  in  private  and  public.  The 
government generally respected the former provisions, yet, religious freedom is limited by the state, and six 
religions receive official recognition in form of a representative body at the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is 
noteworthy, that 1945 Basic Law (§9) regulates that prior to taking office, the President and the Vice President 
shall take an oath according to their religion, or to make a solemn pledge before the People’s Consultative 
Congress (MPR) or the House of Representatives (DPR).  
   
                                                 
194 In general, there can be four sources of Law identified in Indoensia:  Adat (tradition, custom and customary law); Hindu-Buddhist 
prescriptions and Law Code (Hukum Kawi), Islamic Law and European Law. (Zoelva Interview Feb 2011) 
195 All translations from text documents in Indonesian are translated into English by the author. Some were compared to translations done 
by other scholars, the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, but the author’s own translations were used. 
196 Negara berdasar atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 
197 Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya 
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A highly contentious issue during the deliberations on the second constitutional amendment was the issue of 
religion. In 2000, the MPR modified and inserted articles from the MPR Decree No XVII/MPR/1998 on Human 
Rights as a part of the Second Amendment. The debate on the formulation of these right and freedoms was 
linked to a heated debate on the amendment of constitutional article 29 (2) on religious freedom which could 
not be accomplished during the 2000 MPR session. (Stockmann 2004: 234; King Blair 2004; Hosen 2005)  
 
It is essential to note that during the constitutional debate none of the Islamic political parties 
proposed the adoption of a caliphate system, thus acknowledging the nation-state, nor did they 
propose the establishment of an Islamic state like those in Iran, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. However, 
some of them made it clear that they wanted a constitutional guarantee that their rights to 
observe  syari’ah  would  be  fully  implemented.  In  this  case,  they  held  the  views  that  the 
amendment to Article 29 was necessary for the new constitution. (Hosen 2005: 420) 
 
The details of the entire debate shall not concern us here (see Stockmann 2004; King Blair 2005; Hosen 2005). 
Only two Islamic parties (PPP and PBB) advocated the introduction of the crucial stipulations of the Jakarta 
Charter into the 1945 Basic Law. This would have implied a change of one of the foundation of the Indonesian 
state principles. For the amendment of article 29 on religious freedom, the Draft Second Amendment included 
a whole range of alternatives. During the debate on Article 29, four main opinions were advocated. (Hosen 
2005: 428) There was one faction which proposed the reinsertion of the crucial stipulations of the Jakarta 
Charter; another faction suggested modifying Article 29 by mentioning not only Islam, but all religions; another 
faction tended to believe that all five pillars in Pancasila should be added to Article 29; but “the majority of 
Members of Parliament took the view that Article 29 should not be amended”. (Hosen 2005: 428) This means 
that the PPP and PBB, which proposed introducing the syari’ah, were not asking for Indonesia to establish an 
Islamic state; they only advocated the implementation of Islamic law for Muslims. (Hosen 2005: 429; Zoelva 
Interview 2010, 2011) Other political parties and appointed police, military, and functional representatives, 
who together held a majority of the seats Assembly, rejected in committee meetings proposals to amend the 
Constitution to include syari’ah, and “the measure never came to a formal vote”. (Hosen 2005: 427; Crouch 
2003: 23; King Blair 2004; Stockmann 2004) With only 71 combined seats, it was understood that the two 
parties (PPP and PBB) did not want members of the People’s Consultative Assembly to vote for their proposal 
“since it would be an embarrassing loss” (Hosen 2005: 427), or to avoid “hurting the feelings of those party 
members”. (Zoelva Interveiw 2011
198) 
 
Unsurprisingly,  these  alternatives  “are  mirrored  in  the  positions  on  the  corresponding  provisions  in  the 
Constitution’s new human rights article’. (Stockmann 2004: 235) The wording was still unresolved when it came 
to be debated in the Parliament. With regard to religious freedom, the Second Amendment passed on August, 
18 2000, amended article 29 in section XA on Human Rights, article 28E, but the article has actually not added a 
new dimension. (Stockmann 2004) The relevant articles are cited in full length; however, subsections which 
have no relevance to the focus of the study are omitted.  
Article 28E 
(1) Every person (orang) is free to embrace a religion (memelukagama) and perform religious service 
according to their embraced religion (agama); to choose education and teachings
199; (…) 
(2)  Every  person  (orang)  has  the  right  to  adhere  to  a  belief-system  (kepercayaan),  and  to  express 
thoughts and attitude in accordance with their conscience (hati nurani)
200.  
(3) Every person (orang) has the right to freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinion 
 
Article 28I 
(1) The right to life, the right not to be tortured, the right to freedom of thought (pikiran) and conscience 
(hati nurani), the right to embrace a religion (beragama), the right not to be enslaved, the right to be 
recognized as a person before the law, and the right not to be prosecuted on a retroactive legal basis are 
fundamental human rights which cannot be diminished under any circumstance. 
(2) Everyone has the right to be free from acts of discriminatory treatment on whatever basis and the 
right to obtain protection against such discriminatory treatment. 
   
                                                 
198Zoelva has been Chairman of the Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon Party, PBB) that advocated the introduction of the Jakarta 
Charter. He has been member of the parliament from 1999-2004. See Hosen 2005 on his earlier statements. 
199 Setiap orang bebas memeluk agama dan beribadat menurut agamanya, memilih pendidikan dan pengajaran 
200 Setiap orang berhak atas kebebasan meyakini kepercayaan, menyatakan pikiran dan sikap, sesuai dengan hati nuraninya. PART B | 117 
     Article 28J 
(1) Everyone is obliged to respect human rights of another person in the orderly context of living in a 
society, a nation, and a state.  
(2) In carrying out rights and freedoms, every person is obliged to obey the limitations which are laid 
down in law with the sole purpose of guaranteeing recognition and respect of other people’s rights and 
freedoms and to fulfill just requirements in accordance with moral considerations (pertimbangan moral), 
religious  values  (nilai  agama),  security  (keamanan),  and  public  order  (ketertiban  umum)  within  a 
democratic society. 
 
The  discrimination  between  religion  and  belief  has  been  upheld  in  the  amended  article.  The  freedom  to 
embrace a religion – definition is up to the Ministry of Religious Affairs – is guaranteed in private and in public 
and to manifest this right in practice and teaching is likewise permitted. Religious freedom on an individual and 
communal basis is therefore guaranteed for adherents of funded religions. Thus Indonesians have to identify 
their  religion,  probably  even  forced  to  have  a  religion,  but  free  to  choose  between  the  offered  ones 
(authoritarian freedom-of-choice policy), adhere to it and perform their religious worship and receive religious 
teaching according to the adhered to religion. This is noteworthy for a Muslim majority state – because not 
only the people of the book but also Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians are considered as a religion (agama). 
(Tibi 1995; Howell 1987) 
Whereas the freedom to be convinced about a belief-system has been strengthened, probably as a concession 
to Human Rights instruments, the right to manifest this belief in practice or the freedom of worship according 
to one’s belief is omitted. (Stockmann 2004: 236) In other words, adherents to funded religions enjoy religious 
freedom either alone or in community, in private and in public, in thought, teaching and in practice. But 
adherents to belief-systems (kepercayaan) which are not represented in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, have 
the right to be convinced about and to express a belief system only. That is to say, they have the right to belief 
and conscience only as they may not manifest this in public, in teaching, and in worship. However, as anyone 
has the right to association, assembly, and expression of opinion, the gathering of adherents to belief-systems 
and religious service of non-funded religions are not interdicted per se. Because unfunded religions are not 
forbidden, they are simply not financially supported and their adherents face social and legal restrictions in 
spreading their teachings or disseminating their symbols openly. 
In contrast to the UDHR, which promotes the freedom of thought conscience and religion, the right to freedom 
of  thought  (pikiran),  and  conscience  (hati  nurani),  and  the  right  to  embrace  a  religion  (beragama)  are 
separated in Indonesia, the right to embrace a funded religion is guaranteed, whereas the right to thought and 
conscience as expressed in the right to comprehend a belief-system is severely limited. Religious currents that 
are not acknowledged shall register to a General Directorate at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and may be 
included  into  the  administrated  religious  body;  however,  traditional  religious  communities  and  modern 
religious movements do not have to register anymore with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. (Howell 
2003). 
Interestingly, in the context of permissible limitation on human rights, in Article 28J the term general welfare of 
the UDHR is exchanged with the term security, “giving the paragraph an entire different meaning that might  
result  in  restrictive  and  oppressive  legislation”.  (Stockmann  2004:  269,  271)  Besides,  in  a  last  minute 
amendment, religious values have been added as one base on which limitations of human rights may rest. 
Reference to religious values as a ground for the limitation of rights had been among the few provisions the 
Reform faction had proposed. Concerning the amendment of limitations to the right to freedom of association, 
assembly and expression of opinion enshrined in the original article 28 of the 1945 Basic Law, their proposal 
read: “The freedom of association, of assembly and of expression of opinion in spoken word and in writing may 
not contradict religious and moral norms, the norms of courteous behavior nor legal norms”. (Stockmann 2004: 
271) Therefore Stockmann (2004: 271) criticizes  
(…) the religious value part of the restricting formulation that the Reform faction wanted to see attached 
to the original article 28 of the Constitution has now been attached not only to the troika of freedoms, 
but basically to all rights and freedoms. Religious values are so broad a notion that the danger is - similar 
to the employment of the notion of security - that this is yet another rubber paragraph open to abuse”.  
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It seems that the Indonesian management of religion is in conflict with ratified human rights conventions, 
because negative religious freedom is interdicted. This prohibition is legitimized by the clause to “protect public 
order and morals” – here religion becomes finally politicized, politicked and the morals referred to seem to 
imply  the  normative  values  consciousness  of  the  majority,  and  this  again  is  in  conflict  with  human  rights 
instruments, which only allow for a limitation based in morals if they are not exclusively rooted in one religion.  
The Acts on Regional Autonomy and Decentralization and the Act on the National Education System prescribe 
the national education system to be regulated, organized, and operated by the state and the regions alike. In 
this context, Chapter XIII of the amended Basic Law, Article 31 (3) on Education and Culture, sets out the broad 
objective  of  the  national  education  system  to  be  realized  in  the  governmental,  ministerial,  and  regional 
strategic plans of long-term, middle-term, and short-term development, which are implemented throughout 
Indonesia. The agenda followed seems to aim at balancing intellectual capital with spiritual values and the use 
of modern technology
201. The amended Basic Law states in Chapter XIII on Education and Culture, Article 31: 
(3) The government organizes and operates a national education system which is ordered by Law and 
increases faith in God (keimanan), obeying the commands of God/piety (ketakwaan), and noble moral 
(akhlak mulia) in order to educate (mencerdaskan) the nation. 
(5) By holding values of religion and national unity in high esteem, the government promotes science and 
technology in order to improve mankind’s civilization and welfare. 
 
The Indonesian state is religiously neutral, one may say, but as the first principle mandates Belief in One 
Supreme Lordship, the state follows a religious, yet pluralist approach on religion. In other words, as the 
majority’s religion shapes the policies of the state, the state is based on Belief in One Supreme Lordship and 
prohibits negative freedom of religion. Contrary to classical Islam, the Asian Pancasila state recognizes the 
Asian religions and implements a pluralictic but confessional model of religious education. Whereas the right of 
negative  religious  freedom  (to  reject  religious  claims  or  force  by  the  state)  is  restricted  severely,  positive 
religious freedom is enshrined strongly in the five principles and the 1945 Basic Law. Positive religious freedom 
is then delimited, as  Act 1/1965 and Criminal Code  §156 delimit the expression of  religious  freedom and 
officially  acknowledge  six  religions  to  be  funded  and  protected  by  the  state.  Further  delimitations  of  the 
expression of faith have been stipulated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ interpretation and support to 
those officially acknowledged religions. But Indonesia respects the right of the approved religions to “their 
public  self-representation  and  self-interpretation”  (Nipkow  2006:  585)  and  organizes  a  pluralistic  school 
system. Approved religions are financially supported and have the same legal status, in this they have at least 
formally the same rights, whether minority or majority. Since 2005, the Act on the National Curricular Standard 
unified  the  curricula  of  both  courses  of  education,  the  public  and  the  private  faith-based  and  additional 
subjects in religion are taught extra-curricular. Thus the legal framework provides the opportunity to organize 
confessional religious classes at all levels in state education and private faith-based education at all levels. 
4.2.4. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) 
History 
Apparently  in  a  move  calculated  to  counteract  the  growing  influence  of  the  nationalists,  the  Japanese 
attempted to aggregate support from Islamic leaders by establishing a Bureau of Religious Affairs in March 
1942 and the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi) in November 1942. (Bunge 1982: 40) A 
conference held in Surakarta from March 17 to 18, 1945, should prepare the grounds for setting up branch 
offices of a Ministry of Religion throughout Java and Madura. The aspiration of the Islamic group to continue 
the Japanese policy and to establish the Ministry failed, because only six of the twenty-seven members of the 
Committee  expressed  their  consent  on  this  proposal
202.  During  the  preparation  of  Independence,  the 
Committee of 62 had successfully kept aside Islamic elements from being enshrined in the Basic Law. In 
consequence, the loss of the Jakarta Charter and the absence of the Ministry of Religion left the Islamic groups 
with considerable discontent. In consequence, K.H. Wahid Hasyim,  one of the NU leaders and Masyumi 
member, who had previously supported the Islam ist demand that  syari’ah  forms  the  base  of  the  1945 
constitution (Ramstedt 2004: 8), was appointed unofficialMinster of Religion from August to November 1945 – 
although he had no official Ministry. 
                                                 
201 How this constitutional amendment has been implemented in subsequent Acts and regional legislation and then has been introduced 
into the strategic plans of schools and universities is demonstrated here by the Dwijendra foundation.  
202  The  subsequent  paragraphs  are  largely  drawn  from  Mujiburrahman,  2006:  125 -127,  who  summarizes  Deliar  Noer  1978:  The 
Administration of Islam in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project: p. 12-33; Ramstedt 2004: 6-8 PART B | 119 
The political situation changed rapidly in 1946,as the republican government needed the full support of the 
Islamic groups against the Dutch invasion. It was hoped that Islamic support for the national cause could 
eventually be consolidated through the official establishment of a Ministry of Religion (Kementerian Agama). 
Thus, less a compromise between nationalist and Muslim parties, but more the outcome of pragmatic political 
bargaining (Stepan 2001) and consolidation of support for the nation state under the republican government to 
counter Dutch intrusion, the Ministry of Religion was set up by Governmental Regulation Nr.1/1946 on January 
3, 1946.  
With its establishment, Islamic aspirations were eventually comforted. Needless to say, in the decades to come, 
the  Ministry  became  the  domain  of  Islam.  (Kelambora  1976:  236)  Its  tasks  were  assigned  basing  on 
governmental regulations issued in March and April 1946. The MORA was authorized to take over certain 
works previously carried out by other departments during the colonial period, and authorities of the district 
government (Mujiburrahman 2006: 125-127): 
1.  the works of the Department of Home Affairs with regard to Islamic marriage and Islamic pilgrimage 
(hajj) 
2.  the execution of Islamic law (syari’ah) under the authority of the Islamic High Court (Mahkamah Islam 
Tinggi) from the Department of Justice 
3.  the section on teaching religion in schools from the Department of Education 
4.  the regional religious offices (jawatan agama daerah) 
5.  the appointment of religious advisers for the native courts (landraad) 
6.  the appointment of Muslim officials (penghulu) for mosques 
 
Cairo-educated  H.  Muhammad  Rasjidi,  who  came  from  a  reformed,  modernist  Muslim  background 
(Muhammadiyah), a fierce adversary of the kebatinan groups, which he regarded as contextual and therefore 
not  Islamic,  was  the  first  officially  appointed  Minister  (March-October  1946),  but  he  did  not  succeed  in 
developing the structure and function of the Ministry. (Ramstedt 2004: 8) At the Surakarta Conference in 
March 1945, Rasjidi had expounded that the Ministry would concern itself with everything that is in the widest 
sense related to religion (agama) in order to make sure that every member of a religious community would be 
able to carry out his or her religious duties. Rasjidi claimed the MORA would not intervene in the internal 
religious affairs of the people.  
The structure of the Ministry became clearer, when K.H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi was appointed Minister from 
October 1946 to June 1947. Kafrawi came from a traditionalist, orthodox background (Nahdlatul Ulama), and 
had studied in Cairo, Leiden, France, and England. On November 20
th, 1946, he issued a decree about the 
structure of the Ministry of Religion consisting out of three sections: one for the Muslims, one for Protestants 
and  one  for  Catholics
203.  This  division  of  Christ ianity  as  mentioned  above  followed  the  Dutch  colonial 
perception of Christianity by the indigenous population as two different religions. In other words, the Ministry 
sponsored only universal monotheistic world religions of the book and their universal mes sage with the 
exception of Judaism. 
Due to the changing cabinets during the revolutionary war, the Ministers were appointed and soon replaced. 
Under the second and third term of Hasyim’s office from 1949 to 1952, the distinction between revealed 
religion (agama) and a man-made belief system (aliran kepercayaan) was fully developed with all its practical 
consequences. Minister of Religion Regulation No 9 in 1952 Article III section H continued colonial regulation 
which had became popular as H-Regulation. The regulation introduced a differentiation between Islam and 
Christianity and all other local religions. This regulation made all religious belief system of the group H the 
target of Christian mission or Islamic dakwah. For this reason, Regulation 9/1952 governed that group H had to 
establish relations with non-religious institutions and other religious/spiritual systems, and give considerations 
about their religious politics/policies.  
Article VI of the regulation defined a ‘belief system’ as follows: “A belief system is a dogmatic opinion, which is 
closely connected to the living tradition of several tribes, especially of those tribes that are still backward. The 
core of their belief is everything which has become the customary way of life of their ancestors over time.” 
(Ramstedt 2004: 9)    
                                                 
203 According to the holy Quran all religions of the book can be viewed  as legitimate religions. Fire-worshippers and polytheists are 
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As result, all ethno-religious traditions in the archipelago including Balinese religious practices, kajawen and 
kebatinan, who still practiced their traditional or contextual religion, were classified as belief systems (aliran 
kepercayaan) and ascribed to the residual category of “people who do not yet have a religion” (orang jang 
belum beragama), a label associated with primitive backwardness and parochialism.  
According to those drastic preconditions, the Balinese did not profess a proper agama, but possessed only a 
belief  system,  which not only were limited to their island, but did not even form a  coherent and unified 
ensemble valid for the whole island. (Picard 2004: 56-57) In order to bring religion to them, the Ministry 
empowered its growing number of branch offices to encourage Muslim and Christian missionaries to convert 
all the “heathens” throughout the archipelago. (Ramstedt 2004: 9) 
The threefold reasoning that adherents to aliran kepercayaan were not sufficient to be full Indonesian citizen 
was in line with politically correct thinking in the early 1950s: 1.) the first principle of Pancasila required all 
citizens to have a monotheistic faith; 2.) adherence to backward ethnic customs and belief systems was seen an 
obstacle to the progress of the Indonesian society. Identification with adat as an ethnic tradition formerly used 
by the colonizers to prevent the growing of nationalism displayed now disloyalty with the nation state.  
Hasyim defined the work of the MORA as covering twelve items. Besides the Islamic portfolios, the MORA was 
also  responsible  for  supporting  religious  (not  only  Islamic)  teaching  in  schools  and  prisons;  and  to  grant 
material help for building places of worship for religious groups. In addition it was stated, that the first two 
tasks of the MORA were 
1.  to introduceKetuhanan Yang Maha Esa as operative principle in public life 
2.  to safeguard that every citizen has the freedom to embrace his or her own religion and to worship 
according to that religion  
 
Thus, according to its definition, the duty of the Ministry was to put national monotheism to practice in society, 
which in fact committed the religious minorities to shape their beliefs along the lines of Islamic tawhid.Agama 
was seen as a counterpart to superstitious adat, and served to rationalize the religious practices in order to 
create progress and social welfare.  
 
When Darul Islam was contesting the unitary nation state during the 1950s, the Ministry of Religion remained 
the only forum through which loyal Muslim politicians could legitimately advance their interests, while the 
Ministry of Education and Culture has been dominated by Javanese secular nationalists (Ramstedt 2004: 8) – 
this split in ideological orientation is largely maintained until today. In 1951, Hasyim said the Ministry was in a 
difficult position because it had to face three different groups:  
 
1.  the Islamic group, generally being happy with the Ministry but frequently not understanding its true 
position in the state, therefore expecting too much 
2.  the secular group, never being happy with the Ministry, because religion to them was an obstacle to 
on the way to reach freedom and development 
3.  The religious minorities, basically happy with the Government’s support for religious life but afraid of 
discriminative policies against them 
 
The Minister  explained further that the Indonesian government would not be an Islamic government and 
MORA not an Islamic Ministry.  
Ironically, albeit the 1950 Indonesian Constitution guaranteed the Indonesian citizenry to profess and practice 
their  own  religion,  the  MORA,  controlled  by  Muslims,  was  to  severely  restrict  the  official  acceptance  of 
religions by stipulating the catalogue of categories for a religion to receive state funding in 1952. In accordance 
with its definition of agama, MORA initially recognized Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. The existence of 
Agama Hindu Bali was not automatically recognized, as it was not considered to be a book-religion.  
In 1959, Sukarno forced the return to the 1945 Basic Law including a statement that the Jakarta Charter 
inspires the Constitution. From 1959 to 1965 then, the two succeeding Ministers of Religion, KH Wachid Wahab 
(1959-1962) and KH Sjaifuddin Zuchri (1962-1967), both NU leaders, were actively lobbying to reformulate the 
work of the Ministry in favor of the Jakarta Charter, but their efforts did not succeed. PART B | 121 
Profile 
From its establishment
204, until 1966, the Ministry of Religion Affairs was located in the yellow building in the 
Merdeka Utara Street. In 1966 it was moved to the Thamrin Street in central Jakarta. Until 1985, it moved to 
West Lapangan Banteng Street in the government quarter close to the central station Gambir and national 
monument (MONAS).  
All state departments have regional offices at the  provincial level. The MORA’s regional representative is the 
Regional Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Wilayah Urusan Agama). MONE maintains the Regional Office of 
Education (Kantor Wilayah Pendidikan). ThoseRegional Offices represents the ministries’ policies and agenda 
on provincial level. Some ministries have established branches at the regency/municipality level, as the Agency 
for  Religion  (dinas  agama)  or  the  Agency  for  Education  (dinas  pendidikan)  in  Denpasar.  At  the  local 
administrative sub-regency level, the ministries do usually not have branch offices.  
Appointments of officials in the MORA or MONE are influenced by group affiliations, vested interests, and 
political bargaining. Political organizations established along ethnic or religious lines often seek to ensure that 
their group is favorably represented in the officialdom of education – in the central ministry, in the school 
inspectorate,  and  among  headmasters.  When  its  own  adherents  are  in  key  administrative  positions,  the 
political  organization  can  ensure  favorable  or  fair  treatment  of  their  viewpoint  and  of  their  constituents. 
(Postlethwaite/Thomas 1980: 25)  
The strong position of Islam in education, or generally religion in politics, culture, and education, ascribes 
immense influence, authority and power to the MORA. There were some debates during the 1960s  - most 
heated  in  the  late  1960s-  on  the  necessity  of  the  existence  of  the  MORA,  which  included  debates  on  its 
abolishment (Mujiburrahman 2006). Following the era of reform and the increased politization of agama in 
Indonesia, the author is not aware of such debates.  
On the contrary, my findings show that the MORA is vested with remarkable resources and power– its annual 
budget ranks fourth or fifth under the assigned annual budgets of all ministries approaching almost 900 Million 
Euro  in  2007.  Certainly,  this  assignment  has  to  be  linked  to  processes  of  national  strategic  development 
planning. In the young Indonesian democracy, concepts of inter-faith harmony (kerukunan agama), national 
stability (stabilitas nasional), unity and uniformity (kesatuan dan persatuan) and integration promoted by the 
authoritarian Suharto regime are continued in order to guarantee “public order” and minimize the outbreak of 
social hostilities. Those programs and the task of administering 13% of the global Muslim population (Pew 
2009) allocate substantial resources, power and influence to the MORA. But those programs and the financial 
support that goes with it lead to an increasing compartmentalization and politization of religion. Ironically, 
those inter-faith harmony and religious pluralism policies result in the discrimination of faith-based groups as 
the authoritarian style of managing religious plurality works against the appreciation and practice of religious 
pluralism in Indonesia. (cf. Nahrowi 2005; cf. Hasan 2008) 
The democratic development plans set out the first obligations of the citizen. The statutory obligation of all 
citizens is to have faith in God (iman) and to follow the commands of God (takwa). In consequence, the 
production of a citizen who has faith in God (beriman), follows the commands of God (takwa), and has noble 
ethics/character (akhlak) is the pivotal aim of such contemporaneous strategic policies.  
Related to such policies, Minister of Religion Decree Nr 8 in 2008 outlines MORA’s vision and mission. Its vision 
targets  the  creation  of  a  society  that  has  faith  in  God  (iman),  follows  the  commands  of  God  (takwa),  is 
prosperous, and well-trained. In such a society all faith-based groups shall mutually respect each. The mission 
sets out to  
                                                 
204  As all Ministries, the MORA is structured analogously to central and regional administration. Structure and organization of Indonesian 
Ministries are uniform; a Ministry requires  five  constitutive components: 1.) leadership, which is  in the hands of the minister; 2.) a 
secretary-general heads the administrative services; 3.) operational services, each headed by a director-general; 4.) institutional control, to 
be exercised by an inspector-general; 5.) the research and development division, to be headed by a director-general. All these executives 
are appointed and dismissed by the President on the recommendation of the minister. In the exercise of their duties, however, they are 
answerable to the minister only. Ministry officials are guided by the principles of coordination, integration, and synchronization within their 
own department as well as in  relation to other departments and institutions. The secretariat-general is divided into  bureaus with a 
maximum number of five. Each directorate-general is divided into directorates numbering no more than five, and the inspectorate-general 
is divided into inspectorates, also numbering five at most. The research and development division may have a number of centers, each with 
a  specific  task  in  research  and  development  to  meet  the  growing  requirements  of  the  department.  (Asianinfo.org.  2008:  Politics  in 
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1.  raise the quality of guidance, regular practice, experience and service for faith-based
205 life (kehidupan 
beragama) 
2.  increase the comprehension of religious moral and ethics (moral dan akhlakkeagamaan) 
3.  advance the quality of education of religious  communities (umat beragama) 
4.  increase the quality of the organization of the hajj  
5.  empower faith-based communities and religious institutions 
6.  strengthen inter-faith harmony (kerukunan umat beragama) 
7.  develop  conformity  of  religious  interpretation  according  to  the  national  Indonesian  conception 
(wawasan nusantara)  
 
Ministerial  activities  focus  on  (1)  increasing  the  quality  of  faith-based  life,  (2)  manifesting  a  clean  and 
prestigious  governmental  structure,  (3)  increasing  society’s  access  to  qualified  education,  assessing 
deficiencies, and empowering educators, (4) revitalize the hajj and (5) managing inter-faith harmony.  
Consequential Minister of Religion Decision Nr 2 in 2010
206 reformulated MORA’s vision and mission. Its vision 
targets  the  creation  of  a  society  which  obeys  agama  (taat  beragama),  lives  in  harmony,  is  educated, 
autonomous, and prosperous in physical and spiritual matters (lahir batin). The mission than targets to 
1.  raise the quality of faith-based life (kehidupan beragama) 
2.  advance inter-faith harmony 
3.  increase the quality of raudhatul athfal (kindergarten), madrasah (modernist Islamic schools), faith-
based higher education (perguruan tinggi agama), the religion class (pendidikan agama) and faith-
based education systems (pendidikan keagamaan) 
4.  increase the quality of the organization of the hajj  
5.  manifest good, clean, and prestigious governance 
Of interest to the current study is, that among its many functions, the MORA has the task to  
1.  organize the religion class in all types of schools at all levels of schooling (public, private faith-based, 
and state faith-based elementary or secondary schooling)  
2.  organize the religion class in undergraduate public higher education.  
3.  operate state faith-based schools and state faith-based higher education,  
4.  compile of religion class curricula for primary, secondary, and to undergraduate education at public 
and state faith-based schools 
5.  compile the curricula for state faith-based higher education 
During  the  reform  era,  the  national  development  program  (Program  Pembangunan  Nasional,  Propenas) 
mandated a restructuring of the MORA’s institutional set up. Minister of Religion Instruction 1 in 2001 put that 
requirement into practice. The figure gives the organizational chart of MORA in 2007.  
                                                 
205 The document uses the term beragama, (faith-based). It is the task of the MORA to guide faith communities. If the document refers to 
doctrines of the approved faiths, it uses the term keagamaan (religious). 
206 http://www.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=visimisi, 26.11.2011 PART B | 123 
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PART C 
5.  The  road  from  Agama  Hindu  Bali  to  Hindu  Dharma 
Indonesia 
As an immediate impact of modernization, developmentalism, and recently democratization, the Indonesian 
political  culture  of  spirited  politics  evolved  out  of  similarities  in  archipelagic  socio-cultural  practices, 
governmental initiated nation-building efforts and cultural engineering processes as well as participation in the 
global culture; that has nothing to do with a “synthesis of the existing traditional cultures into a single cultural 
system”. (Darmaputera, 1988: 29-30) In previous chapters, three longstanding and one recently emerged socio-
religious cultures were identified:  
1.) Archipelagic Indo-Melanesian megalithic traditions  
2.) Hindu-Buddhist cultures  
3.) Islamic culture (public Islam, political Islam) 
4.) Civil religion or national culture as represented in the first principle of the state.  
 
Contemporary  transformations  of  religions  in  Indonesia  only  begin  to  become  intelligible,  if  we  take  into 
account Indonesian politics. “These politics shed light, too, on the shift of attention from ritual practice to 
doctrine in Balinese religious thought (…).” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 30) As Atkinson (1987, 2003) and Smith-
Kipp/Rodgers (1987: 22) suggest, some Indonesian examples of religions (Dayak, Wana, Bali) may be located 
between the Weberian distinction of traditional and modern/historic religions as “local cultural traditions in 
dialogue with world religious systems.” (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 22) 
5.1. Institutionalization of religion in Indonesia 
5.1.1. Transformation of tradition 
Following Smith-Kipp/Rogers, I suggest that “*r+eligious phenomena in different Indonesian cultures may be 
helpfully seen as transformations of each other and perhaps of other, seemingly nonreligious domains of 
culture”, further “religious phenomena shift form (from trance to meditation, for example
207) as one goes from 
Indonesian culture to culture or as an ethnic religion takes the symbolism of Islam or Christianity”. (Smith-
Kipp/Rodgers:  1987:  6)  In  consequence,  many  religious  phenomena  can  be  studied  in  Indonesia: 
transformations of religions, civil religion, public religion, political Islam, or public Islam, to mention only those 
relevant to the current study. 
Sissions  (1993:  98-99)  offers  a  model  which  recognizes  the  “complex  interplay”  between  four  processes 
involved in the transformation of (religious) tradition.A great variety of terms have been used to describe 
transformations  of  (religious)  tradition  in  the  colonial  and  post-colonial  Pacific.  Sissions  model  aims  at 
systematizing the variety of used terms: He offers a distinction along a rationalization-politicization axis and 
along a systematization-reactive objectivation axis.  
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The terms of invention, reinvention, and construction all refer, albeit in different ways, “to a politicisation of 
tradition within an arena of identity politics (ethnic or nationalist)”. (Sissions 1993: 98)Politicization is defined 
here as the use of (religious) tradition to articulate national, ethnic and regional (religious) identities (Sissions 
1993). The politicization of tradition, when pursued by national elites, is normally tied to the enhancement of 
distinctive national or regional identities in a post-colonial, or neo-colonial context. (Sissions 1993: 99) The 
terms codification and formalization can be equated with the rationalization of tradition occurring during an 
imposition of state power (colonial or national). Geertz (1964) identified the Balinese reformers’ activities as 
attempts at religious rationalization
208. Rationalization, at the systemic level, is normally tied to administrative 
interventions by a state, often in response to formalizations of tradition outside the state or colonial structure. 
(Sissions 1993: 99) Both these general processes of politicization and rationalization result in an objectification 
(substantivization, reification) of tradition. (Sissions 1993: 98)  
Accordingly, as one aspect of national, sub -national and regional identity politics, politicization of tradition 
requires objectification of culture, whereas the strategic rationalization of tradition objectifies traditional 
culture either for the purposes of colonial and state administration, or as local alternative in response to such 
interventions.When ethnic leaders pursue a   politicization of tradition in opposition to state policies and 
actions, these efforts may take the form of a reactive objectification of culture. (Sissions 1993: 99) In the 
context of classical and contemporary Bali, this has been described by Schulte -Northolt (1991, 2007). The 
process of systematization includes, as component process, politicization (the use of tradition to articulate 
national, ethnic, and regional identities) and rationalization (the explicit formulation and codification of 
tradition).  
The rationalization of the religious cultures of the archipelago has been induced by two processes that 
triggered a cultural crisis and social change: 1.) the establishment of colonial rule over sovereign local polities in 
the archipelago by “an industrializing state for rational economic exploitation”, (Howell 1978: 266, 271) and 2.) 
“the transformation of the colony into an independent nation-state”. (Howell 1978: 266, 271) The colonial and 
republican governments pursuit of economic development and the “political integration of units of the state” 
(Howell 1978: 271) were responsible for the rationalization of local religious traditions, because these factors 
triggered  the  local  reformers’  concern  and  interest  in  “reconstructing  local  religious  practice  in  a  more 
systematic and doctrinally justifiable form”. (Howell 1978: 266)  
Today, the “local ethnic religions”, so to speak, are in important part social creations of the interaction of 
world religions and village ritual, for both intense contact with Islam and Christianity, local rituals in many 
ethnic homelands may not have been conceptualized as components of a distinct and systematic domain. 
Moreover, “religious belief” may not have been an entity separate from the rest of knowledge. In the 
same process, Islam and Christianity have been refined and reinvigorated in a number of social contexts 
throughout the archipelago. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 3) 
Religious  reform  has  been  stimulated  by  all  changes  that  disrupted  the  traditional  social  structure  and 
organization of life in the colony as those changes “required local intellectuals to search for more generalized 
solutions  to  spiritual  concerns  than  traditional  religious  institutions  could  offer”.  (Howell  1978:  272)  In 
consequence, Christian influence caused the Balinese reformers’ to systemize their local religious traditions 
into a transcendental and scriptural religion and organize their community into a congregation. (Geertz 1973, 
Howell 1978, 1982) In pursuit of development and integration the republican government also stimulated the 
rationalization of religion, but it constrained the evolution of the forms the religions assumed. (Howell 1978: 
273) Islamic reformism led to the purification of religious beliefs, local tradition, and practices from superstition 
as  represented  in  adat  and  to  a  general  understanding  of  religion  in  terms  of  orthodoxy  and  piety.  All 
modernizing elites took a hostile stand towards traditional religious orientations, which they felt stand in the 
way of progress. In consequence, the central government attempts to limit the proliferation of “new” religions 
(Howell 1978: 273) – until today, as the Constitutional Court’s Decision to retain the controversial Act 1/1965 
on the Desecration of Agama demonstrates. 
   
                                                 
208 Social context of Bali is local, national, and international. At the local level throughout Indonesia, religious qualities often infuse and 
legitimate local power structures. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 30) At the national level, the government embraces religion in the generic, 
but no religion in particular, both to legitimize its exercise of power and also to mollify those who resist the idea of a wholly secular state 
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Government standards which affected the transformation of the Asian religions were released by two branches 
of the state: its representative organs and the Ministry of Religious affairs (MORA). The rationalization of the 
Balinese faith (Atkinson 1987, 2003; Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 22) has come out of the interaction with a 
powerful nation state in which civil religion, public Islam, and the politicization of religion occupy to varying 
extent and to varying degree an obvious place in the political sphere.  
5.1.2. Institutionalization of religion 
As  has  been  shown  in  previous  sections,  the  MORA  defined  the  One  Supreme  Lordship  as  transcendent 
following  the  Islamic  understanding  of  tawhid  beginning  in  the  1950s.  Contemporary  state-funded 
congregations  (Hindus,  Buddhists,  Confucians,  Muslims,  Christians)  were  to  submit  exclusively  to  the 
requirements and doctrines of their particular creeds, as defined by their respective religious authorities and 
approved by MORA. (Howell 2003: 5) Several ethno-religious groups and their reform organizations in the 
young Indonesian nation state were successful in their struggle for official recognition. It is interesting in this 
context, how the Hindu community managed to become a state funded congregation in a Muslim majority stat, 
as this is an exceptional case and probably unique the Southeast Asian or Indonesian Islam
209. “The official 
model of religion reveals its Near Eastern roots. While Hinduism and Buddhism are officially recognized as 
religions in Indonesia, it is an open secret that they do so by conforming in public dialogue to a Middle Eastern 
monotheism.” (Atkinson 1983: 688) But, “While national law reinforced the trend among reformists to develop 
a universalistic rather than a particularistic definition of their religious communities, the representative organs 
of government exercised only slight influence on the evolution of religious doctrine.” (Howell 1978: 274) 
“By  the  early  1970s,  ‘religion’  (agama)  had  been  constructed  through  reform  organizations  and  their 
interactions with government on a particular, mid-century model of respectability in modern world religions: 
Indonesian religions were to be exclusivist, congregational, heavily scripturalist and universalist.” (Howell 2003: 
5) In this, this process shows exemplarily the Weberian rationalization of cultural heritages through formal 
organization and a judicious adaptability of minority leaders.  
It reflected a widely shared concern that Indonesian religions be disentangled from ‘irrational’ 
traditions that stood in the way of progress and be reconstructed according to current standards 
of modern thinking to support reliable citizenship and economic development. (Howell 2003: 5)  
 
In other words, belief systems (kepercayaan) were to a large extent disenchanted, marginalized, and put under 
surveillance,  because  ethnic  groups  who  did  not  belief  in  the  first  principle,  were  easily  alleged  to  be 
Communists. “The construction of all ‘religions’ (agama) as congregational and exclusive was also useful for 
exercising surveillance over religious action at a time when unorthodox, folk or lax practice was equated with 
‘atheism’ and so, like Chinese traditions, associated with Communism.” (Howell 2004: 4, Sudharta Interview 
2008) This process reinforced the construction of agama as mutually exclusive creeds largely defined by an 
orthodox  understanding  in  contrast  to  their  more  orthoprax  predecessors,  and  a  close  affiliation  of  the 
religious authorities with the Suharto regime (Sudharta Interview 2008). This political situation explains the 
predominant interest of the Hindu Council in matters pertaining to piety, scripture, and ritual. Only following 
the era of reform, the Hindu Council began to actively engage in social and educational issues, an engagement 
that even led to the splitting up of the Council into two camps. 
 
Geertz’s (1973) analysis of religious rationalization in Bali stresses that “Balinese religion in the 1950s was 
taking shape through actors’ efforts to grapple not so  much with ultimate problems of existence as  with 
proximate issues of cultural hegemony in the context of the Muslim-dominated Indonesian nation-state. The 
fact that their struggle was constituted in religious terms has cultural, institutional, and historical significance.” 
(Atkinson 1983: 694) In the mid 1950s, Balinese reformers, some of them represented in the Hindu council 
lobbied the MORA and began to represent Balinese religion as a monistic, congregational kind of Hinduism 
until in 1958 they were allowed by President Sukarno to open up a Hindu Bali section in the MORA (Bakker 
1993; Howell 1978, 1982, 2003, 2004).    
                                                 
209 It is significant that of the Indonesian religious groups sprung from the Asian traditions, only Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, 
which strongly emphasized the transcendental aspect of their high god, are now legally recognized and supported by the Indonesian 
government. The other three religions recognized are transcendental faith, and belong to the Islamic category of people of the people (ahl 
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The administrative recognition of Agama Hindu Bali led to the legislative recognition of Hinduism in “the first 
clear specification of legitimate Indonesian religions by Sukarno in 1965” (Howell 1978), Presidential Decree 
1/1965  on  the  Prevention  of  Abuse  and  Desecration  of  agama,  promulgated  in  1969.  Howell  relates  the 
Modernist Muslims’ discrediting of the mystical Sufi path and prescription of a scripturalist that is orthodox 
focus on basic prayers and legal observances to the Hindu reformers efforts to systematize worship, doctrines 
and the emphasize on morals and piety
210. (Howell 2003: 4) The Balinese formulated their own heritage from 
the ancient Indic kingdoms, first as an ethnic religion, and then, in the early 1960s as a universal Hindu religion. 
Remember  in  this  context,  that  the  Balinese  have  been  cut  off  from  direct  contacts  with  India  for 
approximately 1000 years. 
 
Common to religious reformers of all cultural backgrounds in the 1920s -1960s was the concern to adapt their 
long-cherished traditions to the “modern” world.”
211 Howell (1978: 262) states that the reformers of all these 
different movements attempted to accomplish that purpose by similar methods. First, all reformers chose 
“from among their religious traditions certain elements that they considered essential and of perennial values” 
(the  revelations  of  the  Koran  or  the  monistic  Hindu  theology  of  the  Ancient  palm-leaf  manuscripts,  for 
example) to adapt their religious tradition to the modern world. To achieve this end, they used the “intellectual 
equipment  and  social  institutions”  (Howell  1978:  263)  of  the  European  models  they  encountered  in  their 
interaction  with  the  Dutch  colonial  government  or  while  studying  abroad  and  “incorporated  elements  of 
western  institutions  in  their  reconstructions”  of  their  particular  religious  tradition  (Howell  1978:  264). 
Following  quotation  exemplarily  describes  the  process  of  religious  reform  in  Indonesia  and  Bali  and  it  is 
therefore stated at length:  
Reformers arranged what they considered the essential elements of their traditions in logically 
ordered expositions of religious principles designed to reconcile belief with reason  and with 
enterprise in their changing world. They justified these conceptions with references to newly 
examined literary sources of the great traditions and to recent European writings on the. They 
offered their formulations to the general public with the hope of raising the level of spiritual and 
ethical conduct in their communities. The concern of reformers of various traditions with popular 
piety and with adaptation of their religion to the modern world also led them to reorganize on 
much the same principles the social institutions through which their diverse religious heritages 
had  been  preserved.  Thus  each  of  the  reform  movements  (…)  crystallized  around  formal 
bureaucratic  organizations.  Those  organizations  instituted  contractually  based  religious 
education and eventually administered congregational religious activities. (Howell  1978: 262-
263) 
Interestingly, the Indonesian history of religion took a course that the Weberian model of rationalization did 
not predict. It brought forth new religious institutions. As already assessed in the previous section, the Balinese 
followed a model of religious rationalization which Geertz terms “a process of “internal conversion”.” (Geertz 
1973: 182) In this context, Geertz identifies three interrelated processes: 
1.  intensification of religious concern/ religious reason(ing) 
2.  religious literacy/systematization of doctrine 
3.  social organizational institutionalization of religion  
 
With regard to the intensification of religious concern Geertz observes that among “the educated or semi-
educated young men of eighteen to thirty who formed the ideological vanguard of the Revolution, there have 
appeared scattered but distinct signs of a conscious interest in spiritual issues of a sort which still seem largely 
meaningless to their elders or their less engagés contemporaries.” (Geertz 1973: 183, for a description of 
discussions in the early sixties see Geertz 1973: 183-184, cf. Bakker 1993, cf. Covarrubias 1965)  
                                                 
210 Howell (1978: 261) describes how “the rationalization of Indonesia’s Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Confucian traditions
210 brought forth 
novel institutions that Weber’s model of change did not anticipate”. Howell explains this “discrepancies in terms of the distinctive social 
pressures and facilities of colonial and nation states”. (Howell 1978: 261) During the 19
th and early 20th century people under Dutch 
control began to reform their religious traditions. Sumatran, Sundanese, and Javanese scholars introduced a new kind of Islamic reformism 
characterized by efforts to purify local traditions that were not justified by the Koran, and to rebuild “their religion around novel, Western-
influenced institutions.” (Howell 1978: 261-262) “Similar movements to revitalize Indonesia’s religious heritage from the Shiva-Buddhistic 
kingdoms of the islands’ past began in Java in the late 19
th century (Drewes 1966) and in Bali in the 1920s. (Ngurah Bagus 1969)” (Howell 
1978: 262) 
211 According to Howell (1978: 262) the reformers themselves used the phrase modern world (dunia modern).  PART C | 128 
Regarding the systematization of doctrine, Geertz describes the translation of traditional palm-leaf manuscripts 
(see also Hinzeler 1993), and Indian texts and mass publishing efforts which led to a  
 
(…) spreading of religious literacy beyond the traditional priestly castes--for whom the writings 
were in any case more magical esoterica than canonical scriptures--to the masses, a vulgarization 
[secularization], in the root sense, of religious knowledge and theory. For the first time, at least a 
few ordinary Balinese are coming to feel that they can get some understanding of what their 
religion  is  all  about;  and  more  important,  that  they  have  a  need  for  and  a  right  to  such 
understanding. (Geertz 1973: 185) 
 
Thus, he observes how the tradition of ajawera became democratized and secularized as social groups not 
belonging to the jero (Brahmins and royalty) were allowed to understand matters of religion. (cf. Hinzeler 1993) 
However, he notes, “Against such a background, it might seem paradoxical that the main force behind this 
religious literacy and philosophical-moral interpretation movement is the nobility, or part of it, (…) younger 
members of the aristocracy who are collating and translating the manuscripts and founding the firms to publish 
and distribute them.” (Geertz 1973: 186) This is interesting to note, as it has also been the nobility we founded 
and financed the first peoples’ schools in Bali and thereby supported the opening up and change of tradition. 
Geertz explains this with the nobility’s interest in maintaining their status quo,  
 
if they persist in basing their right to rule on wholly traditional grounds they will soon lose it. 
Authority now demands more than court ceremonialism to justify it; it demands “reasons” - that 
is, doctrine. And it is doctrine that they are attempting to provide through reinterpreting classical 
Balinese literature and re-establishing intellectual contact with India. What used to rest on ritual 
habit is now to rest on rationalized dogmatic belief. The main concerns upon which the content 
of the “new” literature focuses (…) all serve to set the traditional hierarchical social system in an 
explicitly intellectual context. The aristocracy (or part of it) have cast themselves in the role of 
the  leaders  of  the  new  Bali-ism  so  as  to  maintain  their  more  general  position  of  social 
dominance. (Geertz 1973: 186) 
 
Geertz attributes the activism of the nobility to their political motivations. It is worth mentioning that Geertz 
(1973: 189) already notes “the regenerative potential of a triangular alliance of troubled youth, threatened 
aristocrats, and aroused priests should not be underestimated.” Thus my observation is supported by Schulte-
Nordholt  (2007)  and  Geertz  (1973),  who  remarks  that  transformations  which  the  Indonesian  nation  state 
brought to the Balinese  
 
(…) have hit the old élite as hard as any other group in Balinese society by questioning the 
foundations of their belief in their own vocation and thus their view of the very nature of reality 
in which they conceive that vocation to be rooted. Their threatened displacement from power 
appears to them as not just a social but a spiritual issue. Their sudden concern with dogma is, 
therefore, in part a concern to justify themselves morally and metaphysically, not only in the 
eyes of the mass of the population but in their own, and to maintain at least the essentials of the 
established Balinese world view and value system in a radically changed social setting. Like so 
many other religious innovators, they are simultaneously reformists and restorationists. (Geertz 
1973: 187)  
 
The third component to this process of rationalization is the social-organizational. This component refers to the 
social organization of the Hindu congregation within the Parisada Hindu Dharma and the MORA. In the early 
1950s the Balinese founded their own independent, locally financed Autonomous Bureau of Religion. With help 
of  this  Bureau,  they  tried  to  reorganize  their  religious  institutions.  Developing  Geertz  observation,  Howell 
(1978: 266-271) outlines three dimensions of religious reform in Indonesia, which are congruent with the 
author’s findings.  
 
1.  Belief and Practices relating to One Supreme Lordship
212 
2.  Congregational organization 
3.  Agents of religious construction 
                                                 
212  I  expanded  Howells  concept  of  practices  relating  to  a  transcendental  God,  as  God  may  be  in  discrepancy  to  Islamic  orthodoxy 
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In the 1960s, Hindus summarized their doctrines, which adherents to Hinduism were required to profess. They 
invented  their  One  Supreme  Lordship  (Ida  Sang  Hyang  Widhi  Wasa)  “despite  its  previous  lack  of  ritual 
importance” (Howell 2003: 4; cf. Bakker 1993), and systematized their rituals. Hindu reformer published an 
ethical code, the Upadeca, and cast adherence to it as an essential part of religious practice
213. (Howell 1978: 
268, Sudhanta Interview 2008) All the reform movements, both those based in Semitic and in Asian traditions, 
“produced  congregational  religions,  that  is,  religions  with  clearly  bounded  communities,  including  lay 
adherents, organized on a localized basis for regularly scheduled activities. (Howell 1978: 269) Howell (1978: 
269) observes the reformers of Indonesian Hinduism did formulate their Asian tradition as ethical religion. They 
did not only compile a code of ethics but they standardized religious practice for the laity and outlined basic 
tenets of faith.  
As the traditional cultures and Balinese polities were incorporated into colonial institutions of Western style 
schools, colonial administration, and technical professions, the Balinese reformers were challenged to reassess 
their  values.  (Covarrubias  1965/1937,  Howell  1978:  270)  The  establishment  of  the  nation  state  and  the 
emergence of its civil religion in dialogue with political Islam pressed the need to understand religion on the 
laity and reformers laid an increasing stress on orthodoxy (scriptualism and formalization) and piety and on the 
systematization of the shared orthoprax village-based communal ritual practices to comply with the standards 
set out by the MORA. Howell (1978: 270) observes that congregational life in Asian religions was also facilitated 
by the organizations around which those religions crystallized. “The organizations drew non-specialists into 
religious activities on a regular basis and coordinated the distribution of religious services.” In the Balinese 
context,  the  present  study  made  the  same  observation  and  therefore  differentiates  between  the  old, 
traditional  Brahmanic and royal elites (oldjero) and the  new, modern educated  elite (new  jero) in  central 
positions within the government or education system. (cf. Bakker 1993: 35) 
The new religious conceptions were formulated by “priests, scholars, and layman acting in concert with like-
minded thinkers.” (Howell 1978: 270) The foundation of the Dwijendra foundation exemplarily demonstrates 
that  fact.  These  reformers  identified  their  conception  with  the  ancient  world  traditions  and  offered  their 
programs as reforms but the outcome of their activities was a radical departure from traditional patterns of 
religious life. (Howell 1978: 270; Triguna 1997, 2009, Parker 2003) My assessment is, however, what has been 
continuously defended as is the ancient Indo-Melanesian concept of ancestor worship and the blood sacrifice 
as those practices seem to form the kernel of Balinese religion, adat, and culture.  
The formal organizations afforded procedures for the collective determination of  values and 
goals, including those at variance with traditional values. The collective nature of the decisions 
taken by the organizations, moreover, was itself a source of legitimacy for these decisions. While 
the formal organizations facilitated the specification of group values, and hence facilitated the 
definition  of  dogma  and  the  standardization  of  religious  practices,  the  very  specificity  of 
decisions taken through formal organizations tended to bring to light differences among the 
participants and to cause the reformists organizations to fissure. That tendency was apparent 
both in the early history of Balinese organizations (…) (Howell 1978: 270-271) 
and - one must add, in contemporary history. In my judgment, this process happened repeatedly: 1.) in the 
1920s as the clerical class has been given solemnly the mandate to explain their religio-cultural system to the 
Dutch colonial officers: 2.) in the 1950s, as the old and new elites were jointly striving for the recognition of 
their religion within the nation state, 3.) in 1965 as Communism threatened to collapse traditional values and 
the social structure based on ancestor veneration, and 4.) after the Bali bombings in 2002, when the slogan 
Ajeg Bali became a crucial motto of reorganizing Bali in an open fortress (cf. Schulte-Nordhold 2007) During all 
these times of crisis, the old and the new elites managed to maintain their status quo by legitimizing their 
hegemony and social dominance. Using religious “reasoning” they adapted to the new social situations, while 
using tradition as a source of answering the social transformations that were challenging them. (cf. Bakker 
1993; Picard 2004; 2011; Triguna 2003) 
   
                                                 
213 This Hindu catechism, first published in 1967, is still the main reference for contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia. After my Hindu 
marriage 1998 in Indonesia, my sister in law presented to me the Upadeca.   PART C | 130 
5.1.3. Hinduism in India and Indonesia 
This chapter gives on cursory overview of the history of Hinduism and the term itself. The shared trait of 
communal religious practice is related to the traditional social form of life based on village ritual and agriculture 
as main its form of subsistence. (Hooker 1978) Those local ethnic cultures nurture a supernatural dimension 
and orthopraxy (Staal 1986a; 1986b; 1989). Oversimplified they focus on the primacy of society over the self, 
whereas secular cultures tend to be individualistic and insist on the primacy of the self over society. (Ruth-
Heffelbower  2003)  Briefly,  those  were  the  characteristics  of  the  Archipelagic  Indo-Melanesian  megalithic 
traditions. This assumptions with is supported by my research on the Baduy in South Banten.  
As the section on pre-colonial history demonstrates, Hindu and Buddhist traditions superimposed ethnic or 
traditional  Indo-Melanesian  traditions  and  practices  from  400  AD  onwards  characterized  by  ancestor 
veneration,  blood  sacrifices,  and  animism  (earth,  mountain,  and  tree  veneration).  In  consequence,  Hefner 
(1998: 93) argues “non-Hindu-cults often continued to operate even after elements of the local tradition were 
drawn up into a Hindu superstructure”. Even more remarkably, in the following centuries, whereas in India a 
schism between both ways of life occurred, in early medieval Java a unique Shiva-Buddhism emerged. (Fic 
2003, Munoz 2006) It is my assumption that those Hindu and Buddhist traditions were received as paksa (skt. 
wing, way of life) and coexisted simultaneously in the Western part of the Archipelago.  
This is demonstrated by the early inscription found in Bali, which testify to the simultaneous existence and 
practice of tantric Hinduism and tantric Buddhism. With reference to Bali, Coedes (1932 in Pringle 2004: 46) 
states  “These  inscriptions  reveal  a  Hindu-Balinese  society,  independent  of  Java,  making  use  of  a  dialect 
particular to the island, and practicing Hinduism and Buddhism at the same time.” In consequence, it is often 
impossible to make a sharp distinction between Hindu, Buddhist, and Indo-Melanesian traditions and practices 
in  ethnic  or  traditional  religions  in  the  Western  part  of  the  Indonesian  archipelago  (Malayo-Sumbawan 
linguistic group, Adelaar 2005).  
Similarly, many Buddhist teachings are translucent to traits of contemporary Indonesian Hindu Dharma, and 
following  the  advice  of  Indonesian  senior  scholars,  (informal  Interview  with  Sudharta  2008,  Ida  Pedanda 
Telabah 2011, Edy Setyawati 2011) the author indicates that there is manifold need for comparative research in 
this  area.  Tantric  Shivaism  and  tantric  Buddhism  are  ways  considered  to  lead  to  release  from  the  cycle 
(samsara) of rebirth/reincarnation (punarbhawa) and recognize such a release as ultimate goal - only does 
tantric  Buddhist  practice  differ  from  the  tantric  Shivaist  practice.  In  the  unique  and  particular  Indonesian 
synthesis of Shiva-Buddhism, Shiva and Buddha are conceptualized as identical in nature, as Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika. The literary apex of this religion is the medieval Kakawin Sutasoma, source of the State Motto Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika. (Ramstedt 2004; Upadeca 1967: 38) 
Early Hindu and Buddhist and medieval tantric Hindu-Buddhist cultures have not been uniformly distributed in 
the early and imperial polities throughout the archipelago. The courts maintained a more refined version of the 
religion  than  the  villagers  who  largely  continued  their  shamanist  and  animist  religious  practices  and  the 
megalithic ancestor worship. Hindu-Buddhist culture and Sanskrit language were certainly “the civilization of 
the elite and not that of the whole population” (Coedes 1968: 16 in Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 15) Also, the 
rural  populations  were  legally,  religiously,  socially,  and  culturally  divorced  from  the  court  elites.  Several 
versions  of  Hinduism  and  Buddhism  have  been  practiced  by  different  dynasties  at  different  localities  and 
historic periods. (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006) Some of those local ethnic traditions are represented 
today by the state funded religions Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. Others which were not integrated 
into one of the sanctioned universal religions are labeled as belief system (kerpercayaan). Those belief systems 
do not enjoy the same rights as citizens who adhere to one state fundedagama (see part A and B). 
As has been discussed earlier, at the time Europeans began to study religions, they tended to use the religions 
most familiar to them, namely Judaism and Christianity, as a general model (Bowen 2005: 26). They assumed 
all religions would have three central elements: a central text
214, exclusivity
215, and separation
216 (Bowen 2005: 
26).  
                                                 
214 The central text was assumed to be a collection of doctrines or beliefs that all adherents shared, ideally written in a sacred book that 
had been inspired by a god or gods. (Bowen 2005: 26) 
215 Exclusivity meant that a person was a member of one and only one religion, at least at any one time. (Bowen 2005: 27) 
216 The idea of separation developed in modern Western Europe. John Locke advocated the separation of State and religion as a way  of 
ensuring toleration and religious freedom. This argument became the basis of the separation of Church and Sta te in France and USA. 
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While  this  model  of  religion  worked  well  to  describe  European  practices,  it  poses  problems  in  the 
understanding of traditional religions or Asian religions in India, China, and Japan. (Bowen 2005: 27) Only today 
we know those collections of texts and teachers under the general rubric of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, or 
Shinto,  but  “these  labels  are  modern  inventions”.  (Bowen  2005:  27)  In  consequence,  “Any  attempt  to 
conceptualize Hinduism is a difficult undertaking from the outset because the term ‘religion’ itself is contested 
and does not have a universally accepted definition.” (Scheifinger 2009: 3)  
First and admittedly oversimplifying, in those Asian societies there is not a singular scripture which provides a 
shared creed for practitioners of religion - instead, each of those traditional religious systems contain large 
bodies of manifold scriptures written on diverse aspects of life, on teachers and on organizations of followers. 
Second, the idea of exclusivity does not fit with the traditional norms in those societies. Third, it is important to 
note that the idea of a separate religious sphere is unfamiliar to those religious systems and many other 
religious traditions. Whereas Muslims, for example, argue that all of life should be conducted according to 
God’s  commands  (Bowen,  2005:  27),  and  the  prophet  serves  as  prototype  of  proper  conduct,  Hinduism 
involves ideas of purity and pollution that permeate the all spheres of social life (Jackson, 2003: 8). This is of 
particularly interest, as in the Indonesian case, Islam and Hinduism are bound up with everyday life, thus 
religion  matters  and  may  not  be  seen  as  separate  from  a  public  space,  a  fact,  which  has  been  concisely 
described in the previous chapters. (cf Casanova 1994)  
In  the  late  19th  century,  European  scholarship  has  drawn  up  a  chronology  for  the  history  of  Hinduism. 
According to this theory, the roots of Hinduism are situated within the Aryan migration into India around 1500 
BCE, and the composition of the first Vedic collection of hymns (Rig Veda). This theory has been “controversial 
from  the  start”
217  and  many  contemporary  Indian  scholars  “consider  it  an  example  of  colonial-missionary 
interpretation  —  a  predominant  culture  projecting  it  own  ideas,  values,  and  biases  onto  the  politically 
dependent”
218. 
In brief, the timeline of a history of Hinduism assumes seven periods of ancient to contemporary history, which 
the current work only briefly sketches, as 1.) the focus of the study is on the Hindu class in the context of 
Indonesian religious and educational policies and not on the history or periodization of Hinduism in general, 
which is also far beyond the scope of the present study, and 2.) the encounter and exchange between India and 
the Indonesian Archipelago with relevance to the transmission of Indian Hindu ideas to the archipelago has 
been terminated by around 1050 and only revived in the 1940s.  
1.  3,000–1500 BCE: Indus Valley Civilization (Old Chronology) or  
6,000–1900 BCE: Indus-Sarasvati Civilization (New Chronology)  
2.  1500–500 BCE: Vedic Period (beginning with the Aryan migration)  
3.  500 BCE–500 CE: Epic, Puranic, and Classical Ages  
4.  500 CE–1200 CE: Early and Middle Medieval Period (Early development of bhakti (esp. in South India). 
Formation of sampradayas contesting internally and externally. Theological establishment of Vedanta) 
5.  1200–1757 CE: Muslim Period (Bhakti saints and the cultivation of personal piety, Development of the 
theistic traditions) 
6.  1757–1947 CE: British Period (The reform movements and birth of neo-Hinduism) 
7.  1947 CE–present: Independent India (Hinduism established as a world religion) 
219 
 
Notwithstanding the given periodization, the current work recognizes several reasons which turn the effort to 
construct  a reliable  chronology of Hinduism into a challenging academic task. First of all,  there is not a 
homogenous religion that can be referred to as Hinduism. Instead, Hinduism encompasses a diverse range of 
traditions, practices, beliefs, and groups that can be subsumed under the term Hindu. (Scheifinger 2009: 3) This 
may be said for India as well as for Indonesia.  Second, those traditions, practices, and beliefs are of such an 
antiquity that they date back far into pre -history. Third, the earliest use of the term ‘Hinduism’ by an English 
professional soldier in India is reported in 1808. (Jackson 1996 in Jackson 2003: 8, emphasis in original) By 1917 
‘Hinduism’ was being used by certain ‘insiders’ and subsequently there have been competing representations 
of true or false Hinduisms. (cf. Jackson and Killingley1988 in Jackson, 2003: 8)  
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In consequence, it is safe to assume that the sets of practices and traditions which are contemporarily called 
Hindu Dharma, Sanatana Dharma, or Hinduism in India and Indonesia are modern inventions, which have been 
born out of the encounter with Islam, Western colonial administration, Christianity, and the modern nation 
state, and they are only recently conceived of as a single, distinct religion.Forth, the traditions and practices 
labeled  Hindu  recognize  no  identifiable  human  founder,  nor  is  there  a  specific  point  of  origin  in  history. 
(Prothero 2010) Fifth, the Hindu traditions and practices lack traditionally a central authority and institution 
(Scheifinger 2009: 5; Bowen 2005: 27; Prothero 2010), and a central text. Hinduism is therefore heterogeneous; 
moreover, some traditions regarded as Hindu are actually “vehemently opposed to one another in terms of 
beliefs and practices”
220 (Svarupa-dasa 1996: 101 in Scheifinger 2009: 5; Prothero 2010)  
As a result, to put all the groups that are regarded as belonging to Hinduism in this all-encompassing category is 
comparable  to  “lumping  together  religions  such  as  Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Islam  and  calling  them  the 
“Semitic religion”.” (Svarupa-dasa (1996: 101 in Scheifinger 2009: 5, emphasis in original) Nevertheless, after 
having briefly pointed to the limitations of the term or label Hindu, for analytical reasons the current work 
applies the term Hindu Dharma as analytical category in order to label the various traditions and practices 
subsumed under the term, even if they might hold contradictory views or sport internal differences of opinion. 
As  the  present  work  is  dealing  with  Indonesian,  not  Indian  Hinduism,  the  meta-framework  of  Indonesian 
Hinduism as outlined by the Upadeca is described in a following section. In consequence, with relevance to the 
case study the current work assesses four important distinctions between those traditions now labeled Hindu 
Dharma in Indonesia or Sanatana Dharma in India. We need to differentiate between 
  The  early  and  classical  traditions  in  India  and  Indonesia  and  their  transformations  following  their 
interaction with 1.) Islam (Christianity) and 2.) the nation state 
  Early, classical and contemporary Indian manifold Hindu traditions and practices and early, classical and 
contemporary Indonesian Hindu traditions and practices 
  Indonesian Hindu Dharma as normative national framework (normative framework) and Indonesian ethnic 
Hindu traditions and practices that are monitored by the Hindu Directorate General (actual practices) 
  Balinese Hinduism and other Indo-Melanesian Indianized traditions 
 
The first and second discrimination simply refers to differences between Indian and Indonesian Hindu and 
Buddhist traditions. The ethnic groups in the Archipelago acculturated some Indian concepts (the Godking for 
example, Munoz 2006) to legitimate dominance of some clans over the others. Thus, Indian Hindu traditions 
and practices differ from Indonesian Hindu traditions and practices in history and in the contemporary nation 
states.  In  this,  historical  traditions  and  the  unitary  political  and  conceptual  framework  of  Hindu  Dharma 
Indonesia,  under  which  all  Indonesian  Hindu  traditions  cluster  for  administrative  convenience,  differ  from 
historical and contemporary Indian traditions. The third discrimination refers to the difference between the 
unitary  political  and  conceptual  framework  of  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia  as  normative  national  framework 
(normative framework and actual practices) and the various Indonesian “Hindu” traditions and practices that 
are monitored by the Hindu Directorate General – remember the Sikh community has chosen to be included 
under the Hindu. However, following ethnic religions, ethnic groups and belief systems are administered and 
monitored under the Hindu Directorate General at the MORA: Karo Batak (Sumatra), Indians in Medan, Banten, 
and Jakarta, Sikhs in Medan, Banten and Jakarta, Hindu Tenggerese (East Java), Hindu Kaharingan (Kalimantan), 
Toraja,  Aluktodolo,  Mamasa  (Sulawesi),  Lombok  Hindu,  Balinese  in  transmigration  areas,  Hindus  Ambon, 
Madura and the Javanese Hindus (wongso weton, wongso kulon nearby Gresik). 
In consequence, the fourth discrimination refers to the difference between Balinese and other Indonesian 
Hindu traditions and practices (Hindu Bali – ethnic Hindus). Note therefore the difference between Agama 
Hindu Bali, and other ethno-religious traditions and practices labeled Indonesian Hinduism. As already stated in 
previous  sections, the construction of contemporary Indonesian Hindu Dharma relies  upon the protracted 
struggle of Balinese reformers to protect and continue their socio-religious identity in the Pancasila state. Yet, 
‘in order to create what defines them’, the Balinese and other Hindus consulted not only their inherited sacred 
scriptures, but also borrowed theology from India and ideas from the Theosophical Society thereby weaving an 
intriguing framework to maintain their way of life relevant for their cultural meaning system.  
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— not, at least, until these “others” threatened to impose their own doctrines. Tis might be demonstrated by the history of Bali. As 
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Consequently, HDI was and is influenced by Indian Hindu religions, Western ideas about Eastern religions, by 
Christian and Muslim doctrines, and by national standards.  
Let us now take a closer look at the global distribution of Hindu Dharma, and then turn to the Indonesian 
context. The Malaysian Mamandram Magazine
221 gives an overview of various sources providing data of the 
number and distribution of Hindus around the world. According to the Magazine, consensus places the figure 
at around 885 million Hindus in July 2008. In this context, the CIA World Factbook
222 places the percentage of 
Hindus in the world at 13.26 out of the total world population of 6,677,563,921 ( July 2008 est.). The graph 
shows the distribution of world religions on the globe.  
 
World Population by Religion (Source: CIA Factbook 2008 in 
http://www.mamandram.org/magazine/2008/10/world-hindu-population/) assessed October 2011 
The table shows the Distribution of Hindus on the globe.  
Country  Population 
(millions) 
Percentage 
of Country 
India  811  80.5 
Bangladesh  24.6  16.0 
Nepal  23.8  80.6 
Indonesia  4.28  
11. 4 (Hindu Directorate General MORA, 2008)  
1.8 
4.7 
Pakistan  3.03  1.02 
Malaysia  1.59  6.3 
Sri Lanka  1.50  7.1 
United States  1.22  0.4 
United Kingdom  1.09  1.8 
Mauritius  0.61  48.0 
Fiji  0.32  34.0 
Guyana  0.22  28.4 
Suriname  0.13  27.4 
Hindu  Populations  by  Country  (Source:  CIA  July  2008  est.  in 
www.mamandram.org/magazine/2008/10/world-hindu-population/) assessed October 2011 
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This graph shows the age of the world religion
223 
 
 
5.1.4. Orthopraxy 
(…) Balinese religion, even among the priests, is concrete, action-centered, thoroughly interwoven with the 
details of everyday life, and touched with little, if any, of the philosophical sophistication or generalized 
concern of classical Brahmanism or its Buddhist offshoot. Its approach to the problems of meaning remains 
implicit, circumscribed and segmental. (Geertz 1973: 175) 
 
It is my assumption, that one should not take too serious such “labels” as Hinduism or Buddhism because in 
early and classical Asian religions, what counts is orthopraxis (from Greek orthos, right and praxis, action) (Staal 
1989:  116-117)  rather  than  doctrines  and  scripture.  In  this  context,  Geertz  (1973:  177)  writes  “Beyond  a 
minimal level, there is almost no interest in doctrine, or generalized interpretation of what is going on, at all. 
The stress is on orthopraxy, not orthodoxy--what is crucial is that each ritual detail should be correct and in 
place.” And even more sound, Geertz (1973: 176) states, “The Balinese, perpetually weaving intricate palm-leaf 
offerings, preparing elaborate ritual meals, decorating all sorts of temples, marching in massive processions, 
and falling into sudden trances, seem much too busy practicing their religion to think (or worry) very much 
about it.” As a result, following Geertz and Staal, Picard (2004: 62; cf. Bakker 1993) argues “Balinese ritual is a 
classic case of ritual without religion”, a view which is supported by Ketut Waspada.  
 
Das  höchste  für  sie  (die  Bali-Hindus  A.L.)  ist  nicht  die  Vereinigung  mit  dem  Absoluten,  sondern  die 
Erhaltung der Harmonie im Kosmos, wodurch das Wohl des Menschen erhalten wird. (...) Um die religiöse 
Lehre brauchen sie sich nicht zu kümmern (das ist traditionell Aufgabe der Priester, A.L.). Es kommt nur 
auf die Praxis an. Diese Gemeinschaft aufgrund der Orthopraxie erhält sich solange aufrecht, wie die 
äußerlichen  Lebensbedingungen  intakt  sind.  Aber  wenn  (...)  [die  Harmonie,  A.L.]  nicht  mehr 
zustandekommt, dann wird der einzige Halt verloren gehen, und dies bedeutet eine religiöse Katastrophe. 
(...)  Das  war  es,  was  um  das  Jahr  1930  geschah.  (…)  Schuld  daran  sei  die  Tatsache,  dass  die  hindu-
balinesische Religion keine einheitliche Lehre hätte. (Waspada 1988: 121) 
 
In  Bali  (as  elsewhere),  ritual  relates  specific  social  groups  to  each  other,  to  their  ancestors,  and  to  their 
territory. As the relevant ethnographic details are readily available in the literature, a description of these 
complexes  is  beyond  the  scope  of  my  study.  In  consequence,  observers  in  the  19  and  20century  found 
traditional Balinese religion to be defined by “ritual affiliation, lineages, initiation, cults, and practice” (Staal 
1986b: 206) in the local context, the complexes of temple systems, the sanctification of social inequality, and 
the cult of death and witches (Geertz 1973: 1976).  
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But the conceptual side is of much less moment: the worshippers usually don’t even know who 
the gods in the temples are, are uninterested in the meaning of the rich symbolism, and are 
indifferent to what others may or may not believe. You can believe virtually anything you want to 
actually, including that the whole thing is rather a bore, and even say so. But if you do not 
perform the ritual duties for which you are responsible you will be totally ostracized, not just 
from the temple congregation, but from the community as a whole. (Geertz 1973: 177) 
 
The  relevant  concern  is  not  right  belief  (orthodoxy)  but  appropriate  behavior  (orthopraxy).  As  result, 
orthopraxy has become a basic feature of all religion in India and Bali, and we should refer to the orthoprax, as 
expressed in “ritual affiliation, lineages, initiation, cults, and practice” (Staal 1986b: 206) instead of referring to 
the faithful or the orthodox. (Staal 1989: 116-117)  
 
Thus, in any one village a man and his neighbor will ordinarily be dependent upon different 
priests for their religious needs, the most important of which is the obtaining of holy water, an 
element essential not just for temple ceremonies but for virtually all important rituals. Only a 
Brahmana priest can address the gods directly in order to sanctify water, as only he has, as the 
result of his ascetic regimen and his caste purity, the spiritual strength to traffic safely with the 
tremendous magical power involved. The priests are thus more professional magicians than true 
priests: they do not serve the divine nor elucidate it, but, through the agency of ill-understood 
sanskritic chants and beautifully stylized sacred gestures, they utilize it. (Geertz 1973: 179)  
 
The clerical class has been responsible for the proper conduct of the ritual, thus the community was not 
concerned  with  theological  questions,  which  were  entirely  the  duty  of  the  priests  and  their  families.  In 
consequence,  the  elitist  systematization  of  Hindu  Dharma  is  a  modern  phenomenon  and  a  characteristic 
feature  of  the  process  of  reinvention,  rationalization,  secularization  and  democratization  of  Balinese 
orthopraxy. Further, it is an entirely modern phenomenon that the Balinese laity needs to understand religion. 
Those  processes  began  in  the  1920  as  Dutch  colonizers  mandated  the  collaborating  elites  to  codify  their 
religion,  customs  (adat)  and  law  (adat  law).  Insofar,  the  “Hinduization”  of  Balinese  religions  is  a  singular 
process (Picard 2004: 58). In consequence, Geertz (1973) coined the term “internal conversion” to denote the 
ambiguous  phenomenon  that  the  Balinese  had  to  reinvent  themselves  as  Hindus  that  they  already  were 
assumed  to  be  by  Dutch  observers  acquainted  with  classical  Hinduism.  (Swellengrebel  1960:  25;  on  the 
Western image of Bali as Hindu museum see Schulte-Nordholt 1986) 
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5.2. Consolidation of Indonesian Hindu Dharma 
This part discusses the consolidation processes of tailored or invented Hindu Dharma Indonesia (henceforth 
HDI). In general six periods of consolidation of contemporary HDI can be identified. My periodization displays a 
reconstructed version of history, which the participants to my study and the sources they gave me referred to. 
In consequence, my periodization does not claim historical accuracy. (cf. Schulte-Nordholt 1991) Basically, the 
classification  focuses  on  Balinese  history,  as  the  Balinese  were  the  agents  within  the  process  of  internal 
conversion that shapes the contemporaneous curricular content of the Hindu class and the Hindu education 
system.  It  was  Balinese  reformers  struggling  for  their  religion’s  recognition  by  institutionalizing  it  into 
congregation. Likewise, they made the first and successful systematization efforts.  
Java/Sumatra/Kalimantan  BALI 
400  Indianized  King  Purnavarman  in  Kutei  (East 
Kalimantan) and King Mulawarman in West Java 
Probable  direct  contact  between  India  and  Bali, 
certainly trade relations between Indianized Java and 
Bali 
700-1100 Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya in Sumatra  First consolidation: prehistory - 1846 
914 first inscription in Sanur  
Threefold  Hindu-Buddhist  Javanization  of  Indianized 
plural cults in Bali throughout the middle ages: 
Rsi Markandeya (probably 800) 
Empu Kuturan (around 1050) 
Dang Hyang Dwijendra/ Dang Hyang Niratha (1550) 
800 -1100 Hindu and Buddhist  Kingdoms of Central 
Java and East Java 
1250-1450 Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit 
1100-1700 Islamization of Sumatra and Java, Islamic 
Sultanates in Java, Sumatra and the Archipelago 
 
1600-1945 Dutch colonization  Second consolidation: 1846-1949 
Colonial  conquest  (1846-1908):  Exchange  between 
local ideas about religious practices (orthopraxis) and 
Dutch  efforts  in  administration  and  social  science, 
systematization of religious practices by clerical elite 
and  first  academic  descriptions  of  Balinese  religion 
and culture 
Third consolidation (3 contemporary constructions)1945-present 
Incorporation  into  the  nation  state:  Re-systematization  of  local  belief  systems  into  an  exclusive  and 
congregational system of agama, construction of One Supreme Lordship according to MORA regulations  
1
st construction (1949-1965) 
Several Hindu cults conceptualize their orthopraxis in  Agama Hindu Bali (on the naming cf. Bakker 1993 and 
Picard 2004). Balinese agents organize in foundations, and instituonalize their religion successively in the Hindu 
Council and the Hindu Directorate General at MORA 
2
nd construction (1965-1998) 
Following the Suharto take over after 1965,  Pancasilaization  of  the  religion,  universalization,  increasing 
ritualization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
3
rd construction (1998-present) 
Following the era of reform, opening up of the ritualism and scriptural piety of the Hindu Council. After the 
bombing conservative reactive objectification of Balinese religion and culture ( Ajeg) and modern diffusion into 
sampradaya (cults) of Dharma Hindu Indonesia. 
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5.2.1. First consolidation: Guru-personalities of Balinese religious traditions 
According to historical research, several Hindu, Buddhist and Shiva-Buddhist cults coexisted and were practiced 
simultaneously in Bali until the 11
th century. Remember, in the 1950s the orthodox Muslims represented in the 
MORA decided on a catalogue of what features a religious system must have if its adherents want it to be 
recognized as agama. One of the crucial problems the Hindu traditions in Bali met was first having prophets 
(nabi) and second that its adherents must not be limited to one single ethnic group. (Dosther Interview 2007, 
Sudharta Interview 2008) With respect to the prophets, Balinese participants to my study, the Upadeca (1967: 
36-42) and the sources they gave me, enumerate several sages which are credited to have laid the base for 
religious traditions and practices that shaped the embryo of Agama Hindu Bali (on the naming see Bakker 1993 
and Picard 2004, 2011) from approximately the 8th to the 15th century
224 and are revered as guru-personalities 
in a retrospective view: the mythical Resi Agastya (said to have sailed from India to the Archipelago, credited 
with the Indianization of Java and Bali), Resi Markandeya (800), Emp u Kuturan (1000), his younger brother 
Empu Bharada, Dang Hyang  Dwijendra (1550) and his nephew Astapaka
225. (cf. Upadeca 1967; Bakker 1993: 
172; Sudharta 2006) In consequence, it is safe to assess – if we consider the first inscriptions dating from the 
early 9
th century - that the first persons to systematize and unify a common practice of worship among those 
Indianized cults in Bali and practices arrived between the 9
th and 16
th century.  
 
Agastya has been pictured as Shivaite Ambassador of Dharma (Dharmaduta), who came to Java in the 8
th 
century to spread the Shiva traditions. Therefore he is given the title  Maha Resi Agastya  (Great Prophet 
Agastya) and Bhatara Guru (Patron Guru), as he is perceived to have been a manifestation of Shiva, who spread 
the  Dharma  in  the  Archipelago  (Java,  Bali,  Lombok,  South-Sulawesi,  Kaimantan).  Archeological  evidence 
supports this thesis. (Upadeca 1967: 36-37)  
Another person to spread a systematic Hindu lore in Bali was Resi Markandeya, who travelled from East Java to 
Bali and seems to have disseminated a Vishnuite cult in the 8th century. He is credited with the foundation of 
the Besakih temple, which is regarded as the central and most important temple in Bali today. Prior to the 
temple erection, Markandeya has buried five metallic elements (panca dhatu: gold, silver, iron bronze, and an 
amalgam of all four metals) as substructure in the ground.. Those elements are regarded as sacred today, and 
Balinese  reiterate  that  it  is  Markandeya’s  merit  to  strengthen  and  protect  Balinese  soil  with  this  primary 
sacrifice. Today, new constructions of a Balinese house begin with the ritual of burying those five metallic 
elements in order to protect the house.  
Next in spiritual genealogy of Javanese founders of religion is the East Javanese Empu Kuturan. As has been 
mentioned  previously,  several  Indianized  cults  coexisted  and  were  practiced  simultaneously  in  Bali:  Siva 
Siddhanta,  Pasupata,  Bhairawa,  Waisnawa,  Bodha  (Sogata),  Brahmana,  Resi,  Soa  (Surya)  and  Ganapatya. 
Empu  Kuturan  is  credited  with  1.)  the  attempt  to  reduce  those  cults  into  three:  Shiva  Siddhanta,  Bodha 
(Sogata), and Waisnawa (Resi), 2.) the introduction of the Tri Sakti/Murti (manifestation and veneration of 
Brahma  as  creator,  Vishnu  as  maintainer,  and  Shiva  as  dissolver).  Thereby  the  contemporary  tripartite 
priesthood (Tri Sadhaka), the Shiva and Buddhist professional priesthood and the Bhujangga Waisnawa, the 
Vishnu-worshipping  priesthood,  emerged
226  among the  variety of priests. Empu Kuturan introduced the 
tripartite village temple-system followed up to the present, and the priestsof Besakih are seen as his spiritual 
descendants. (Interview with a priest at Besakih in 2007)  
                                                 
224 As the periodization and systematization of Hindu scriptures is a a recent phenomenon, a difficult academic task and probably a 
Western effort continued by Asian scholars - as the debates about the periodization of Hindu scriptures in India demonstrate - the present 
study aknowledges that the decades after 1920 and especially after the mid 1960s witnessed an enormous increase in activities in research 
and publication concerning the progenitors of clans and the founders of the religion. The authenticity of those efforts needs to be qualified, 
because of several political and social pressures. On pre-nation state periods see Schulte-Nordholt 1986, 1991 and Ramstedt 1991. With 
refernce to the nation-state period, I like to mention 1.) provisions of the MORA, and 2.) the search for ancestors after the massacres in 
1965. My analysis does not ask after the factual historical authenticity of these guru-personalities, but as my emic approach allows for, 
reiterates the current Balinese construction of their religious history, therefore it is in my view academically responsible to describe this 
certainly constructed view.  
225 The Upadeca enlists Rsi Agastya, Rsi/Bhagawan Wyasa, Resi/Empu Tantula r (the composer of the Suta Soma, in which the Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika verse is contained), Kuturan, Bharadah, Markandeya, Dwijendra and Astapaka. 
226 Those priests represent the roles of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva in ritual. In the 1600s century, the Bhujangga  were marginalized by the 
dominant Shiva and Buddhist Brahmin priesthood out of conflicting interests. Their traditional role in ritual was given to th e kings 
represented. This situation continued until 1999. Following a mysterious incident in Besakih in 1999, the Bhujangga Waisnawa priesthood 
was allowed to carry out the Panca Wali Krama (five year cycle purification ceremony at Besakih temple) ritual jointly with the Shiva and 
Buddha priests for the first time in national history. Only in 2003, the status of the Bhujangga Waisnawa has been elevated by Tri Sadhaka-
Bhisama of the Parisada as they were then given the right to perform all rituals along with the Shiva and Buddha priesthood. (Interview Ida 
Resi Oka 2004) 
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His brother Empu Bharada was probably a Vishnu priest at the East Javanese court. He was involved in the 
conflicts of succession between the descendants of the East Javanese king Airlangga whose spiritual teacher he 
is assumed to have been.  
From the 11
th to 13
th century, the king (representing Vishnu, and thereby replacing the Bhujangga in ritual) 
resided at a palace assisted by a Shiva and a Buddhist priest. This unity of Shivaite and Buddhist clerics was 
termed dwi tunggal and the Shivaite tradition was named kacewan and the Buddhist tradition kasogatan. 
(Agung/Musta: 1991-1992: 3; Santeri, 1992: 102-103) The basic core of Balinese religion is assumed to rest on 
belief in  
1.  A diversified or created reality (sekala) and an undiversified or uncreated reality (niskala);  
2.  Life after death (ancestor world), Cycle (samsara) of reincarnation (punarbhawa);  
3.  Ancestor veneration (the souls of the ancestors that dwell in the mountains. (Santeri 1992: 98-117) The 
living humans beg their ancestors for help and support, and with the power of niskala, these ancestral 
spirits can bestow boons on their descendants. Thus security, fertility, welfare and progress are essentially 
tied up with the veneration and service to ancestral spirits. In consequence, cremation ceremonies and the 
continuiation of the purusa line constitute are situated at the very core of Balinese religion and culture. In 
this, the educational aim of the Hindu class is to build an suputra, who understands about the obligations 
towards the ancestors and the community. 
 
The Central Javanese Brahmin Dang Hyang Dwijendra or Dang Hyang Nirartha, who is assumed to have fled the 
perishing Central Javanese Majapahit kingdom, is credited to be the progenitor of the contemporary Balinese 
brahmin class. Moving east Dwijendra came to Bali and Lombok. Prior to the advent of Dwijendra, there were 
various priestly groups, among them the brahmana probably did not form a continuing dynasty or descent 
group, and were just one of many groups of priests. (Vickers 1989) The major tool by which the diversity of 
groups of priests pre-dating Dang Hyang Dwijendra was displaced was the idea of an exclusive priestly caste, 
the brahmana. It was Dwijendra, who was responsible for the inauguration of the genealogical lineage as it is 
now known in Bali and for the elevation of the priests who perform worship to Siva and carry out rituals for the 
court, as the major priestly group. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52; Interview Ida Bagus Wiyana 2011) The four descent 
groups of Dwijendra, the Brahmana Manuaba,Brahmana Kemenuh, Brahmana Keniten and Brahmana Mas, 
clans, became the brahmana high priesthood, a priesthood complemented by the smaller group of high priests, 
who directed their worship to Buddha. In the retrospective accounts the ancestor of all the Buddhist priests 
was Dwijendra’s nephew Dang Hyang Astapaka, “so the structure was kept within family”. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 
52) All the other categories of priest which have survived have been relegated to the lower lineages. (Vickers 
1989: 49 – 52; Interview Ida Bagus Wiyana 2011, Interview Ida Resi Oka 2004)  
In consequence, Astapaka is the progenitor of  the Buddha priests and is said to have founded the village 
Budakling, the hatchery of all Buddhist Brahmins in Bali. In consequence, the system of contemporary Balinese 
social order and lineage (varna or clan (dadia and soroh)) emerged in the 1600 century. As the framework of 
social order and lineage was meaningless without some kind of everyday practice to support it,  Dwijendra 
introduced the present day Balinese ritual order, particularly the making of holy water (tirtha), which is the key 
rite  for  the  brahmana  priesthood  and  the  temple  system.  (Vickers  1989:  49  –  52)  In  consequence,  he 
systematized  the  Indianized  religions  in  Bali  through  codification  of  worship  style  and  introduction  of  the 
padmasana (shrine in each temple or family temple dedicated to the worship of One Supreme Divinity, cf. 
Stuart-Fox 1996). The constant element of Balinese society before and after the Majapahit conquest was that it 
was held together by social networks and personal relationships. The spatial dichotomy between thecore and 
the periphery of the village was translated into the social and spiritual distinction between jaba (outsider) and 
jero(insider)  denoting  the  proximity  to  royal  or  priestly  descent,  which  in  turn  was  tied  to  the  proximity 
between human and creator, and residence. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52) 
5.2.2.  Second  consolidation:  Dutch  conquest,  Wangsanization,  and  modern 
education 
The pace and course of colonization took its own and singular shape in Bali. The island was the last region to be 
subjected to Dutch rule in the Indonesian archipelago. It had the status of a residentie and not of a colony, as 
the royalty had the right to self-rule (swa-praja). Launched in the north coast in 1846, the conquest of the 
Southern and Eastern parts was only completed in 1908. Predating Dutch invasion, the image of Balinese was 
that  of  a  savage,  violent,  belligerent  and  deadly  tribe.  Balinese  were  described  as  fierce,  proud,  and PART C | 139 
occasionally running amok. The nobility led a life of luxury and financed such a sumptuous life-style by selling 
their subjects as slaves to Batavia (contemporary Jakarta).  
The royal power of the king was traditionally linked to the mobilization of labor force for ritual performance 
and warfare. The Dutch government utilized that negative image to justify their invasion of the island. The 
continuous quarrels and feuds amongst the nobility stopped them  from forming a  unified diplomatic and 
military front line against  Dutch supremacy. From 1908 to 1942 the Balinese experienced  social tensions, 
tensions regarding social hierarchy, conflict, rationalization and secularization of their religious traditions and 
practices. (Bakker 1993: 31-48; Triguna 1997) Despite the Dutch attempt to insulate Balinese society from 
foreign influences, Bali underwent rapid and profound changes as a result of increasing interference in native 
affairs by the colonial state and later the nation state. The introduction of a monetary economy, the imposition 
of taxes and forced labor, the enlistment of former rulers in the bureaucracy, and the access of a tiny minority 
of  Balinese  youth  to  European  education  undermined  the  relationships  that  had  prevailed  between  the 
commoners and the nobility (Picard 2004: 59)  
After Dutch forces crushed a fierce resistance of poor armed Balinese guerillas, they occupied the North and 
West  parts  of  the  island  in  1846.  In  1882,  the  harbor  town  Singaraja  in  the  North  was  made  the  Dutch 
administrative capital of Bali and Lombok as it became the seat of the colonial government and the strategic 
headquarter. The local regent of Gianyar asked for Dutch support in 1899 and thus had been forced to accept 
Dutch  supremacy  in  the  regencies  of  Gianyar  and  Karangasem.  Only  the  South  (Badung,  Tabanan,  and 
Klungkung) remained independent. In 1904 a Chinese trading vessel had been looted in Sanur, the quarrel 
about the reparation payment between the Dutch and the regents of Denpasar and Pamechutan led to the 
final Dutch take over.  
The royalty and their priesthood jointly decided to fight for independence and respectability and to accept 
death in order to defend honor and liberty. Those people gave preference to death over disgrace which they 
equated with the loss of liberty. Together they swore a pledge on puputan
227and carried out the related ritual 
to prepare them to wage war. On November 11
th, 1906 the royal and the clerical families of Denpasar, dressed 
up in ritual clothes and armed with traditional weapons and they clashed with a superior force of Dutch troops 
armed with rifles. Those Balinese which survived the deadly Dutch bullets stabbed themselves to death in the 
vicinity of the king. In the same year, the regent of Tabanan together with his son and heir had to surrender 
and were taken into custody. Humiliated, they cut their throats with a pestle. In 1908, the last Hindu-regency of 
Indonesia, Klungkung, had to surrender to Dutch supremacy. In the puputan of Klungkung, the Dewa Agung, 
the supreme king, had been murdered and the capital looted
228. The chief minister of Bali informed the Dutch 
that the king’s subjects numbered 300,000, which made Bali one of the most densely populated islands in the 
world at that time, a reputation it was to maintain until the nineteenth century. (Vickers 1989: 51) 
In  consequence,  the  colonial  war  had  successfully  swiped  and  pocketed  Bali.  But,  the  colonial  power  too 
registered  losses  at  a  moral  level,  resulting  out  of  the  successive  invasion’s  immense  cruelty  there  were 
national protests in their homeland and vast concerns about the morality of that invasion. (Vickers 1989: 51) 
The Dutch conquest had made Bali part of the Dutch East Indies, and this meant strengthening the ties with the 
other islands in the archipelago, especially with Java – this reactivation of a close tie with Java, which had been 
neglected for 200 years, became of importance for the nationalist movements later on. (cf. Bakker 1993: 33-34) 
Karangasem, Klungkung, Bangli, Gianyar and Tabanan were added to the residency of Bali and Lombok formed 
in 1882, with Singaraja as its capital. (Bakker 1993: 34) In 1922, Buleleng and Jembrana were absorbed into the 
department of Singaraja. (Bakker 1993: 34)    
                                                 
227 Interconnected with ancestor veneration, ideas of the soul and the cycleof rebirth, the Balinese religio-culture classifies distinct types of 
death. The main categories are natural, not natural and exceptional. Not natural deaths are suicide, slaughter, and accidents. The warrior’s 
death, while performing duty, or a selfless death to save other lives, is classified as exceptional. In modern words, the conscious decision to 
accept death in order to defend the own notion of truth, life-style, and individual or communal liberty is classified as honorable. This kind 
of death must not be equated with committing suicide - which is stigmatized - as it is commonly interpreted in academic literature on Bali, 
because there is no such notion of death in Balinese culture. But it is a highly honorable and respectable way to accept death probably in a 
collective state of trance by facing a vastly superior enemy in order to stand up for one’s own conviction and values and does not 
necessarily lead to death. Hence the practice of puputan is closely related to the idea of freedom. (Landmann: 2004) 
228 So we can provocatively conclude that all contemporary priesthood compounds ( geriya) and palaces (puri) are the descendants of 
collaborators. First, they collaborated with or came from Majapahit, Next, they collaborated or evaded conflict with the Dutch (otherwise 
they would have died in the puputans).Probably, the pre Majapahit indigenous Balinese nobility is already extinct and undulates in the 
margins. Or as they had been renedered to lower social startas, this might explain the continous conflicts between local clans and the 
Brahmins. Interestingly, both main temples, Besakih and Batur have no high priests and puris as patrons, but are themselves the patrons of 
the puri and religious service is exclusively conducted by ordained lay priests (pemangku) originating out of a certain set of villages and not 
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As the kings and princes of Karangasem, Bangli, and Gianyar had not offered armed resistance to the Dutch 
conquest, those dynasties were allowed to retain their positions of authority, though under the supervision of 
Dutch administrative officers. (Bakker 1993: 34) The remaining principalities were placed under direct Dutch 
rule.  The  noble  families  thus  became  district  heads  over  clear-cut  areas.  (Bakker  1993:  34)  The  Dutch 
maintained the traditional social hierarchy of Balinese society, assuming its abolishment would have let to 
unrest and undermining the position the Dutch eventually attained in Bali.  
On the contrary, the Dutch even reinforced the Balinese hierarchy by using the knowledge of the 
traditional Balinese brahmana judges in the administration of justice. They also had pub-lished a 
number of law books with Hindu leanings, in which the Hindu caste system was stated much 
more explicitly than in traditional Balinese society. Because the Dutch believed that the nobility 
was the exclusive vehicle for the Hindu religion and because they wanted to protect Hinduism, 
the position of the nobility was later reinforced. (Bakker 1993: 35) 
Following a devastating earthquake in 1917, which let to great terror among the Balinese, who believed the 
earthquake was a consequence of the disruption of hierarchy caused by the changes brought by the Dutch 
conquest, the Dutch thought that their authority would be best guaranteed by a restoration of the traditional 
dynasties and by leaving intact as much as possible of traditional Balinese society. (Schulte-Nordholt 1988: 245 
in Bakker 1993: 37) The Dutch then adopted local kings to nominally head the Balinese social order, and gave 
the priesthood a special role in explaining Balinese religion and society (Vickers, 1989: 51) which has been 
perceived as Hindu by Balinese, Indians, and colonizers alike. In 1938, the former princes were restored to their 
old positions of independent governors (swapraja), each in their own territory. At the same time, the Dutch set 
up a council of princes known as Paroeman Agoeng (Great Council), which was made responsible for governing 
the whole island of Bali – if course it was under supervision by a Dutch official.  
Just as the Dutch adopted kings to nominally head the Balinese social order, so they gave the priesthood a 
special role in explaining Balinese religion and society
229. The Dutch saw the whole nature of religion, class, and 
lineage as a big mystery, and were satisfied with simplified explanations which fitted into their administrative 
structure. In consequence, it were the clerical class itself who set up a rigid and ritual oriented social order to 
perpetuate their hegemony and social status and the system of religio n we encounter today. In order to 
administrate the social system, the Dutch needed the help of the brahmana high priests to explain and simplify 
the system. So, it was Balinese clerical elite, and not the Dutch, who determined the practical details of colonial 
policy in Bali. (Vickers 1989: 146 – 148) The priests had great freedom within the confines of Dutch rule to 
determine how Balinese society should be organized according to their ideal model of varna (class). But as has 
been shown, the transition to Dutch rule and the subsequent imposition of the priestly ideal of varna was not 
bloodless; several cases of resistance occurred. To settle the disputes, a new, revised version of the three 
upper classes, the triwangsa, was constructed from1910 onwards.  
Basically, it was the contemporary old elite who gained enormous influence in political, spiritual, and economic 
affairs. In consequence, the Dutch administration concerns paired with the old elites’ willingness to reorganize 
society according to their ideal image ascertained genealogical lineage on Bali. This in turn created a struggle 
for status as people jockeyed to be classified as the highest class. This struggle sometimes converted into a 
physical one, because the issue of class created an alliance between Dutch colonial interests and the ruling 
group  of  Balinese,  an  alliance  which  was  challenged  by  educated  commoners  (new-jero),  who  saw  their 
education as being at least as important as the old status titles, which they now saw as feudal (old-jero). Here 
the importance ascribed to education by the reform organizations is intimately linked with the opportunity of 
vertical mobility through education. (Vickers 1989: 146 – 148; Parker 2003) 
Starting with the colonial subjugation of Bali from 1846 to 1908 onwards, the Balinese ruling elite and the 
colonizers alike “attempted to give the local orthopraxis a common name, while arguing about how it should be 
named”.
230 (Picard 2004; see Bakker 1993 and Picard 2004, 2011 on the naming) There was a heated debate 
between  Balinese  ruling  elites  and  colonial  administrators  arguing  in  favor  of  or  opposing  Christian 
proselytizing in Bali. F.D.K. Bosch and Dr. R. Goris
231 argued Balinese society had already been hit by various 
Western influences such as government, education, and tourism, out of this reasoning they opposed Christian 
missionary work.  
                                                 
229 This chapter draws heavily on interpretation and findings by Vickers (1989) and places weight on his judgment. Vickers consistently uses 
the term caste of which I do not approve as elaborated in a section of this thesis. Therefore I employ the term class and lineage. 
230 On the process of naming see Bakker 1993 and Picard 2004. This study does not elaborate further on the naming.   
231 F.D.K. Bosch was head of the Archeology Department in Batavia and Dr. R. Goris specialist of Old Javanese and Balinese language.  PART C | 141 
In their view, religion and social order form an inseparable whole in Bali and missionary work would bring 
about the collapse of the entire culture. To prevent the march in of Christianity, the religion of Bali should be 
considered a legitimate part of the world religion Hinduism. (Picard, 2004: 58-59)  
In 1927, Rabindranath Tagore spent two weeks in Bali. Tagore wanted with his visit to restore the contacts 
between India and other populations influenced by the religious lore of India. He thought, if some of those 
people would stay at his Santiniketan ashram in Bengal, he would make an important contribution (Bakker 
1993:  36)  Several  Balinese  influential  in  the  process  of  reinvention,  rationalization  and  systematization  of 
Balinese religion, among them Ida Bagus Mantra, later governor of Bali, studied there for some time after 1949. 
Following his visit to Bali, Tagore declared that the Balinese were real Hindus, “but that while the Indians had 
worked out the old Hindu belief philosophically and metaphysically, the Balinese had opted for an aesthetic 
elaboration of their religion.” (Bakker 1993: 36) 
The Dutch colonizers and the Europeans visiting Bali were acquainted with classical Hinduism and they wore 
‘Hindu spectacles
232’ and albeit vast differences in practices and beliefs, the Western imagination was that of 
Bali as a ‘living museum’ of Hindu-Javanese civilization, the one and only surviving heir to the Hindu heritage 
swept away from Java by the coming of Islam. (Picard 2004: 58; Schulte Nordholt 1986) In this context, Picard 
(2004: 58) remarks sophisticatedly that the story of the Western vision of Bali as a Hindu island in a sea of Islam 
remains to be written. But even the Indians who visited Bali came to this insight. In consequence, this view had 
been partially adopted by the Balinese ruling elite (old jero) as early as 1910 (Picard 2004: 58) and also by the 
new Balinese educated elite (new jero) in the 1920s and 1930s (cf. Bakker 1993) By classifying Bali as Hindu, the 
imperative  was  to  protect  the  local  religious  practices  from  Christian  proselytizing  attempts  (Picard  2004, 
Covarrubias 1965/1937), and in the 1950s from Islamic dakwah.  
Because Bali underwent a different process of colonization as other parts of the Archipelago, it also underwent 
a different implementation process of secular education devices. Schools were established by interests of three 
agents:  
1.)  Dutch imperatives to train a local bureaucracy or to train an educated technical labor force;  
2.)  Sponsorship of local ruling elites (old-jero), largely aiming to perpetuate their status quo with modern 
means of patronage  
3.)  Efforts of local reformist organizations. 
 
Requirements related to modern administration were instrumental in the emergence of the Balinese educated 
elite, since the colonial state needed bilingual educated locals to mediate between the population and their 
European overlords. In 1875, the first village school had been opened by the Dutch in their capital Singaraja. 
(Agung/Musta, 1991-1992: 12) It was the sole school until the conquest of South and East Bali in 1908. Until 
1914 there were only 13 of those village schools established, and more village schools were opened across Bali 
eventually  after  1914,  while  the  Dutch-Native  School  (Hollandsch  Inlandsche  School,  HIS)  and  the  Dutch-
Chinese School (Hollandsch-Chineesche-School) were established for the Dutch, Eurasians, local nobility, and 
Chinese  communities  in  Singaraja.  (Parker  2000)  In  1918  two  other  HIS  were  opened  in  Denpasar  and 
Klungkung, the pupils were trained in reading, writing, calculating, Dutch, and Malaysian language. All these 
schools  were  using  Dutch  architecture  and  Dutch  as  language  of  instruction,  thereby  infringing  Balinese 
standards of architectural and etiquette. (Covarrubias 1965/1937; Parker 2000)  
The new ideology that education was seen as attribute of a civilized person increasingly gained foot in Bali and 
the East Indies from 1910 to 1945. In the arena of education, the local desire  for literacy, numeracy, and 
modernity  overlapped  with  the  local  jero’s  understanding  of  their  responsibility  to  modernize,  to  urge 
patronage  and  to  upkeep  personal  relations,  and  social  networks,  and  thereby  their  traditional  social 
domination. Balinese royalty and other classes came to understand mass schooling as the means to acquire 
modern  competencies  and  skills  for  a  future  post-agricultural  economy.  (Parker  2004:  265)  Founded  by 
Balinese old and new elites, private and community based schools were taking more than half of all pupils in 
Bali  in  1920.  (Parker  2004:  211)  In  consequence,  private  patronage  by  the  royalty  rather  than  colonial 
sponsorship of mass schooling was frequent in the colonial era.  
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Since there were obviously not enough schools to educate the young generation in Bali, a very small number of 
privileged Balinese had attended school in Java and Sulawesi in the 1910s and 1920s, mostly the teacher 
training  school  (kweekschool).  (Intervie  Cok  Sudharta  2008)  Those  schools  were  located  in  Banyuwangi, 
Probolinggo, Surabaya, Malang, Yogyakarta, and Batavia (Jakarta)
233. (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 52, author’s 
translation) As a result, Balinese graduates had gained a new understanding of progress, and the emergent 
Western educated elite in Singaraja and Denpasar were inspired by that understanding and believed in the 
utility of the intellectual Western school system. (Interview Gede Sura 2007; Cok Sudharta 2008; Parker 2004) 
Those graduates harbored “a strong will to develop Balinese society through education and religion and to 
change customs and traditions that did not conform to the spirit of age”. (Agung 1986: 3 in Parker 2003: 210)  
The graduates from Java were employed as teachers or civil servants first in Singaraja and later in Denpasar and 
many of them started to found the first modern organizations aiming to bring education to the still backward 
Balinese society. (cf. Bakker 1993) It is my assumption that this started a process still ongoing today which 
established the educated middle-class (new jero) as the major agent in the institutionalization and organization 
of Hindu religious education. In consequence, the introduction of modern mass schooling was simultaneously 
revolutionary and conservative, since it aimed to modernize the impoverished and backward population and to 
conserve the position of traditional authority and power of the elite at the same time. (Parker 2003: 210) But 
this process radically changes the relationships that had prevailed between the commoners and the nobility 
(Picard 2004: 59; cf. Bakker 1993, Parker 2000, 2004) 
In consequence, a number of non-profit organizations concerned with educational and religious issues made 
their appearance in Bali. The joint objective of all these associations was to raise the standard and quality of life 
in the Balinese society in enlisted areas: social life, economy, politics, culture, and education. The main aim was 
to evenly distribute and provide access to education in Bali.  Influential organizations were:  Setiti Bali
234 in 
Singaraja,  Suita  Gama  Tirtha  (1921)  in  Singaraja,  Shanti  (1925)
235  in Singaraja,  Satya  Samudya  Bau  Danda 
(1925)
236 in Bali and Lombok, Bali Adnyana (1925), Surya Kanta (1925), Catur Wangsa Gama Gndu Bali (1926), 
and Bali Dharma Laksana (1926). In 1939 the Tri Murti association was founded, which then evolved into the 
Hinduism Council (Majelis Hinduisme). Afterwards the Wiwada Shastra Sabha and the Pandita club appeared in 
1949 and in 1952 Panti Agama Hindu was founded. (Bakker 1993: 32-45; Parker 2000; Sudharta 2006; Arsada 
2006: 52;) 
Therefore, two factors motivated Balinese reformers to adopt a secular school system that communicated 
regionally specific knowledge, because local practices and elements were part of the curricula. First, secular 
schooling provided the opportunity to vertical mobility as Western thought and culture were part of curricular 
contents  necessary  to  obtain  an  office  in  colonial  administration.  Second,  as  Catholic  and  Protestant 
proselytizing  efforts  caused  irritation  in  society,  local  elements  in  the  curricular  content  should  help  to 
counteract those efforts by strengthening local identity. (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 54, author’s translation) In 
addition, in a reactive move in the 1920s, the official Dutch policy of Baliseering(Balinization policy; cf. Parker 
2000: 56-57) tried to  mandate the use of traditional Balinese dress, traditional architecture, and Balinese 
language  in  schools  and  society,  to  counteract  nationalist  interests,  as  Malay  had  become  the  vehicle  of 
communication  of  the  much  feared  nationalist  movement  in  Java.  (Interview  Ida  Bagus  Dosther  2007)  In 
addition to local interests, the Dutch pedagogue and teacher at HIS Klungkung, H. te Flierhaar, introduced 
Balinese local art, writing, and chanting into the secular class. These local contents were taught by Balinese 
‘adat  gurus’  -  traditional  artists.  In  1939,  the  policy  of  Baliseering  in  the  arena  of  education  aimed  to 
(Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 54, author’s translation; Parker 2000):  
1.)  Increase the number of school buildings that apply the local style and pattern of architecture 
2.)  Return to traditional style/methods of painting and drawing 
3.)  Return to traditional style/methods of chanting  
4.)  Collect traditional reading material to publish new books 
5.)  Impart Balinese dance into sports 
   
                                                 
233 In 1927 the distribution of Balinese at schools located outside Bali was as follows: MULO 35 students, AMS 1 student, kweekschool 9 
students, Ambaachtschool 8 students, NIAS 1 student, OSVIA 4 students, HKS 1 student and in OSVIA Makassar 10 students. 
234 Founded in 1917, the organization aimed to further the state of the Balinese society in the arena of education, religion and  adat, and 
economy. The organization was disbanded in 1920.  
235 The Shanti group even opened a school for women to train mothers in reading and writing. 
236 Founded in Karangasem in 1925, this group was active in the field of study -fonds. The group had the function to safe money, to 
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In the 1930s these educated Balinese aimed to advance the Balinese society in the educational sector, by 
providing a study-fund and in preparing national independence. Since the situation of education in Bali was 
perceived to be backward compared to the one in Java, the Balinese educated elite made various efforts to 
improve the educational sector in the 1930s up to the 1950s: Journals were published (Bali Adnyana and 
Suryakanta), study clubs and frequent assemblies were held to discuss the future of the Balinese kingdoms and 
the national revolution. (Parker 2000) On the initiative of I Nyoman Pegeg, the Taman Siswa School opened in 
Denpasar in 1933, the Jembrana branch opened in 1936 and the  Taman Siswa School in Karangasem was 
founded in 1939. (cf. Parker: 55-56) There were several other private schools that were established in the 
1930s, amongst them was the Putri Bali Sadar group (Aware Balinese daughters) founded in Denpasar in 1936. 
(Agung/Musta, 1991-1992: 57, author’s translation; Parker 2000: 52-56) The aim of the group was to increase 
the literacy and numeracy of Balinese girls and women by opening morning and afternoon courses, providing a 
study-fund and “creating harmony between Balinese daughters in promoting a basic Balinese civilization which 
conforms to the changing spirit of age”. (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 58, author’s translation)  
Historical animosities between the Javanese Islamic Sultanates and the Hindu kingdoms of Bali are responsible 
for the distrust of Balinese elites towards Muslim Java. This historical distrust most likely led to the protracted 
traditional Balinese elites’ support of Dutch colonizers until 1949. But it is noteworthy, that the modern elites 
not only attended school in Java, but from the beginning they also participated in nationalist organizations in 
Java in the first half of the 20
th century – despite their traditional disaffirmation of Muslim Java. Some Balinese 
had participated in the second Congress of the Java Jong (Java Youth) group in Yogyakarta in 1919. (Interview 
Ida Bagus Dosther 2007) It is my hypothesis that as in the 17
th century (see previous sections), the retrospective 
view on a common historical past as represented in Majapahit helped to bridge conflicts in domination and 
religion in order to cooperate against Dutch colonial intrusion.  
The large numbers of nationalists and the anti-colonial political engagement of the young Balinese nobility 
alarmed the Dutch, they did not only establish the Baliseering policy (Balinization policy; cf. Parker 2000: 56-
57), but they restricted the freedom of the Balinese to attend school in Java. Then Balinese attended school in 
Makassar, Sulawesi. (Parker 2000: 52) One of the graduates from Makassar, who then went to study in India 
was Ida Bagus Mantra (1928-1995), later Indonesian ambassador to India, member of the national parliament 
and  governor  of  Bali  from  1978-1988.  (Interview  Cok  Sudharta  2008)  As  Balinese  were  engaged  in  the 
independence movement forming a tight anti-colonial opposition, parts of the Balinese citizenry were involved 
in  the  process  of  producing  and  designing  the  newly  gained  independence  through  several  organizations 
(mainly  reform  religious),  and  they  participated  in  shaping  the  structure  of  independence  with  great 
enthusiasm.  
During  the  Japanese  occupation  (1942-1945),  there  was  no  change  in  the  educational  sector.  The  only 
difference in the shift from Dutch to the Japanese colony was that all schools were made state schools, and the 
order was given to burn all Dutch textbooks. Preceding the proclamation of Independence, there were 245 
schools at the primary level in Bali.  
5.2.3.  Third  Consolidation:  From  Feudalism  to  the  Pancasila  state  and  modern 
education 
From 1908 to 2008 in the passage of a century only the traditional agrarian community transformed itself into 
a  knowledge-based  stratified  society.  The  ancient  traditional  order  of  the  social  system  had  twice  been 
secularized, and the erosion of the vertical as horizontal hierarchical stratification of the social and religious-
cultural groups is imminent. Therefore, the spiritual revitalization movement (Ajeg Bali) set out by Balinese 
urban intellectuals’ attempts to work out strategies to develop Bali into an open fortress
237. The awareness of 
being Hindu amongst the Balinese society arose out of political and conceptual concerns and due to a limited 
dialectical exchange with Indian scholars. The name Agama Hindu Bali gained ground as the Balinese religious 
community  moved  from  an  ethnic  community  towards  a  universal  community  exposed  to  international 
political,  social,  and  economic  influences.  In  Bali  the  advent  of  modernization,  the  establishment  of  an 
educational system and Hindu identity are closely linked.  
This following illustration shows my process model of social and cultural change in Bali.  
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The  institutions  of  modernity  –  mass  education,  taxation  systems  based  on  control  of  land  not  labor, 
impersonalized, individual-based democratic forms of government, public-health systems had been introduced 
by the Dutch colonial regime and Indonesianized after Independence. (Parker 2004: 267; Wertheim 1959) 
Following Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Dutch promptly landed heavily armed troops to reinstate their pre-war colonial administration (Netherlands 
Indies Civil Administration, NICA) in key centers in Indonesia, including Bali.  
The challenge to class or traditional social hierarchy arose under the  Dutch, but emerged again after the 
proclamation of Independence. In Bali some members of the traditional elite welcomed and supported the 
Dutch as protectors of what they saw as hegemonic moves on the part of Muslim Java. One reason for that 
sympathy can be identified as in protecting their own physical and psychical safety as well the one of their 
subjects from Islamic proselytizing and domination efforts. Actually, the Balinese kings were in favor of the 
Republic of Indonesia, but due to resentments against the strong Javanese Muslim-dominated tones in Java, 
the republican sentiment was not as strong amongst the feudal Hindu elite, as it has been in Java and Sumatra.  
Since the inauguration of the royal houses by the Dutch in 1938, those traditional elites displayed some loyalty 
with the Dutch. Since centuries, the Muslim sultanates of Java had been the enemies of the Balinese kings, who 
regarded themselves as the “descendants and heirs of Majapahit” and the Balinese were highly suspicious 
about what they saw as Javanese-Muslim efforts to gain control over the archipelago. (Ramstedt 2004: 7, 
emphasis in original) This mutual suspicion is still reflected on side of the capital and some Muslims which fear 
mass conversion to Hinduism in East and Central-Java that would shift entirely the proportional distribution of 
faith-based  communities  or  religious  demography  in  Indonesia.  (cf.  Geertz  1973)  Notwithstanding,  several 
Balinese participated in those Youth Congresses which paved the way for the Youth Oath in 1928. Most of the 
Balinese seem to have  supported decolonization in favor of national independence.  The famous last anti-
colonial partisan, Colonel I Gusti Ngurah Rai and his freedom army of co-partisans died after a fierce fight for 
independence in the Puputan of Margarana in November 1946. 
Between December 7 and December 24 1946 in Denpasar a conference was held at which it was decided to 
establish  a  federal  republic  of  East-Indonesia  (Negara  Indonesia  Timoer).  (Bakker  1993:  47)  The  Balinese 
Cokorda Gede Raka Sukawati was appointed federal president and the king of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung, 
was its prime minister. (Bakker 1993: 47) 
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NIT encompassed most of eastern Indonesia, and Bali was incorporated into the administrative Lesser Sunda 
Islandsprovince (Sunda Kecil) with the capital in Singaraja. Bali was to be administered by a Dutch resident in 
cooperation  with  the  Dewan  Radja-Radja  Bali  (Council  of  Balinese  Kings),  previously  known  as  Paroeman 
Agung. During this period the religion of Bali had obtained full recognition and the Dewan Radja-Radja Bali was 
expected  to  take  responsibility  for  its  development.  (Bakker  1993:  47)  One  of  its  first  initiatives  was  the 
establishment of a Paruman Para Pinandita (Council of Priests) in Singaraja on February 2 1947. Its task was to 
organize the education of priests and Hindu teachers, to compose a holy book (which never materialized – only 
in 1963 the Upadeca was written on own efforts of the Balinese), and to establish councils of priests in the 
various principalities. (Bakker 1993: 47; 226) The Dutch returned to their prewar policy of Baliseering that is to 
reinvigorate Balinese culture, arts and religion in education, while strengthening the political authority of the 
loyal Balinese aristocracy.  
Year  Amount  of 
death 
fighters 
Schools 
built 
  From  August  1945  to  December  1946  the  educational 
situation in Bali was problematic. Agung/Musta (1991-1992: 
77) link the stagnating expansion of the school system to 
combats between Balinese anti-colonial guerilla and Dutch 
forces, as demonstrated in the following table. The bigger 
the  losses  of  the  Balinese,  less  schools  were  built.  One 
reason  the  authors  adduce  why  so  many  teachers  and 
nurses where involved in the anti-colonial war is that if they 
were seen to carry letters or big amounts of sheets, this 
seemed  to  be  less  suspicious  to  Dutch  intelligence  and 
administration. 
 
1945  30  19   
1946  802  5   
1947  383  8   
1948  135  7   
1949  20  22   
1950  2  29   
Another problematic issue has been that the founders of schools and teachers, who had disseminated anti-
colonial propaganda, were persecuted by the Dutch colonial apparatus. Eventually, the traditional kings and 
the  new  elite  eventually  supported  the  republican  and  not  the  colonial  cause.  “After  the  Dutch  had 
reconquered  Bali  peace  never  returned  to  the  island.”  (Bakker  1993:  47)  Dutch  soldiers  were  combing 
ruthlessly the island for independence fighters and pro-nationalists to put them to death
238. Hence, a historical 
reason for the strong commitment to nationalism among the modern elite is that Bali was made part of the 
Negara Indonesia Timur. (cf. Bakker 1993: 95, 96) In the anti-colonial upsurge from 1946 to 1949, the Balinese 
strived for independence from Dutch administration of which mostly the Dutch inaugurated elites profited. 
Enthusiastically  Ida  Bagus  Dosther  (Interview  2007)  remembers  “during  the  anti-colonial  war,  all  class 
differences and power struggles between the triwangsa and the jaba clans faded and they united their forces 
against the Dutch!”  
After  the  contracts  of  the  Dutch-Indonesian  roundtable  in  The  Hague  in  December  1949,  the  Dutch 
government unwillingly transferred the sovereignty over the Dutch East Indies to the federation of the Republic 
of the United States of Indonesia  (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS). In August,  1950 the sovereign Unitary 
Republic of Indonesia was established and the Balinese were incorporated into Indonesian Nation State. In 
1950, the Dewan Radja-Radja was disbanded and Anak Agung Bagus Suteja became governor of Bali. Gusti 
Bagus Oka was appointed vice-governor of the province of Sunda Kecil. The Paruman Para Pinandita continued 
its existence until 1959, when it was dissolved into the Hindu Council. (Bakker 1993: 47) The various forces 
which had emerged in Balinese society clashed over the direction Balinese identity, culture and religion should 
take. (Vickers 1989: 147) In 1958, Bali was made a province and the capital moved from Singaraja to Denpasar 
in 1960. 
From 1945 to 1950, among the subjects taught in the Balinese village schools or people’s schools was the 
Taman  Siswa  concept  of  moral  and  character  building  (budhi  pekerti).  But  there  was  not  any  systematic 
approach of Hindu instruction. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006, 2008) In the 1940s, handpicked Balinese obtained 
grants to study in India, among them were the “fantastic three”: Ida Bagus Mantra, Oka Puniatmaja, and Cok 
Rai Sudharta. (Interview Cok Rai Sudharta 2008)  
                                                 
238 Personal communication with PHDI representative at PHDI’s yearly meeting 8.11.2007, I Nyoman Mayor. I asked the wherefores of his 
naming and he told me that after losing his father in the battle, he and his siblings had been hidden away from these units down in a ravine 
in a river. But because he was crying the major found them and returned them to a village. That’s why he is named mayor. The story gave a 
elucidating picture of the circumstances leading to the national incorporation of Bali and answered my question why Balinese (new) elites 
are that nationalist, which mere protection could not explain, because they could argue for secession. The deeper reason might be that 
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Besides short-term visits of a few Indian scholars, one Indian intellectual, Prof Dr Narendra Dev Pandit Shastri 
settled permanently in Bali from 1948 onwards probably to do Hindu missionary work for the Arya Samaj 
(Interview I Gede Sura 2006, 2008; cf. Ramstedt 2004; Bakker 1993). He was the first and singular Indian 
cultural engineer in  Bali  who received financial support from the Indian government in order to build up 
Hinduism in Bali. He was the first to introduce Hinduism in a structured that is systematized and standardized 
way to the Balinese community. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) For that reason, he brought a lot of books on 
teaching Sanskrit with him from India. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) 
Admittedly,  Balinese  read  lontar  before  he  arrived,  but  all  these  scriptures  were  not  yet  systematized. 
Influenced  by  Pandit  Shastri’s  amongst  other  things,  Balinese  reformers  decided  to  found  the  Dwijendra 
foundation in Denpasar, and Pandit Shastri was actively involved in teaching at the Dwijendra foundation and 
the Saraswati School. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) Before Pandit Shastri arrived in Bali, Dr. Goris and other 
Dutch scholars taught Dutch and German language to Balinese ruling or educated elites, but they did not teach 
the peasants. He taught the community in school speaking Sanskrit and Old Javanese and reading Dewanagari 
script as well as Old Javanese for the first time, for the simple reason that these languages are the source of 
Indonesian Hindu religious scriptures and teaching. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) Pandit Shastri introduced 
facing east while praying and he was the first to teach school children how to pray the Tri Sandhya. After his 
pioneer work the idea was born to establish a school to train teachers in Hindu religion with standardized, 
regulated and systematized teaching methods. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006)In the early 1950s, the political and 
religious situation contained several challenges to the Balinese (Yayasan 2003: 53):  
1.)  The society’s knowledge of Hindu religion was severely limited, as became obvious during rituals and 
religious holidays 
2.)  From village to village, style and performances of rituals in Balinese Hindu communities were at variance 
with each other.  
3.)  Terminology and the name of the adhered to religion was at variance (Agama Bali, Agama Shiva, Agama 
Tirtha; Agama Hindu Bali and so forth) 
4.)  Since Balinese religion was not yet officially recognized, it played no role in the life of state, nation, and 
society and it was therefore not regulated and protected. 
5.)  In its function as state philosophy, Pancasila guaranteed every community the freedom to fully embrace 
their  practiced  religion,  thus  each  agama  community  (umat  beragama)  or  religious  current  (aliran 
keagamaan) enjoys freedom to be practiced and its adherents to give explanations to the community and 
to adherents to other religions.  
 
Balinese reformers realized two challenges during the Sukarno regime, one challenge from outside Bali, which 
was related to the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia with the Ministry of Religion as main institution to 
administer religious affairs, and the other related directly with the social condition in Bali itself. (Yayasan 2003: 
53) The first challenge faced was that each agama or kepercayaan was forced to unite under an organizing 
institution in order to facilitate internal communication and the exchange of information. Likewise, it had to 
establish and maintain communication and interaction pertaining to religion and belief with the republican 
government.  The  second  challenge  denoted  the  pressure  from  within  Bali,  as  the  Balinese  spiritual 
organizations felt the necessity to provide the community with an overarching organization to develop the 
educational and cultural sector. (Yayasan 2003: 28) This meant practically, that the kings as patrons of Balinese 
rituals and social order were forced to organize communication with the Muslim republican government in 
Jakarta. In 1958, the self-government of the feudal kingdoms (swapraja) was abolished. In consequence, their 
role in ritual was diminished as their authority was transferred to the regional government. As a result, there 
was no spiritual institution any more to safeguard ritual and to protect and represent the Balinese community. 
Basically, this fact has been perceived as a threat to the continuation and reproduction of Hindu Dharma, and 
the Hindu Council has been founded in 1959. (Interview Ida Bagus Dosther 2007, Cok Sudharta 2008) 
Oversimplified,  Guided  Democracy  (1959-1965)  triggered  political  polarization  between  feudalism  and 
communism leading to radical politization and mobilization of the peasantry and women in Bali. The nation 
state attempted to redistribute resources via egalitarian new laws supported by the socialists and communists 
and opposed by the feudal elites. The feudal rulers, allies of the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and its mass 
organizations PETANI (Persatuan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian farmers’ union) and Tani Marhaen opposed the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its mass organizations BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers’ 
Front),  Pemuda  Rakyat  (The  People’s  Youth)  and  GERWANI  (Gerakan  Wanita  Indonesia,  the  Women’s 
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Political polarization over land issues and traditional social order carried increasingly class messages colored 
with  morality.  For  example,  the  PKI’s  general  anti-feudal-privileges-attitude  and  anti-triwangsa  incitement 
mobilized the uneducated peasantry to organize in its mass organizations, and inflamed a sense of injustice and 
grievance.  The  traditional  political  and  clerical  Balinese  elites  perceived  Communism  and  its  political 
orientation and opposition to religion as a tremendous threat to Balinese religion, culture, and social order. 
Many Balinese, especially women, however, took enthusiastically part in the Communism movement. (Parker 
2004;  Robinson  1995)  Throughout  1964  and  1965  there  are  newspaper  reports  of  disputes  over  land 
distribution and sharecropping arrangements involving PKI and PNI members. (Parker 2004; Robinson 1995) In 
this context, the polarization between different groups in Balinese society took the form of a political struggle 
between Right and Left, “a fight in which the Left lost in the bloodiest of ways”. (Vickers: 1989, 147)  
The  gendered  aspect  of  the  massacres,  sophisticatedly  elaborated  by  Parker  (2004:76-77),  supports  the 
argument that the status-quo had to be preserved in 1965. As in fact since the proclamation of independence 
men  and  women  were  given  equal  status,  many  women  were  organizing  themselves  in  the  Communist 
Indonesian Women Movement (GERWANI, Gerakan Wanita Indonesia). In Bali, women are responsible for the 
ritual offerings, for rough labor, and bringing up the children. The GERWANI women put a real threat to the 
feudal gender model of patrilineal kinship displaying traditional male supremacy in “virilocal residence pattern 
and patrilineal inheritance of land” and women’s usage as complimentary labor force, objects of sexual desires, 
modus of forging alliances, and mode of payment. (Parker 2004:76-77) Of course such a deviation from the 
social order could impossibly be tolerated. During the massacres many women were cruelly slaughtered, as the 
prominent place of women in the dead lists shows. In the aftermath, these women have been described as 
having “behaved like men”. (Parker 2004:76-77) Parker states, “with the massacres men won the case”. The 
visible and obvious concern of women today with “bread and butter issues
”, ,their extraordinarily apolitical 
conduct, and their husbands’ “different interest in patrilineal family, political loyalty and status maintenance 
(and  perhaps  long-term  security)”  is  striking.  (Parker  2004:  72;  cf.  Robinson  1995:  266-270)  The  resulting 
apolitization of women, their political silence, and the abuse of female labor force reconfirmed the feudal role 
model, left power and wealth in male control thereby securing their patriarchal status-quo 
Due to the importance of the massacres in 1965 and 1966 for the construction of a peaceful Hindu Balinese 
identity in contrast to the historical reality of wild savages, the events leading to the rise of the New Order will 
be discussed here in relation to Hindu identity construction and the religious class. The massacre was amongst 
the  worst  slaughter  in  the  twentieth  century,  the  total  number  killed  is  unknown,  estimates  range  from 
100,000 to one million victims in Indonesia. (Parker 2004: 75) Mass violence in Bali was largely preceded by 
violence in Java, as people “tried to sense where events in Jakarta were leading the country”. (Parker 2004: 75 
citing Cribb 1990 : 241; Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2007) Following the events on 30 September 1965, the 
Balinese elite and the population were alarmed and in a state of paralyzation because the traumatic events 
from 1942 to 1949 were still in the collective memory. Even more as Jakarta is far away, and Balinese governor 
Sutedja  were  reported  missing  in  Jakarta.  (Ida  Pedanda  Bajing,  protocol  2007)  The  massacre  in  Bali  was 
committed by external and internal perpetrators in about only two month from December 1965 until January 
1966. Besides violence against members of the PKI, which broke out in Bali, it was particularly NU’s youth 
organization Ansor that gained notoriety for its participation in the massive killings of Communists. (Ramstedt 
2004: 15) The Army, especially the RPKAD units (Army Para Commando Regiments), vigilante Islamic youth-
groups (Ansor) coming from Java and from Jembrana, local gangs (tameng) and PNI youth groups set out to 
extinguish whole neighborhoods of PKI members or sympathizers, killing an estimated 80,000-100,000 people 
in Bali. (Parker 2004: 75; Vickers 1989: 172)  
The present study holds that the massacres were not an expression of Balinese culture reasserting its centuries’ 
old traditions of religion, harmony, order, and social equilibrium, which was a colonial and elitist construction 
and actually never has existed. They were also unconnected to cultural traditions as that of puputan and of the 
renowned  ferocity  of  Balinese  front-line  troops  in  the  past,  because  they  occurred  in  a  perfectly  distinct 
context. I endorse the view of Robinson (1995) in arguing that the massacres of 1965 were caused by rational 
human agency.  
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Military,  party,  and  religious  authorities  in  Bali  actively  shaped  and  encouraged  a  popular 
discourse of violent anticommunism based on existing religious ideas and cultural analogies. The 
fact that massive violence could somehow be justified or plausibly portrayed in terms of Balinese 
religious beliefs or cultural analogues undoubtedly contributed to the dynamics of the killings. 
But this should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the victimization and the physical 
annihilation of the PKI were not simply or even primarily the consequences of a spontaneous or 
natural religious impulse, but the products of political and historical processes in which human 
agency played a central part. (Robinson 1995: 279) 
It is my hypothesis following the two hours interview with Ida Pedanda Bajing that the massacres were not 
incited by the high clerical or royal class, but more by certain agents, who aspired to increase their social 
position and expand their influence, dominance, and wealth
239. Those agents effectively wrote and distributed 
death lists to extinguish their rivals out of personal, not religious motivation. Throughout the changing political 
regimes, the survival of the status quo of the Balinese social order was maintained, but concessions were 
successively made towards a more egalitarian organization. As example may be adduced tha t local jero were 
not involved in Banjar activities prior to 1965, yet, since then they take part in all Banjar assemblies.  
As  proposed  by  Lyn  Parker,  the  massacre  in  Bali  should  be  seen  in  two  contexts.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
preceding  years  of  radical  politization  and  popular  mobilization  under  Sukarno  were  coupled  with  rising 
expectations among the landless and poor that the land reform would redress the economic inequalities and 
exploitation of the class system. (Parker 2004: 67) On the other hand it can be understood as reaction to the 
agonizing  dual  shift  from  feudalism  to  capitalism  incorporation  into  the  nation  state.  The  murders  were 
motivated by revenge on the PKI attacks on traditional power, outrage about the attempt to dismantle social 
hierarchy, and to settle wrongs perceived right. (Parker 2004: 67) On side of the PKI, the effort to disparage the 
image  of  the  conservative  local  status-pro  elite  resulted  in  the  accusation  they  would  try  to  hinder  the 
implementation of the land-reform to protect feudal traditions. In turn, this triggered the defensive stance of 
the local status-pro elites and their PNI supporters, who denied the grasping claims of ‘wong cilik yang ambisi’ 
(ambitious little people) and implied that the PKI was anti-Hindu, anti-dharma (social order) and therefore 
destructive of the cosmic order. (Parker 2004: 74; Robinson 1995: 270) In consequence, the heated discourse 
was on archaic rights to land and opposition to feudal privileges. According to Parker, the exponents of the 
traditional social order became “emotional” (Parker 2004: 78) and as answer to the insubjugation of their 
opponents  simply  eradicated  them.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  massacres  were  the  violent  aspect  of  the 
transformation or incorporation from feudal Bali into the nation state.  
Today, the justification of the 1965 massacres sounds that these crimes were not committed out of mere 
emotion, but that it was ‘Balinese-ness’ that had to be defended against social rupture and division, improper 
conflicts within society and the abandonment of religious devotion. (Parker 2004: 81-82) The PKI did not object 
Hinduism or religion per se but the established hierarchical social order, which legitimized the injustice of 
unequal access to wealth, power, and knowledge. In turn, opposition to traditionally vested power and wealth 
were seen as insubordination not as sacrilege. The massacres were seen as pollution of Balinese soil, but the 
pollution was due to the occurrence of murder and the shedding of blood, not to the PKI affiliation of the 
victims.  The  after-the-fact-rationalizations  and  psychological  self-justification  by  the  guilty  pay  tribute  to 
religiosity, purity and cleanliness, to the rightness of the stratified society as already expressed in Vedic times, 
as well as to proper loyalties in, albeit transformed, kaula-gusti relations and of social and religious duties and 
obligations. (Parker 2004: 81-82) The rhetoric of cleansing, Parker continues, is most pertinent if examined as 
an effect rather than a motivation of the massacres. (Parker 2004: 82) 
   
                                                 
239 One of those agents was the leader of the Balinese PNI. His son declared himself to be the king of Majapahit in 2011 without having the 
legitimate ancestral lineage. This Napoleonic self inauguration incited protest from all palaces in Bali which held an assembly and do not 
accept this inauguration. The Hindu Council likewise does not support this action. As he has royal status now, he has been invited by the 
king  of  Thailand,  and  probably  will  participate  in  the  next  royal  marriage  in  Europe.  In  the  next  step,  he  legitimated  Sukmawati 
Sukarnoputri as queen of Majapahit after an mystical incident in the palace of Tampaksiring. Sukamawati has been given the Majapahit 
stick of a General to rule over the Majapahit kingdom. This provoked hysterical laughter from some of my Balinese colleagues who suppose 
that this would be a political move to position them as future governor team or probably even targeting for presidency. This is a splendid 
example how lineages that are relocated to the lower levels of power aim by traditional and organizational means to obtain a higher status 
in society. Asked about his opinion, the priest of the UNHI temple stated (Communication 11 2011):” A king without kingdom, bondsmen, 
influence, and realm. His home is his palace, bondmen, country alone!” PART C | 149 
In conclusion, the murders in Bali occurred only two months after the generals’ assassination in Jakarta and the 
heat of the moment was past, therefore the killings in Bali were an expression of class struggle inflected with 
the  preservation  of  the  traditional  social  hierarchy.  The  idea  of  the  mass  killings  was  facilitated,  even 
normalized, by the predating violence in Java and legitimized by statements in the press and the activities of 
supra local political and military forces. (Parker 2004: 84) 
Under the New Order then, as Lyn Parker impeaches, there was no talk of punishment, crime, justice or moral 
judgments upon murderers. These crimes could not be talked about, because murder is still murder, but those 
who committed such acts have to live with themselves and with the surviving family members of their victims. 
Murderers  have  resumed  a  normal  life,  having  gone  unpunished,  and  have  been  allowed  to  avoid  public 
responsibility for their violence. (Parker 2004: 67) Only recently in 2005, Indonesians started to carry out a kind 
of Aufarbeitung.  
The apolitization of the Indonesian public during the New Order is a well documented fact. Opposition was 
anything that threatened the unity of the nation or Pancasila. (Parker 2004: 99) The Indonesian Hindu Dharma 
Council engaged in issues of proper ritual performance and acted only in the field of individual spirituality. The 
overweight importance given to harmony, tolerance and peace in the construction of the post-1966 Balinese 
identity, as a harmonic and peaceful one, has to be interpreted as aftermath of that never ‘aufgearbeitete’ 
trauma. The coronation of the Tri Hita Karana –concept has to be seen in the same light. This casts a slur on the 
recent introduction of the new tourism-branding shantishantishanti. 
5.3. Hindu Dharma Indonesia: Modern Institutions and Meta-framework 
Part D presents the historical and ethnographic description of the cases studied.  
5.3.1. Fireworshippers or ahl al-kitab? 
This chapter describes the drawn out and tedious process of institutionalization, Agama Hindu underwent, 
until it been was recognized as a state funded agama with at the central MORA. Established in 1946, the 
Ministry  of  Religious  Affairs  (MORA)  had  three  sections,  one  for  Muslims,  one  for  Catholics,  and  one  for 
Protestants, but there was no section for Hinduism. Balinese religion was thus not officially acknowledged in 
the young republic. In accordance with its definition of agama, MORA initially recognized Islam, The existence 
of Agama Hindu Bali was not automatically recognized, as it was not considered to be a book-religion. The 
administrative recognition process of Agama Hindu began in 1950 and was only completed between 1964 and 
1967. Picard (2004: 56-57) gives a moving synopsis: 
Stressing the theological importance as well as the moral implications of religion, the Balinese 
reformers  attempted  to  restrain  the  ritualistic  propensity  of  their  co-religionists,  while 
interpreting their Hindu-Javanese heritage in reference to Islamic (and Christian) doctrines and 
institutions. They enjoined the Balinese to come back into the fold of Hinduism, which they 
presented  as  the  source  of  their  rites,  by  renewing  their  contacts  with  India,  whose  freshly 
acquired independence had  increased its international prestige.  This combination of political 
lobbying and religious reformism was to prove efficient, as the Balinese religion was indeed 
eventually recognized as a legitimate branch of Hinduism.  
 
From August 1950 onwards, a number of Balinese reformist organizations put tirelessly pressure on the MORA. 
They called for the recognition of Agama Hindu Bali. Several proponents of the ruling elite and members of the 
reform  organizations  -  all  with  distinct  educational  and  social  backgrounds  -  gathered  spontaneously  and 
irregularly in Denpasar and Singaraja. During those meetings, they discussed their thoughts and ideas and 
identified strategies how to face the phenomena of ongoing political and radical social change. During this 
time, they forgot about the class conflict between triwangsa and jabawangsa (Ida Bagus Dosther Interview 
2007; Yayasan 2003, 2005). In consequence, during those meetings they developed strategies how to introduce 
good relations with the independent central government and the MORA in Jakarta, in “Muslim Java”.  
On December 28, 1950, a delegation from the Ministry of Religion officially visited the Council of the Bali-region 
Administration (Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah Bali). The delegation inquired into the state of faith affairs on 
Bali and the difficulties the Balinese congregation faced in connection with religious affairs. The delegation met 
with I Gusti Sugriwa, member of the Council.  
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Sugriwa showed the delegation that in the past the princes of Bali had been responsible for the 
rituals (…). Now that the Dewan Pemerintah Bali had assumed the position of the princes, the 
council was responsible und thus needed financial support from the central government in order 
to be able to fulfil its responsibility. Sugriwa hat three more requests: support for translating into 
Indonesian the Old Javanese literature still used on Bali: a contribution to the costs incurred by 
the  pedandas;  representation  of  the  Balinese  religion  in  the  capital  of  Indonesia,  in  every 
province  and  in  every  kabupaten
240.  Only  the  first  of  those  requests  –  a  contribution  to 
translation costs - was granted. (Bakker 1993: 226) 
 
In addition, the delegation inquired into the official name of the religion, the contents of its philosophy, its 
views  on  God,  the  style  of  worship,  the  sanctuaries,  religious  schools,  and  finally  if  there  were  a  sacred 
scriptures. I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa answered all questions exhaustibly – “but the delegation was not convinced 
that the religion of Bali deserved recognition” in the young republic. (Bakker 1993: 226; Yayasan 2003: 2005) 
“The Balinese were quick to realize that a satisfactory answer to these questions was essential.” (Bakker 1993: 
226) Soon this discussion became popular in the Balinese community and Sugriwa’s claims got strong civil 
support from Balinese Hindu organizations. 
In  the  meeting  between  Sugriwa  and  the  delegation  of  MORA,  it  became  clear  “that  there  could  be  no 
recognition of the religion of Bali without knowledge of its official name, its holy book, its festivals, and its 
philosophy”. (Bakker 1993: 227) In consequence, members of Hindu organizations met in Denpasar on June 10, 
1951. (Yayasan 2003; 2005; Bakker 1993: 226-227; Sudharta 2006) Those organizations were  Panti Agama 
Hindu Bali(represented by  Ida Pedanda Gde Ngenjung),  Majelis Hinduisme (represented by I Gusti Ngurah 
Ananda Kusuma (Sri Resi Anandakusuma) and Ida Bagus Raka), Paruman Para Pandita (represented by Ida 
Pedanda Made Kemenuh) and Wiwadha Shastra Sabha (represented by Ida Bagus Raka Keniten. After intense 
deliberations,  they  developed  a  joint  declaration.  The  joint  declaration  in  form  of  a  written  petition  was 
submitted to Minister of Religion Hasyim (Yayasan 2003; 2005), the Hindu members of the national parliament, 
and the governor of the province Sunda Kecil. (Bakker 1993: 227) The petition requested (Yayasan 2003; 2005): 
1.  Establishment of a Hindu Bali representative body and Hindu representatives in the organizational 
structure of the MORA on national, provincial, and regional level. 
2.  Setting up of a special committee,  which is paid by the central government, whose task it is to 
compile Agama Hindu Bali text books that can be used in elementary and secondary schooling  
3.  Regulation  of  a  salary  package  of  assigned  professional  high  priests  (pendeta),  lay  priests 
(pemangku), and a budget for the maintenance of temples following a previous regulation in 1948 
which applied to village heads (penghulu). 
4.  Payment  of  annual  subsidies  and  one-off  payments  to  set  up  a  fund  for  the  restoration  and 
maintenance of important temples, to develop Balinese art and the cultural field.  
 
On August 23, 1951 the Ministry denied the petition. In consequence, the Balinese reformers continued to 
exercise civil pressure on the government to recognize Agama Hindu Bali. As reaction to the denial of the 
petition,  a  strong  movement  emerged  which  sought  the  official  recognition  of  Hinduism  as  state-funded 
religion.  
 
In compliance with the H-Regulation, the MORA established branch offices throughout Indonesia with the 
target  to  disseminate  the  proper  understanding  of  agama  and  Ketuhanan  Yang  Maha  Esa  among  the 
population. Muslim dakwah and Christian missionaries were encouraged to spread modern agama throughout 
Indonesia, to convert the groups that did not have an agama yet, and to rationalize backward practices of adat. 
(Picard 2004: 56-57; Ramstedt 2004: 9) This was also the case in Bali. Therefore the Balinese were alarmed as 
they were made target of the open and hidden Muslim and Christian proselytizing efforts. During colonial 
times, the Dutch limited proselytizing on Bali, and now for the first time since Dang Hyang Dwijendra arrived in 
Bali, the doors were wide opened for proselytizing – a situation of which the Balinese community did not 
approve.  
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kabupaten, and even provinces, there is no representational body within the structure of the MORA. The Hindu Council executes the Hindu 
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Minister of Religion Decree 40 in 1952 established a Central Religion Office (kantor pusat jawatan agama) in 
Singaraja,  which  was  able  to  open  up  branches  throughout  the  Balinese  kingdoms  (that  were  to  become 
regencies  after  1958).  Its  structure  was  conformed  to  MORA,  because  it  accommodated  only  Islam, 
Catholicism, and Protestantism. Its assigned tasks were elucidation, dissemination, information in matters of 
religion and culture.  
To prevent the relentless march in of Islam and Christianity, Balinese reformed their religion in order to make it 
eligible for the status of agama. Albeit the 1945 Basic Law and the 1950 Constitution guaranteed the freedom 
of  religion  and  its  public  practice,  the  Muslim-controlled  MORA  severely  restricted  the  interpretation  of 
freedom of religion during Hasyim’s term of office. In 1952, it established a catalogue of criteria, which a 
religion had to have, in order to be recognized as agama and receive state-funding (Yayasan 2003; 2005):  
1.  a sacred book (kitab suci);  
2.  a monotheistic substructure, that is teach belief in the existence of One Supreme Lordship;  
3.  a codified law system for its followers that is exclusive boundaries;  
4.  a prophet (nabi),  
5.  international recognition,  
6.  the congregation must not be limited to a single ethnic group, that is transcends ethnic boundaries and 
not being essentially an aspect of a hereditary culture  
 
This  catalogue  of  provisions  reveals  unequivocally  that  the  Muslim-controlled  MORA  applied  a  modernist 
Islamic  understanding  and  ascribed  this  understanding  to  their  definition  of  agama.  This 
interpretationobviouslypromptedthe ministryto takeits negative attitude against Agama Hindu Bali, because 
the MORA came to the conclusion that under a thin varnish of Hindu and Buddhist concepts, Balinese religious 
life predominantly consisted of heterogeneous local animist and polytheistic practices. (Ramstedt 2004: 10)  
According to IB Dosther (Interview 2007), the major point of critique which substantiated MORA’s denial to 
recognize Agama Hindu Bali was 1.) the unclear naming of the religious practices, because the Balinese reform 
organizations could not agree on a common name (Agama Tirtha, Agama Hindu Bali, Hindu Dharma). Minor 
points of critique were 1.) the religion did not have a founder or prophet, 2.) it did not have international 
recognition, and 3.) it was not distributed in more than one ethnic group.  
Geertz (1973: 188) gives a vivid description of the problems Balinese faced while dealing with this catalogue. 
The description is quoted in full length and to some extend it is still actual despite Hinduism became a state 
funded religion in 1963.  
The  Muslims  say  that  the  adherents  of  Balinese  Hinduism  are  all  in  one  place,  unlike  the 
Christians who are scattered all over Indonesia; the Balinese point out that there are Balinese 
communities in Djakarta and elsewhere in Java, as well as in south Sumatra (transmigrants), and 
instance the recent erection of Balinese temples in east Java. The Muslims say, you have no 
Book, how can you be a world religion? The Balinese reply, we have manuscripts and inscriptions 
dating from before Mohammed. The Muslims say, you believe in many gods and worship stones; 
the Balinese say, God is One but has many names and the “stone” is the vehicle of God, not God 
himself.  A  few  of  the  more  sophisticated  Balinese  even  claim  that  the  real  reason  why  the 
Muslims are unwilling to admit them to the Ministry is the fear that if “Bali-ism” were to become 
an officially recognized religion, many Javanese,  who are Islamic in name only and still very 
Hindu-Buddhist in spirit, would convert, and “Bali-ism” would grow rapidly at the expense of 
Islam. 
On February, 14 1953, the General Secretary of the MORA held a meeting with the Council of the Government 
of the Bali-Region and the Governor of Lesser Sunda Islands Province in his official residence in Singaraja
241. To 
the annoyance of the Balinese elite,  the General Secretary of the MORA still continued the colonial legacy of 
the ‘H- regulation’.  
   
                                                 
241 From 1950 to 1958, the islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, West-Timor and Sumba formed the province Sunda Kecil (Lesser 
Sunda Islands). The capital was Singaraja in North Bali. In 1958, Bali was made a autonomous province, and in 1960 the capital moved to 
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This  regulation  governed  that  with  the  exception  of  Islam  and  Christianity,  all  belief  system  were  to  be 
classified as group H, which turned them into a battle ground for Christian proselytizing and Islamic dakwah. 
Deeply  shocked  and  frightened,  the  local  government  of  Bali  unilaterally  proclaimed  the  island  as  an 
autonomous area pertaining to affairs of religion. On March, 24 1953 the Council of the Government of the 
Bali-Region met and adopted DPRDS Decree Nr. 2/S.K./DPRDS/1953 on the Agreement to form an Autonomous 
Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region (jawatan agama otonoom daerah bali). 
In order to comply with the criteria outlined by MORA, several officials appointed to the Central Religion Office 
of the Lesser Sunda Islands Province, held a meeting with concerned officials from the Dewan Pemerintahan 
Daerah Bali and members of the religious organizations in Tampaksiring on May 25, 1953
242. “This was the first 
so-called Pesamuhan Agung, where prominent Balinese discussed accommodations to be made in rituals (…) 
and  how  they  should  one  more  apply  for  government  recognition.”  (Bakker  1993:  228)  They  reached 
agreement in subsequent crucial points (1) the proper name of the religion is Agama Hindu Bali, (2) its sacred 
scriptures are the Vedas (Shruti), the quatrology of Divine revelation (wahyu), and  Smriti (tradition) as its 
exegetical textual corpus, (3) the profession of faith, which resembles the Islamic shahada, is the compounded 
Om Tat Sat, Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman.
243“For Sugriwa the importance of the meeting lay in the fact that it 
represented the first feelings of unity among the participants.” (Bakker 1993: 228) 
The Balinese religious reform organizations agreed to turn to India and to renew their contacts with Indian 
scholars to arrive at a common redefinition of their religious philosophy and practices along the lines of the 
criteria outlined by MORA. A few Balinese were taking advantages of scholarships of the Indian government at 
R. Tagore’s Vishva Bharaty University and the Banaras Hindu University. (Sudharta Interview 2008; Bakker 
1993: 227; Ramstedt 2004: 11) The three most meritorious Balinese to study in India were Ida Bagus Mantra, 
Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmaja, and Cokorda Rai Sudharta, which I call the “fantastic three”, as their thoughts and 
decisions came to shape Indonesian Hindu Dharma until today.  
The Indian Arya Damaj missionary Pandit Shastri settled permanently in Bali and some other Indian scholars 
were placed temporarily in Bali. (Sura Interview 2006, Bakker 1993: 227) Pandit Shastri, who brought many 
books with him, wrote the book “Essence of Hindu Dharma” (Intisari Hindu Dharma), in which the complete 
philosophical framework of Hindu Dharma was outlined. (Ramstedt 2004: 11) The heavy weight put on the 
importance of the Bhagavad Gita (previously unknown to the Balinese) should be seen in connection to the 
Theosophical Society, which considers the Gita as most important book of Hinduism. (Ramstedt 2004: 11) The 
leaders of the several religious reform organizations agreed to this basic framework in 1958, among them the 
graduates from India, who compiled the Upadeca in 1963.  
A second resolution was drafted on June 14 1954
244. It called for the establishment of a Hindu-Bali unit within 
MORA on the grounds that Agama Hindu Bali was not in conflict with the first principle of the Pancasila, since 
its creed is essentially rooted in the Sanskrit mantra “Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman”. (Ramstedt 2004:11) The 
Balinese term for this “Undivided One” equivalent to the Indonesian One Supreme Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa) was to be Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa. (Ramstedt 2004: 11) Protestant missionaries used this term 
for the translations of “God” in the Bible the 1930s.  
On November, 1 1954, the Balinese regional government (DewanPemerintahan Daerah Bali) finally was able to 
implement the 1953 Decree and to establish an Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region (Kantor 
Dinas Urusan Agama Otonom) for Balinese citizens and adherents to Hinduism. Here everyone could apply for 
help concerning questions pertaining to the agama Hindu. (Bakker 1993: 228) After succeeding to establish this 
body, the Balinese Hindu community relaxed, but continuously exercised pressure on the central government 
and the MORA to provide the Hindu community with a suitable body to represent their faith in the Ministry 
(Yayasan 2003, 2005).  
 
In  order  to  realize  their  claims,  representatives  of  eight  Hindu-based  organizations  held  a  conference  in 
Denpasar on June 26, 1958. (Yayasan 2003, 2005; Bakker 1993: 229)  
   
                                                 
242 Bakker (1993: 228) mentions Denpasar. 
243 “Om, thus is the essence of the undivided One”. The Balinese formula would be Sangkan Paraning Sarat. (Upadeca 1967: 15; Ramstedt 
2004:11; Sudharta 2006: 26) 
244 Bakker (1993: 229) dates this resolution on June 26 1958. Probably, the resolution has been drafted in 1954 and renewed in 1958, prior 
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These  organizations  were  Panti  Agama  Hindu  Bali  (represented  by  I  Ketut  Kandia),  Majelis  Hinduisme 
(represented by Ida Bagus Tugur), Paruman Para Pandita (represented by Ida Pedanda Made Kemenuh), Satya 
Hindu Dharma (I Gusti Ananda Kusuma), Yayasan Dwijendra (Ida Bagus Wayan Gede), Partai Nasional Agama 
Hindu Bali (Ida I Dewa Agung Oka Geg),  Angkatan Muda Hindu Bali (Ida Bagus Dosther) andEka Adnyana 
Dharma Sempidi (Ida Bagus Gede Manuaba). During the conference, they consented to adopt a resolution. It 
stated that: 
 
  the Balinese will exercise constant pressure on the government to establish an  Agama Hindu Bali 
section at MORA, which enjoys the same organizational level as all other religions  
  the Balinese call for the amendment of Minister of Religion DecreeNr 9 in 1952 (H-regulation) to 
include Agama Hindu Bali as religion in part III 
  The government of the Bali region constantly upholds the Independent Religion Office for the Bali 
Region (Kantor Dinas Urusan Agama Otonom) 
 
The resolution was submitted to the central government. It was sent to the President, the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Religion, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Chairman of the Parliament, the Chairman of the 
National  Assembly,  the  Central  Warfare  Commissioner,  the  Warfare  Commissioner  of  the  Region  INusa 
Tenggara, the Chairman of the Bali region, the Chairman of the local parliament, to ethnic-Balinese members of 
the national parliament, and the National Assembly. (Yayasan 2003, 2005) 
On June 29 1958, I Gusti Putu Metha, Chairman of the Balinese parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
Peralihan Bali) accompanied five delegates representing religious and social organizations, Ida Pedanda Made 
Kemenuh, I Gusti Ananda Kusuma (Sri Resi Anandakusuma), Ida Bagus Wayan Gede, Ida Bagus Dosther and I 
Ketut Kandia to meet President Sukarno at his palace in Tampaksiring. Sukarno himself was influenced by 
Theosophy and the thoughts of Rabindranath Tagore. He appreciated the Bhagavad Gita, which he regarded as 
gospel of action (Bakker 1993: 229), and he represented contextual Islam, since he had always combined 
various  ideologies  and  systems  of  thought  in  a  typically  Javanese  manner.  The  institutionalization  of  the 
Pancasila and its Buddhist background displays that fact exemplarily. (Ramstedt 2004) Apparently he hesitated 
to recognize Agama Hindu Bali, as he did not want to further alienate the loyal representatives of political 
Islam in the Ministry during the 1950s. (Ramstedt 2004)  
Those  Hindu  delegates  called  for  the  recognition  of  Agama  Hindu  Bali  and  the  establishment  of  a 
representative unit of Hindu religion at MORA. Following the 1954 resolution’s line of thought, they argued 
that the religion was compatible with the first principle of the nation, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, because 
“there is only one God - there is no second (Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman). (Upadeca 1967: 15; Bakker 1993: 
229)  “In  other  words,  agama  Hindu  Bali  is  not  polytheistic”.  (Bakker  1993:  229)  Eventually  supported  by 
Sukarno after an eight years lasting struggle with the officials at the Ministry from 1950 to 1958, the reforms of 
the Hindu-Balinese tradition were received favorably at MORA in Jakarta. On September 5 1958, a division for 
Agama  Hindu  Bali  was  established  at  the  regional  office  of  religion  in  Singaraja.  I  Gusti  Gede  Raka  was 
appointed director. “Now that the recognition of Balinese religion had become a reality (…), the  Parisada 
Dharma Hindu Bali was to play a central part, its activities extending over three areas: the rituals, education, 
and the organizing of Hindus in Indonesia.” (Bakker 1993: 232)  
On August 14 1958, the province Bali has been established. In the past, the kings were the dharma-guarding 
authority  in  their  function  as  guru  wisesa,  they  were  the  guardians  and  leaders  of  the  temples,  religious 
community, religious rituals  and  adat. As the Dewan Raja-Raja and the Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah Bali 
(swapraja) had been disbanded in 1958, there was no institution responsible for religion and the rituals. “(…) 
the task of the government is limited to creating space and facilities for the religions of Indonesia and does not 
include active participation in the rituals”. (Sr Resi Anandakusuma in Bakker 1993: 59) A modern organization, 
Hindu-based in outlook, had to replace this royal function. In consequence, the idea was born to set up a Hindu 
Bali Council (ParisadaHindu Bali)
245. We may assess a drastic secularization process in the late 1950s – note the 
increasing influence of the PKI in Indonesia at that time.  
   
                                                 
245 In 1959, the Council was named Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali. In 1964, the name was changed into Parisada Hindu Dharma for political 
reasons, to “safe the Hindu brethren outside Bali” (Sudharta Interview 2008). From 1959 to 1986 its central office was located in the Ratna 
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5.3.2. Directorate General246 for Hindu and Buddhist congregations 
In the period from 1946 to 1958, Hinduism and Buddhism (for Buddhism only in 1967) had no representative 
body in the organizational structure of the MORA in the capital Jakarta. Bali was integrated into the Lesser 
Sunda  Islands  province  comprising  Bali,  Lombok,  Sumbawa,  Flores,  Timor  and  the  girdling  islands  with  its 
capital located in Singaraja. The Regional Office of Religion had only sections for Islam and Christianity, but no 
section  for  Agama  Hindu  Bali.  Moreover,  the  Balinese  were  declared  as  target  for  Christian  and  Muslim 
proselytizing for the first time since 1550. The Balinese were outraged as they had been classified as people 
without religion. During their incorporation into the Dutch established Negara Indonesia Timur, their religion 
had been recognized, and the Kings’ Council and the Priests’ Council were responsible for the development of 
the religion. In order to prevent the march in of Muslim and Christian missionaries sponsored by the Regional 
Office of Religion, the Balinese had set up an Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Regiontorepresent 
the  community  and  to  struggle  for  the  approval  of  their  religious  practices.  The  table  shows  the 
acknowledgement process and the institutionalization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia at MORA.  
 
Jakarta/Yogyakarta (1946-1950): 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) 
Established in 1946 in Jakarta 
Bali (1938-1959): 
Paruman Pinandita (Council of Hindu Priests) 
Bali (Province Sunda Kecil) 
Regional  branch  office  (kantor  jawatan  agama)of  the  MORA  in 
Singaraja and the regencies established in 1950, Islamic/Christian 
mission  
In 1960, move of the capital from Singaraja to Denpasar 
Bali (Province Sunda Kecil) 
Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region(jawatan agama 
otonoom daerah bali) established from 1952-1966 
Agama Hindu Bali had the status of ‘aliran kepercayan’, people who 
do not yet have a religion 
  Bali (Province Bali established 14.08.1958) 
Traditional function of Kings’ Council and Priests’ Council abolished 
Hindu Bali Affairs Unit at the regional branch office of religion in 
Singaraja/Denpasar  established  from  1958-1961  (I  do  not  know 
when the Kantor Wilayah Agama was opened in Denpasar) 
Unit head: I Gusti Gde Raka 
MORA/Jakarta:  
1961-1963 a Hindu Bali Affairs Section was established in Section J 
at the central MORA 
Unit head I Gede Pudja 
MORA/Jakarta  
1964-1967 Agama Hindu Bali Affairs Bureau  
Unit head I Gede Pudja 
1967-1969  Directorate  General  for  the  Guidance  of  Hindu  Bali/ 
Buddhist Congregations 
Director General IB P Mastra (1967-1970) 
1969-2001  Directorate  General  for  the  Guidance  of  Hindu  and 
Buddhist Congregations (as other ethnic groups joined into the fold 
of Agama Hindu, the Directorate was renamed from Hindu Bali to 
Hindu. The Hindu Bali Council (Parisada Hindu Bali) was renamed 
into  Parisada  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia  in  1986.  Interestingly  the 
Directorate does not use the term Dharma) 
Director General I Gede Pudja MA (1970-1985) 
Director General I Gusti Agung Gede Putra (1985-1994) 
Director General I Ketut Pasek (1994-1997) 
Director General I Wayan Gunawan (1997-2001) 
 
2001-2006  Directorate  General  for  the  Guidance  of  Hindu  and 
Buddhist Congregations 
Director General I Wayan Suarjaya (2001-2006) 
2006-2009  Directorate  General  for  the  Guidance  of  the  Hindu 
Congregation  
Director General Prof. Dr. IB Gde Yudha Triguna 
 
Following  those  developments,  Agama  Hindu  Bali  gained  some  semi-official  recognition,  when  Suharto 
approved of the delegates’ call for having a Hindu section introduced into the structure of the Ministry, and the 
Hindu Bali Affairs Section (Bagian Urusan Hindu Bali) was established at the Regional Office of Religion in 
Singaraja in1958. To comply with regulation H and to take concerted actions, the formation session of a Hindu 
Council  were  held  in  December  1958  and  February  1959.  Headed  by  Ida  Pedanda  Gde  Jelantik  and  Putu 
Serangan, the Hindu Bali Affairs Unitextended its influence until Sulawesi by including the Aluktodolo and 
Toraja ethnic groups into their administration, thus Hinduism were not longer restricted to one ethic group.  
The  controversies  between  Sukarno  and  political  Islam  were  drastically  resolved  in  1959,  when  Sukarno 
proposed  to  return  to  the  1945  Constitution  and  proclaimed  Guided  Democracy.  In  consequence,  the 
weakening impact of political Islam after 1959 had facilitated the full recognition of Agama Hindu Bali from 
1961 to 1964, when Minister of Religion Decree 40 in 1960 set the stage for the formation of a Hindu Bali 
Affairs Sectionin Section J at the central MORA in Jakarta.  
                                                 
246 Note, Directorat Jenderal is translated as Directorate General, since General (Jenderal) refers to a rank and not to general as adjective 
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In 1961, as KH M Wahib Wahab was appointed Minister, he passed Minister of Religion Decrees 86 and 87 in 
1961, which accommodated a Hindu Bali Affairs Section into ‘Section J’ in the central Ministry in Jakarta. I Gede 
Puja was appointed Head of Section J in the central Ministry. (Bakker 1993: 102) In 1956, on the advice of 
Pandit Shastri Gede Puja departed to India in order to study Indian philosophy, religion, architecture and arts at 
the  Indology  College  of  the  Banaras  Hindu  University  in  Varanasi.  (Bakker  1993:  102)  In  India,  Puja’s 
companions were Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmadja and Cokorda Rai Sudharta. (Bakker 1993: 102) Ida Bagus Mantra 
has studied in India as well, but at another University. Only in 1964
247, the Hindu Bali Affairs Bureau was 
officially set up. In consequence, the first political development steering the  recognition of Agama Hindu Bali 
was the return to the 1945 Basic Law and the proclamation of Guided Democracy, which put a sudden end to 
political Islam in 1959.  
In  accordance  with  the  Departments  catalogue  of  criteria,  the  final  recognition  was  based  on  following 
reasoning: 1.) the Balinese religion was indeed Hindu, and 2.) Hinduism was monotheistic. During Wahab’s 
term, the government paid considerable attention to Agama Hindu Bali, and national holidays were introduced 
in Bali and Lombok at certain Hindu holy days (Saraswati, Galungan,Kuningan, and Pagerwesi). Minister of 
Religion Decree 96 in 1961 regulated the national holidays for the region Bali and for Balinese Hindus, who 
settle outside Bali. The following table shows how the rationalized and systematized Agama Hindu Bali met 
with the MORA’s catalogue of criteria: 
  1952 Regulation   Codified and systematized Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
1.  Monotheism 
(tawhid) 
Monotheistic One Supreme Lordship:  
Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa (Bali) 
2.  Religious law and social order 
(syari’ah, fiqh) 
Religious Law 
Manawa Dharmasastra, Nithi Sastra (India) 
Adat, Dresta, Awig2 (Bali) 
3.  Sacred, revealed scripture 
(Quran)  
 
Vedas, Dharmasastras, Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita (India) 
Sarasamuccaya; Sanghyang Kamahyanikam (Oldjavanese) 
Balinese Lontar 
5.  Prophet and Sages 
(nabi, Arabic) 
Rishis (India) 
Maharesi, Empu, Bhagawan (Java - Bali)  
6.  Places of worship/ sanctuaries  Temples, nation- and island wide classified system of temples  
(Pura; Padmasana; Pelinggih: Bali) 
7.  Pilgrimage (hajj)  Tirtha Yatra 
8.  Religious service 
(sholat) 
Panca Yadnya (five ritual types); Tri-Sandhya (three times a 
day  prayer  designed  in  1952,  Gayatri  Mantra,  hitherto 
unknown to the Balinese), Pancah Sembah (fivefold prayer 
using flowers) 
9.  Officials  
(Ulama, Kiayi) 
Professional High priests and lay priests  
(Sulinggih, Pinandita, Pemangku), 
10.  International recognition   Hinduism  is  internationally  recognized  as  world  religion 
Unclear naming: Agama Hindu (IB Dosther) 
11.  Followers are not limited to an single 
ethnic community  
 
Several ethno-cultural communities also joined into the fold 
of Hindu Dharma Indonesia (Balinese, Javanese, Tenggerese, 
Toraja, Alok To Dolo, Karo Batak, Ngaju, Dayak et al.) 
 
1964 seems to be the year of the administrative recognition of  Agama Hindu Bali, as Minister of Religion 
Instruction 47/1963 (II, §12) stipulated the establishment of an Agama Hindu Bali Affairs Bureauat the central 
MORA, which has been realized in 1964. The Bureau comprised three units: General unit, education unit, and 
information  unit.  In  1964,  the  Parisada  changed  its  name  from  ParisadaHindu  Bali  into  Parisada  Hindu 
Indonesia. (Sudharta 2006) The full legal recognition of Indonesian Hindu Dharma was only one year later, 
when Sukarno passed Act 1/1965 on the Desecration of Religion, in which six agama, among them Agama 
Hindu and Agama Buddha, were mentioned.  
   
                                                 
247 According to Bakker (1993: 102), in addition to the Hindu Unit, a separate section for Buddhism was established in 1963. The Year Books 
of the MORA, however, mention the year 1967. Bakker (1993: 102) and the Year Books of the MORA state the Hindu Bali Section was 
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In  my  view,  the  final  official  recognition  of  Indonesian  Hindu  Dharma  by  Sukarno  and  the  equality  in 
administration  –  however,  influenced  by  discriminative  practices  –  by  Suharto  has  to  be  unambiguously 
brought in relation to the contemporaneous political tension between Communists and Islam, and thus with 
Suharto’s rise to power, because the Suharto regime aggregated and utilized all aspirations and groups in 
society to consolidate its base for power in the late 1960s and during the 1970s. In consequence, as sadly as it 
is, the recognition of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and several of its harmony and peace supporting concepts 
should be brought in relation with the mass killings in 1965-1966. Only after the violent takeover of the Suharto 
regime, a Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu Bali/Buddhist congregation equal in status to the 
Christian  and  Islamic  Directorates  has  been  established  at  the  MORA.  This  Directorate,  however,  never 
received funding comparable to the other Departments.  
 
In 1966, the Agama Hindu Bali Affairs Bureau was restructured into a Directorate General for the Guidance of 
Hindu Bali/Buddhist Congregations by Presidential (!) Decree 170/1966  – thereby eventually achieving the 
same status as the Islamic and Christian Directorates. However, as the Hindu congregation and the Buddhist 
congregation  were lumped into one Directorate  with one and the  same  minimalist  budget, one finds the 
normative equality of religion in Indonesia betrayed by practices within the Muslim-controlled MORA.  
 
Minister of Religion Instruction 56/1967 regulated the organizational structure of the Directorate General for 
the Guidance of Hindu Bali/ Buddhist Congregations. It consisted of three sections:  
 
1.)  General  Unit  of  Hindu/Buddhist  Affairs,  responsible  for  aliran  (currents),  religious  organizations, 
pilgrimage affairs (tirtha yatra), sanctuaries, weddings and training of clerics.  
2.)  Hindu/Buddhist Affairs Education Unit, responsible for educators and experts training, guidance and 
counseling in education, and development of tertiary institutions.  
3.)  The Hindu/Buddhist Affairs Information Unit, in charge to subsidize, guide and supervise private and 
state Hindu/Buddhist education institutes, to translate, interpret and supervise Hindu scriptures and 
books, and nurture in Pancasila doctrine.  
 
In 1966, the Ministry was renamed to Department of Religion (Departemen Agama)
248, the first appointed 
Minister was KM KH Mohamad Dahlan (1967 -1973). It may be assessed, since all decrees  pertaining to the 
organizational structure of the MORA were passed by the President Suharto, religion had become a matter of 
the boss.  During the early years of the Suharto regime, a strong pluralist aspect was introduced. This 
perspective  found  its  expre ssion  in  the  exhaustive  inter -faith  harmony  ( kerukunan  hidup  beragama  or 
kerukunan agama) legislation aiming to contribute to national stability, unity, and integration, which is still 
maintained  and  developed  during  contemporary  Indonesian  democracy.  Religion  was  to  be  reformed  and 
modernized by abnegating both fundamentalism and primitive superstition as represented in adat traditions. 
(Parker 2004: 246)  
 
When the co-existence of all recognized religious communities is based on inter-faith harmony (kerukunan 
hidup beragama), religion was understood as playing an important part in creating a prosperous, stable and 
modern Indonesian society. Modern education and religious classes were seen to balance the promotion of 
religion and the revitalization of useful traditional values. These traditional values were no longer identified 
with adat, but with local culture (budaya). The ensuing folklorization of local ethnic traditions in turn provided 
the capital for cultural tourism and thereby contributed to the economic development of the whole country. 
(Ramstedt 2004:17)  
 
In  the  beginning  of  the  New  Order  era,  there  were  debates  on  the  Jakarta  Charter  and  strong  Christian 
opposition to the MORA, the debates faded and the Suharto Regime never decided to dissolve it. In 1966, 
communism was banned. The Pancasila was implemented as supreme base of jurisdiction. Ethno-religious 
communities  without  religion  were  under  the  suspicion  of  being  atheists.  As  atheists,  they  could  be 
Communists, and therefore they lived in mortal danger. As result, the official promotion of religion on basis of 
reinforced religious tolerance
249 forced the population without religion to seek affiliation with a proper agama. 
                                                 
248 In 2010, the Department of Religion again was renamed into Kementrian Agama, thus I consistently use the acronym MORA.  
249 During the Suharto regime, the principle of believe in One Supreme Lordship coexists with three other basic principles: 1.) the freedom 
to embrace religion; 2.) the responsibility to develop an attitude of respect towards those, who embrace another reli gion; and 3.) the 
recognition of a link between society and God. The accommodation of those four principles was called tolerance in school book s, in 
teachers’  oral  teaching,  and  in  general  social  conversation.  Almost  invariably,  tolerance  was  associated  with  religious  tolerance.  The PART C | 157 
In consequence, all agama congregations increased in size, including the Hindu community. In Java, many 
million followers of kebatinan and kejaven were classified as Muslims, and they are counted as Muslims until 
today.  
 
From  1967  to  1970,  The  Directorate  General  for  Guidance  of  the  Hindu  Bali  and  Buddhist  Congregation 
pioneered  the  introduction  of  Hinduism  and  Buddhism  into  society  and  education  in  those  religions. 
Presidential  Decree  56/1969  fully  acknowledged  Hindu  Dharma  as  sponsored  religion  by  establishing  the 
Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu and Buddhist Congregation. In 1967, Ida Bagus Putu Mastra, was 
appointed  Director  General  of  the  Directorate,  and  I  Gede  Pudja  remained  responsible  for  the  Hindu 
subdivision. As the Suharto regime attempted to integrate and use all aspirations of all societal groups, during 
Mastra’s term (1967-1970), the organizational structure was adjusted to real needs of the Hindu congregation 
as shown in the increase of the number of employees at the Directorate. Mastra defined the function of the 
Director  General  as  formulator,  operator/manager,  and  supervisor  of  technical  policies  in  guiding  and 
empowering  the  Hindu  community.  In  cooperation  with  the  Hindu  Council,  he  bought  land  for  the 
establishment of schools, and his efforts in the educational sector were successful.  
 
During  Gede  Pudja’s  third  term
250  (1970-1985),  the  Directorate  witnessed  a  fast  development,  and  an 
incredible amount of Indian and Old Javanese scriptures focusing on Hindu Law were translated and compiled, 
as the Catur Vedas, the Law of Manu, the Sarasamuccaya, Silakrama, Upadeca. (cf. Bakker 1993) Pudja may be 
named the king of Hindu publishing or the chief poet of modern Hinduism. Gede Pudja laid great emphasis on 
education. During his time in office, he was closely involved in the development of educational programs for 
various types of Hindu religious education or for subjects directly related to it, especially those subjects in 
which he himself was an expert. He composed various text books for education in Hinduism and also several 
subjects directly related to Hindu religious education. (Bakker 1993: 142)  
 
In relation to this, and as a result of national development policies, the number of educators at the teacher 
training colleges was increased, many text books were compiled for elementary to secondary education and for 
the teacher training colleges, printed, and distributed. The first curriculum for the teacher training colleges was 
also provided. (cf. Bakker 1993: 142 -144 for a detailed discussion) In 1968, the Directorate nationalized the 
Dwijendra teacher training college in Denpasar and established one Hindu-based Educator Training School in 
Singaraja and in Mataram, Lombok. Then those  colleges were nationalized and renamed into State Hindu 
Educator Training Colleges in 1973. During the 1970s, private  Agama Hindu-based Educator Schools were 
established in Java (Blitar, Klaten, Boyolali), Sumatra (Lampung), Central Kalimantan (Palangkaraya) and Bali 
(Negara, Amlapura, Tabanan, Bangli). The graduates were employed as Hindu educators at the elementary 
level throughout Indonesia. During this period several Indian Hindu scriptures were translated into Indonesian 
and were distributed free of charge throughout Indonesia. It is noteworthy in this context, that there are no 
translations into Balinese, pointing to a deep commitment to the adherence to the Pancasila state.  
 
(…) Pudja was a major influence on developments in Indonesian Hindu religious education, so it 
would not come as a surprise to find that many people involved in Hindu religious teaching has 
based their philosophy on the thoughts and methods of Gede Puja, and that gede Pudja had 
contributed greatly to the renewal of formal education in Hinduism in the schools of Indonesia. 
(Bakker 1993: 153) 
 
Again, the structure and tasks of the Directorate General became clearer with Presidential decrees 22 and 68 in 
1980. The Secretariat General was responsible for Hindu and Buddhist Affairs. It was structured into three 
sections and respective sub-sections: 1.) the program and law compilation section, 2.) the financial section, and 
3.) the general section. All Hindu affairs were to be managed by the Directorate of  Agama Hindu Affairs, 
whereas Buddhist Affairs were administered by the Directorate of Buddhist Affairs. The general section was 
responsible  for  administration,  compilation  of  statistics,  reports,  and  general  public  relations.  The  sub-
Directorate for Agama Hindu information was responsible for data and information compilation, guideline 
compilation, matters pertaining to marriage, sacred arts and rituals, training and appointment of Hindu ‘street 
workers’ (penyuluh). A development section was responsible for sanctuaries, Hindu scriptures, paraphernalia, 
and ritual materials for priests.    
                                                                                                                                                         
teacher explained that having five religions, Indonesian citizens had to have respect for all for the sake of stability and security. There had 
to be this tolerance between religious communities, and there was no excuse for religious conflict. (Parker 2004: 246) 
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The Sub-Directorate for Education was structured into four units, responsible for the execution of tasks in the 
field of education, educators, education material, education assessment and reports. It organized the operation 
of  Hindu  education,  the  quality  improvement  of  Hindu  education,  the  improvement  of  textbook  quality, 
improvement  of  the  Hindu  education  infrastructure,  assessment  and  supervision  of  Hindu  education,  and 
compilation of statistical data of Hindu education.  
 
On Novemer 8 1985, I Gusti Agung Gede Putra succeeded Gede Puja as Director-General of the Directorate 
General  for Guidance of the Hindu Bali and Buddhist Congregation. Previously, he officiated as appointed 
director of the provincial office for Hindu and Buddhist Affairs of the province Bali in Denpasar. During the 
second Mahasabha or congress of the Hindu Council in 1968, he was appointed member of the  Paruman 
Welaka (the committee of laymen). For years he was dean of the Faculty of Religion and Culture at the Institute 
Hindu  Dharma  (since  1993  Universitas  Hindu  Indonesia),  and  from  1976  to  1979  he  was  director  of  the 
Institute
251. His scholars recorded his lectures and several books with the title “Cudamani” were published 
passing on his ideas. (Bakker 1993: 157)  
 
During I Gusti Agung Gede Putra term (1985-1994), publishing efforts were continued, yet the focus shifted 
from educational materials (textbooks, teacher training curricula) to Hindu philosophy and Vedanta teachings. 
Putra seems to have been mainly concerned with systematizing an orthodox understanding of Hindu concepts. 
However, he published two books on the content of Hindu lectures at higher education in 1985 and 1986. 
(Bakker 1993: 168) The book published in 1986, has been reworked and the last publication was in 2005
252. 
During his term, the unwritten rule that every publication on Hinduism is hoped  to be facilitated with a 
prologue  of  the  Hindu  Directorate  was  introduced.  This  rule  is  intended  to  show  the  conformity  of 
thepublicationswith  the official version of Hindu Dharma promoted by the Directorate General.  Putra has 
served concurrently as Head of the Regional Office of Religion in Bali, as Head of the Traditional Architecture 
Faculty at  Dwijendra  University,  and  as  Dean  of  the  Religion  and  Culture  faculty  at  IHD,  which  has  been 
established as the full-fledged Indonesian Hindu University during his term. 
 
Concerning with improving the quality of education and upgrading teachers’ quality, the 1989 Education Act 
and Act 60/1990 on Higher Education introduced that religion teachers at the elementary level are required to 
be at least diploma II graduates. Educators at secondary schooling were required to hold at least a diploma III 
degree. This policy translated in a unfavorable situation for the Hindu education sector, as there were no Hindu 
institutions of higher education, which produced graduates holding bachelor, master, or doctoral degrees. As a 
consequence  of  this  policy,  the  State  Hindu  Educator  Training  Colleges  at  the  senior  high  school  level  in 
Denpasar, Mataram, and Singaraja were disbanded in 1990. In order to face this unfavorable condition and to 
comply with the requirements set out by the new educational policy, the Directorate General took immediately 
countermeasures to avert the dearth of teachers in organizing and operating a long-distance open-university 
upgrading  program  (KUTE,  kuliah  terbuka)  to  improve  quality  and  provide  qualification  for  all  elementary 
educators.  
The Directorate assessed and calculated the future need of teachers and lecturers for the Hindu class and for 
all  Hindu  teacher  training  institutions  based  on  the  number  of  10  Hindu  students.  It  aimed  thereby  to 
guarantee the quality of the Hindu class and Hindu education. Further, the Hindu education sector should be 
given equal status compared to general or other faith-based state institutions, and in the second step, those 
educational institutions were to be nationalized. As there were many Hindu students, but not enough qualified 
teachers, State Hindu Teacher Academies and Institutes were to be opened, which could train the calculated 
Hindu  teacher  workforce.  In  order  to  improve  quality  and  provide  the  necessary  qualification  of  Hindu 
educators in schooling through teacher upgrading programs, institutions of higher education were set up in 
Bali, Lombok, Kalimantan and Java. As first concrete step, the State Agama Hindu Educator Training Academy 
(APGAH, Akademi Pendidikan Guru Agama Hindu) was pioneered during the early 1990s. Based on Minister of 
Religion Instruction 58B/1993, the academy was set up in Denpasar. Its Hindu pedagogy faculty offered study 
programs in diploma II and in diploma III. I Gede Sura had been appointed first rector, and the former facilities 
and  materials  of  the  disbanded  State  Hindu  Educator  Training  Colleges  (Pendidikan  Guru  Agama,  PGA)  in 
Denpasar were used to allow for its operation. At the same time, new curricula for the Agama Hindu Educator 
Training Academy were compiled.   
                                                 
251 Here, the close connection between UNHI, the Hindu Council and the Directorate General in Jakarta becomes obvious. As Gede Pudja 
and Gusti Agung Gede Putra, Professor Triguna also is involved with all three institutions. 
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I Ketut Pasek, former official at the Regional Office of Religion in Bali, was appointed Director General from 
1994 to 1997. During his term, the publishing activities and the effort to compile a unitary Hindu curriculum 
were continued. Hindu sanctuaries were given loudspeakers in order to socialize the proper chanting of  Tri 
Sandhya – those loudspeakers resemble the Islamic practice of azan (call to prayers). The upgrading programs 
for teachers run well. The first Hindu educators’ classes holding Diplomas II or Diploma III certificates graduated 
from the State Agama Hindu Educator Training Academy. For the first time in history, the State Agama Hindu 
Educator Training Academy in Denpasar and the remaining private institutions throughout Indonesia were 
given a consistent format of certificates and format of educational achievement by Director General Decree 
H/16/VII/1994 in 1994.  
The basic content and curricula of Hindu pedagogy in the learning process of higher education was unified by 
Director General H/24/SK/1996 on the Establishment of the Guidelines for the Teaching and Learning Program 
(Garis  Besar  Pendidikan  dan  Pengajaran,  GBPP),  theGBPP  syllabus,  and  course  instruction  outline/course 
syllabus (SAP, satuan acuan pembelajaran). All Hindu educators were required to participate in the Diploma II 
program, which was operated by the Directorate. The program targeted to guarantee the minimal qualification 
standard as required by the 1989 Education Act. It should improve Hindu educator’s knowledge and the overall 
quality of Hindu education.  
In 1996, numerous private Islamic colleges were nationalized. Contrary to those mass nationalizations, the 
Hindu  congregation  only  had  one  State  Agama  Hindu  Educator  Training  Academy  authorized  to  provide 
Diploma  II  and  Diploma  III  study  programs  and  to  issue  respective  certificates.  Replying  to  continuously 
improved quality standards in education, educators holding a bachelor decrees were required. In consequence, 
I Gede Sura, Principal of the State Agama Hindu Educator Training Academy proposed upgrade the academy 
into an State Institute authorized to issue bachelor degree certificates.  
The first Director General with a military and not a civilian background, I Wayan Gunawan, former Infantry 
Brigadier General, improved not only the administrational structure of the Directorate considerably but also its 
working  discipline.  The  directorate’s  tasks  were  then  exercised  following  the  pattern  of  coordination, 
integration, and synchronization. Following Sura’s proposal, he successfully lobbied the democratic Habibie 
government. 
In the era of reform and during Indonesian democracy, the Hindu education sector has boosted and the budget 
has increased considerably. Thus, the Hindu education sector and the Hindu congregation in general profit 
from the compartmentalization and politization of religion in Indonesia. Presidential Decree 20/1999 set upthe 
State Agama Hindu School for Applied Science (STAHN, Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri). It was structured 
into four faculties providing undergraduate study programs and Diploma and Bachelor certificates. The State 
Agama Hindu School for Applied Science has been officially and ceremonially opened by Minister of Religion 
Prof Malik Fajar, while Wayan Suarjaya has been appointed the first rector. Suarjaya then was appointed the 
forth acting Hindu/Buddhist Director General.  
During  Wayan  Suarjaya’s  term  of  office,  the  State  Agama  Hindu  School  for  Applied  Science  Gede  Puja  in 
Mataram was officially and ceremonially established by Minister of Religion KH M Tolchah Hasan on April 24 
2001.  In  addition,  the  State  Agama  Hindu  School  for  Applied  Science  Tampung  Penyang  in  Palangkaraya, 
Central Kalimantan was officially established by Suarjaya on July 26, 2001. A significant triumph of the Hindu 
education  sector  was  the  opening  of  the  first  Hindu-based  postgraduate  program  concentrated  on  Hindu 
theology (Brahma Widya) at STAHN Denpasar, which was authorized to issue Master certificates. This provided 
an epoch-making equalization and recognition of the Hindu education sector that put the Hindu sector on a par 
with  Christian  and  Islamic  education  institutions  -  at  least  theoretically.  In  addition, Suarjaya  pursued  the 
nationalizing of Hindu-faith based schools (Widyalaya) from elementary to higher education. Compared to the 
complex Islamic education system, the Hindu education system was not only insignificant, but literally invisible. 
Unlike the Islamic course of education, where from the basic levels onwards profound knowledge of Islam is 
taught, qualifying for teacher training or the profession  of an Islamic Law expert, in the Hindu education 
system, there are only a few faith-based schools providing basic education, which do not qualify for the teacher 
profession or teacher training. (Arsada 2006: 53) The pioneer of Hindu widyalaya was set up in Bangli in 2001.  
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Minister of Religion Instruction 1/2001 on the Position, Tasks, Function, Authority, Organizational and Working 
Structure changed the organizational structure of the Hindu Directorate General. A new milestone in the arena 
of  Hindu  education  was  the  formation  of  the  State  Hindu  Dharma  Institute  in  Denpasar  with  Presidential 
Decree 1/2004 dated November 82004 on the Status Change of the State Agama Hindu School for Applied 
Science in Denpasar. Minister of Religion M Maftuh Basyumi officially opened the Institute on Mach 232005.  
The opening of the State Agama Hindu School for Applied Science is celebrated as a countermeasure to face 
the dearth of Hindu teachers, to speed up the implementation of Education Act 20/2003 for Hindus, and to 
answer the uneven distribution of Hindus teachers in the Archipelago. In 2005 the Directorate transferred 
authority to the Parisada to operate pasraman (Hindu Sunday Schools) for Hindu students, who do not receive 
formal Hindu religious instruction at schools and to grade the students. Thereby it is warranted that all Hindu 
pupils receive a mark in the religion class necessary for promotion to the next level of schooling. The pasraman 
are  facilitated  by  the  Directorate,  yet  grading  of  pupil’s  performance  is  carried  out  by  the  Parisada.  The 
following table shows thenumber of Pasraman, Hindu students and teachers in Indonesia in 2006 and 2007 
Level  Pasraman 2006  Pasraman 2007  Pupil 2006  Pupil 2007  Educators 
2006 
Educators 
2007 
Elementary education  1.207  3.025 
 
152.532  152.532 
 
11.038  9.075 
 
Junior secondary  1.207  2.943  167.572  136.595  2.045  8.829 
Senior secondary  1.207  2.979  137.613  134.435  1.542  8.937 
TOTAL  1.207  8.947  457.717  423.562  14.625  26.841 
Source: Hindu Secretariat General  
In general, it can be assessed that the consolidation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia has been executed by middle -
class Balinese Hindu professionals, religion-experts, teachers and civil servants, who were western-educated or 
Indian-educated. The urban middle-class in Singaraja, Denpasar, and from 1967 onwards in Jakarta is the 
central agency in the recognition process of Hindu Dharma and in the consolidation of the Hi ndu education 
system. The Indonesian middle-class is not identical to the European middle-class. Because the middle-class is 
not categorized by income, but by high levels of education and access to strategic position in the governmental, 
religious, cultural, and educational sector.  
 
The Hindu higher education sector has been in an unfavorable situation since its integration into the nation -
state. Despite the engagement and enthusiasm of a few reformers, low human resources and discriminative 
policies led to a very small, sometimes even inexistent, and poor qualified Hindu education sector. It is my 
hypothesis, that the education sector for Hindus has systematically received discriminative funding in order to 
limit an equal development and distribution throughout Indonesia. With bad qualified teachers and almost no 
teacher training institutions, it must be seen as a major success of the Directorate and Hindu reformers to have 
established  higher  Hindu-based  education  institutions  authorized  to  issue  bachelor,  master  and  doctoral 
certificates for its graduates and to be able to raise enrollment at those study programs. 
 
From 2001 to 2005, the major challenge faced by the Directorate General for Guidance of the Hindu and 
Buddhist Congregation were the poor quality of its human capital. Only 121 poor educated employees at the 
MORA in Jakarta were responsible for the administration, organization and guiding of approximately eight 
million  adherents  of  Hinduism  and  Buddhism  (official  statistics).  Problematic  issues  we re  correct  data 
acquisition and compilation of statistics and calculation of demands for both congregations. As exact data on 
the number of adherents was difficult to collect, it was impossible to compile correct statistics on adherents, 
students, and in turn the demand for text books, and educators. As a result, a correct calculation of the 
demand for teachers, text books and students has been a difficult task and remained often a mere guess. 
Related to this, funding and subsidies of education evolved as c entral problem. Because with an estimated 
number of adherents, and an estimated number of students, the exact demand for teachers and text books 
remained unclear, and it has been difficult to compose reports on how much funding and subsidies are actually 
to be retrieved from the Planning and Finance Bureau of the General Secretariat at MORA. This situation 
resulted in an unclear picture of the state of Hinduism and Hindu education in Indonesia.  
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5.3.3. The Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Community 
Presidential Decree 63/2005 and Minister of Religion Decree 3 in 2006 restructured the Directorate General for 
the  Guidance  of  Hindu  and  Buddhist  Congregations.  The  Directorate  General  for  Guidance  of  Hindu  and 
Buddhist Congregations has been split into a Hindu Directorate and a Buddhist directorate. This separation 
aims to improve the exercise of the Directorates’ tasks in the educational sector related to matters pertaining 
to 1.) retrieving adequate funding and subsidies, and 2.) implementing educational policies complying to the 
paradigm  shift  in  education.  Since  its  establishment,  the  Hindu  section  is  under-staffed.  In  2006,  the 
Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation employed 88 officials. In 2007, the Directorate 
had  82  employees.  Of  the  total,  41  were  employed  at  the  Directorate  General,  20  at  the  Hindu  Affairs 
Directorate and 21 at the Hindu Education Directorate. One might imagine that administrating the affairs of 
around 10 Million Indonesian Hindus with 82 employees is a tiring task to execute. 
 
Since the development of religion is an integral part of national progress, the Directorate General for the 
Guidance of the Hindu Congregation plays a strategic role in the political and conceptual administration of 
Indonesian Hindu communities reflecting the principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. The contemporary documents 
of  the  Hindu  Directorate  speak  of  Bhinneka  Tunggal  Ika  instead  of  Pancasila.  The  Indonesian  pluralists 
therefore currently prefer to refer to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, as it offers the same substance. It is regarded 
politically neutral, truly pluralist, and it does not share Pancaisla’s history of exploitation of meaning. (Triguna 
protocol 2007) Probably homage is paid to Empu Tantular, the Majapahit sage and poet, who composed the 
Sutasoma poem from which the slogan originates. Despite the legal status of the Pancasila has been preserved, 
the five principles are less popular in contemporary political discourse. This is most likely the result of the 
Pancasila being interpreted as an instrument of power formerly utilized to manipulate Indonesian citizens. 
(Habibie 2011) The shift from the term One Supreme Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) to God Almighty 
(Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) in all legal documents in the last twenty years indicates that the majority religion 
attempts to impart their understanding of the representation of God (tawhid) on the religious minorities.  
The Hindu Directorate is tasked with organizing and managing policies and the technical standardization in the 
area of guiding the Hindu Community basing on policies stipulated by the Minister. (Directorate General Hindu 
2006: Strategic Plan) The Directorate has following functions: it 
1.  formulates the vision and mission statement, the strategic plan,  
2.  plans the standardization, norms, models, criteria and procedures to be exercised at the Directorate,  
3.  subsidizes, improves and supervises the Hindu community and  
4.  reports and assesses on the outcome of the strategic development strategies. 
 
The chart shows the planning process at the Hindu Directorate General as of 2006 to 2008 (Hindu Education 
Directorate 2006: 6, own translation) 
 
 
The vision statement of the Hindu directorate 
concerns two major areas:  
 
1.)  ‘prima’  service  quality  (pelayanan  prima) 
and Hindu practice as vehicle to achieve a 
prosperous nation,  
2.)  application  of  inter-faith  harmony  as 
expression of the Indonesian multicultural 
society  to  realize  a  safe  and  peaceful 
Indonesia.  
 
The mission statement sets out amongst others 
to  increase  the  quality  of  guidance, 
understanding,  realization,  and  regularly 
practice  of  agama  Hindu,  to  improve  the 
Directorates service quality, to raise the quality 
of  Hindu  education  and  to  empower  Hindu 
faith-based social organizations and Hindu faith-
based educational institutions.  
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In 2006, Prof Ida Bagus Gede Yudha Triguna, had been appointed Director General. Since 2005, he acts as 
President of the Indonesian Hindu University. In 2011, he is still holds both offices. Yudha Triguna may be 
described as a professional academic, a brilliant lobbyist with management capabilities, who wields enormous 
power in the fields of politics and religion by virtue of his traditional authority, personal charisma (taksu) and 
simultaneous  bureaucratic  power  as  Director  General  and  president  of  UNHI.  Prior  to  Yudha  Triguna’s 
appointment, the Director-General did not have an official car. Thus, he asked the Minister of Religion to 
recognize the officials of the Hindu congregation in the same way as other religious communities are respected 
in Indonesia, and has been provided with an official car. He even was given an official residence in the district 
of Kelapa Gading, Jakarta. The official residence moved in 2008 to Salembah, Jakarta.  
As a result of Yudha Triguna’s lobbying efforts, the budget allocated to the Hindu Directorate General also 
steadily increases. The diplomatic strategy used, is called by Yudha Triguna “the ant and the elephant strategy”. 
(Interview, protocol 2007) In this metaphor, the Minister of Religion, heading the MORA and its resources, is 
compared with the elephant, while Yudha Triguna is compared with the ant.  
If an ant tries to talk to an elephant, it is very likely that the ant is not answered. If the ant tries to 
attack the elephant, the elephant might not even recognize being attacked, or worse, he did not 
even notice that he just trampled the ant. But, if the ant climbs on him, to sit between his eyes, 
and starts to tickle the elephant, while plucking his fur, most likely the elephant will start giggling, 
and feeling comforted. Then and only then, the elephant will notice the ant and will eventually 
listen to the ant’s demands. 
 
Another problem faced by Indonesian Hindus is the scarce distribution of regional Hindu officials, since the 
MORA maintains three structural types of regional offices (I a-f; II, III a-c). Only the province of Bali is structured 
according to type II having two Hindu sections: one Hindu Affairs section and one Hindu Education Section. 
Another Hindu Affairs section is established in the West Nusa Tenggara Province Office of religion in Mataram, 
Lombok. In consequence, the Hindu community has only three sections throughout Indonesia, as in all other 
regional offices there is only one unit representing the Hindu community. As a rule, there are one to three 
officials employed at those units. If there are more Hindu employees, they do not receive fixed salaries but are 
paid by honorarium.  
There are even regencies without a Hindu section, and the regional official of the Hindu Council coordinates the 
section’s task. This is especially of concern to the qualification of Hindu teachers. According to educational 
legislation, at the regency level a supervisor for the teacher’s certification program must be provided. For 
Hindu population living in specific Indonesian regencies, the regional government must provide the Hindu class 
and the Hindu teacher, if there are more than ten students. The teachers are required to hold a bachelor 
degree. Since the quality of Hindu teachers is mostly poor, they must participate in the upgrading program 
supervised by an official of the Regional Office of Religion.  
Since mostly there is not even a Hindu section at some regencies, the Hindu Council has been authorized to act 
as supervisor, and the State Hindu Dharma Institute in Denpasar, the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar, 
and  the  Dwijendra  University  are  authorized  to  offer  long-distance  courses  to  guarantee  the  teachers’ 
certification. Therefore, one of the first official acts undertaken by Yudha Triguna has been to allocate 100 
Million Rupiah to each section or official at the regional offices in the provinces in 2006. Yudha Triguna also 
implemented a program with study grants to certify the teachers.  
The following graph shows the organizational chart of the Regional Office of Religion in the Province of Bali.  PART C | 163 
 
 
The Directorate of Hindu education 
The broad mission statement related to the Hindu educational sector are (1) strengthening the understanding, 
implementation, and regular practice of Agama Hindu in individuals, families, communities, and state organs to 
strengthen  the  inter-  and  intra-faith  harmony  and  to  build  social  harmony  in  social  and  national  life,  (2) 
omitted; (3) strengthening the understanding, implementation, and regular practice of agama Hindu in order 
to build sraddha, bhakti, virtue, and morals in students, (4) empowering and improving the quality of Hindu 
faith-based  social  organizations  and  institutions  to  provide  educational  services  to  peasants  with  low 
economies.  
 
Each of these aims is then formulated into a target. The achievement of the targets is diversified into annual 
and five-term strategic plans. The 2006 strategic plan of the Directorate then sets out the target and program 
of mission statement 3 and 4, which concern the education sector, as follows: 
 
Mission 3  
Target 
Program 
decrease deviations and violations of ethics and morals by students, 
either at school/campus or in society. 
raise the number of educators 
meet the target and operate the program 
implement the 9 years compulsory school attendance 
improve and increase higher schooling  
improve and increase higher education 
Mission 4  
Target 
Program 
increase  the  role  of  Hindu  based  social  organizations  and 
institutions  in  the  field  of  education,  foundations,  pasraman, 
Sunday schools  
raise prominence of religious values in social change 
improve  the  quality  of  employees  at  Hindu  based  social 
organizations and institutions 
facilitate  educational  material  and  infrastructure  (pasraman, 
Sunday schools) 
increase the development of Hindu based social organizations and 
institutions in the field of education 
 
In order to put those missions into practice, the Hindu Directorate formulated three broad tasks on the sector 
of religion, education, and general service for the period between 2005 and 2009. With context to the field of 
religion, following programs are stipulated: 1.) the program to increase understanding, realization, regular 
practice and progress of Hindu values, 2.) the program to increase Hindu religious instruction and faith -based 
education, 3.) the program to improve the quality of Hindu life, 4.) the program to develop Hindu faith -based 
social organizations and institutions in the field of education, the religion research and development program, 
and 5.) the program to raise  inter-faith harmony. In the sector of education, the strategic plan stipulates an 
ambitious program. On the formal stream of education from pre -school to the higher education, the Hindu 
class shall be implemented as expressed in the implementation of the nine-year compulsory school attendance 
program. On the informal stream of education following programs shall be implemented: 1.) an educator’s and 
employee quality upgrading program; 2.) a program to socialize reading culture and to foster libraries, 3.) an 
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Minister of Religion Decree 3 in 2006 regulated the current structure and tasks of the Hindu Directorate: the 
fifth section (§56-75) of the document outlined the structure and duty assignments of the newly introduced 
Education Directorate headed by the Director of Education Made Sujana. The Hindu education Directorate is 
structured in to four units. The chart shows the organizational chart of the Hindu Education Directorate in 
2007. 
 
Following the era of reform and the education paradigm shift, general tasks assigned to the Hindu Education 
Directorate pertain to the operation and guidance of Hindu education. Those policies are based on technical 
policies  passed  by  the  Hindu  Director  General,  which  in  turn  follow  the  parameters  of  national  and 
international conventions in education. The tasks executed by the Education Directorate are 
1.  preparing materials to formulate the educational strategic planning instruments,  
2.  formulating  the  national  standards  and  operational  policies  for  Hindu  education  in  instruction, 
curriculum, accreditation, supervision, in media and technologies,  
3.  implementing, monitoring and evaluating technical Hindu educational policies, and  
4.  planning and approving the educational budget and subsidies.  
 
Its vision aims to mould a Hindu, who has sraddha (iman, faith), practices bhakti (takwa, follows the commands 
of God), and morals (susila, akhlak) and knowledge acquired in the Hindu class and Hindu-based education, and 
puts them regularly to practice in social and national life. Its mission is to: 
1.  improve the quality of Hindu education by reforming the education system as to emphasize cognitive, 
affective, and psycho-motor aspects 
2.  improve the role and function of Hindu-based education institutions in the efforts to anticipate the 
impact of social changes, which occur in all field of life in order to strengthen the national identity and 
personality and thereby cementing existential harmony in society, nation and state 
3.  increase  the  Hindu  human  capital  quality  through  education,  trainings,  seminar,  orientations  and 
research 
4.  increase media and infrastructure of Hindu instruction and education  
Then the Hindu Directorate Generals ambitious mission 3 is concretized in a program aimed to implement the 
compulsory school attendance and to raise the quality of Hindu education at all levels. The Hindu Directorate 
General  and  the  Hindu  Council  currently  join  forces  to  nationalize  Hind-based  institutions  at  all  levels  of 
education, which have been previously operated by private Hindu foundations, by proposing the Hindu-based 
widyalaya as an equivalent to the Islamic-based madrasah. In other words, general but Hindu-based state run 
education institutions shall be established at all levels throughout Indonesia. This effort conforms with article 
12 of the National Education Act 20/2003, in which the widyalaya are listed as equivalent school type to the 
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During the era of reform, the proposal of a Hindu education concept equivalent to the madrasah system was 
brought  to  the  Minister  of  Education,  the  parliament  and  the  Indonesian  president.  Eventually  National 
Education Act 20/2003 and subsequent regulations accommodated the Hindu proposal to implement a Hindu-
based education system comparable to the Islamic madrasah. It is safe to say that together with the Muslim 
fraction the Hindu community represented by the Hindu Council supported paragraph 12 of Law 20/2003 and 
subsequent  regulations  on  faith-based  education.  (Interviews  I  Made  Sujana,  IB  Yudha  Triguna  in  2007, 
informal interview IB Gunadha).  
Related to those developments on the education sector, three tertiary institutions were nationalized in 2005, 
the Institute Hindu Dharma in Denpasar, the State School of Applied Hindu Science (STAHN, Sekolah Tinggi 
Agama Hindu Negeri) Tampung Penyang in Central Kalimantan, and the State School of Applied Hindu Science 
Gede Pudja in Mataram, Lombok. Due to the concerted action of incumbent Balinese Governor I Mangku Pasti 
Pastika and Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gede Yudha Triguna, who both have vast political and social networks with 
donors from inside and outside Indonesia since 2006, educational management and provision of facilities are 
continuously improved on the Hindu education sector. In 2006 and 2007, Hindu tertiary institutes were opened 
in Lampung and Manado, and it is safe to say that the era of reform, but especially the Yudhoyono presidency, 
brought an increasing room to maneuver for Hindus on the educational sector.  
Teacher demand 
The subsequent tables show the population distribution by province, the share of the Hindu population, the 
amount of Hindu educators and pupils, the number of supervisors, and the amount of pasraman in 2006 and 
2007. The numbers clearly indicate that the previous data on the number of Hindus in Indonesia has been 
inaccurate. The statistic is compiled by the Directorate General. The number of the Hindu population in 2005 is 
compiled by the National Statistic Board, whereas the 2007 record is compiled from statistics of Hindu Council, 
the officials at the regional offices of religion or its regional agencies.  
 
If one compares the numbers of the Hindu representatives at the provincial level with the number of the 
community, the under-staffing of Hindu officials at all levels becomes evident. The assigned tasks cannot be 
exercised satisfactorily and sometimes even not completed. The table shows the Hindu population and its 
representatives at the provinces. PART C | 166 
 
1Agents of Hindu Affairs with different tasks assigned, competences required and salaries paid, pembina is a 
coach, penyelenggara an operator, penyuluh a street worker and juru penerang an information clerk 
The following table shows the state of Hindu religious education in numbers. Based on 10 students per class, 
the last column gives the calculated demand for teachers, which are needed to operate the Hindu education 
system successfully. It shows that 28.387 Hindu teachers are needed. Remarkable is the lack of 820 Hindu 
teachers in Bali. PART C | 167 
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The following table shows the amount of public and private schools, students (all religions), and the state Hindu 
teachers  appointed  either  by  the  Department  of  Religion  or  the  Department  of  Education  in  compulsory 
schooling in Bali in 2005/2006. As the table demonstrates, even in Bali there is a lack of Hindu religion teachers, 
whereas Islamic education units and teachers are overrepresented.  
  Schools  Pupils  Hindu religion teacher   
2005/2006  public  private  total  total  Nip  15 
(DepAg) 
Nip 13 
(Depdiknas) 
total  demand  needed  ratio 
Elementary 
school 
2369  34  2403  350.561  224  2827  3051  4803  1752  Each 
school 
two 
teachers 
Junior  high 
school 
177  116  293  122,797  109  361  470  1,333  863  One 
teacher 
for  90/ 
100 
students 
 
Hindu budget and Hindu education budget allocation 
According to Presidential Decree No 165/2001 and Minister of Religion Decree No 1/2006, the administrative 
structure of the MORA is financed entirely by the annual national revenue and expenditure budget (Anggaran 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN), which is approved by the parliament. The annual operational budget 
allocated to the MORA is among the highest budgets in Indonesia. Usually, it ranks fourth or fifth under the 
assigned annual budgets of all ministries. In 2007, the largest annual operating budget was allocated to the 
MONE. The annual budget of the General Labor Department ranked second and the Health Department third. 
In 2006 and 2007, the MORA received an annual budget approaching 900 Million Euro. 
The annual budget is distributed proportionally to the percentage a faith community holds of the population’s 
total number. The population of Indonesia amounted 220 million in 2006, of which 10, 5 million were Hindus. 
Consequently, the proportion allocated to Hindus should be between five and six percent, yet usually it the 
allocated budget is below one percent
253. But, the allocated annual operating budget to the Hindu Directorate 
is insufficient and not in proportion with the work load. In the past, it was even impossible to allocate budget 
to some Hindu sub-divisions and/or regional offices or agencies. In order to realize the outlined vision and 
mission statements, unfailing Prof Triguna is lobbying all thinkable instances to steadily increase the Hindu 
budget. The table shows the annual operational budget of the MORA and annual operating budget allocated to 
the Hindu Directorate. 
 
YEAR  Annual Budget MORA  Annual Budget (Hindu-Buddha)  Euro 
2000 
Hindu Buddha 
-  IRD 4,039,264,000  - 
2001 
Hindu-Buddha 
-  IRD 6,430, 225, 000 
EUR 643,022,5 
Exchange rate (July 7) 
EUR 1 = IDR 10,000  
2002 
Hindu-Buddha 
-  IRD 8, 310, 353, 000 
EUR 923,594,8 
EUR 1 = IDR 9, 000 
2003 
Hindu-Buddha 
-  IRD 11, 891, 885, 000 
EUR 1,251,777,37 
EUR 1 = IDR 9, 500 
2004 
Hindu-Buddha 
-  IDR 16, 781, 332, 000 
EUR 1,452,929,2 
EUR 1 = IDR 11, 500 
2005 
Hindu-Buddha 
-  IDR 20,103,000,000 
EUR 1,675,250,0 
EUR 1 = IDR 12, 000 
2006  
Hindu-Buddha 
IDR 9.720.931.700.000  
EUR 810.077.642,0 
IDR 34.637.876.000 
EUR 2,886,490,0 
EUR 1 = IDR 12, 000 
YEAR  Annual Budget MORA  Annual Budget (Hindu)  Euro 
2007  
Hindu 
IDR 10.775.882.200.000 
EUR 862,070,576,0 
26,049,951,000 
EUR 2,083,996,1 
EUR 1 = IDR 12, 500 
2008 
Hindu 
-  IDR 36.309.629.000 
EUR 2,593,544, 90 
EUR 1 = IDR 14, 000 
Source: Direktorat Jenederal Bimas Hindu dan Buddha, 2005: 62 -63, personal communication with Prof Dr 
Yudha Triguna 
                                                 
253  Interview  Made  Sutresna,  Planning  and  Data  Division;  I  Made  Suma,  Finances  and  State  Property  Division,  and  Ketut  Lancar, 
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The  Hindu  Director  General  sets  out  the  vision  and  mission  statements.  The  Director  of  Hindu  education 
specifies those statements into strategies and programs. Based on real demands, an annual education budget 
plan for the coming year is calculated by the officials in the planning division of the education directorate. Thus, 
the Hindu education directorate plans how much budget it will need in the next year to realize its strategic 
program and drafts an education budget plan list (DIPA, daftar isian perencanaan anggaran). This list registers 
all expenditures necessary to achieve the target of the strategic plan. The budget plan is submitted to the 
planning and data division of the Hindu Directorate, which drafts the entire budget plan list of all units at the 
Directorate. The Director  General then approves of the  definitive budget plan list,  signs it, and the list is 
submitted to the finance division at the Secretariat General. Here the whole budget plan list of the MORA is 
compiled. The whole budget plan list is now turned in to the Department of Finance, which presents the whole 
budget plan list to the parliament. The parliament approves of the annual budget of all ministries. After the 
parliament’s approval, an annual budget is allocated to the account of the MORA, which is managed by the 
finance division at the Secretariat General. The planning division then distributes and allocates the budget to 
the  respective  Directorates
254.  The  following  illustration  shows  the  organizational  chart  of  t he  Hindu 
Directorate General in 2006. The arrows denote the procedure followed to estimate the demand for subsidies 
and funding within the Hindu Directorate and apply for those subsidies and funds described in the next 
chapter. 
 
The arrows show the procedures of application for annual budgets needed in the coming fiscal year. The graph 
shows the organizational chart of the budget planning process (2001-2006). 
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I found a major obstacle to the generally neutral and pluralistic position and policies of the MORA are situated 
in actual practices. Hindu educational planners may be as motivated and spirited as possible, yet, if the head of 
the planning unit does not approve of the Hindu directorate’s annual budget plan list, the directorate is not 
allocated the necessary amount of money needed to realize its targets. In the field of education, the national 
educational targets are even contravened, as the programs for pre-school Hindu education, for the widyalaya 
and for Hindu inter-faith harmony policies have not been subsidized by the MORA in 2007.  
According to my informants, usually there is a drawn out argument on the Hindu budget allocation between 
the head of the planning unit at the Secretariat General and the Hindu Director General. Prior to Prof Trigunas 
appointment, the budget might be influenced by the political and religious orientation of the head of the 
planning unit. Depending on the orientation of the planning divisions’ head – whether he is a nationalist or a 
‘greenish’ – an orthodox – Muslim, the allocated budget is insufficient or minimal, but still below the optimal 
amount to complete the targets. The Hindu Directorate criticizes its marginal budget, less than one percent of 
the actual six percent are allocated based on the argumentation that the Hindu community would not have 
many Hindu institutions, as there are only three state funded higher education institutes, and therefore it 
would be sufficient to have a small budget.  
To counter this line of argument, the Hindu Council and the Hindu Directorate conducted a census of all Hindus 
in Indonesia. Instead of approximately 4 Million Hindus, more than 11 Million adherents to Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia were counted. So Yudha Triguna argued that for such a number of Hindus a sufficient budget has to 
be allocated. As we can see in the following table, a growing amount is allocated to the Directorate. The table 
below shows the allocated education budget for the formal educational path.  
Educational 
program 
Elementary  High  Tertiary level  Total 
2000-2005  4, 276, 100, 000  1, 726, 600, 000  4, 856, 500, 000   
2005  6, 050, 000, 000  2, 800, 000, 000  3, 000, 000, 000  11, 850, 000, 000 
2006  3.606.993.000  1.947.284.000  1.834.977.000   
2007  3.768.000.000  2.100.000.000  2.670.000.000   
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5.3.4. Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
I did not explore in depth on membership, structure, and organization, as I focused on the analysis of the 
guidelines on religious instruction set out in Council’s decrees and bhisama (a legal statement binding for all 
Hindus issued by the council on a specific issue). Still, I like to note that the council has shifted from a spiritual 
into a social organization after its organizational structure was changed in 1996 and 2001. (see Picard 2011) 
Certainly, the old elites, or the ‘Brahmana Gang
255’ was not in support of this restructuring - as always, if the 
status quo is open to controversy. Indeed, the shift towards a more secular management is a point of open 
controversy between Indonesian Hindus. 
From a local to a global conception 
This section describes the Council’s conceptional shift from a local into a global representative organization of 
the Indonesian Hindu Community. (Dana 2005, 2005a; Sudharta 2006, Parisada 2006) The Hindu Council has 
been established in 1959 and continued the work of the Balinese Dewan Raja-Raja and the Paruman Pinandita. 
On  October  7  1958,  a  meeting  between  the  executives  of  the  provincial  and  national  parliament,  the 
Independent Religion Office of the Bali Region
256 and leaders of the Hindu organizations was held in the great 
meeting hall (Balai Agung Mayarakat) in Denpasar. It was decided to establish a Hindu Council designed to 
assist the Hindu division at the branch office of MORA in Singaraja.(cf. Bakker 1993: 230) For this purpose, it 
was agreed to build a committee for the preparation of a Hindu Bali congress (Panitia Perancang Hindu Bali 
Sabha). The committee members were Paruman Para Pandita (Pedanda Made Kemenuh), Panti Agama Hindu 
(I Ketut Kandia),  Angkatan Mudah  Agama Hindu (Ida Bagus Dosther and Wedastra Suyasa), Dr.  Ida Bagus 
Mantra, and I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa (national parliament member).  
On December 6 1958, the committee held a meeting in Pesanggrahan, Bedugul, deciding that a Great Assembly 
(Pesamuhan Agung) was to be held in January 1959, which came to be known as formation session of the 
Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali. On February 21, 22 and 23 1959, the Hindu Bali Sabha conference was held at the 
Airlangga Literature Faculty (today the Udayana University) in Denpasar and adopted the  Parisada Charter 
(Piagam  Parisada)
257. On the suggestion of Ida Bagus Dosther (Interview 2007), the  Parisada  should  be 
structured following the model of the Nahdlatul Ulama and the national parliament. It should consist of two 
chambers, one for the priests and one for laymen
258. The Charter has been signed by 28 signatories, comprising 
8 delegates from the Balinese provincial government, eight representatives of the eight districts, eight heads of 
the provincial and regional religion offices, and 12 religious organizations. Perhimpunan Buddhis Indonesia, Bali 
Dharma Yadnya, Partai Nasional Agama Hindu Bali, Majelis Hinduisme, Wiwadha Shastra Sabha, Satya Hindu 
Dharma,  Perhimpunan  Hidup  Ketuhanan,  Angkatan  Muda  Hindu  Bali,  Yayasan  Dwijendra,  Eka  Adnyana 
Dharma, Persatuan Keluarga Bhujangga Waisnawa, Paruman Para Pandita. (Yayasan 2003, 2005; Sudharta 
2006: 230; Bakker 1993: 230)Sudharta also mentions Kumara Bhuwana. 
In  sum,  all  Hindu  reformist  organization  united  in  the  Hindu  Council.  As  also  a  Buddhist  organization 
participated in the meeting, it is very likely that they did so in order to discuss a common strategy. From 1963 
(Bakker 1993) or 1967 (MORA Year Books) until 2006, the Buddhist congregation and the Hindu congregation 
were represented in one directorate general at MORA in Jakarta. Article 11 of the Piagam Parisada mentions 
the tasks to be exercised research, education, information, and social welfare. The Parisada was charged with 
the task of coordinating all the religious activities of Balinese Hindus by regulating, promoting, and developing 
agama Hindu Bali in order to strengthen the awareness of Hindus about their religious and social life. (Bakker 
1993: 231) 
   
                                                 
255 Personal communication with Dr I Gusti Komang Aryana, October 2007. ‚You’, he said, ‚you continously hang out with the brahmana 
gang’. The brahmana gang denotes the circle of  Brahmins and intellectuals that centre around the PHDI and UNHI, as its cadre training unit 
or elit school, which display a organicist and feodal or status-quo oriented attitude.  
256 Recall the existence of a branch of the central Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bali and the simultaneous establishment of an Independent 
Religion Agency of the Bali Region by Hindus. The central Ministry’s branches were suspected to be Muslim and Christian missionaries, 
preparing and initiating big mass conversion, therefore the Balinese countered these approaches by establishing an Independent Religion 
Agency. 
257 Bakker (1993: 230) and Yayasan (2003, 2005) mention the Dwijendra secondary high school building, whereas Sudharta (2006) and  
other sources mention the Airlangga Faculty. Most likely, the Bali Maha Sabha had been held at both buildings. 
258 After intense deliberations, the Hindu Council is structured as council of brahmins (Vipra Council) (Law of Manu XII 110-114). The eleven 
Brahmins of the Vipra Council were to be assisted by twenty-two laymen. The membership amounted thirty-three, a number regarded as 
sacred and auspicious. PART C | 172 
During the first years great assemblies were held frequently to discuss aspects of religion and to decide on 
future decisions. During the first assembly on October 31959, held at the Dwijendra high school, the book 
DharmaPrawerti Sastra
259, the first book compiled the Council’s secretariat, was discussed. It should be used as 
textbook in schools, and distributed to those who wish to deepen their knowledge of Hindu Dharma. The 
second Great Assembly was held at Dwijendra high school on October 21 1961. This assembly debated the 
preparation of the Eka Dasa Rudra Ritual, which was planned to be performed in 1963. Also, it was decided to 
organize  a  retreat  (pangasraman)  for  high  priests,  Hindu  experts,  and  community  leaders.  The  retreat  or 
Dharma Asrama was held in the district of Gianyar from November 17 to 23 1961 and adopted the Campuhan 
Charter (Piagam Campuhan). The document calls for the establishment of a Hindu-based institution of higher 
education, the Institute Hindu Dharma.  
It is noteworthy, that the Campuhan Charter is the first national Hindu document. It is structured in two parts: 
Dharma Agama (religious duties) and Dharma Negara (state duties). Dharma Agama denotes a dharmic life 
style oriented on the basic meta-framework of Agama Hindu (Tatwa, Susila, Upacara). Here the organicist 
understanding  accords  well  with  the  Hindu  Bali  anthropology  and  concepts  of  governance.  A  Hindu  has 
religious duties (swadharma), but as a citizen and social creature a Hindu has duties towards the community 
and the state. Hindus shall respect the Pancasila and the 1945 Basic Law. Hindus shall position themselves as to 
play an active role in national life. The confident style of argument and demand expressed in the document is 
remarkable. The Parisada used the public space to maneuver, and the first national Eka Dasa Rudra Ritual was 
carried out in 1963, playing a crucial role in the modern attempt to construct an Indonesian Hindu identity
260. 
In 1969, the second  Eka  Dasa  Rudra  Ritual  drew  large  attention  from  national  and  international  media, 
therefore reconfirming the national and international recognition of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. 
As the Balinese do not constitute the single Hindu community in Indonesia, the council made consistent efforts 
to open branches in all regions. In October 1964, the name was changed into  Parisada Hindu Dharma for 
political reasons, to “safe the Hindu brethren outside Bali” (Sudharta Interview 2008). “More than ever before 
the general Hindu character of the religion of Bali was emphasized, whereas the specifically Balinese element 
was becoming less important”. (Bakker 1993: 238) At the congress in 1964, the Parisada proclaimed five creeds 
(panca sradha) to be the theological foundation of Hindu Dharma, these five creeds parallel not only the 
principles of the state, but also the tenets of Indian neo-Hinduism and the Islamic pillars. As a result of the 
political tensions in Indonesia, many ethnic groups in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra and other islands had joined the 
council. Thereafter the council began to represent all Hindu communities in Indonesia.  
During the advent of the New Order, atheism and communism were interpreted either as threat to Islam or 
national unity. Therefore the adherence to an officially sanctioned religion was essential for survival, at the 
same  time  the  management  of  religion  gained  more  weight  in  the  political  arena.  Linked  to  the  ban  of 
communism, one was in mortal danger, if one was reckoned as atheist. Especially in Java, the polarization 
between  Islam  and  Communism,  and  the  unease  between  orthodox  ad  contextual  Muslims  led  to  the 
perception that one either is a Muslim or a Communist, and unverified stories circulated announcing an assault 
on non-Muslims. (Sudharta 2006: 72; Sudharta Interview 2008) Affiliation with an officially recognized agama, 
at any rate, became crucial for all people classified as not having a religion yet.  
   
                                                 
259 The booklet comprises the topics of Dharma, Widhi Tatwa, Atma, Samsara, Karmaphala, and Moksa. 
260 In 1963, the first national Eka Dasa Rudra Ritual was carried out, which played a crucial role in the modern attempt to construct an 
Indonesian Hindu  identity. According to some priests,  the performance of  that major ritual over several  weeks was allegedly stage-
managed by Sukarno, mistimed, and corrupted, in order to attract overseas travel agents and foreign investment. (Parker, 2004: 85 FN 14) 
During  the  performance  of  the  ritual,  the  holy  volcano  Gunung  Agung  erupted.  According  to  the  local  interpretation,  the  incorrect 
performance of the ritual caused the volcano to erupt. The eruption disturbed the performance of the ritual and damaged the crops, 
causing starvation, and this catastrophe was followed immediately by a rat plague. After those natural disasters (interpreted in local 
scriptures as divine sanctions), and the mass killings in 1965 and 1966, the performance of a purification ritual was required, as the island 
was contaminated and spiritually polluted due by the bloodshed, piling of corpses and mass graves. In 1969, the second Eka Dasa Rudra 
Ritual drew large attention from national and international media, therefore reconfirming the national and international recognition of 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia. After 1969 a big search (ngereh soroh) arose to find the appropriate ancestor line and basing on local genealogies 
(babad) several clans (Pasek, Pande, Dukuh) claimed descend from former Balinese nobility and don’t accept the supremacy of the Wong 
Majapahit.  PART C | 173 
By the end of the 1960s, the Suharto Regime had developed the joint secretariat of the functional groups 
(Sekber Golkar) aiming to utilize all aspirations of the Indonesian citizenry positively. Fearing Christian and 
Islamic  missionary  work  and  accusations  of  communism,  Cokorda  Rai  Sudharta  and  Ida  Bagus  Oka  Punia 
Atmaja, two Jakarta-based Parisada’ functionaries filed a petition for the admission of the Parisada to Golkar 
(Golongan Karya, functional groups) as a joint secretariat (Sekber, Sekretariat bersama) without knowledge of 
the entire council on July 6 1968. The Parisada was officially affiliated to Golkar on July 23 1968. The final 
official recognition of Hinduism, and interrelated to this process is the provision of the Hindu class and State 
Hindu institutions, has to be unambiguously brought in relation with the New Order’s assumption of power and 
the rescue maneuver initiated by Balinese Hindus. With the affiliation to Golkar however, the Parisada was not 
anymore  an  independent  Council,  but  a  wheel  in  the  Golkar  machinery,  it  as  a  consequence  Hinduism 
increasingly became indonesianized by the New Order regime. This affiliation has been severely criticized by 
‘subaltern’ Balinese intellectuals. 
In 1971, the Besakih temple was inaugurated as the central Indonesian Hindu sanctuary. Rituals conducted 
there are perceived to disseminate their respective energy benevolently across the entire archipelago and the 
world. In addition, the Hindu New Year Nyepi was proposed as national holiday and is since then a red-letter 
day  and  the  dictum  of  Desa-Kala-Patra  was  made  the  contextual  paradigm  to  adjust  contingent  tensions 
between adat and agama. In 1980, the discrimination between profane and sacral was formally introduced, to 
end and avert the inordinate sell-out and touristic exploitation of Balinese religion and culture. In the same 
year the inauguration of the Tri Hita Karana as basic pattern of life was introduced with the first long-term 
work  program  (program  kerja  jangka  panjang)
261. Echoing the national development plans, the prog ram 
universally  and  programmatically  defined  bhakti  (keimanan,  faith)  and  sradha  (ketakwan,  following  the 
commands of God) as Hindu method to attain the twofold soultion of Moksartham Jagathita to the problem of 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In the first step,physical well-being in this life  (jagadhita) on the individual and 
communal level shall be attained, and in the next step spiritual bliss and the union of individual soul and the 
universal soul. The strategy adopted to realize this twofold aim on an universal and programmatic level is to 
enable national and civil organizations to strengthen  sradha by improving a faith-based life based on the 
triangle of satyam (truth), siwam (purity), and sundaram (beauty, aesthetics). 
In 1984, the council’s short-term program outlined in the long-term program adopted the Pancasila as sole 
basis  of  the  organization  and  implemented  the  Pancasila  Comprehension  and  Practice  Program  (Program 
Penghayatan  dan  Pengamalan  Pancasila,  henceforth  P4-program)  for  the  Hindu  community  using  the 
administrative structure of Indonesia. This shows exemplarily the top-down process of implementing national 
guidelines into all the segments of the nation-state. Using the administrative structure, those programs were 
socialized into all groups and individuals. The P4 program resulted in the Pancasilzation of Hinduism and its 
increasing gradual Indonesianization afterwards. As extension of this policy, the Council gave its active support 
to the decision taken by the Suharto regime to require all students to attend the religion class from primary to 
higher education. (cf. Bakker 1993: 240) 
During the 1970s, and 1980s the Parisada set up branches in almost all provinces and regencies. The council 
complied with the Suharto regime’s state-building efforts and the culturalization of politics. During Suharto’s 
presidency, several ethnic religions became Hindu and joined the  Parisada and the Directorate General of 
Hindu Affairs. In consequence, the increasingly multi-ethnic composition of the Hindu congregation resulted in 
the universalization and global contextualization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In 1986, the council changed its 
name into Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In addition, it was decided to move the principal office from 
Denpasar to Jakarta. (Bakker 1993 238; Sudharta 2006)  
The integration of ethnic groups into the fold of Hindu Dharma was accepted by the government, who saw in it 
a way of preserving the ethnic religions without violating the principle that every citizen had to embrace one of 
the state funded agama. (cf. Bakker 1993: 241) And of course, for the ethnic religions the possibility of being 
registered as Hindus while at the same time preserving some of their own religion was very attractive: “(…) 
their temples and rituals remained unchanged; the only thing expected of them was that they should take 
cognizance of the Upadeca tentang Ajaran-ajaran Agama Hindu, far less than would have been required had 
they become Muslim or Christian. (Bakker 1993: 241)  
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In consequence, Hindu Dharma Indonesia is monistic, and has five central creeds (Panca Sradha) as central 
element of tatwa (Philosophy). Whereas tatwa is identical for all Indonesian Hindus, ethics (susila) and ritual 
(upacara) may vary according to desa, kala, and patra among the Hindu groups in the archipelago
262. As has 
been shown, there was “a world of difference in the experiences” (Bakker 1993: 241) of the Balinese and the 
ethnic  religions  with  regard  to  their  religious  conceptualizations  –  Balinese  Hinduism  and  the  separate 
traditions of the ethnic religions.  
Replying to economic, social, and political transformations in the 1990s, the Parisada changed its mere spiritual 
orientation and became increasingly involved into social issues after 1996
263. Related to the increasing public 
space and room to maneuver during the tradition to democracy, the council’s agenda moved away from its 
traditional focus on ritual and theology and began to focus on ethics and the active achievement of social 
welfare (lokasamgraha)
264.  
As a consequence, its structure shows mechanism of participatory democracy. The current vision and mission 
statement focused on respect of plurality, social welfare, gender equality, the challenges of globalization, 
education, and the role of the young generations. (Dana: 2005) Continuing the thoughts of the early reformers, 
the twofold solution to the problem of Hindu Dharma Indonesia ( Moksartham  Jagathita  ca  iti  Dharma  - 
Dharma is the way to attain individual and communal physical-well, bliss and release from the cycle of rebirth) 
is maintained. (Dana: 2005) As Hindus live together with other religious communities without conflict in Bali 
and Indonesia since  centuries, Hindus approve of intra-faith and inter-faith plurality and pluralism. (Dana: 
2005)  
Beginning  with  its  formation,  the  Parisada  has  been  structured  bi-cameral,  as  its  architects  followed  the 
organizational model of the Indonesian parliament and the Nahdlatul Ulama. (Dosther Interview 2007) Starting 
with the organizational restructuring in 2001, the council is now structured into a high priest ‘chamber’ (sabha 
pandita) headed by a Dharma Adhyaksa (Dharma prosecutor) and its vice prosecutor consisting of thirty-three 
professional  high  priests  coming  from  all  Hindu  groups  in  Indonesia.  With  this  restructuring  the  equal 
representation of Balinese, other ethnic groups, and sampradaya (currents) shall be guaranteed. The second 
chamber, the lay-men ‘chamber’ (sabha walaka), constitutes the administrative body and the management 
board. It comprises fifty-five lay Hindu members from all Hindu.  
In 2001, the central Hindu council in Jakarta set out the strategy to re-actualize the interpretation of charity 
(dana punia) and four social groups(catur varna) in the community. In 2002, these new interpretations were 
codified in three bhisama (a legal statement binding for all Hindus issued by the council on a specific issue).  
                                                 
262 Concerning plurality, Parisada has published following considerations (Parisada 2006: 106-107) Agama Hindu is a religion that truly 
respects diversity. The multicultural Indonesian society and its various cultures are seen as a mosaic – a divine grace harboring affluent 
diversity.  This  diversity  comprises  ethnicity,  race,  religion,  regions,  which  all  are  a given.  Indonesia’s multicultural  social  condition  is 
interpreted as an exceptional cultural abundance. Naturally, diversity comes with the potential of conflict, if the citizenry or the state 
mismanages  diversity.  As  shown  in  history,  the  Hindu-Bali  community  outside  Bali  and  the  non-Balinese  Hindu  communities  feel 
comfortable with their experience of diversity as long as practices conform to the five basic creeds. Inherited from the ancestors, all Hindus 
apply their respective ritual system in their particular region of origin. Remarkable is here, the Parisada admits out of aforementioned 
reasoning that the standard of sanctuary ornamentation does not have to be identical with Balinese temples style. 
263 An Analysis of the monthly journal  Warta Hindu Dharma was initially planned but then neglected, because it is not concerned with 
formal education in schools. There were virtually no articles on formal Hindu religious education in the years from 1998 to 2002. One of my 
informants even giggled amused as I have told him that I had considered using the WHD as a source. It sees itself mainly as a media to 
spread a certain conservative or super-jero understanding of Hinduism among its readers, but it appears to be quite apolitical until 2008. 
Since it is similar in style to Catholic tabloids, I consider it to be the propagation media of the Parisada and the traditionalist fraction of the 
Brahmana Gang. Its target group is the educated society interested in ahistoric and purist Hindu exegesis, but it appears as if the journal 
excludes contemporary issues and opinions which are considered to not benefit the system. During the monetary crisis, the fall of Suharto 
and the reform area criticism of the social situation remained quite subtle, afterwards it became more pronounced, but the journal is still 
mainly concerned with spiritual-philosophic questions and usada, less with economic, social or cultural pressures.  
264 The ideal of lokasamgraha is said to be understood following Dr Radhakrishnan as denoting ‘(t)he maintenance of the world stands for 
the unity of the world, [and, AL] the interconnectedness of society’
264. Lokasamgraha denotes universal well-being and social welfare. The 
concept of universal welfare is narrowed down and focused on the universal well-being of the Hindu community as part of the global 
community. Because all members of the world community are part of the global ensemble, if one community feels unwell, in this case the 
Indonesian Hindu community, global stability and welfare will not be achieved. Well-being is defined as a condition in which all Hindus can 
achieve an appropriate standard of life and are free from material and spiritual poverty. In essence, social welfare is interpreted as a target 
to be realized, and this is achieved by broadening the conception of manusia yadnya to include not only life-cycle rituals, but also charity 
(dana punia). (Interview Titib 2007; Dana 2005: 234) On base of compassion and cosmopolitism, contributions shall be made by Hindus for 
Hindus which will be used strategically for the long term benefit of the Indonesian Hindu human capital. Women shall be given the same 
opportunities as men, for that they together can drive forth the progress of Hinduism. This avowal of gender equality seems to be more 
than mere lip service, as there were many young woman given administrational tasks by Dana in 2007. PART C | 175 
Those new interpretations are specified in the Strategic Socialization Plan and are to be implemented using 
following channels: 1.) education, 2.) Hindu social organizations, 3.) state institutions (MORA, Center for Clerics 
at the National Police and the National Army), 4.) mass media, and 5.) art. The 2001-2006 working program has 
the following arenas of activities: 1.) religion (tatwa and its realization), 2.) information and education, 3.) 
organization and management, 4.) economics and contributions, 5.) social and cultural sphere, and 6.) research 
and development.  
In conclusion, the Hindu Council as modern organization lobbies for the rights of Balinese and Indonesian 
Hindus influencing the consolidation process of Indonesian Hindu Dharma since its inception. The Parisada is 
the highest independent Indonesian Hindu Dharma representative organization in the Indonesian nation-state. 
It is authorized by the government to administer Hindu Dharma affairs, and to monitor Hindu Dharma law. As 
official  independent  representative  of  the  Hindu  community,  the  council  works  closely  together  with 
governmental bodies, as the MORA, the Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation and 
other ministries to maintain a multicultural conception. The council’s outreach is still insufficient as result 
limited human and financial resources. Therefore Parisada admits a lack of Hindu professionals in all sectors, 
which are central to increase the role of the Parisada in its relation with the state. Parisada representatives 
participate  in  numerous  international,  national,  and  regional  meetings  and  conferences  on  community-
building, inter-faith dialogue, inter-faith cooperation, and inter-faith harmony, as in the 1
st ASEM Interfaith 
Dialogue  that  launched  the  “Bali  Declaration  on  Building  Interfaith  Harmony  with  the  International 
Community”.  
Participation in politics 
In 2004, the Parisada criticized the Hindu community’s tendency of either being apolitical - as result of being 
traumatized or even allergic to politics - or avoiding politics at any rate because ofpolitics image as dirty or high 
risk. Consequently, the Parisada calls for a new paradigm of “participation in politics” in order to eradicate the 
practices of collusion, corruption, and nepotism. Politics are seen as related to power and the functioning of 
the state, and thus politics are seen to be a noble profession, community assignment, and sacrifice, and not 
linked to personal greed and wealth. Therefore the PHDI proposes that 
1.  The Hindu community shall engage actively in daily politics while respecting the incandescence of 
Hindu morality and ethics  
2.  The Hindu community may have divergent political opinions, yet these controversies shall not cause 
the disintegration of the Hindu community 
3.  Hindu politicians struggling to forward the interest of their party shall remember the interests of the 
Hindu community. 
4.  The Hindu community in general shall be guided always and in every activity by the doctrines compiled 
in the Catur Veda. 
 
In addition, the Parisada distributed an information and motivation letter to all regional branches to socialize 
its new paradigm. 
 
1.  Taking actions in the arena of politics is a responsibility of the community (niatam karma) 
2.  While  doing  politics  one  should  orient  oneself  on  Hindu  vales,  moral  and  ethics  in  line  with  the 
Lokasamgraha Vision  
3.  Differences in political opinions and aspirations shall not cause conflicts or the disintegration of the 
Hindu community 
4.  The overture to engage actively in politics shall not influence the autonomy of the  Parisada (this 
pertains to the Parisada functionaries in the regions) 
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As the PHDI is an independent Hindu Council and a faith-based/moral institution, it is not engaged in party 
politics and elections
265. It does not recommend the Hindu community to vote for a certain party, because this 
would contravene the concept of democratic, free, direct, public, and secret elections. However, the  Parisada 
encourages Hindu voters to elect a ‘kebhinekkan’ party promoting plurality. That is not to say that Balinese are 
democratic,  but  the  study  likes  to  point  out,  that  centralistic  and  authoritarian  as  well  as  pluralistic  and 
democratic trends and traditions have existed and blended in Bali. Since the formation of the state, Balinese 
intellectuals support and back the plural and multicultural conception of Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 
which are deeply rooted in the pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist legacy. 
Hindu Council Policies on Hindu Education 
The Parisada currently attempts to evaluate the quality of the Hindu education system, its content and the 
curriculum. The council aims to invent creative pedagogy and teaching methods. Besides strengthening faith, 
the Hindu class and Hindu education is considered to promote economic, political, scientific, and technological 
progress in this world. This section describes the recommendations and regulations on the Hindu class and 
Hindu education issued by the Parisada chronologically. 
1961 Campuhan Charter 
In  the  founding  document,  the  Piagam  Parisada,  education  is  mentioned  as  a  field  of  activity.  The  1961 
Campuhan Charter has invoked in section A Dharma Agama, first article the Indian Vedas (Weda Sruti) and the 
smriti  texts  (Dharma  Sastra  Smirti)  as  basic  sacred  scriptures,  however,  listed  are  Javanese  medieval  and 
Balinese scriptures and not the standard Indian systematic. In its second article, the section demands the 
establishment of an Asrama Pangadyayan (religious tertiary institute), a place to study dharma. This aspiration 
was realized on October 3
rd, 1963 with the opening of the Hindu Dharma Institute (now UNHI
266) in Denpasar. 
Referring to the nation state’s pluralistic Basic Law, the council shows its nationalistic orientation, while at the 
same time it insists on providing Hindu education at all levels of schooling and higher education. Section B, 
Dharma Negara, article 3 of the Campuhan Charter states:  
 
Espousing the first principle Belief in One Supreme Lordship, the Pancasila is well-thought-of and 
the council is of the opinion that every citizen shall obey this principle. The council votes for the 
provision of instruction in Dharma Agama at schools and urges the governmental bodies to draft 
and adopt regulations that implement the religion class in the embraced faith and explanations 
on the fountainhead of One Supreme Lordship as compulsory class for students at public and 
private schools and in higher education and urges the MORA to implement the council’s decree 
in order to provide the Hindu Bali religion class in schools, where Dharma Hindu Bali adherents 
attain class. (Sudharta 2006: 52, own translation) 
 
The fourth point of section B, Dharma Negara, reads:  
                                                 
265 During the transition to democracy criticism of the social situation remained quite subtle in the Warta Hindu Dharma, afterwards it 
became more pronounced. The editions of 1998 and 1999 do reflect on a spiritual crisis in Indonesia, but are not critical at all, at best they 
engage in a subtle criticism as it was common under the Suharto regime for the reason not to lose the publishing license. Probably the 
editorial board feared a situation like in 1965 and remained therefore silent and observant. There are a few articles on the use of Hindu 
concepts in intercultural conflicts and about clean government, but they are philosophically oriented towards Hindu scriptures and their 
exegesis and mention no implication for practical concerns. In august 1998 the WHD published an article, criticizing a high priest (pedanda) 
for actively engaging in the then political uproar. (Madrasuta 1998: Pedanda Demonstran. WHD, Agustus 1998, 377: 8-9) A high priest is 
described as holding a religious office that is bond on certain conditions and rules, obligations and competencies that are termed Sasana 
Kawikon. Traditionally, Sasana Kawikon is related to the performance of Hindu rituals. The duty of a high priest is to point on auspicious 
days (dewasa ayu) for rituals and to decide on the complexity of upakara used to perform the ritual. The Kawikon also contains rules of 
conduct or a code of conduct. Outside the field of religion, a high priest cannot do much. He can express himself on the field of art, 
architecture or literature, but may not be indulge himself in the field of economics. A high priest may be concerned with science, but may 
not engage in research which uses animals in tests. The author is then further of the opinion that a high priest may not participate in 
politics. A high priest may not use the obedience or relationship of his subjects (siwa-sisya) to influence or manipulate the direction or the 
political choice of the community, because this would diminish individual freedom. Then the protest-priest is named: Ida Pedanda Gede 
Sebali  Tianyar  Arimbawa  has  participated  in  discussions  on  social,  societal  and  religion  problems.  He  also  participated  in  the  mass 
demonstrations and protests against Suharto in Jakarta. Accompanied by some Hindu exponents he went to the parliament and expressed 
his sorrows about the present situation in Indonesia. Curiously this criticized high priest was Ida Pedanda Gede Sebali Tianyar Arimbawa, 
who was appointed Dharma Adhyaksa or Chief Dharma prosecutor of Indonesia from 2001-2006 and was re-appointed from 2007-2011. 
He then also signed the ‘participation in politics’ – paradigm of the Parisada in 2004.  
266 Between employees and graduates of UNHI, the Parisada as its founding and operational organization, the local government, the  
national government the MORA, the Hindu Directorate, the Army and Policy (graduates are employed at the Centre fo r Clerics) close links 
are entertained. UNHI was established explicitly as a Hindu cadre training centre, since the Parisada needed educated Hindus  and Hindu 
experts to place them in strategic positions in the government or in the army, expert capable to s ystematize Hinduism and teachers to be 
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Considering that the establishment of a Hindu Bali section in the central MORA has not been 
achieved, and the fact that the position of the Independent Religion Office of the Bali Region has 
been not revised, and in line with the claim of the Bali regional government, the Council urges the 
central government to end this intolerable condition immediately which cannot continue into the 
present. And, in addition to it, in all areas where Hindus settle, such as Lampung and Lombok, the 
government  shall  pay  attention  to  these  communities  by  establishing  a  Hindu  Bali  section  to 
cultivate inter-faith life. (Sudharta 2006: 57, own translation) 
 
Only after the Suharto take-over, as Sudharta (2006: 57) remarks, a triangle meeting between representatives 
of the Parisada, the regional government and the Independent Religion Office of the Bali Region had been hold.  
1968 Decree 
Then the Great Assembly held by the Parisada adopted the second decree in December 1968. Its consented 
areas of operation were in fields of  adat, developmental economy, education, culture, priesthood, sacred 
scriptures, and ritual. With regard to education, it was consented to continue the strategy of baliseering: Hindu 
religion and philosophy shall consequently inspire all subjects in school and efforts shall be made to strengthen 
moral and character (budhi pekerti) and faith. (Sudharta 2006: 72) This had an immediate impact, as the first 
official curriculum on Hindu religious education was established by the second decree in 1968. The table shows 
the content of the Hindu class at all levels of educational: 
 
(a) Elementary level (age 7 – 12)  (d) Higher education (age 19 +) 
Traditional folk songs containing educational  and religious elements      (1) Tatwa/ Philosophy  
   (2) Regional language and script     (2) Ethics (Susila Agama) 
   (3) Religious fairy tales     (3) Ritual and Ritual materials       
         (Upacara/Upakara) 
   (4) Religious duties (Dharma Agama)     (4) Dharma Agama 
   (5) Ethics (Susila Agama)     (5) Religious Science 
(b) Junior High level (age 13 – 15)   
   (1) Ethics (Susila Agama)    
   (2) Ritual and Ritual materials (Upacara/ Upakara)   
   (3) Basics in Tatwa/ Philosophy    
   (4) Dharma Agama   
(c) Senior High level (age 16 – 19)   
   (1) Ethics (Susila Agama)   
   (2) Tatwa/ Philosophy    
   (3) Ritual and Ritual materials (Upacara/Upakara)   
   (4) Dharma Agama   
1973 Decree 
The third decree in 1973 set out the strategies to be followed. Thereby the targets to be achieved in the arena 
of  in-school  (material)  and  out-of-school  (non-material)  education  became  clearer.  Concerning  formal 
education, subsequent agenda is outlined:  
 
1.  The  Parisada  is  responsible  for  the  compilation  of  a  synchronized,  systematic  and  normative 
curriculum  for  Hindu  instruction  at  all  levels  of  the  education  system  and  to  submit  it  to  the 
responsible institution.  
2.  The Parisada is responsible for the compilation of a curriculum for the training of the professional 
priesthood 
3.  The Parisada is responsible for the standardization of text books that can be used as manual at every 
grade and level of education  
4.  The  Parisada  is  responsible  for  increasing  the  efforts  made  to  help  Hindu  schools  thereby 
guaranteeing their continued existence 
5.  If funds are available, the Parisada is responsible for increasing the number of Hindu-based schools. 
Failing that, courses shall be held at the Hindu teacher colleges. The Parisada shall establish Hindu 
faith-based schools and general schools with a Hindu ethos. 
6.  The  Parisada  shall  open  ‘Pengasraman’  in  addition  to  existent  schools,  thereby  advancing  the 
efficiency of Hindu instruction and education for the community. 
7.  The  Parisada  shall  urge  the  government  to  increase  the  appointment  of  Hindu  educators  across 
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1980 Decree 
Subsequent sixth degree in 1980 on community structure has laid out more carefully the targets to be achieved 
within the scope of the formal education system. The decree mentions the allocation of grants and scholarships 
as a necessary means for the production of a cadre in the arena of religion. In the context of socializing the 
Pancasila  Comprehension  and  Practice  Program  (Program  Penghayatan  dan  Pengamalan  Pancasila,  P4-
program),  the  Hindu  community  shall  ensure  the  continuous  orientation  on  P4  as  the  national  standard 
(Pancasilaization and Indonesianization of HDI). 
1.  Infrastructure 
In the arena of formal education, the establishment of Hindu-based Teacher Training colleges, public schools at 
all levels of the education system and teacher training colleges shall be developed 
The quality of education and training at the IHD shall be increased and the infrastructure and materials shall be 
improved 
The Parisada shall continuously exercise pressure on the government to nationalize teacher training colleges 
across the country, especially outside Bali and the nationalization of the IHD shall be prosecuted as additional 
teacher training colleges shall be established in regions where the Hindu community is booming as in Central 
Kalimantan. 
2.  Educational Staff 
The Parisada shall continuously exercise pressure on the government to appoint state religion instructors at all 
levels  of  the  education  system.  This  shall  be  done  especially  in  regions  where  the  Hindu  community  is  a 
scattered minority. 
In the assignment of religion instructors to a region the dedication or will of the instructor in question to be 
assigned to that certain region shall be considered.  
3.  Curriculum 
A systematic, normative, synthesized and structured curriculum shall be compiled and put to practice at all 
levels of the education system, therewith a reasonable and effective HRE system will be offered, that is capable 
to nurture in Hindu faith sustainably. 
The curriculum shall be compiled according to the level of age, education and development of the child 
Hindu faith textbooks have to be compiled and published as teaching aids to support such a curriculum. The 
textbooks have to be structured in a consistent pattern. 
 
The long-term program passed in 1980 repeated the council’s call to 1.) nationalize the Hindu teacher training 
college (PGAH) in Denpasar, 2.) establish Hindu-based schools in all regions where a demand for Hindu-based 
educational units exists, 3.) appoint Hindu teachers and supervisors for Hindu teachers to schools, where Hindu 
students  attain  class,  and  4.)  improve  the  function  and  role  of  the  IHD  as  research,  interpretation,  and 
development institution for Hindu doctrines. With regard to parents, their role in the religious education of 
their  children  shall  be  increased  in  the  family  context,  that  is  to  say  more  attention  shall  be  given  for 
appropriate religious nourishing. The call to nationalize the IHD were repeated in 1991 and reiterated until its 
realization in 1999. In addition, the decree set out the following strategy in the educational sector (formal and 
non-formal education): 1) complying with national development targets, the functional transfer of the State 
Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN) into an Institute of Teachers’ Education (LPTK, Lembaga Pendidikan 
Tenaga Kependidikan) that has a status, role, and function in the training of Hindu teachers shall be achieved, 
2.) the establishment of a Hindu university shall be accomplished (this was achieved in 1993), and its role and 
function  as  Hindu  studies  center  in  research,  interpretation,  education,  training,  and  information  shall  be 
strengthened 3.) and the quantity and quality of pasraman shall be increased across Indonesia.  
In 1996, the council set itself the task to formulate a model and plan for out-of-school religious education by 
inaugurating the family as the central agent in religious education. For the first time in its history, the council 
engaged in social and political means by undertaking a census of all religion instructors from elementary to 
tertiary level across Indonesia and actively engaged in political efforts to realize the appointment of Hindu 
religion teachers at all levels of schooling. In addition, it investigated and reported on the number, quality, and 
status of all Hindu teacher training colleges and institutions should be investigated and reported. 
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Working Program 2001-2006 
In the information and education sector, the working program of the Parisada sets out the strategy (point 4 
and 6) for the period 2001-2006 to formulate a proper standardized Hindu education concept and its subject 
matter for all ages and social strata in all from kindergarten to higher education. This program shall be annually 
assessed and evaluated in order to report on the program’s level of effectiveness and success. Furthermore, 
the provision of Hindu education material shall be improved for all educational streams at all levels (Sunday 
schools,  pasraman,  ashrams,  formal,  and  non-formal  education).  In  consequence,  a  periodic  sraddha-
deepening program for all age groups and social groups in the Hindu community shall be implemented, as a 
week-end ashrams for children at the pre-school and elementary level, youth-camps for the higher education 
levels, discussion forums for students and the youth, and pilgrimages for their parents.  
 
Efforts to be realized were 1.) compilation of a comprehensive data set of Hindu education institutions at all 
levels  (the  program  was  successful,  as  the  data  on  the Hindu  population  and  Hindu  education  show),  2.) 
building new schools and renovating the existing school buildings, 3.) increasing the Hindus education systems 
academic status, quality and teaching management. The working program then identifies steps to be taken 
(many of them have been realized in 2007 according to my judgment, as I have visited the central secretariat 
four times from 2007-2009): 
 
1.  Formation of an archive and data management center at the central secretariat, which powers a 
representative internet presence 
2.  Enhancing the quality and distribution of the Journal Warta Hindu Dharma, organizing discussions on 
Hindu development 
3.  Increasing  the  amount  and  quality  of  Hindu  broadcasting  by  utilizing  mass  media  through  the 
community 
4.  Establishing a Parisada Publishing House 
5.  Launching and operating an Hindu based radio 
6.  Providing continuously trainings and assigning Dharma Duta (Dharma delegates) to the Hindu pockets 
in the regions 
7.  Collecting data on and improving the welfare of Hindu teachers across Indonesia 
8.  Collecting data on and advancing the cooperation with Hindu Widyalaya education institutions from 
kindergarten to higher education 
9.  Compiling and preparing a Hindu religion instruction curriculum for all educational levels and types 
10.  Deepening the understanding of bhakti and sradha in all levels of formal, non-formal and informal 
education, youth camps, religious discussion forums and Dharma Sadhana 
11.  Establishing a Parisada Center Library and pushing the regional offices across Indonesia to establish 
libraries focusing on Hindu literature. 
12.  Offering  various  training  to  the  young  generation  in  order  to  nourish  and  strengthen  bhakti  and 
sradha.  
 
The program’s responsibility report enlists 130 activities that have been exercised in the sector of education 
and information. Because the recommendations of the Parisada are included into effective law, it is safe to 
assess that the Parisada is successfully lobbying for its interests realizing its targets. 
2002 Bhisama: Education a crucial vehicle 
The  2002  bhisama  introduces  education  as  a  crucial  vehicle  to  disseminate  the  council’s  renewed 
interpretation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In 2002, for the Parisada launched a Hindu education institute
267, 
which is given manifold tasks in the educational sector and in curriculum compilation. When I visited the 
Parisada central office in Jakarta, the institute has not been operational  – due to insufficient funding and 
expert staffing. Educational institutions at the formal (schooling and higher education) and non-formal level 
(families and society) are interpreted by the council as  efficient channels  for the socialization of the new 
bhisama. The content of the bhisama have to be disseminated in such a form that it befits the respective 
(evolving) intellectual and acculturation capacity. The implementation of the bhisama is not required to follow 
literally the high priest council’s interpretation. But it has to correspond to the essence contained therein, 
which in turn shall motivate the Hindu congregation to follow and practice it. The methods (Sad Dharma) to 
nurture in the new competencies used in formal and non-formal education are:   
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1.  Dharma Wacana (method of speech/lecture) 
2.  Dharma Tula (discussion method: panel, sarasehan, symposium, seminar) 
3.  Dharma  Santi  (reading  Vedas  communal  approach  method,  networks  and  clubs, 
silaturahmi/maintaining family ties; anjangsana/ philanthropic visits to orphanages) 
4.  Dharma Gita (Vedas reading method in pesantian mode, from club to national level) 
5.  Dharma Yatra (pilgrimage method in order to attain enlightenment) 
6.  Dharma kanti (method of cooperation with social organizations and state institutions) 
 
Those methods are very effective in the nurturing in of religion and religious competencies and are applied for 
all Hindu communities (Sujana Interview 2007) Those methods are used to achieve the twofold solution to the 
problem of Hindu Dharma: Moksartham Jagathiaya ca iti Dharmah, dharma is the path to achieve bliss and 
release. Since the Parisada, the Head of the Hindu Education section at the Directorate General, and the Head 
of the Curriculum Subdivision refer to those methods as specific Hindu methodology of instruction, it is safe to 
assess that the Parisada conception is not only implemented in law, but also in textbooks, curricula and syllabi. 
In consequence, it shapes life and conduct of the contemporary and the next young generations of Indonesian 
Hindus. 
Parisada Recommendation Letter 5 /2003 
In the section pertaining to consequential actions to be taken in defining the National education Act 20/ 2003, 
the Parisada recommendation letter 5 /2003 to the national government proposed that during the drafting 
process  of  the  new  law  on  religious  instruction  and  faith-based  education  (passed  in  2008)  there  will  be 
explicitly  recorded  that  in  particular  areas  which  have  sufficient  Hindu  communities,  the  government  will 
establish general faith-based state elementary schools (AdiWidyalaya) with an Hindu ethos, junior high schools 
(MadyamaWidyalaya) senior high schools andhigher education (MahaWidyalaya). (Dana 2005: 241-243) Note, 
borrowed from India (vidyalaya: (Hindi) school and vikasa: school), the brand new Hindu term ‘Widyalaya’ 
denotes a formal general faith-based school system, likewise the term Bala Wikasa is used to identify out-of-
school formal education at the Pasraman. Furthermore, the council has introduced a discrimination between 
material (formal) and non-material education (non-formal), referring to an earlier discrimination in 2007. At the 
non-formal education path, which is managed and operated by a specific Hindu community, the subject matter 
of the curriculum is focused on Pesantian or the art of reciting sacred scriptures (Vedas, Mantras, tembang) by 
use of the methods of Sad Dharma. The contents of education are reciting, preparing offerings, praying, and 
yoga.  
 
In context of Widyalaya, it is the task of the government to compile the organizational and technical guideline 
on the procedures of establishment, management and Widyalaya curriculum at each level of the education 
system. In the case of conditions which do not allow for the organization of Widyalayas on all levels, it shall be 
guaranteed that Hindu students are able to attend the Hindu class at the level of compulsory schooling and 
higher education. In line with Act 20/2003, article 12, paragraph 1a, it shall be stated in public policies in an 
affirmative and clear manner that every Hindu student at any educational has the right to attend the Hindu 
class. In addition, a qualified Hindu teacher, who embraces Hindu Dharma, shall be appointed to the respective 
educational unit. As this call of the Parisada is difficult to implement in all regions for various reasons (ideology, 
access, budget), the Parisada has been authorized by the Hindu directorate in 2006 to provide long-distance 
and  online  Hindu  classes  and  to  issue  certifications  which  will  be  included  in  the  report  to  ensure  the 
promotion of Hindu students at all levels of education. 
The Parisada recommendation letter 5 /2003 to the national government introduces three types of life-long 
systematic formal and non-formal educational units. It mentions pasraman, pesantian and express pasraman. 
Those  types  of  Hindu  education  units  are  already  successfully  operated  in  the  Hindu  congregation.  Their 
objective is nurturing in (implant in original)  sradha and bhakti for Tuhan Yang Maha Esa. The Pasraman 
operate formal religious education at all levels (from Adi Bala Wikasa to Maha Bala Wikasa). The pasraman 
strengthen the skills and capacities of the students to become a religious expert as postulated by the national 
educational objective. Next, pesantian are operated for the participants at all ages and social strata of the 
Hindu congregation. Pesantian provide Hindu-based religious education in form of applied spiritual education 
as reading Vedas, Dharma Gita (sacred songs), sacred art, and. The express pasraman organize society-based 
religious education in national vacations. The call for pengasraman was voiced as early as 1971, to allege an 
example, but only put to practice in 2005. PART C | 181 
The management board of the Parisada is given the mandate to coordinate relations with the government and 
related institutions. It shall guarantee that the council’s recommendations will be included in the draft of the 
Act on the religion class and faith-based education (passed in 2008). This has been achieved successfully, as all 
new  conceptualized  types  eventually  were  included  in  the  Act.  In  addition,  the  council  shall  formulate  a 
proposal  on  the  subject  matter  of  the  organizational  and  technical  guideline  on  the  procedures  of 
establishment, management and curriculum of Widyalaya, Bala Wikasa, pesantian and express pasraman and 
at  all  educational  levels.  The  council’s  task  is  to  socialize  the  Act  and  its  implementation  guidelines  by 
organizing  training  in  management  and  teachings  for  the  administrational  and  educational  staff  of  the 
respective  pasraman.  Until  2005,  there  were  out  of  the  total  sum  only  23  Hindu  faith-based  foundations 
registered with the Parisada, amongst them the Widya Kerthi foundation, which is the legal body to operate 
education at UNHI.  
2005 Education Operation Scheme 
In 2005, the Parisada adopted an Education Operation Scheme
268 which in essence reiterates the contents of 
the recommendation letter. The introductory paragraph describes the educational condition of the Hindu 
community as the worst in Indonesia. To demonstrate this fact, the state of illiteracy of the Hi ndu community 
from 1980 to 2000 is referred to as the lowest among the faith -based communities. The illiteracy rate among 
the Hindu congregation amounted 38 percent in 1980, 25 percent in 1990, 16, 9 percent in 2000 and finally 15, 
56 percent (9, 70 male and 21, 39 female). In comparison to this, the Muslim illiteracy rate is at 11, 2 percent, 
the Protestant rate is at 10, 2 percent, the Catholic illiteracy rate is at 10, 4 percent and the Buddhist illiteracy 
rate was the lowest, only 6, 6 percent. The overall illiteracy rate of Indonesia was at 10, 21 percent in 2005, 6, 
52 percent for the male population and 13, 84 percent of the female population. (Departmen Pendidikan 2007: 
293, 298) Considering that the female illiteracy rate of Balinese women is more t han twice as high as the 
national rate, the gender equality program of the council becomes self-evident. 
 
The second paragraph summarizes that the backward and marginal educational condition of the Hindu 
community causes low standards of well being and soc ial welfare and results in low participatory activities in 
the economic as well as in the social and the political domains of national progress. This condition transfers in 
turn a negative image on the Hindu community, as if the Hindu community could not c reate a working ethos 
that conveys well being and welfare on its members, since its members are overwhelmingly peasants with low 
standards of education and economy. Thus the Christian and Muslim communities then would prejudice Hindu 
religion as to be primitive, polytheistic, and superstitious, thereby locating the Hindu community in a difficult 
position within the nation. The young Hindu generations would increasingly convert to Islam and Christianity, 
because Hindu religion is considered by them to provide less effective answers to their evolving intellectual and 
spiritual needs.  
In connection with the rapid pace of globalization, the primary strategy of the council must aim at educating a 
qualified and competitive Hindu human capital capable to answer th e challenges of globalization thereby 
averting that the already marginalized position of the Hindu community will increasingly mingle around the 
margins of society. Therefore a Hindu -faith based education system as outlined in the  bhisama and working 
program  must  be  immediately  realized  and  established.  Formal  faith-based  in-school  and  out-of-school 
education  (vidyalaya,  bala  visaka)  and  non-formal  education  (pesantian,  sadharma)  shall  constitute  the 
structural embryo of a universal Hindu human resources character building in contemporary times and in 
future,  and  the  growth  of  the  embryo  must  be  focused  on  in  order  to  equip  the  Hindu  community  for 
international competition. The online version of the Parisada’s Dharma Duta Widyalaya may be accessed on 
http://www.Parisada.org/. 
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5.3.5. Megalithic to modern religion: Core concepts 
The following list gives a tentative summary of the main traits of Balinese religious practices from prehistory to 
contemporary  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia.  Swellengrebel  (1960:  28-29)  differentiates  between  indigenous 
cultural elements and cultural elements of Hindu or Hindu Javanese origin. I synthesized the pre-Majapahit and 
post-Majapahit elements in my approach, however, the summary follows a chronological order ranging from 
Indo-Melanesian (Malayo-Sumbawan; Adelaar: 2005) elements to Indianized, Javanized, and finally modern 
elements.  
1.  The temple system evolved out of the megalithic sanctuaries of the Malayo-Polynesian tribes settling in 
Bali. The sanctuaries were open spaces surrounded by walls, where big stones were placed. At this place, 
all religious ceremonies were held. In contemporary Bali and in the past, priests invoke the invisible Gods 
and ancestors to sit on stone seats or contemporary on shrines. (Liefrinck 1934 in Swellengrebel 1960: 28-
29)  
2.  Belief in Rwa Bhinneda) (dualism or bipolar division of existence, dwaita) expressed in (1) a undiversified 
(niskala) and a diversified (sekala) realm (Suka Yasa Interview 2007; Triguna protocol 2007) 
3.  Anchestor  worship  (Liefrinck  1934  in  Swellengrebel  1960:  28-29;  Sudharta  Interview  2008)  and  the 
centrality  of  cremation  ceremonies  (Ida  Pedanda  Bajing  Interview  2006,  2009;  Titib  Interview  2007; 
Sukerda Protocol 2007) 
4.  Belief in life after death and cycle of rebirth (Santeri 1992: 98-117) 
5.  Centrality of megalithic bronze gongs and five-tone music (angkluh, gamelan) in rituals 
6.  Agriculture based religion: central function of wet-rice cultivation 
7.  Patrinlinear descent groups and the purusa line (Howe 1987: 143; Parker 2004: 77): the male line of the 
descent group is prominent, traditional “viri-local residence pattern and patrilineal inheritance of land”. 
(Parker 2004: 77) The task of a Suputra (noble descendent) is to set out the cremation rituals for his elders 
and the rituals for his ancestors), in order to place or revere them in the ancestor shrine where they 
become  ‘bhatara’  or  divinized  ancestors,  believed  to  protect  their  descent  group.  The  triwangsa  and 
purusa system enforces male supremacy and female subordination. Female uproar could endanger this 
social order. This system proscribes hypogamy
269, encourages polygyny
270, supports male-only inheritance, 
prescribes  marginal  position  for  women  in  genealogical  lines,  discourages  divorce,  and  has  many 
ramifications that in daily life place woman in a position of dependency and inferior to men. (Parker 2004: 
113) 
8.  Veneration of the Earth, related to this is the element of the blood sacrifice (caru, tawur) and game-cock 
breeding, which are used as animal sacrifice (Geertz 1973) 
9.  Veneration of Mountains, where the ancestors souls reside (All ancestors reside in Besakih) (Santeri 1992: 
98-117) 
10.  Veneration of Trees. Appreciation and love of nature and environment (as expressed in the ideal paradigm 
of Tri Hita Karana, but often neglected for economic reasons) 
11.  Complex networks of social relations that are related to temples and ritual or social meta-systems, in 
which membership and relations or duties are overlapping. Family clan system (dadia, pamaksan, soroh; 
Howe 1987) and genealogical descent group system  (Triwangsa/Sudra; Jaba-Jero) often confused with 
Indian  caste  system;  democratic  community  systems  (one  man,  one  vote;  Howe  1987:  143)  and  the 
pattern  of  gotong  royong  (mutual  help):  Banjar  (neighborhood  communities),  desa  (village  systems, 
boundaries are defined by temple maintenance, the annual purifying ritual, each desa has its own specific 
and distinctive set or corpus of laws (awig awig). Sekaa (specific voluntary interest groups, membership is 
defined  by  age  or  activities  like  gamelan  (music),  dancing,  kites  etc),  Subak  (community  of  wet-rice-
farmers) 
12.  Preparation of holy water (tirtha) by priests 
13.  Complex offering system 
14.  Brahmin rituals  
15.  Religious writings and mystical speculations 
16.  The triwangsa system (Swellengrebel 1960: 30; Howe 1987) 
17.  Hindu paksa or internal pluralism (Tantrayana, Yoga, and Samkya; modern: Sai Baba, Hare Krishna and 
other ‘Sampradaya’, terminus technicus for  spiritual cults oriented at Indian Hinduism. Internal Hindu 
currents now register with MORA, if they fulfill the prescription of the Department, as the Sick community 
for example) 
                                                 
269 Hypogamy: the marriage of a triwangsa man to a woman of lower social class or status. 
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5.3.6. Upadeca: Hindu Dharma Indonesia’s meta-framework 
I am very proud to be a Hindu, since all basic principles and concepts exist in Hindu religion. The objective of 
existence is to achieve composure (serenity, tranquility and bliss), and composure is only to be achieved in 
Hinduism. My agama provides far ranging latitude of styles to face God, either through bhakti, karma, jnana, 
yoga marga. ‘I Love Hindu’ not only since I work as an official *…+, but merely due to my Hindu self-conception. 
(Triguna, 2007) 
Prothero’s (2010) four-part approach to the religions was used to analyze and describe the basic tenets of 
Indonesian  Hindu  Dharma  as  outlined  in  the  Upadeca  (Hindu  meta-framework)  published  in  1967  and  by 
analyzing my questionnaire I distributed
271. Thereby I was able to confirm the basic tenets of Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia outlined in 1967.  
 
Since its establishment in 1959, the Hindu Council
272 published books on Hindu Dharma in Indonesian language. 
The fact that the early  Parisada published in Indonesian language indicates that the members were mostly 
western-educated  and  nationalist  in  orientation.  The  “fantastic  three”,  Ida  Bagus  Mantra,  Ida  Bagus  Oka 
Puniatmaja, and Cokorda Rai Sudharta translated Indian scriptures as the Bhagavad Gita and the Law of Manu 
(Manawadharmasastra) into Indonesian language. I call them the “fantastic three” as they shaped to great 
extents the course of HDI and the life of the Hindu congregation.They also took the initiative to compose the 
Upadesa.  
Their  work  was  highly  efficient,  because  they  composed  the  content  in  one  week  only,  the 
conceptual outline was arranged and written by Cokorda Rai Sudharta. The Upadesa was the first 
short standard reference volume covering the raw essence of Hindu teachings in Bali. There have 
been several books before the Upadesa aiming to deliver a basic reference standard, but the 
Upadesa was the first book to introduce Hindu teaching in a systematic way. (Sura Interview 
2006) 
 
Most likely in 1963
273, following the first Assembly (Mahasabha) of the Hindu Council the Upadeca has been 
compiled. During the Mahasabha in 1961, the Council decided that the basic framework of  Agama Hindu 
should be presented and compiled systematically in one book  – a book, in which all the basic creeds and 
convictions  –  the  meta-framework  (kerangka  agama)  of  the  young  religion  were  contained.  (Sudharta 
Interview 2008) 
Ida Bagus Mantra, who studied in India, assembled 7 people in his house. We compiled the 
Upadesa. Seven people were coordinated by Ida Bagus Mantra, to stay at his house and compile 
the Upadeca. We were not allowed to leave or to go home. We had to eat there so that our 
thoughts were concentrated and focused on our task. All our knowledge and opinions were 
discussed  and  poured  into  the  Upadeca.  The  seven  people  were  Bagus  Oka  Punia  Atmaja, 
Pedanda Wayan Sidemen, Ida Bagus Mantra, Ida Bagus Dosther, Ida Bagus Alit, Mertha from the 
MORA, and me- Cok Rai Sudharta. 
In consequence, the meta-framework of Hindu Dharma Indonesia (henceforth HDI) which is followed until 
today has been constructed in a conscious effort by seven Balinese reformers – three of them studied in India: 
Oka Punia Atmaja, Cok Rai Sudharta, and Ida Bagus Mantra. The book is written in form of a dialogue between 
the teacher Rsi Dharmakerti and the disciple Sang Suyasa – a characteristic style of Upanishad Hindu literature. 
   
                                                 
271 This chapter is based on an analysis of the Upadeca and the evaluation of my questionnaire. In my view it is amazing in how far the 
Upadeca shapes the understanding of Agama Hindu in the following generations. The analysis of the questionnaires gave me to almost 
congruent information about HDI as they have been comnpiled in the Upadeca, 40 years ago.  
272 The Parisada published the first book on Agama Hindu Dharma Prawerti Sastra. Pandit Shastri had composed the book Intisari Agama 
Hindu, but it was too difficult to understand for the broad Balinese community, probably for the fact that he was an Indian he did not have 
a proper or a limited understanding of Balinese religion. (Sura Interview 2006) Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmaja composed the book Pancasradha 
Silakrama. Other published works were the Sarasamuscaya I and II, the Balinese Calendar, and the monthly journal Warta Hindu Dharma. 
In Gede Suras opinion, until today there is no continuance to further develop and broaden the paramount effort in publishing conducted in 
the 1960s. Contemporary, the council operates several foundations, as the Paramita and the Mabhakti foundation, to publish books on 
Hindu themes.  
273 Cok Rai Sudharta could not recall exactly the year during the interview, at this time he was employed at the Literature Facul ty at the 
Udayana University and had just been appointed as Head of the local Office of Religious Affairs in Denpasar. PART C | 184 
The problem and solution of Agama Hindu Indonesia, is in my view, the existence of eternal and immutable 
bliss and truth. Or in other words, the problem refers to the blindness of the human about their true nature. 
Caused by the circle of reincarnation (punarbhawa), humans experience attachment to worldly matters, the 
wrong  perception  (maya)  and  suffering.  The  problem’s  solution  constitutes  attaining  knowledge  and 
comprehension of the true human nature, which detaches and releases humans from the circle of rebirth 
(moksa). The techniques (ethics, prayer) and exemplars (resi, guru) provide the way and practice how to obtain 
such eternal bliss and truth. All humans may achieve such eternal bliss and truth, if they pursue agama as 
provided by the sacred Veda with pure hearts and sincerity. (Upadeca 1967: 11) 
According to the participants in my study, the contemporary Indonesian Hindu community is characterized by 
the specific Hindu formula of greeting, gesture and parting, the “Hindu salute”. The Hindu salute has been 
invented by the authors of the Upadeca, as the fantastic three felt the need to invent a uniform salute similar 
to the Indian namaste after their studies in India. The primary verbal formal greeting and salutation is OM 
SWASTYASTU, meaning “I hope you experience a good condition as grant from Hyang Widhi Wasa”. Like the 
most sacral Swastika symbol (卐), the Hindu salute symbolizes the basic power and welfare of the macrocosm 
and microcosm. (Upadeca 1967: 11) The reply to the Hindu salute or verbal closing of prayer and religious 
speeches is OM SHANTI SHANTI SHANTI, which means “I hope you experience peace as grant from Hyang Widhi 
Wasa”. (Upadeca 1967: 12) 
Agama is understood as faith in the sacred teachings revealed by the immortal and immutable Sang Hyang 
Widhi (One Supreme Lordship). The faith the Balinese adhere to is Agama Hindu or Hindu Dharma. Agama 
Hindu has been revealed to Sang Hyang Widhi, who has descended to earth. It has unfolded around the holy 
Sind river for the first time. (Upadeca 1967: 13) The basic understanding of HDI is delineated in subsequent 
motto: “Agama is to us the Dharma and eternal truth which covers all human ways of life”. (Upadeca 1967: 13) 
In consequence, HDI is not a dogma, but a way of life amongst others. (cf. Sarkar 1922) 
The solution of HDI is to attain Moksartham Jagadhitaya Ca Iti Dharma. Dharma or agama help release (moksa-
rtham) the soul (jiwatman) from the cycle of rebirth and to achieve individual and communal spiritual and 
physical or material wellbeing and bliss (jagadhita) (Upadeca 1967: 13) – during this life and for the lives to 
come prior to release. The participants to my study are congruous in their view that agama Hindu is flexible, 
open, and replies tospatio-temporal-contextual requirements(desa, kala, patra). It is written in the Veda that 
contents may be neglected, which are not congruent with epochal needs. As Hindu teachings correspond to the 
changing conditions of each four eras (yuga), Agama Hindu is always up to date and in line with the changing 
epochal  needs.  Therefore  agama  Hindu  requires  not  to  be  changed,  but  to  be  deepened  (educational 
aspect)and actualized to the requirements of location, time, and situation (desa, kala, patra). (Questionnaires) 
The four Vedas (Catur Veda Samhita) are acknowledged by the authors of the Upadeca as sacred scriptures. 
They are held to be a divine revelation heard by ancient seers (in case of the Upadeca by Ida Sang Hyang 
Widhi, the Hindu Supreme Lordship). In consequence this collection of sacred scriptures presents the absolute 
ultimate textual authority. Indigenous local scriptures are held to be sacred as well, but they perform at a much 
lower level of the hierarchy of scriptural heritage, which ranges from Indian scriptures to Javanese Shiva-
Siddhanta  scriptures,  and  to  Balinese  Lontar.  According  to  my  interviews  and  the  questionnaires,  the 
controversial question at hand is, to which scripture one should refer to in the first instance. As indicated 
earlier, this controversy developed into a full-blown quarrel between all elites about textual sources and their 
interpretation (‘Quellen and  Exegesestreit’). As Balinese traditions are systematized into the framework of 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia, the Hindu Council’s and the Hindu Directorate’s monopoly of textual exegesis and the 
related power to shape religious practice are controversial. The Bali centric fraction and the old elite maintain 
that Balinese and Javanese sources must remain the primary pool and source of Balinese religion, and only 
then the Veda may be consulted, whereas the Indian modernist fraction tends to refer first to the Vedas, the 
Dharamsastras, the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita and only then to local 
scriptures. (cf. Bakker 1993: 89) 
Following the Upadeca (1967: 14), all subsequent scriptures on Hindu Dharma which have been approved by 
the  Hindu  Council  or  the  Hindu  Directorate,  and  all  curricula  and  textbooks,  are  uniform  in  describing  a 
threefold basic framework (kerangka dasar) of Hindu Dharma Indonesia: 
1.  Tatwa (philosophy) 
2.  Susila (ethics) 
3.  Upacara (ritual) PART C | 185 
Those three elements are interrelated and have to be practiced together. Philosophy without ethic and rituals 
remains  empty,  whereas  ritual  without  proper  motivation  as  provided  by  ethics  and  purpose  as  given  by 
philosophy is meaningless. (Upadeca 1967: 14) The basic framework is compared to an egg: The egg yolk refers 
to philosophy (tatwa), the albumen is susila (ethics) and the eggshell is ritual (upacara). In this description, we 
find a radical departure from the traditionally orthoprax Balinese religion. (Upadeca 1967: 14) In sum, the basic 
framework of the HDI way of life is holistic as its three core elements encompass all aspects of Hindu life. Thus, 
an important distinction should be made between Dharma as way of life and tatwa, philosophy or metaphysics, 
because they are not identical: Dharma is the Hindu way of life, and there are various Hindu ways to attain bliss 
and  welfare,  whereas  tatwa  are  the  core  teachings  and  the  basic  philosophy  derived  out  of  the  sacred 
scriptures, which need not to be congruent, but they all offer the same solution to the same problem. 
Tatwa refers to the proper comprehension of the core philosophy and teachings compiled in the Vedas and 
Agamas. If one rightly comprehends and practices tatwa, then susila (proper conduct) emerges automatically. 
In other words, tatwa lays out the norms and values, which proper conduct reflects. Finally, upacara refers to 
the  obligatory  and  punctual  rituals,  performed  to  strengthen  and  realize  tatwa  and  susila.  In  maintaining 
relations with One Supreme Lordship, the rituals have an impact on spiritual and emotional health as they 
develop the strength and force of human logical reasoning. (Questionnaire) 
 
As  integral  part  of  tatwa,  the  five  basic  creeds  (Panca  Sradha)  are  now  outlined.  (Upadeca  1967:  14-36; 
Questionnaires) The life of an Indonesian Hindu is based on the Panca Sradha. The practice and manifestation 
of  the  Pancasila  is  expressed  in  the  first  basic  creed  within  the  framework  of  HDI.  The  Panca  Sradha 
encompasses: 
1.  Faith in Sang Hyang Widhi
274 (One Supreme Lordship (Upadeca 1967: 14); One Supreme Lordship and 
its functions or manifestations including ancestors (Questionnaires)) 
2.  Faith in Atman (ancestors souls (Upadeca 1967: 14); individual souls, the true self (Questionnaires)) 
3.  Faith in Karma phala (Karma Law) 
4.  Faith in Samsara (Purnarbhawa) (circle of rebirth and reincarnation (Questionnaires)) 
5.  Faith in Moksa (release from circle of rebirth, self-realization, bliss and welfare (Questionnaires)) 
 
The current study will describe the first creed in detail, as it is the realization of the first principle of the state in 
Hindu  practice.  It  is  interesting  to  note,  that  the  pillars of  Islam,  the  Pancasila,  and  the  Hindu  creeds  all 
comprise the basic five principles. The remaining four principles will be discussed only briefly.  
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Reciting Vedic mantra, the first creed is conclusively explained by the Upadeca (1967: 15-24). It is stated that 
Sang Hyang Widhi is Maha Esa (Supreme One). There is only one God - there is no second (Ekam Eva Adwityam 
Brahman)
275. (Upadeca 1967: 15) This formula should resemble the Islamic Shahada, “there is no god but God”. 
Oversimplified,  HDI  describes  with  advaita  philosophy  (referring  to  the  identity  of  God  and  the  Soul)  the 
essential identity in the existence of all creatures. In consequence, HDI believes in the  Maha Esa-ness or 
doctrine of Oneness (compare to Islamic tawhid) of Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, who is the origin of all that 
which  exists  -  both  diversified,  concrete  and  visible  (cetana,  sekala)  or  undiversified,  abstract  or  hidden 
(acetana, niskala).  
The Maha-Esa-ness is manifested in sacred rays or gods (Deva, Sanskrit div) emanating from Sang Hyang Widhi 
and in patrons or protectors (Bhatara, Sanskrit bhatr, patron/protector). (Upadeca 1967: 17) The three most 
important manifestations or functions of Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa are Tri Sakti: Brahma as creator (utpeti), 
Vishnu  as  protector,  loving  and  caring  maintainer  of  creation  (sthiti),  and  Shiva  as  dissolver  of  creation 
(Pralina), who also transforms creation back to its origin (Old Javanese: Sangkan Paran), so that creation may 
begin anew. (Upadeca 1967: 16) Bhatara may refer to gods, or men of prowess as deceased virtuous kings or 
ancestors which are given the title bhatara. Besides Sang Hyang Widhi, Hindus venerate their ancestors as 
patrons and as manifestations of God. All participants to my study are convinced that their ancestors act as 
mediators  between  humanity  and  God.  Their  ancestors  are  thought  to  be  Divine  rays,  which  are  highly 
sensitized  for  the  aspirations,  obstacles,  and  needs  of  their  descend  group.  (Questionnaire)  Prof  Triguna 
(protocol 2007, Questionnaire) supports a functional-integrative perspective. In his view, the conception One 
Supreme Lordship is transcendental and impersonal. When emanating into its creation, the transcendental and 
abstract Maha Esa-ness becomes immanent and personal, and divides itself into manifold functions (bhatara, 
dewata) without losing its holistic character.  
In this context, the Upadeca (1967: 21) describes the process of creation referring to the Taittriya-Upanishad 
and tantric Samhkya, one of the oldest systems of the six classical schools of Hindu philosophy. (Suka Yasa 
Interview 2007) It is very interesting to see how the authors of the Upadeca synthesize advaita (monism) and 
dwaita (dualism) concepts. Oversimplified, Samkhya is a strictly dualist dwaita philosophy, which denies the 
existence of a transcendent creationist God. It enlists how creation emanated out of the meeting between two 
realities: Purusha (consciousness or self) and Prakriti (empiric realm of matter). 
Hyang Widhi Wasa made a conscious and focused effort of self-control undertaken to achieve a 
goal (tapas, Sanskrit heat). After this meditation, the universe has been created, and all things 
contained  therein.  Following  the  process  of  creation,  Hyang  Widhi  united  with  creation. 
(Taittriya-Upanishad in Upadeca 1967: 21, own translation)  
In short, after Hyang Widhi meditated, two elementary powers came into existence: Purusha (consciousness or 
self) and Prakriti/Pradhana (empiric realm of matter). (Upadeca 1967: 20-24) Whereas Purusha is uncaused, 
undiversified, uncreated and does not create, Prakriti is unconscious and the first cause and principle (tatwa, 
therefore it is named Pradhana) of the universe, with the exception of Purusha. Following their liaison, step by 
step  the  universe  came  into  existence  moving  from  fine  elements  to  coarse  elements.  First  mind  (cita) 
emerged,  already  influenced  by  three  basic  features  (trigunas)  which  compose  Prakriti:  satwa  (fineness, 
illumination, and joy); rajah (dynamism, activity, and pain); tamah (coarseness, and sloth). Then everything 
what is in the universe emerged, until the coarsest elements as earth. During the process of creation, the seven 
spheres  emerged:  Bhur-Loka, Bhuwah-Loka, Swah-Loka,  Maha-Loka, Jana-Loka, Tapa-Loka and Satya-Loka. 
According to the Upadeca, we live in the Bhur-Loka, our ancestors live in the Bhuwah-Loka or Pitra-Loka, and 
the Dewa live in the Swah-Loka. Each of those spheres is composed of a specific mixture of elements. Those 
three spheres are called the triloka. There are to my knowledge, variations from this conception.  
Manu, the thinking creature, is the progenitor of humanity. In consequence, the solution to the Hindu problem 
of  life  as  conceptualized  in  the  circle  of  rebirth  and  ignorance  is  humanity’s  utilization  of  their  mind  and 
thoughts under the rays of Sang Hyang Widhi to advance the quality of human and other creatures’ lives. 
(Upadeca 1967: 24) 
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The Atma-tatwa states that every individual human soul is a small particle of the Parama –Atma or Sang Hyang 
Widhi. (Upadeca 1967: 25-26) In reality, the individual atman (jiwatman) which animates the human body is 
identical with the universal Sang Hyang Widhi. The atman is compared to a carter, who steers the carriage 
(body). The problem of Agama Hindu is, that the meeting of atman (purusha) and body (prakriti) results in 
awidya (darkness) – the unproduced atman forgets about its immutable characteristics. Blindness and oblivion 
cause the human mind’s attachment to the created and diversified world, and to engage in deeds or acts 
(karma).  Those  acts  cause  effects  (phala)  according  to  their  quality;  a  specific  action  is  followed  by  its 
equivalent reaction. Karma -defined as action in thought, speech, and deed - has its equivalent karmic results 
(phala). All actions produce results and effects which correspond to the nature and quality of that very action. 
Residues of those actions will stick to the jiwatman, which is not aware of its own reality caused by karmic 
defilement. (Questionnaire) Jiwatman will be reincarnated again and again (punarbhawa) for its karmic energy 
until based on its own efforts, the discrimination between dharmic and adharmic lifestyle is made. The atman is 
then  released  from  the  circle  (samsara)  of  rebirth/reincarnation  (punarbhawa)  and  unites  with  its  origin 
(moksa). (Questionnaire) In consequence, by engaging in actions that are provided by the techniques and 
exemplars of the Hindu ways of life, humans can burn their karma and attain bliss and release (Moksartham 
Jagadhitaya Ca Iti Dharma). In consequence, the solution to the problem is that the immutable  jiwatman 
becomes  conscious  of  its  true  nature  after  countless  cycles  (samsara)  of  rebirth  and  reincarnation 
(punarbhawa) and attains release (moksa) from the cycle of reincarnation.   
In the context of susila (ethics), Tat Twan Asi teaches social contact or dedication without limits. The advaita 
(monism)  philosophy  implies  that  the  general  motivation  of  HDI  is  given  in  the  Chandogya  Upanishad’s 
teaching of Tat Tvam Asi (You are that). This teaching implies that helping fellow men or creatures is identical 
with helping one’s self and the reverse, to harm or hurt fellow men or creatures implies harming one’s self. 
(Upadeca 1967: 51; Questionnaire)  
The Upadeca (1967: 53 – 63) then outlines the basic practices, concepts and the social order to be followed by 
a Hindu, which will be briefly sketched here. The five core creeds (Panca Sradha) develop into the Hindu theory 
of values, norms and social order, which result in the main axiological concepts of Tri Rnam,Panca Yadnya, Tri 
Kaya Parisudha, and Tri Hita Karana. The basic order of life is the Varnasramadharma (see chapter on varna 
and jati). The Rg Veda, the Law of Manu, and the Bhagavad-Gita reveal that God has created the world with a 
devout sacrifice, thus, “The one who eats alone, without considering the Yadnya (sacrifice), sins” (Upadeca 
1967: 52) Every newborn Hindu has automatically a threefold congenital obligation or debt: the tri rnam. The 
graph illustrates the three debts (tri rnam).  
 
 
These three debts result in the duty to perform the rituals (panca yadnya, five rituals).  
1.  Dewa Yadnya venerate the functions of One Supreme Lordship (Dewata) 
2.  Pitra Yadnya venerate bhatara and ancestors 
3.  Bhuta Yadnya placate and pacify the chthonic energies and transform them into benevolent forces  
4.  Rsi Yadnya are carried out for the benefit and boon of seers and sages 
5.  Manusia Yadnya denotethe life-circle rituals and charity (Titib Interview 2007). 
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Then the theory of the caturasrama and caturvarna is outlined (see chapter on varna and jati). In the following 
the ethical concepts of what is advised and what is permitted are outlined. All those concepts are a major part 
of all curricula at all educational levels. As the focus of the present work has been how the Hindu class emerged 
in the context of national policies on religion and education, a discussion of this specific curricular contents has 
been outside the scope of the present study. Therefore the present study indicates that there is a need for 
future research in this academic field. One might analyze how the concepts outlined in the  Upadeca were 
included into the curricula of 1974, 84, 94, 2004, and 2006, and how they were formulated into educational 
aims and competencies, how they were formulated in the textbooks, and what methods the teacher use in 
instructions.  
Essential to susila (meta-ethic) are the panca srada (tatwa). Hindu conduct is both the communal obligation to 
mutual cooperation (gotong-royong) and the individual obligation of mental and spiritual purification. In order 
to attain the solution of the specific Hindu problem of life (circle of rebirth, reincarnation, and karma), a Hindu 
must practice the technique of self-control and learn how to control thought, speech, and deeds (Tri Kaya 
Parisudha). Tri Kaya Parisudha (three basic human techniques of self-control, own translation; Upadeca 1967: 
58) denote the Hindu core concept of orientation; they probably originate in the Buddhist eightfold path. In 
order to achieve the solution (moksa, release) to the Hindu problem of life (circle of rebirth, reincarnation, and 
karma), first of all the jiwatman must arrive at a spiritual level, which makes moksa possible. In consequence, 
Hindus should always control their thoughts, speech and deeds in order to defeat the six enemies (sad ripu) 
within human nature that lead to ignorance and oblivion.  
1.  Manacika  is  the  way  in  which  a  HDI  practitioner  controls  and  makes  best  use  of  thoughts:Right 
intention or thought – self-control grounded in intention, thought and reasoning (to aspire only things 
one is eligible for, freedom from ill will and prejudices against fellow beings, to obey karmic law)  
2.  Wacika is the way in which a HDI practitioner controls makes best use of communication:Right speech 
- self-control grounded in speech and communication (abandoning abusive speech, divisive speech, 
defamatory speech and keep promises) 
3.  Kayika is the way in which a HDI practitioner controls makes best use of actions and is identical with 
Eightfold  path:Right  conduct  or  right  action    -  self-control  grounded  in  conduct  and  deeds  (non-
violence  and  abstaining  from  taking  life  (ahimsa),  from  stealing,  and  from  sexual  misconduct) 
(Upadeca 1967: 57-59; Questionnaire) 
The six enemies (sad ripu) within human nature leading to ignorance and oblivion of true nature are kama 
(lust), lobha (greed), krodha (anger), mada (use of psychotropic substances), moha (indecisiveness), matsarya 
(malevolence).  
 
In conclusion, Hindu Dharma Indonesia is interpreted by the participants to my study as device, which provides 
the manual for existence, the manual how to understand the true meaning, nature, working mechanism and 
objective  of  existence.  The  main  characteristic  is  its  flexibility  and  the  dynamic  adjustment  to  changing 
situations and epochs. Like two sides of the same coin, religion teaches us that there are positive and negative 
aspects  (rwa  bhinneda).  In  consequence,  life  must  be  interpreted  as  providing  options.  Hindu  Dharma 
Indonesia instructs humans how to choose dharmic options. It gives humans the techniques and exemplars 
how to solve the Hindu problem of life by achieving physical and spiritual bliss and welfare. Hence studied 
properly  and  in  holistic  fashion,  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia  and  other  ways  of  life  help  humans  to  control 
negative qualities (sad ripu), because the dharmic option controls the influence of the five senses in the human 
body.  By  controlling  emotions  as  lust  (kama),  wrath  (krodha),  greed  (lobha),  envy  (matsarya),  which  are 
components of human nature, all agama provide ways for humans to realize harmonic and tolerant relations in 
the encounter between humans, God, and nature. In addition, Hindu Dharma Indonesia guides, controls, and 
motivates humans to pursue physical and spiritual progress and good deeds. By leading a dharmic life, one is 
thought to procure patience, serenity, firm faith in God and by following the commands of God ignorance and 
oblivion (awidya) is caused to vanish. The pious is awarded with inner peace, prosperity and friends. “Agama 
Hindu teaches spiritual practice and self-discipline to achieve the ideal aim of establishing paradise (surga) on 
earth.” (Questionnaire) 
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5.3.7. Bali Jaya Dwipa 
In order to build a physical and spiritual wealthy Balinese human and community (jagadhita), the strategic 
plan
276 of the Balinese provincial government implements the vision and mission of regional development. The 
vision outlines the concept of  Tri Hita Karana as base for the creation of Bali Dwipa Jaya. Bali Dwipa Jaya 
means  the  glorious  island  of  Bali,  mentioned  in  medieval  stone  inscriptions.  Bali  DwipaJaya  points  to  a 
revitalization trend of Balinese religio-cultural traditions. In this context, Bali will be capable to cope with future 
challenges  by  utilizing  socio-cultural,  economic,  and  environmental  opportunities  to  achieve  the  targeted 
progress. It aims to construct balanced and permanent social welfare (jagadhita) based on values, norms, 
tradition, social order and local wisdom (kearifan local, local genius) of Balinese culture, which is inspired by 
Agama Hindu.  
 
The concept of Tri Hita Karana is interpreted symbolically as three causes for human welfare in the Hindu 
Balinese community’s way of life. The term was coined by the Administrative Region I Conference of the Board 
of  the  Hindu  Bali  Congregation  Struggle  (Konferensi  Daerah  1  Badan  Perjuangan  Umat  Hindu  Bali)  on 
November 11, 1966. Based on Hindu Dharma faith, the Hindu community held this conference in order to 
participate in the New Order nation-building. The concept became more popular after 1966, and it is agitated 
today as one of the leading concepts of social and environmental encounter and the prime parameter to 
achieve Bali Dwipa Jaya. Tri Hita Karana pursues a harmonizing and stabilization policy between encounter of 
God and humanity, in social relations, and between humans and their environment. Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
refers to the Bhagavad Gita III, 10 as textual source, which described a causal triangle between the creator and 
progenitor, the created man, and the environment, which feeds man and progenitor. 
 
In performing the yadnya, the creator and progenitor Prajapati, a title of Brahma, created human kind, 
and said: By this you will multiply (10) and if you foster the gods by this, the gods then foster you in turn; 
then, each the others fostering, you shall attain highest welfare (11). From food all beings are produced: 
And from rain all food is produced: from sacrifice there comes down rain; from action is born sacrifice. 
(14)  Action  arises  from  Brahma,  Brahma  from  the’  Imperishable.  Hence  the  all-pervading  Brahma  is 
established  in  sacrifice.  (August  2008,  Vedanta  spiritual  library,  Bhagavad  Gita, 
http://www.celextel.org/Gita.html) 
In this context, it becomes evident again, that Hindu Dharma Indonesia anthropology borrows from Indian 
universal sources and continues Indo-Melanesian religion that locates human beings right in the centre of 
existence, as it is a typical feature for ethnic religions. In fact, HDI emerged out of an ethno-religion and has 
been  consolidated  into  a  national  religion  less  out  of  theological  matters,  but  rather  out  of  political  and 
administrative reasons. The figure shows the concept of Tri Hita Karana: 
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The holistic concept encompasses God, society and their natural environment as parts of an intact unit, or parts 
of one ensemble, analogously to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. The mission of the Bali strategic plan
277 provides the 
strategies to put the vision into practice. Of seven strategies set out five are enlisted here:  
(1) to create a Balinese human and community, which has the qualities of Sradha (faith), bhakti (following the 
commands of God, devotion) and yasa kerthi (dharmic action),  
(2) to create Bali as one intact and balanced unity,  
(5) to manifest awareness regarding the rule of law and human rights thereby creating dynamic and conducive 
peace and order,  
(6) to empower and safeguard traditional Balinese institutions, and to  
(7) create a stable regional autonomy.  
 
In the second chapter internal factors are divided into strengths and weaknesses and external factors are 
categorized in opportunities’ and challenges. Referring to the internal environment, Balinese culture which is 
inspired or animated by Agama Hindu is interpreted as strength. Culture in the region of Bali is alive, grows and 
flowers and is composed of a physical, structural, and cultural core. These parts compose the cultural value 
ensemble,  which  is  animated  through  the  spirit  of  Agama  Hindu.  This  implies  that  Agama  Hindu  inspires 
Balinese culture and Balinese culture colors Agama Hindu. The globalization process is interpreted as impact of 
foreign culture causing social changes and shifts in the value orientation of society, primary in the negative 
cultural transformation towards commercialization, individualism, materialism, and consumerism which are 
accompanied by the superficiality and fragility of moral basics. In the next step, the strategic plan has outlined 
targets to put its vision statement and mission strategies to practice.  
 
The strategy to manifest  Tri Hita Karana as base for Bali Dwipa Jaya is to create Balinese individuals and 
community, which have the qualities of Sradha (faith), bhakti (devotion) and yasa kerthi (dharmic action). The 
first aim is to realize harmony in faith-based life by  
 
(a) Advancing religious education  
(b) Stabilizing inter-faith harmony, and  
(c) Stabilizing the understanding, realization, and application of religious teachings for Hindu-Balinese (krama 
Bali).  
 
Practical steps to be taken in raising religious education are to better the quality of religious education by 
improving the quality of Hindu educator’s training and fostering literature. The second and third aim refers to 
the creation of professional human resources through health care and education and by providing sufficient 
labor and application of technology. 
5.4. Modern education and Balinese elites 
5.4.1. Excursus: Varna, Jati, and Dharma 
The effort to understand Balinese social order, rank and kinship system makes it necessary to introduce first a 
short and superficial side note on the terms casta
278 (caste), jati(birth, origin), and varna (color, class) as distinct 
concepts. (Cf. Sarkar 1922: 213) Whereas “casta” is a foreign inscription, the term jati describes a corporate 
group. In addition, Hindu scriptures mention four colors
279, the catur varna, which denote an ideal Indian type 
of class. Whereas the concept of jati denotes specific corporate communities or specific sub-groups in the 
Indian subcontinent, varna refers either to skin color or to human and spiritual quality (guna) and their action 
or deeds (karma). In the Rig-Veda and the Law of Manu, varna refers to an individuals’ social function and/or 
the organic model of society, because each group fulfills a particular function in sustaining the social body. By 
describing those four varna as originating from different parts of one single body, the Law of Manu indicates 
the varna system to be non-hereditary, thereby implying congeniality of all four varna.    
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278 The term casta is a twofold foreign ascript ion. “When the Portuguese arrived in India in 1498, they found what was to them, a 
perplexing  system  of  stratification  and  discrimination  prevailing  amongst  the  people  of  India.”  (http://www.colaco.net/1/caste.htm) 
Unable to explain this system to their rulers, those first Portuguese sea-farers to India called it “casta”, which literally means “breed or 
lineage”. The British colonial administrators then continued to apply the term in mapping the population of the Indian sub-continent and 
for administrative interests. 
279 The Mahabharata describes the varna of the Brahmana as white, Ksatriyah as red, Vaisyas as yellow and Shudras as black. PART C | 191 
The Purusha Sukta (Rig-Veda X: 90)
280 introduces the cosmological substantiation of the ideal social order and 
the  ritual.  The  different  varna  were  designed  to  promote  the  harmonious  functioning  of  society.  In 
consequence, the four varna as mentioned in the Purusa-Sukta cannot be said to denote “caste” in the sense in 
which is understood in modern times. In this context, Sarkar (1922: 212) remarks, “communally speaking, the 
prakriti or members of a society naturally fall into economic and professional groups, classes or orders, the so-
called castes of India”. Sarkar (1922: 212) holds that “orders of praja or classes of members of the state” are 
known as varna, but “the alleged classification of a society into four occupational groups (…) is however a 
conventional myth, at best, legal fiction”
281. 
With  the  passage  of  time,  occupation-based  social  rank  became  hereditary,  as  a  son  usually  followed  his 
father’s profession, and concepts of purity and pollution were associated with profession. This system acquired 
the titlejati, because one belonged to one’s jati right from birth. Remarkably, the term is employed across 
faith-based  groups  in  India.  Affiliation  to  a  group  was  determined  by  interaction;  in  consequence  it  was 
relational in nature. Traditionally, in India and Indonesia, social networks serve as integrative frame, because 
the evolution of the Indian society has been based on the integration of diverse ethnic groups through these 
networks. Although varna and caste/jati denote the classification of society based on social functions which 
one performs, varna is determined by individual profession, deeds and spiritual quality In contrast, the term 
jati, literally meaning birth, is associated with heritage, tradition, and profession. Both concepts of  jatiand 
varna were thus originally fluid functional groups. Only in 1901, the British fitted the jati system into the varna 
system promoted by the Law of Manu in order to conduct a population census. 
In addition, in India and Bali, descent has not always been traced to consanguinity; often the lineages were 
based  on  spiritual  descent  from  sages  of  the  past.  Outside  the  kinship  system  there  is  the  guru-shishya 
relationship that is based on spiritual descent, the disciple traces his spiritual birth from a master who stands in 
the lineage of other spiritual masters. This system of spiritual descent is still practiced in Bali, the phenomenon 
may be observed in the traditional training of Brahmin high priests.  
Purusha’s self-sacrifice (Purusha Sukta, Rig Veda X: 90) creates the ideal social order of varnashramadharma 
(the particular duties (sva-dharma) of the classes and the stages of life). There are at least five senses in which 
dharma is used both in scientific treatises as well as in social conversation (Sarkar 1922): 
  religion, a category of theology, e.g. Confucian Dharma, Islamic Dharma, Christian Dharma, Hindu 
Dharma etc. 
  virtue, as opposed to vice or sin, a category of ethics 
  law, as a category of jurisprudence 
  justice 
  duty 
The members of the society must perform their duties (svadharma) and observance of these duties implies the 
organization of the people into a unified state or a country (rastra). Both “movable and immovable things” are 
indicated  by  the  term  state.  “There  is  no  dharma  in  the  non-state,  i.e.  the  condition  of  men  is  left  to 
themselves”. Sarkar (1922: 206) elucidates, “Dharma only comes into existence with the state, as dharma is 
created by the state or rather by its sanctions (danda, stick) or authority”. In essence, if there exist no states, 
there is no dharma. Likewise, a group can have no dharma, when its state is abolished, e.g. through the loss of 
freedom, revolution, or anarchy (compare the puputan ritual in the next sections). In conclusion, the existence 
of  the  state  was  primarily  dependent  on  two  factors:  authority  (danda),  and  social  order 
(varnasrahmadharma). The need for a social contract between ruler and subjects is therefore absolute, as the 
king has to protect the dharma in order to secure the social order, as long as the intactness of the social order 
is protected, the non-state condition will not triumph.   
                                                 
280 According to the Purusa-Sukta, Rig-Veda X, 90, progenitors of the four ranked varna groups sprang from various parts of the body of the 
primordial Purusa, who has been fabricated from clay by Creator Brahma. Brahmins (men of intellect, clerics, and scholars) were created 
from the mouth. They were to provide for the intellectual and spiritual needs of the community as teachers, therefore learning and 
teaching denoted their prime function. Kshatriyas (warriors and rulers) were derived from the arms. Their duties were adjudication, 
strength, action, the selfless and just protection of the population with arms, in other words, their role was to rule, adjudicate, and to 
protect others. Vaishyas (landowners and merchants) sprang from the thighs, were associated with desire and were entrusted with the 
care of commerce, trade, cattle breeding, and agriculture. Shudras (servants) came from the feet. Their task was to perform all manual 
labour and to serve the three other. 
281 Students of  Realpolitik  (…) are aware that the actual number of these orders or castes is “unlimited”. The reason (…) is (…) the 
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From the standpoint of the individual then, people pass through well-marked physiological and social stages. 
Those stages or periods of individual life are called the catur asramas. They are known to be four in the span of 
human existence: student (brahmacharya), parents/householder (grihastha), retirement (vanaprastha), and 
renunciation (sannyasin). The total population with all its interests and problems of all the different periods of 
life is then comprehended by the two categories, varnas (classes) and asramas (stages). If therefore any group 
is  to  constitute  a  state,  every  member  of  each  of  the  varnas  (no  matter  what  their  numbers  and  their 
occupations) must have to perform the duties (sva-dharma) of his “station” at each of the four asramas or 
periods of life. (Sarkar 1922: 213) 
As soon, therefore, as the praja [social group, members of a state, AL] is organized into a state, 
be it in any part of the world or in any epoch of history, a varnashrama spontaneously emerges 
into being. It is inconceivable, in this theory, that there should be a state but no varnashrama. To 
say that the state has been born and yet the various orders or classes of the people do not follow 
dharma  would  indeed  be  a  contradiction  in  terms,  a  logical  absurdity.  Sva-dharma  leads 
inevitably to varnashrama, the two are “relative” terms. They indicate coexistent phenomena in 
the social world. In other words, the doctrine of varnasrama is a corollary to that of dharma as 
duty, varnasrama is but sva-dharma “writ large”. (Sarkar 1922: 213) 
Sarkar (1922: 214) concludes thatthe theory of varnasrama, the fourfold social order and the stages of life, 
“though obviously a socio-pedagogic and ethno-economic term is thus fundamentally a political concept. It is 
an indispensable category in an organic theory of the state”. 
5.4.2. Jero and jaba 
The system of social stratification in Bali is often described as caste (kasta or varna) system. The only systemic 
comparison between the Indian and Balinese classification of hierarchy and rank, the author is aware of is 
Howe (1987), who states: “Although Bali is often designates a caste system and although its religion is regularly 
referred to as ‘Hindu’, there has been (…) no systematic comparison of India with Bali in respect to these social 
and cultural domains.” (Howe 1987: 136) He gives some “tentative remarks” concerning those “very complex 
issues”. (Howe 1987: 137) Comparing the conceptual, institutional, and interactional level, he comes to the 
conclusion that the concept of caste could be applied to the Balinese case, but the “present interests and the 
burgeoning reaction to positivism inhibit this sort of simplistic classification.” (Howe 1987: 150) However, it is 
safe to assume that in Bali there is no caste system as there is in India. 
The Balinese social order is vertically and horizontally highly stratified and the history (and architecture) of 
Balinese kingship, clans, and social order is  very  much “a story of origins, of kinship, of hierarchy and of 
relations of asymmetry”. (Parker 2004: 41 FN 5) In addition, in medieval Bali status and rank depended also on 
social networks and interpersonal relations between social groups, clans and the traditional democratic village-
based  society.  The  most  significant  of  these  relations  is  the  division  of  architecture  and  society  into  jero 
(insider) and jaba (outsider).  
The adoption of a genealogical descendant system (triwangsa) began with the occupation of Bali through the 
Javanese Majapahit Empire in 1343. Prior to 1343, there is no evidence for a genealogical descent system in 
Balinese village-based society, in which core groups of villagers, living in the core part of the village, were most 
important,  from  whose  the  council  of  elders  were  elected.  (Vickers  1989:  47)  Other  groups  lived  in  the 
surrounding part of the village (jaba). After the conquest of Majapahit, the Javanese nobility were placed in 
administrative posts in Bali and forced the local nobility to accept minor posts and many of the priests and 
royalty preserved their roles only by being relegated to the status of commoners. Wong Majapahit denotes 
therefore the Javanese royalties, their descendants and the Balinese local rulers which became Javanized. Bali 
Aga refers to the Balinese tribes that were living in the inaccessibility of the mountains, therefore became 
never Javanized or subjugated to Javanese administration. (Vickers 1989: 49-50) Thus society was organized 
into a hierarchy from villagers (kaula) to king (gusti), (Vickers 1989: 47), therefore dyadic patron-client ties 
prevailed between villagers and palace (puri)
282. (Parker, 2004, 28) 
                                                 
282 Javanese mysticism emphasizes the all-pervading unity of existence, and the logic of the traditional Javanese concept of power required 
a central focus, synchronistic and absorptive in character; this centre was usually realized in the person of a ruler, who personified the 
unity of society. (Canonica- Walangitang 2003: 50-53) The Javanese state model and the relations between king and his subjects are 
exemplified in the ruler-subject (kaula- gusti) principle. Originally master and bondsmen, the king and his subjects are in an asymmetrical, 
but mutually dependent relationship. The main feature is the ability of the master to concentrate power, to bind it in his body, and to 
absorb outward power. In consequence, kings were then viewed as “receptacles of cosmic potency” and their worldly power reflected their PART C | 193 
The triwangsa system was consolidated under priest Dang Hyang Dwijendra in the 1550s, when Bali moved to 
being a far more king-and-priest-centered society, organized into the four varna of Hinduism. Most likely, the 
term varna was known more as an academic term than a descriptor of social organization.  Varna had no 
“validity in actual life” in ancient Java or Bali prior to the fifteenth century, but it did exist in theory in the 
model of the World Ruler. In the model, the semi-divine or divine status of the ruler and the spiritual basis of 
the kingship depended on his relationship with the priesthood. (Vickers 1989: 50) This caesaropapist (Casanova 
1994) model has already been described in the Ramayana, where priests were meant to serve kings through 
running rituals for the proper functioning of the realm. As a rule in this caesaropapist model, the king’s power 
and divine mandate to rule was substantiated by a priest, acting as his counselor and securing the spiritual 
security of the kingdom. The palace was situated at the (spiritual or spatial) centre of a small kingdom, which 
boundaries were defined by overlapping social networks responsible  for the  maintenance of temples, the 
performance of rituals and for jurisdiction, thus a kingdom had never a bounded territory, nor was there a 
stable and homogenous population. (Parker 2004: 31) This function of the kings became to be known as guru 
wisesa in the national period.  
In general, the power of a king was judged by how many people he was able to mobilize by corvée bonds in 
order to perform a ritual; in turn this corvée secured his bondsmen spiritual and material health and welfare. 
This new system introduced a massive transformation process of the social order
283, as the councils of  elders 
were replaced and the ancient binary divide between core villagers and newcomers shifted towards a new 
separation in inner and outer maintained until today. (Vickers 1989: 47) The original spatial dichotomy 
between thecore and the periphery of the v illage was translated into the social and spiritual distinction 
between  jaba  (outsider)  and  jero  (insider)  denoting  the  proximity  to  royal  or  priestly  descent  or  spatial 
differentiation between the innermost part of the temple and the outer parts, which in turn was tied to the 
proximity between human, creator, and residence. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52)  
Varna and lineage have worked as an ideology to the advantage of the Brahmins and the descendants of the 
kings, who were the second varna or lineage or warrior-kings. (Vickers 1989: 50) However, in Bali the three 
high varna are commonly known as triwangsa or jero, they are twice-born (dwijati)
284and distinguished from 
the wong jaba (outsiders), as a rule in everyday life the binary divide between royalty and priesthood (jero) and 
commoners (jaba) is more pertinent than the three-way division into Brahmin, Khsatriya, and Wesia. (Vickers 
1989: 47) Inside and outside mark major social as well as spiritual categories of ethnosociology
285, (Wiener 
1995: 153 in Parker: 2003 42 Fn 5: Vickers 1989: 48) as the pre -eminent position of the palace (puri) and the 
high  status  of  the  priestly  houses  (geriyah)  created  a  social  system  composed  of  two  components:  the 
members of royal or priestly houses are insiders (jero) since theywere close to the inner world of gods and 
rulers, but everyone else was an outer person, a jaba. (Wiener 1995: 153 in Parker 2003: 42 FN 5)  
                                                                                                                                                         
charisma or “reception of a divine mandate to rule”. (Canonica- Walangitang 2003: 50-53) Power should be concentrated in the power-
holder and the society in which he wields his power. If this condition is met, the power-holder is thought to have the wahyu (divine 
radiance). (Canonica- Walangitang 2003: 50-53) This concept corresponds with the Indian concept of sakti or the Balinese taksu. The 
evidence of such concentrated power in the power-holder was societies’ fertility, prosperity and stability, order and glory, whereas the 
diffusion of power resulted in manifestations of disorder in the natural world and in inappropriate modes of social conduct. (Canonica- 
Walangitang 2003: 50-53) Javanese people tended to believe that a ruler who still had this power would prevent such natural and social 
disturbances from appearing. Order as prevailing condition symbolizes harmony with the cosmic purpose and in its deepest sense it means 
unity, the oneness of all, of creator and created, of servant and master. In this context, Shiraishi (Shiraishi 1997 in Parker 2004: 95) points 
to the congruence between the kaula-gusti relationship and Suharto’s fatherly patron-client relationship with his children and clients, a 
triangular hierarchy which had been repeated throughout society. She has identified two  contrasting traditions:  that of the modern 
organisatie (rational Dutch bureaucratic machine) and that of the sometimes idiosyncratic, personal power of the bapak (father). There 
was a continuing tension between the first style interpreted by economic rationalist and technocrats as Western, modern and desirable 
and the bapak’s so called “Asian” way of running the state as the source and the remedy of arbitrary power.  
283 The unity of the formerly semi-autonomous villages was broken down into smaller units called banjar in the 14
th century which grouped 
households according to corvée obligations. Each banjar carried out its obligations under a court appointed head or klian. (Vickers 1989: 
47) 
284 The Law of Manu X: 5 draws a distinction between Ekajati (Onceborn) and Dwijati (Twiceborn). Only the first three varna were classified 
as Dwijati: They were believed to have two births, one from their mothers’ womb and one from the initiation rite for studying the Vedas 
(Upanayana). During the course of history, the study of the Veda became prohibited for the Shudra, because as Ekajati those people were 
not  initiated  and  not  legitimized  to  receive  spiritual  knowledge  correlating  to  mundane  and  spiritual  power.  (Notice  the  practice  of 
upanayana rituals prior to receive education in ancient and medieval India and in classical and contemporary Indonesian Hinduism). It is 
unknown to me, when the concept of Ekajati and Dwijati became popular in Java or Bali.  
285 The high king (Dalem) in Klungkung was the ultimate “insider”. Aristocrats were called anak jero, inside people. Royal brothers “went 
out” from the puri to establish branch line houses – lesser “insides”, Jeros, to the wider social “outside”. Commoner officeholders, whose 
homes were known as jeroan and who were addressed with the title Jero, were also “inside people”, and the same position was extended 
to court retainers and servants. The honorific title Jero was given to commoner wives of royalty or priests, but commoners of either sex 
who became temple priests, shadow play puppeteers and traditional architects or healers were also addressed as Jero. (Wiener 1995: 153 
in Parker: 2003 42 Fn 5: Vickers 1989: 48) PART C | 194 
The population’s majority are outsiders (93%). Commoners occupied a vast range of ranks in state and religious 
offices, and in recognition of their status received the titlejero. In consequence, it is possible for a commoner to 
move from being an “outsider” (jaba) to being an insider (jero)
286. (Vickers 1989: 48-49) The puri and geriyah 
have built complex social networks, based on blood and affinal ties. They must keep these ties alive by inviting 
and being invited to a large number of social and ritual events (Parker 2004: 33) thereby strengthening their 
social networks, personal relations, and social capital. The puri by virtue of wealth, status, and political power 
have been and are important actors in the creation of communities and political networks, (Parker 2004: 31) as 
are the geriyah in religious matters.  
In the 1910s, the triwangsa system had been strengthened by the Dutch colonizers. (Pringle 2004: 123) Dutch 
colonizers mandated the Brahmins in the 1910s to explain their social system. Thus, the Brahmins reintroduced 
and ascertained the ideal model of triwangsa for Dutch administrative interests. To complicate the situation, 
there are many groups of descendants, particularly in highland interior Bali, but also in lowland and urban Bali, 
which either do not acknowledge or do not fit themselves in varna or triwangsa affiliation. (Parker 2004: 43-44 
FN 12) Educated, modern individuals may also reject the triwangsa system. (Vickers 1989: 50)  
In conclusion, Howe (1987: 142-143, paraphrased) points to six important differences between the systems of 
hierarchy and rank in India and Bali.  
1.  In Bali there is no concept of untouchability and no notion concerning the accumulation of pollution 
for those at the bottom of social hierarchy. 
2.  Whereas  in  India  Brahmin  priests  rank  lower  than  non-priestly  Brahmins,  in  Bali  the  situation  is 
reverse. 
3.  Balinese religion is better described as an ancestor cult than a peculiar version of Hinduism. 
4.  While Balinese society does display patrilineal descent groups practicing preferential endogamous 
marriage, by no means all Balinese are members of such groups. In general, kinship institutions and 
marriage practices differ from those in India. 
5.  Whereas in India sub-castes are general corporate groups, in Bali people holding the same title form 
groups  only  under  specific  conditions,  and  are  more  aggregates  of  similar  kinds  of  people.  The 
Balinese word for title, soroh, has the same range of referents as does the Hindu word jat.  
6.  The Balinese form functionally specific voluntary social groups, which are open for all to join and 
which  are  democratic.  Organs  of  local  government  in  village  Bali  are  similarly  organized,  though 
membership is often compulsory and more permanent.  
 
He finds that ranking within the Balinese varna is only important for the triwangsa, the upper three varna 
constituting less than ten percent of the population whereas ranking is less important among the shudra varna, 
with the example of the pande (metal smith) clans and the pasek clans, who rank highest among the shudra. At 
the level of the village, he even finds a democratic egalitarian system. Howe (1987: 143-144) then enlists six 
crucial  factors,  which  provided  the  Balinese  system  of  hierarchy  and  ranking  with  its  own  particular 
characteristic, which I will quote at length.  
First, the available evidence points clearly to the fact that it was Sanscritic culture rather than 
Hindu social structure that was adopted by the Javanese and Balinese, and that it was brought to 
Java both by Hindu priests and by Indonesians who travelled to India (…). Second, such a culture 
eventually  arrived  in  Bali  via  Javanese  intermediaries.  Third,  it  is  probable  that  Bali  already 
possessed a fairly well developed ancestor cult and ranked status and titles on which this suitable 
culture could settle; and it is worth noting the complete absence in Java of any kind of caste-like 
groups now and in the past. Fourth, whatever was the nature of the culture adopted, there were 
in it significant strains of Buddhist influence. Fifth, there probably existed in Bali, prior to the 
advent of Hindu culture, a system of family, village and regional temples with its associated ritual 
and ceremony. Sixth, (…) it is likely that there already existed the practice of wet rice agriculture 
and its associated irrigation organizations.  
   
                                                 
286 By rising in wealth, rank and status, commoners tied to the courts could elevate their whole family and their ancestors. The rewards 
were entry to heaven after death, and a good incarnation in later lives. All of this could be achieved through devotion to the king, and 
through the possibility of studying worthy literature under the guidance of the priests. (Vickers 1989: 48-49) PART C | 195 
The usage of the term caste is therefore not justified in Bali, as I propose, and varna and lineage has remained 
merely an ideal used to describe Balinese social order from the sixteenth century until the present day out of 
political interests for social dominance and maintaining the constructed social order for reasons of freezing 
power  relations.  As  there  are  various  differences  between  the  Indian  and  Balinese  societies,  “it  is  the 
substantial nature of some of these which should caution against any dogmatic assertion that Bali constitutes a 
caste society.” (Howe 1987: 143) In consequence, the varna model has always been an ideal which worked for 
the triwangsa or the top two varna, priests and warriors, but which was full of inconsistencies for everyone 
else. (Vickers 1989: 50-51) During the colonial conquest, Dutch anthropologists ascribed the term caste to the 
local  genealogical  lineage  (wangsa)  system  and  inaccurately  equated  both  systems.  Later,  most  Balinese 
reformers adopted the term and used it uncritically over decades. In recent years a Balinese debate on the 
appropriateness of this foreign ascription arose, as a result, the Hindu Council has passed a bhisama (legal 
pronouncement in Hindu Dharma Indonesia, issued by the Hindu Council on a specific issue) on the correct 
interpretation of the varna borrowed from India. This appears to be the first effort to introduce a revitalized 
understanding in favor of the social equalization of the jabawangsa.  
5.4.3. The impact of modern education, Ajawera, and modern elites 
Modern education has affected the pre-colonial social order to a considerable extent. Main criticism espouses 
that after having received a little of Western education, the generations of the 1920s up to the 1960s forgot 
about their own culture. This in turn undermined the traditional society and created division between the older 
and the younger generations, as the emergence of the new elite shows. John Coast (1951 in Parker 2004: 22-
23, FN 4) warned “if modern education, which is an urban product, ever tends to make the modern Balinese 
generation discontent with working on the rice fields, then the whole basis of Bali’s economic as well as social 
fabric will be destroyed”. This is exactly the problem, modern reformers, elites and the society currently has to 
cope with. The participants to my study assess uniformly that Balinese religion and culture is endangered from 
influences outward to Bali, emerging either from inside or outside of Indonesia. Not only the old-jero complain 
that “the contemporary youth doesn’t care about the future, doesn’t consider how future life will be and how 
Bali will be tomorrow, they just know how to enjoy themselves and imitate foreign lifestyles without criticism” 
(Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006), but also the Strategic Development Plans, the Strategic Plan of the Hindu 
Directorate and the new elite complain about the moral distortion of the Youth by assessing low standards of 
values and morals.  
Indeed, social change brought by colonialism, trade, tourism, modern education and the economic change to a 
post-industrial service society has resulted in the erosion of the substructure of pre-colonial socio-religious 
social order which is based on the cooperation of villagers characterized by agrarian rice cultivation. Whereas 
in the pre-colonial period, the Balinese kings were the guardians and authorities of the inseparable complex of 
religion, culture, and ritual, the Brahmins became more influential during the colonial period and under the 
New Order (1965-1998).  The “cultural transformations” of social relations and political efforts of elites to 
construct and reconstruct national or sub-national life, culture, and religion necessitated a constant negotiation 
process of “cultural engineering”. (Antlöv 2005: 47; cf. Vickers, 1999: 383)  
To investigate on the share of education in that social change, let’s go back to the year 1937 and listen to a 
witness of the times, Miguel Covarrubias (1965/1937: 394)
287, who assessed “the younger generation is rapidly 
being cut off from a cultural environment which they have learned to regard as below them, considering their 
parents, formerly their model of behavior, as rude peasants who have not gone to school”
288. Covarrubias 
(1965: 394-395) argues in an unrivaled polemic style: 
   
                                                 
287 Covarrubias was a Mexican artist and ethnographer, who had married in Bali in 1930. He regularly contacted the father of one of my 
informants, Ida Pedanda Telabah, who in turn called my attention to Covarrubias work, especially the last chapter. 
288 Covarrubias (1965: 394) delivers a gripping illustration of one facet of the delineated change, namely clothing, and tensions between the 
traditional way of life and the new lifestyle brought to Bali by modern educated Balinese, who received education in Java or M akassar. 
“The young gurus look upon the graceful and healthful costume of the island, so well suited to the climate, as indecent and primitive and 
demand that their little pupils wear shirts in school” He (1965: 395) tells the dramatic story about a boy who was shamed by his teacher 
because he didn’t wear a shirt in school, but the father, “who had never owned one (nor had any of his ancestors), refused to buy it for 
him. He felt so thoroughly disgraced that one night he hanged himself from the tree in front of the schoolhouse”. Today, all pupils wear 
school uniform, but at religious festivals as fullmoon or new moon they wear the modern Balinese “ritual uniform”.  PART C | 196 
…(t)he old-fashioned teachers were the reservoirs of the science and poetry of Balinese culture, 
but those young Balinese who have gone to Java to become teachers  for the Western-style 
Government schools have returned convinced, that what they learned in Java is the essence of 
knowledge and progress. They have become conscious of the contempt of Europeans for the 
native cultures and have been influenced to believe that the philosophy, arts and habits of their 
country are signs of peasant backwardness (…) The teacher forces his half-digested jumble of 
European ideas on the little pupils, who from the beginning of their education learn to look down 
on  everything  Balinese.  They  are  taught  about  what  a  European  child  learns  in  elementary 
school; they learn to speak and write in Malay, a language foreign to Bali, which most of their 
parents ignore, and some even have a smattering of Dutch, so when they come out of school 
they make good, cheap clerks, totally uninterested in their own culture. Since there are so few 
jobs available on the island in which such education would be required, making clerks of the 
Balinese seems to make European education have a negative and even detrimental effect. 
The  introduction  of  the  modern  education  by  the  educated  new  elite  secularized  and  democratized  the 
patriarchic, patrimonial, and feudal pre-colonial etiquette in Bali as the equality in access contravened the 
traditional class system and gender relations. (Parker 2000: 51; 2004: 210) As first Dutch and later Indonesian 
were the language of instruction, in using foreign languages in school, the Balinese reformers alienated their 
fellow Balinese at first, but thereby they provided the ground for equal schooling. Traditionally, anak jero were 
to be seated in a higher position than commoners. The royal class was assumed to be closer to the realm of 
Gods, and purer than commoners. Therefore, their social and spiritual status was higher. In consequence, 
royalty and brahmins had to be seated in an elevated position, with their servants and bondsman to their knees 
and feet. But with modern education, this code of physical separation which regulated class hierarchy was 
gradually secularized and democratized. (Parker 2004: 210) In the early days of schooling all children sat on the 
floor,  later  on  chairs  and  tables,  they  all  used  the  egalitarian  Bahasa  Indonesia  at  school  and  they  were 
“rubbing shoulders with commoners”. (Parker 2004: 210).  
A  salient  feature  of  social  change  is  therefore  that  the  attitude  of  respect  towards  the  triwangsa  has 
dramatically  declined.  The  old-jero  have  become  increasingly  impoverished  and  powerless,  many  of  them 
working as servants now, though they still maintain some traditional “spiritual” status, whereas their social 
status has declined. In turn, commoners who underwent longtime education occupy excellent jobs, and have 
increasing influence and prestige. The focus on individual merit seems to be revolutionary to the agricultural 
Balinese social order and culture, which is organized hierarchically, determined by faith and all activities are 
carried out in groups (cooperative ethos). Even the nomenclature directs to a lack of individuality, because the 
name changes after parenthood or grandparenthood. Formerly, even artists would not sign their paintings. 
Traditional Balinese religion, culture, ritual, and social order had no religious teaching for all children. And there 
has been certainly no sermons or catechetical addresses in temples, nor even readings from the scriptures. 
(Parker 200: 49; Steenbrink 2001: 20) Teaching was given according to the classes children were born into. 
Whereas the majority of the commoners and peasants were left without any education before the Dutch 
conquest, the access to historical and ritual knowledge was restricted to the upper classes (triwangsa), the 
jero(insiders), or dwijati segment of society, who lived in the priestly compounds and the palaces, which had 
been initiated ritually to study traditional textual sourceswritten on palm leaf manuscripts (lontar). (cf. Hinzeler 
1993: Parker 2000: 49-50) Similar to the medieval monopoly of the European monasteries on sacred scriptures, 
in  the  study  ofsacred  scriptures(agama)  the  doctrine  of  ajawera  denotes  the  upper  classes’  (jero) 
monopolization of traditional textual sources(lontar). To put it differently, in the socio-cultural perspective the 
jabawangsa were not allowed to study sacred palm leaf manuscripts (lontar) and were left without education 
in religion. (Parker 2000: 49) 
Related  to  the  introduction  of  modern  education  after  1846,  Dutch-Native  Schools  (Hollandsch-Inlandsche 
Scholen, HIS) were established in Singaraja and Denpasar. Instruction was held in Dutch, giving the pupils 
access to Dutch East-Indian secondary education on Java. At the same time, a number of people’s schools were 
established, where instruction was given in Balinese. (Bakker 1993: 35; Parker 2000) At the onset the Balinese 
upper classes did not voluntarily attend the village schools or the HIS; the colonial clerks rather had to force the 
parents to send their children to school. After 1914 a few members of the Balinese nobility registered their 
sons  at  these  schools,  since  they  hoped  to  increase  the  possibility  of  their  children’s  vertical  mobility,  as 
positions in the bureaucracy and the government, or clean, white-collar jobs in the city were appreciated. After 
the popularity of modern education increased, the Balinese set up schools themselves, where instruction was 
given in Dutch. (Bakker 1993: 35)    PART C | 197 
Due to the social pressure of the jabawangsa, who had begun to articulate and discuss religious issues, the 
access to study these sacred scriptures was opened for them in the 1920s. (cf. Hinzeler 1993; Bakker 1993) 
Founded in 1921, headed by I Gusti Putu Djelantik, the Suita Gama Tirtha reform organization targeted at 
educational and religious progress by studying the knowledge on religion, literature, ethics and  philosophy 
contained in the lontar. (on the reformist organizations see Bakker 1993: 35-48) An important event was the 
founding of the Kirtya Liefrink-Van der Tuuk library (now called Gedong Kirtya). Here many copies of old law 
texts  and  religious  text  which  had  previously  been  a  close-guarded  secret  by  the  pedandas,  had  been 
assembled. (Bakker 1993: 36) Now they became more  widely known, especially to a number of  western-
educated  Balinese.  (Bakker  1993:  36)  Ida  Pedanda  Gede  Pameron  was  one  of  the  trustees.  In  1932,  Ida 
Pedanda Gede Pameron founded the Sekolah Agama in Tabanan which taught religion. (Bakker 1993: 42) One 
objective  of  many  of  those  organizations  was  to  abolish  the  tradition  of  ajawera.  The  tradition  interdicts 
commoners  (the  Ekajati  segment  of  society)  to  study  lontar  unless  they  took  part  in  a  mewinten  ritual 
(purification  ritual  to  obtain  sacral  knowledge  especially  for  Brahmins  and  Ksatriya).  (cf.  Hinzeler  1993) 
Djelantik, member of the Raad Kerta (colonial administrational body) in Singaraja initiated lontar readings and 
reading  courses  for  the  interested  young  generation,  thereby  secularizing  and  even  democratizing  the 
tradition, as all classes of society were eligible tolontar study.  
In consequence, viewed from the social and political perspective, knowledge was not freely disclosed prior to 
the 1920s; it was valuable and a source of power. The tight control or release of historical and ritual knowledge 
and  information  conferred  upon  the  palace  or  priest  compounds  considerable  advantage,  by  not  sharing 
information freely both could to an extent direct ritual and kinship networks and were vested with a source of 
power. (Parker 2003: 31) In the theological perspective, ajawera denotes the interdiction to transmit sacred 
knowledge to people who are not prepared or initiated yet. Because knowledge is conceived to include a 
magical connotation, it might, if misapprehended and misapplied, not reach the intended target, but result in 
negative implications, which in turn endanger the individual, the social system, and the environment. It is very 
interesting, that in the Hindu education institutions, an initiation ritual (upanayana) is carried out prior to 
taking up studies and after graduating from studies a closing ritual is held. Contrary to secular India, where this 
tradition  originated  but  is  not  continued  anymore,  in  contemporary  Bali,  this  tradition  is  continued  until 
present times.  
The  shift  from  a  traditionally  exclusive  understanding  of  accumulating  knowledge  towards  the  modern 
universal concept of schooling for all Balinese demonstrates the secularization and democratization of tradition 
towards an understanding of education as a universal right, which is not restricted to birth-right privileges. 
Religious  scriptures  were  after  the  1920s  no  longer  restricted  to  the  triwangsa.  Those  scriptures  were 
translated into Indonesian, are printed in school books, and thus made available to all people, regardless of 
their origin, class, or spiritual status. These modern developments created a reformist neo-Hinduism, thereby 
bringing a drastic turn to classical Indian sources. Nowadays, in schools and temples the Bhagavad Gita and 
parts of Vedic and Upanishad scriptures are read, texts which were hardly known amongst Balinese religious 
specialists just two generations ago. (Steenbrink 2001: 20) In consequence, the integration of the Hindu class 
into the modern school system and the Hindu education system may be considered 1.) as one of the greatest 
democratic renewals of religion in Indonesia (Steenbrink 2001: 20; Parker 2000) and, 2.) as a singular case of 
religious pluralism in Muslim majority nation-state.  
“The effect of these new institutions based on the Western model was the creation of a new elite parallel to 
the old elite. The new elite often had better prospects of a job as an official in the colonial administration or as 
a teacher at one of the schools.” (Bakker 1993: 35) Those emerging educated new elites constitute the middle 
class of Indonesia. This middle class is the agent of change away from traditional systems of thought towards 
more egalitarian societies. Increasingly educated middle classes are a significant democratizing force as they 
demand predictable, safe, rational, legal, socio-political contexts. In Indonesia, a clear-cut differentiation of 
who was already in and who was still out of the Indonesian middle-class was hard to draw with parameters 
used for developed economies in the 1980s and 1990s. (Gerke 2000: 145) Membership in the Indonesian 
middle-class is not necessarily dependent on income, but it is largely defined by education, social networks, 
social behavior and lifestyle. (Gerke 2000: 145; Suwitha 2000: 223-249; Triguna, protocol 2007) 
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The  shift  from  a  peasant  to  middle-class  status  in  Bali  was  most  likely  to  occur  through  education  and 
employment in the towns and tourist centers. (Parker 2004: 98) High social status and wealth operate through 
the  education  system  in  Bali:  high  status  and  wealthy  groups  reproduce  their  privileged  position  through 
education.  Frequently,  the  sons,  but  also  girls  (Bakker  1993:  195-222)  of  the  royal  and  priestly  houses 
(triwangsa) benefited from their inherited positions of privilege and power, reproducing traditional hierarchies 
within the colonial and modern state. (Parker 2000; 2004: 215-222; Suwitha 2000: 223-249, Triguna, protocol 
2007) Some old elites (triwangsa) successfully protected their status quo, whereas the educated new elite 
comprising segments of the old elite, marginalized members of the old elite (triwangsa) and jabawangsa, 
endeavor to reform the religion sector. (see Bakker 1993 and Triguna 1997) In the beginning, it was only the 
jero girls and boys, who were automatically steered into high school and beyond, as privileged admission to 
elementary and secondary schooling was given to the triwangsa. Those jerowhose status coincided with wealth 
were  best  able  to  utilize  educational  facilities,  drawing  not  only  on  their  wealth  to  finance  long  years  of 
schooling, but also on extended family ties in towns and cities for contacts and accommodation in Bali or 
outside Bali. (Parker 2004: 215-222; Suwitha 2000: 223-249, Triguna, protocol 2007)  
Remember,  after  initial  resistance,  modern  schools  became  popular  amongst  the  Balinese,  because  they 
provided the possibility of vertical mobility, as graduates were able to alter their social status. (Bakker 1993; 
Parker 2004) In context of the colonial period, Bakker (1993: 35) remarks “It was noticeable that children from 
the higher classes gained admission to these schools more easily than the great majority of the lower classes, 
again showing the extent to which the Dutch wished to maintain the Balinese hierarchy”. Remember, it has 
been the Dutch who gave the mandate to the Brahmins to explain their complex social order for colonial 
administrative interests. This pattern continued in the nation state, “The state-building impetus of independent 
Indonesia created its own slipstreaming effect”, Parker has noted, “sucking in first the elite sons and daughters, 
then gradually peasants’ sons and even daughters” (Parker 2004: 265) – with the result that now without 
difference in gender all children are obliged to go to school.  
In the 1930s, the small old and new modern elite came to occupy numerous strategic positions in society as 
teachers or civil servants. But only since the 1960s and the expansion of service related industries such as the 
tourism and export sector, education and the health system, the Balinese middle class  has grown steadily. 
During  the  nation  state  period  related  to  development  plans  and  compulsory  schooling,  a  mentality  of 
progressiveness was fostered through school attendance and school attendance affected that mentality in 
turn. But only since the economic boom in the 1980s, the expansion of the tourism sector and export industry 
related service economy on cost of agriculture, the bureaucratic and service jobs have been available more 
widely for all Balinese.  
In the last decades,  education is an  important factor in giving the young generations the  confidence and 
incentive to leave the villages. The young generation are not attracted to rural village life anymore or their 
villages do not have the capacity and enough labor to feed them, as a consequence most young individuals and 
families of all descent moved to the cities (Kuta, Denpasar, Gianyar) apply to underpaid and overtime work in 
the tourism industry and export sector, thereby causing rampant urbanization, linked with this process is the 
rationalization and secularization of religion. Research in the 1980s showed that Balinese high school students 
aspired to the modern jobs publicized by school and government and did not want to follow traditional-village 
based occupations such as stone masons, farmers and even priests. Overwhelmingly young people saw their 
future in modern occupations requiring education and skills. (Parker 2004: 250-254) Therefore education has 
been radically transformative and dramatic shifts in social status have been achieved through education and 
employment. (Parke, 2004: 215-222, Suwitha 2000: 223-249, Triguna, protocol 2007) Today, such concerned 
urban middle-class intellectuals position themselves at the forefront of new identity politics (Schulte-Nordhold 
2007: 5) - some desperate and probably last-ditch efforts and attempts to safeguard what is vaguely perceived 
as the core of Balinese religion and culture, from secularization. 
I  found  following  types  of  elites  belonging  to  the  Balinese  elite  actively  engaged  in  systematization  and 
conceptualization efforts in the sector of religion and the Hindu class.  
1.  Old Jero: traditional royal and priestly elite. 
2.  New Jero: new elite represented in educated middle-class experts, who are seen by some old elites and 
their  bondmen  in  the  villages  as  lacking  traditional  authority  or  breaching  traditional  sanctified 
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The new elite can be categorized into three camps:  
1.  Super-jero, these are old-jero or traditional royal and priestly elite, who reproduced their status through 
secondary and higher education, wealth and offices in the Hindu Council, MORA, education sector, 
government,  political  system,  and  bureaucracy,  and  who  influence  and  shape  the  top-down 
construction of the Hindu education class and system and Hindu and Balinese identity policies. 
2.  New jero, those commoners (jaba) or marginalized or empoversihed members of the old elite, who used 
education to move vertically upward and who hold positions in the Hindu Council, MORA, education 
sector, the national and regional government, and bureaucracy, which enable them to participate in the 
top-down authorization process of Balineseness and Hindu identity. 
3.  ‘subaltern’ jero, either new or old elites who do not share the top-down construction of Balinese and 
Hindu identity, but argue for a participatory and bottom-up approach. These elites argue for subaltern 
and an alternative approach to identity policies.  
4.  Foreign researchers, whose intercourse with Balinese academics fertilize consciously or unconsciously 
future developments. 
There is a recurring tension between Bali-centric conservative reformers trying to appropriate Hinduism on 
their own terms, and modernist reformers aspiring to universalize their religious traditions according to their 
conception of what Hinduism is really about, (Picard 2004: 57) as portrayed in Indian scriptures. Religion and 
social order are perceived by the conservative Balinese elites as an inseparable unity. Religion, culture, and art 
are seen as an organic unity (Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006), and to secularize religion implies to destroy the 
tradition of ancestor veneration and the social order of Hindu Bali. In this context, Schulte-Nordholt (2007: 5) 
has noted, “the discourse of urban intellectuals in Bali is deeply rooted in New Order concepts with which they 
were brought up”. “As such, their thinking is heavily influenced by an interesting mixture of colonial categories, 
New Order bureaucratic concepts and recent modernist Hindu ideas”. (Schulte-Nordholt 2007: 5) In this, the 
implementation of the organic philosophy in the population by means of education proved to be very efficient 
as those models are still adhered to today. But if we recall the persistence of the Indic state model and the 
Javanese kaula-gusti relationship, one might argue following a cultural relativist argument, that the Balinese 
indeed display a preference for organic models.  
There are also repeatedly tensions between the super-jero and the old-jero about privileges, and competencies 
of ritual performances. As a rule, I found the super-jero to be rather represented at UNHI, whereas the new 
jero are mainly employed at the IHDN. Based on Balinese nomenclature (see Parker 2004; Geertz 1963), I 
counted course membership of all students registered with UNHI or IHDN from 2006 to 2008. I could not 
validate a public prejuidce that at UNHI only the triwangsa would gather, whereas at IHDN the commoners 
study. Though, the students reflect a strong loyalty to their respective campus ethos, are proud to study at the 
respective tertiary unit and campus life is vivid.  
Today, the textual sources of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and Agama Hindu Bali are disputed in a quarrel over 
textual  sources  and  their  interpretation  (‘Quellen  and  Exegesestreit’)
289.  The  Bali-centric  faction  at  UNHI 
(Sudharta Interview 2008) and the old elite (Pedanda Baing Interview 2006, 2007) maintain that Balinese and 
Javanese sources must remain the primary pool and source of Balinese religion, and only then the Veda may be 
consulted, whereas the Indian modernist fraction tends to refer first to the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the 
Ramayana, the Bhagavad Gita and only then to local scriptures. In this context, the Hindu Council has regulated 
the hierarchy of Hindu scriptures analogues to the hierarchy of law according to the concept of a Stufenmodell. 
The high priest chamber of the reformed Hindu Council has pronounced three  bhisama (a legal statement 
binding for all Hindus issued by the council on a specific issue) in 2001 and 2002. The Hindu Council is given 
authority on issues of Hindu Law. Those bhisama are passed and implemented by the lay-men chamber and the 
management board. The mechanism promoted and used by the reformed council to reform and consolidate 
traditions by passing new laws continues the mode of filtering set out in 1968.  
   
                                                 
289 In 1968, the Hindu Council adopted its second decree. It inaugurated the concepts of Tat Twam Asi (Thou art that), Atma Aupamya 
(Bhagavad-Gita: equality of others  with oneself) and  Moksartham Jagathita. In addition, the decree introduced a hierarchy between 
agama (as represented in the Vedas and the smriti), adat and awig-awig. As long as the local adat supports the strengthening of agama 
Hindu, it may be cultivated according to Desa, Kala, and Patra. The regulations on the sublevel of social units as banjar, subak are termed 
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Usages and customs are reformed following three strategies: utpati (to invent a new tradition which is based 
on the Vedas), stihti (to maintain appropriate traditions) and pralina (to abandon traditions which do not befit 
the development of the soul (jiwa) or modernity). Concerning the legal hierarchy, regulations on the lower 
level may not be in conflict with the higher levels, and a bhisama must follow subsequent legal sources in order 
to be valid: 
1.  Sruthi (Catur Vedas)
290 
2.  Smrthi (Dharma Sastra) 
3.  Sila (ethics of sages) 
4.  Sadacara (sacred traditions: adat, awig-awig) 
5.  Atmanastusti (contemplation) 
 
All fractions are extraordinarily devout in ancestor service. (Titib Interview 2011) This debate also extends into 
the Hindu class and teachers’ training. In general, the Hindu educators’ curriculum contains Sanskrit and Old-
Javanese in reading and writing at the tertiary level, because educators’ shall be able to read the sources of 
Hindu religion in their original version. This is heavily criticized by some experts of pedagogy (Tanu Interview 
2007), who demand the future educators to be trained in pedagogical science and less in dead languages.  
It  is  important  to  note,  that  most  of  the  Balinese  elites  (old-jero,  new-jero  and  super-jero)  certify  the 
uneducated  Balinese  community  (masyarakat  awan)  limited  capacity  to  the  particular  importance  of 
reproducing the constructed Balinese identity. But they all note the thirst (haus) (Interview Bajing 2006, Sura 
2006) of the community for deepening knowledge in religious questions. In other words, the new and old elites 
detect an interest, appetite, and need in the Balinese community to understand religion. (Sura Interview 2006, 
Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006, Suryani Protocol 2005) As Moran (1991: 257) has illustrated, this is the crucial 
change in the modern world that presses the issue of understanding religion on increasing numbers of ordinary 
people. (Parker 2000) A net effect of the rapid urbanization is that the religious and value education of the 
youngest  generation  is  endangered,  since  first  young  core  families  live  in  cities  dependent  on  child  care 
institutions  and  therefore  the  larger  family  cannot  socialize  the  traditional  values.  For  this  reason,  Hindu 
reformers attest the Hindu class and the Hindu education system an important position in nurturing in Hindu 
religion and values, even if the role the Hindu class plays is still insufficient. (Sura Interview 2006, Pedanda 
Bajing Interview 2006, Suryani Protocol 2005) In other words, the educated elite criticizes that social systems 
and the family are insufficiently nurturing in Hindu knowledge and competence into children and society as a 
whole, hence the government and elites have the mandate to organize a system of religious education.  
Prof Triguna (protocol 2007) sees the task of Balinese political and social agents in developing a commitment to 
protect the Balinese and the Hindu community. Therefore Balinese politicians and academics have to display 
goodwill and have to offer the whole community the same opportunities on equal grounds. In consequence, 
motivated by their Hindu literacy thirst and based on the own efforts and interest, the Balinese community 
reproduces and continues their cultural-religious heritage. Given the mandate to reform, the motor or agency 
of such a systematization and reproduction is the Balinese educated middle class, and the religious experts, the 
former ruling elite, and the priesthood. The educated elite represented in Hindu reformers and Hindu strategic 
planners design programs to facilitate the dynamic expression of faith and saving the very core of Balinese 
Hinduism in a traditional but updated way (Ajeg revitalization movement) at the same time. This process is 
intimately linked with the question whether there is a core of Balinese Hindu identity, what constitutes this 
core,  and  what  the  role  of  Hindu-based  education  is  in  this  concern.  Since  the  Dutch  conquest,  and  the 
classification of the Balinese orthopraxis as Hindu, there is a debate among Indonesian and foreign specialists 
concerning the “authenticity” of Balinese culture and Hindu Dharma Indonesia. It remains controversial, to 
what extent traditional religious practices and beliefs pertain to universal Hindu Dharma, or are a variant of the 
Indian prototype or are local traditions.    
                                                 
290 The Catur Vedas Samhitas (Sankrit: four knowledge compilations) are a large compilation of ancient metrical texts originating in India. 
Their exact age is unknown. The verses contained in the Vedas are known as Mantra. Those four compilations constitute the most ancient 
texts of Sanskrit literature and the highest authority of Hinduism. According to Hindu traditions, those Vedas are not of human agency 
(apaurusheya: eternal and authorless) and are perceived to been directly revealed. In consequence, they are called sruti (what is heard or 
listened). The Vedas are the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, and the Artharvaveda. The large body of commentaries to those four 
compilations (Brahmanas, Aranyakas, Upanishads, and Vedangas) also belongs to the category of sruti. Besides the Vedas, the Agamas (a 
text containing a specific traditional doctrine, or system which commands faith) belong to the class of sruti texts. The Vedas are said to be 
general, whereas the Agamas are specific, as they give instructions on the details of worship, yoga, mantra, tantra, and temple building. 
The secondary texts known as smirti are a vast collection of texts which are remembered, as the Itihasas (epic dramas and history—
specifically the Ramayana, Mahabhrata (which contains the Bhagavad Gita), the Puranas (history), and the Law texts as the Law of Manu 
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Interestingly, the megalithic tradition of ancestor veneration and the male  purusa line of descent seem to 
constitute the core of Balinese religion by the old, new, and subaltern elites. The oldest son and grandson have 
important obligations during the three-steps-cremation ritual and during the regular rituals of ancestor worship 
(pitra yadnya). If they fail to perform those rituals and to exercise their obligations, the security and welfare of 
their families and clan are perceived to be endangered. The ancestors protect the island and the families; if 
they are not revered anymore, the spirit of Balinese religion and culture will be destroyed. In this abolishing 
ancestor veneration is seen as to cause the social order to erode. (Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006, 2009; 
Titib Interview 2007; Sukerda Protocol 2007) 
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PART D 
6.  Emergence,  conception,  and  organization  of  the  Hindu 
education system 
6.1. The legal base of the religion class in Indonesia 
This section examines in detail the current legal framework of the religion class from elementary to tertiary 
level. Due to the demographic composition of Indonesia, the topic of the religious class in public schools and 
the  sector  of  faith-based  schools  remains  a  source  of  controversy  since  the  early  days  of  the  nationalist 
movements and the foundation of the state.  
 
Beeby (1979: 263) clearly identifies the choice between secular schools and education controlled by religious 
organizations as a cause of tension in the educational policy of Indonesia. From independence until 1964, the 
confessional religious class was a non-compulsory subject in public schools and universities testifying to a quite 
open climate of thought and a more secular value orientation during the Sukarno years. Attendance of the 
religion class was optional in the sense that the students or the parents of the students had the freedom to 
decide, if students attend or not attend the class. In consequence, the religion class did not affect student’s 
promotion to the next level of education.  
 
By 1965, the confessional religion class was made a compulsory subject. The current Indonesian  legislation 
requires that six confessional religious classes are provided in public and private schools at all levels of the 
education system (with the exception of master and doctoral studies at state universities). The findings show a 
specific peculiarity of the Indonesian case. First, the ultimate ambition of Indonesian strategic and educational 
policies is to mould an Indonesian citizen who has faith in God (Islam: imam or Hindu: sradha), follows the 
commands of God (Islam: taqwa or Hindu: bhakti), and has morals (Islam: akhlak or Hindu: budhi pekerti). In 
this context, the dimension of spiritual intelligence (UNHI 2007: xxv, Belen 2007) in education is a dimension of 
education, which is given particular importance by Indonesian educational planners regardless to the religion 
they  adhere  to.  Thus,  Indonesian  national  educational  planners  add  this  peculiar  dimension  of  spiritual 
intelligence to the UNESCO standards of student-centered learning throughout life. Second, and related to the 
first point, students are required by law to attend the religion class in the religion they adhere at all educational 
levels instructed by a teacher of the same agama. In addition, the religion mark is a compulsory item in the 
school report, and whether a pupil/student stays back or is promoted to the next level depends amongst 
others  on  how  the  religion  teacher  grades  the  student.  It  is  thus  interesting  to  assess,  in  Indonesia,  the 
organization of religious education is strictly confessional, but at the same time pluralistic. Therefore it is safe 
to assume that Indoensia has advanced an own and unique model of the religion class. 
6.1.1. Precursors of the National Education System 
This  section  gives  a  cursory  and  incomplete  overview  of  the  main  four  historical  precursors  which  have 
contributed to the nature of current national education system. The first stream refers to informal training that 
children receive from their families and communities. In the ancient past as in the present, the core of what 
young people know about the nature of their world, the tradition of their ethnic group, social roles, and their 
occupation has been learned through direct participation in family and village life. (Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 
1980: 59) In the context of traditional archipelagic “religious education”
291, education took place amidst the 
social environment in the nuclear family, clan, community, and village transferring religious knowledge and 
socio-cultural skills to the child. “A main channel is religious learning by face-to-face contacts and via imitation. 
In modern societies, the former religious ecology of the family is more or less broken.” (Nipkow 2006: 579) 
 
Buddhist and Hindu religious instruction constitutes the second stream. Speculatively, the type of archipelagic 
Hindu education was similar to the Indian model
292 as represented in a Hindu or Buddhist scholar’s centre 
(gurukula) where education was conducted in an individualistic fashion.    
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Those  Indian  educational  units  developed  over  time  and  the  more  elaborated  the  teaching,  the  more 
prestigious such a school has been valued. In India, Hindu teachers (guru, pandit) gathered a few students 
(shishya) to study Sanskrit, memorize sacred scriptures, and to do some disputation at their homes (acharya-
kula),  a  brahminical  settlement  or  hermitage  in  forests  (ashrama),  or  a  “Hindoo  school  of  learning”  (tol). 
(Scharfe 2002; transliteration omitted) There the students lived together with their teachers or returned home, 
if they lived in the vicinity of the educational unit. Scharfe (2002: 6; 127; transliteration omitted) comments on 
the Indian context:  
 
It was the duty of every “twice-born”, i.e., member of the three upper social orders, to continue the arya 
traditions, and especially of the brahmins to teach “what had come down” (agama) as a link of “passing 
on” (sampradaya) of sacred texts and customs. In spite of the important role that this “passing on” of the 
sacred tradition played in Indian society, no full-fledged theory of education was developed. (Scharfe 
2002: 6) 
(…)  there  is  no  indication  of  organized  structures  within  the  hermitage,  let  alone  state  imposed 
regulations. The goal was personal improvement, the capability to meet one’s religious and social duties, 
not preparation for government service – at least not directly. (Scharfe 2002: 127) 
 
The  ashrama  model  seems  to  have  been  popular  in  the  archipelago.  The  students  (commonly  male 
descendants of the upper social order) learned the religious lore from India which has been acculturated in the 
Archipelago. It is crucial to note in this context, that neither Hinduism nor Buddhism – although Buddha has 
been the ultimate authority on conduct – developed a central religious or educational authority that could have 
enforced unity or uniformity. “Education was decentralized and it saw modest centralization only much later 
when large institutions developed administrative structures.” (Scharfe 2002: 145) In consequence, only with 
the  kingdoms  of  Sriwijaya  (7
th  -  13
th  century)  (Kulke  1986,  1993a,  1993b,  1995,  1999;  Munoz  2006)  until 
Majapahit (11
th – 15
th century) (Slametmuljana 1976; Munoz 2006) exclusive, formal and religious oriented 
education had been invented. In the kingdom of Sriwijaya, an international renowned Buddhist University had 
been operated from the 7
th century onwards. This university has been in vivid exchange with the University of 
Nalanda in India. The University of Nalanda (located in the contemporary state of Bihar in India) had been 
founded  around  400  AD.  (Scharfe  2002:  143-147)  It  was  one  of  the  first  Universities  with  an  integrated 
boarding school (ashrama), where around 11 thousand students were instructed in Buddhist teachings. The 
‘Indonesian’ students even had their own ashrama there. After its destruction by Muslim conquerors in 1193, 
Nalanda was reopened in 2007.  
 
The  relationship  between  teacher  and  the  male  student  of  the  upper  social  order  had  been  intensive, 
individualistic, and subjected to strict rules. “The initiation to Vedic study (upanayana) seems to presuppose 
some  elementary  knowledge,  while  no  recitation  of  Vedic  texts  was  allowed  before  formal  upanayana.” 
(Scharfe 2002: 86) The initiation is considered a second birth, where the Vedas are the mother, the teacher the 
father. Only after this rite, the student, who has been a descendant of the upper social order, is considered a 
real “twice born” (dvijati). In consequence, a student had to perform an initiation or rather a purification ritual 
prior to taking up studies and after graduation a closing ritual (samavartana). This tradition can be traced from 
early Vedic and Zoroastrian texts times to modern times, but its character has changed.  
 
Interestingly in contemporary Bali, Hinzeler (1993: 458) observes “Anyone who wishes to read manuscripts 
regularly needs to undergo a consecration (mawinten, madiksa *…+), which must be performed by a brahmin 
priest.” Informal training of professional priests requires those ritualsbefore consecration (diksita), but on a 
much more elaborate and complex level. T is my observation, that at formal educational units as the Dwijendra 
Foundation, the Indonesian Hindu University, or the State Hindu Dharma Institute this tradition is continued
293. 
Students are required to participate in those initiation rites, or rather purification rites ( apodgala, abebersih) 
prior  to  taking  up  studiesand  before  graduation.  At  UNHI,  the  upanayana  ritual  is  called  mawinten  or 
mahasisya  upanayana  (as  madiksa  refers  to  the  inauguration  of  a  professional  priest)  performed  by  one 
professional Siva priest (pedanda shiva) and one professional Buddhist priest (pedanda shiva)
294.  
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294 On the roles and functions of the priests see C. Hooykaas (1964) Weda and Sisya, Rsi and Bhujangga in present-day Bali. In: Bijdragen tot 
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Company ; T. Goudriaan and C. Hooykaas (1971) Stuti and stava  (Bauddha, Śaiva, and Vaiṣṇava) of Balinese Brahman priests / [Sanskrit 
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Likewise, at the end of the studies, a closing ritual is held (mejaya-jaya)
295. Taking up studies and graduation is 
divided into two steps: the first step is accepting or releasing the students in matters pertaining to the 
undiversified or uncreated (niskala) and the second step is formally registering or graduating them – that is in 
matters pertaining to the diversified or created (sekala). With those rituals the balance between the students’ 
intelligent  quotient  (IQ),  but  also  the  emotional  intelligence  quotient  (EQ),  and  the  spiritual  intelligence 
quotient (SQ) shall be created. (UNHI 2007: xxv; BaliPost 13.10.2011) 
 
From the 8
th to the 15
th century Bali, a few Vihara (Buddhist monasteries) were founded located at rivers, and it 
is  very  likely  that  they  also  provided  Buddhist  education  in  the  ashram-model.  Since  only  a  few  stone 
inscriptions mention those pasanggahan (study centers), Agung and Musta (1991-1992: 1-15) assume there 
was only a slight formal institutionalization of education prior to the Dutch conquest in Bali. Presumably, prior 
to the Majapahit invasion, education was organized in the guru-kula system, and it was differentiated into four 
pillars:  Asrama,  Vihara,  and  profession-based  education  at  the  palace  (paguron  kraton),  and  the  family 
compound.  The  paguron  kraton  system  denotes  education  in  the  subject  matters  of  religion,  statecraft, 
philosophy and law that the younger nobility received by an appointed priest or teacher at the palace. In 
consequence,  the  palace  became  a  center  for  the  production  of  knowledge  and  literature.  Following  the 
conquest of Bali by Majapahit in 1343 but preceding the introduction of secular education by the Dutch around 
1846, traditional education had been differentiated into vocational areas based on kinship and social order. 
This differentiation model has a long tradition as Scharfe (2002: 86) observes in the Indian context. With regard 
to  the  upper  social  order  (jero  –  insiders),  the  brahmins  would  have  provided  their  sons  with  education 
centered  on  literacy,  theology,  philosophy,  law  and  ritual  performance  located  at  the  geriyah  (Brahmin 
premises). The priests held a central and important position in the traditional educational types and in the 
production of literature. Yet, all these educational types were strictly limited to the social groups they aimed to 
educate. Similarly, nobility provided their sons with education oriented on statecraft, martial skills, and law 
located at the puri (palaces). Both strata of the upper social order provided elitist education. Yet, the lower 
social  orders  (jaba  –  outsiders)  as  peasants,  craftsmen,  traders,  were  left  without  any  spiritual  or  formal 
education (On a detailed account of literature and literacy in Bali from 18
th to the 20
th century see Hinzeler 
1993; Parker 2000). At the family compound children were taught the traditional profession as art and craft 
that  displayed  some  status  and  skills,  it  were  the  peasants,  who  had  no  tradition,  no  education,  and  no 
knowledge in religious matters. The sons of peasants would have helped in the fields and in tending farm 
animals, sons of craftsmen would have learned their fathers skills by learning and doing in the manufacture, 
whereas sons of traders would have helped in the storehouses. The remaining clans in society, as the pande 
(smiths), educated their offspring in the skills they needed in order to pursue their profession.  
 
The third stream is Islamic religious instruction. As stated earlier, Indonesian Islam developed on a substructure 
of shamanist and Hindu-Buddhist elements that preceded its arrival. With the advent and dissemination of 
Islam from the 10
th to the 13
th centuries, informal teaching units (langgar) were attached to the first mosques, 
and the Hindu scholar’s centre was transformed into Islamic boarding schools (pesantren, padepokan or surau). 
In the early 20
th century, Islamic modernist organizations recorded their dissatisfaction with the traditional 
pesantren type. Those organizations reformed the Islamic educational sector and curriculum by establishing 
schools with a combined curriculum of secular and Islamic subjects. These new learning centers were named 
madrasah, a term imported from the Middle East. (Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 60-61) Concerning the Islamic 
model, the traditional type (langgar and pesantren) as well the modernist Islamic type of school (madrasah) 
were initially restricted to religious teaching only, that is Arabic (arabiyah), Theology (tawhid), and Law (fiqih). 
In  1931  the  curricula  of  the  madrasahadopted  subjects  in  general  education.  Today,  Islamic  education  is 
offered either at small prayer houses (langgar), non-graded schools (pesantren) operated by a Muslim scholar 
(kiyai or ulama) or a graded school (madrasah) operated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
 
The forth stream is Western-style education. Portuguese and Spanish traders were the first to open catholic 
schools in the Moluccas in 16
th century. Starting with the expansion of Dutch control by the advent of the 17
th 
century, Protestant schools were opened in the Moluccas and other islands. Then the Dutch introduced the 
intellectual Western-style secular school system. But this system  was not egalitarian; it displayed a highly 
stratified pattern. At top of the system ranked Dutch schools, fully funded by the colonial government, using 
Dutch as medium of instruction and identical in curricula and staffing to those in the Netherlands.  
   
                                                 
295 Bali Post 13 October 2011, UNHI Gelar Prosesi Ritual “Majaya-jaya”. PART D | 205 
Those schools offered restricted access only to families of the colonial administration officers and wealthy 
businessmen. At the medium level were schools for Dutch, Chinese, Eurasians, and a few handpicked locals 
using Dutch as well as medium of instruction. At the lowest level, village elementary schools provided a small 
range of subjects for the local population using local languages as medium of instruction, but those schools 
were established and funded by the local aristocracy. (Sudijarto/ Thomas et al. 1980: 60-65) 
 
Established in 1901, a central concern of the Ethical Policy was education. The arena of education and culture 
left  an  open  space  for  to-be  Indonesians  to  express  their  ideas  against  the  restrictions  of  the  colonial 
government. In consequence, the beginnings of the nationalist movement leading to Independence concurred 
with the establishment of the Ethical Policy. Advisor on Native Affairs to the  Colonial Government of the 
Netherlands  East  Indies,  Snouck  Hurgronje
296  came to believe that the adoption of enlightened policies, 
particularly in the field of education, would enable Indonesians to develop rational reasoning in  order to shed 
both Islamic and  adat (local traditions, customs and customary law) preoccupations, as Islam andadat were 
perceived to be contradicting a modern rational world view
297. This would enable the locals further to develop 
a modern consciousness nec essary for self-government. Hurgronje promoted European education in Dutch 
limited to the Westernized elite only in order to provide the colonial administration with fairly educated civil 
servants. Because colonial officers were uneasy about the idea of In donesians entering the same educational 
system as the Dutch, other Europeans and Chinese, those receiving Dutch education remained a small elite, 
who came to have a tremendous influence over the course of Indonesian affairs in the coming decades. Only in 
the 1920s, a handful of locals had the advantage to gain tertiary education in the Netherlands. As secondary 
schooling was all in Dutch language, thereby the possibility that any youth, who had not mastered Dutch, 
would  rise  beyond  the  lowest  primary  grades   in  the  secular  school  structure,  was  severely  limited. 
(Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 65) Only a small number of Javanese  priyayi
298 and Balinese nobility attended 
European elementary schools where they had the opportunity to study Dutch - the key to gain modern skills 
and achieve an awareness of the outside world. 
 
In 1900, there were about 1,500 elementary schools in the entire archipelago for a population of over 36 
million  people  (only  one  was  located  in  Bali)  and  only  some  1,545  students  visited  Dutch  schools. 
(Frederick/Worden  1993;  Bunge  1982)  In  consequence,  “public  education  was  virtually  nonexistent” 
(Frederick/Worden 1993) until the government finally established a 3-year village school system in 1906. As 
those schools needed to be staffed, teacher training schools (Kweek schools) were also established. Although 
the  Dutch  colonial  government  subsidized  the  construction  of  school  buildings,  the  responsibility  for 
maintenance and paying teacher salaries was left to the local population. Then in 1914, seven-year schools 
were established in order to enable the locals to qualify for higher education without having to pass through 
the Dutch system. Enrolments in those Western-type schools increased tremendously in the 1900-1930 period 
(from 265,940 in 1900 to over 1, 7 million in 1930) yet the literacy rate for adults remained low even by 1930, 
averaging 7, 4 percent overall. (Bunge 1982: 31) Even though many locals resented the schools as a new 
government-imposed burden – they had to finance the schools and the staffing, there were some 3,500 village 
schools in 1913 and 18,000 in 1940. (Frederick/Worden 1993)  
 
At the beginning of the 20
th century, education opportunities were highly limited for the archipelagic locals, 
even for the local rulers collaborating with Dutch colonizers. Even though the amount of formal education of a 
Western type that was available to the local population was severely limited, those young locals who did 
progress through the school system produced then a small corps of nationalistic leaders, who adopted secular 
Western-type schooling. Generally, Indonesian leaders in the first decades of the twentieth century devoted a 
great deal of attention to educational reform, and a number of experimental schools were established outside 
the  government  and  missionary  systems  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  In  relation  to  the  very  late  educational 
opportunities for the vast population, educated elites of all political groupings subscribed a central meaning to 
education, thereby the basic conflicting lines of politics and over the shape of the future nation also played out 
in the education system. Therefore, if we look at the current education system, we can see that the ideological 
conflict about the shape of the nation and its culture is manifest in it.  
   
                                                 
296 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (8 February 1857 - 26 June 1936) was a Dutch scholar of Oriental cultures and languages and Advisor on 
Native Affairs to the colonial government of the Netherlands East Indies. 
297 Somewhat modified, this line of thought is continued until today as the strong emphasis laid on religion in the education system has the 
implicit purpose and ultimate ambition not only to rationalize superstitious beliefs and adat in order to purify agama.  
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There were two general efforts made by the local reformers themselves in the educational sector: the cultural-
nationalist (Taman Siswa) and the Islamic (see previous paragraph in this section). The Taman Siswa program 
was  founded  by  the  Javanese  Ki  Hadjar  Dewantara.  He  was  appointed  as  first  Minister  of  Education  and 
Culture, and later he was declared “National Father of Education” and his birthday, May 2
nd, to be the National 
Education Day. The Taman Siswa movement was strongly influenced by the pedagogic ideas of the Indian 
Rabindranath Tagore. (Ramstedt 2004: 6) This model supported a rather alternative approach of education to 
the mere intellectual Western approach, in which intellectualism was combined with a religious dimension and 
a strong moral commitment -as expressed in the subject of moral education (budhi pekerti). The movement 
established several schools throughout the archipelago, and environment and nature were part of a contextual 
curriculum. The key feature was Dewantara’s promotion of Javanese cultural values as part of moral education 
(budhi pekerti) The influence of those Javanese ethics – which are intrinsically linked to Javanese mysticism – 
arose protest from proponents of the orthodox Islamic model as the Minister of Religion, Rasjidi, who worried 
that those cultural values on Muslim children might conflict with orthodox Islamic values and norms.  
 
The cultural-nationalist and the Islamic model are two ideological ends of the spectrum ever present in the 
national education system and each has its own vested interest to protect at all costs. (Kelambora 1976) The 
local  elites  understood  education  as  a  means  first  to  achieve  equality,  dignity,  and progress,  as  both  the 
national and the Islamic line of thought saw education as the way to obtain the same standard and status as 
the Dutch colonial power. Second, education was a means to abscond from either being underestimated or 
treated as a second class human by Dutch colonizers. Therefore in Indonesia national education is assessed as a 
feat, as victory above colonialism. In Indonesia, the education system is seen as opportunity of vertical social 
mobility, or as vehicle for conveying the students to a higher social-class structure. (Kelambora 1976, Parker 
2003) In sum, from the onset of the National Movement and Independence throughout all political epochs, all 
groups considered education to be the key factor in national development despite their contesting lines of 
thought. All groups have always posed great weight on education as the constitutional link between education 
and culture shows. Education is a vehicle to develop Indonesian spirited culture and identity necessary to 
maintain national unity, stability, and public order. Thus we can understand the crucial role agama is ascribed 
to in national development plans. 
6.1.2. Note on strategic planning instruments in education 
In  order  to  realize  the  objectives  of  education  on  a  large-scale  and  in  a  short  period  of  time  the  young 
republican government launched a comprehensive mass education program to enhance correct understanding 
of Pancasila during the period of national consolidation (1950-1960). The mass education program
299 included 
an alphabetization campaign aiming to eradicate illiteracy for the entire population including adults and 
women, spreading out education amongst the population, expansion of the school system (primary schooling 
and the teachers training), creation of a democratic and  Pancasilaistic  in  nature  political  consciousness, 
rehabilitation of the youth and empowerment of women. Certainly, the program targeted the building up of 
political and critical awareness, especially for the uneducated militarized youth, which could have been easily 
manipulated by anti-republican forces, may it be the Dutch or Islamists. It was one  ambition of the mass 
education  program  to  accelerate  the  integration  process  of  an  Indonesian  society  in  order  to  consolidate 
national and cultural unity crucial for the survival of the young republic. The government made following 
efforts in education: 1.) increasing the Peoples’ school attendance from 3 to 6 years, 2.) improving the standard 
and  quality  of  education,  and  3.)  increasing  the  number  of  schools  to  meet  the  people’s  need  towards 
education  and  schooling  by  building  new  schools,  contracting  houses,  and  implementing  a  morning  and 
afternoon schools. The government faced following difficulties: 1.) the dearth of teachers, 2.) the lack of school 
buildings,  and  3.)  the  insufficient  equipment  situation.  In  order  to  make  the  1954  Act  on  Education  and 
Schooling  operative,  the  government  tried  to  overcome  all  those  challenges  by  implementing  a  ten  years 
strategic program from 1950 to 1960. (KPD 1950: 45-46)  
 
In  view  of  the  population  size,  distribution,  and  annual  growth  rate,  the  task  of  Indonesian  educational 
planners is immense. In the 1950s, the magnitude of their goal to furnish universal elementary schooling and 
large amounts of secondary education is even more impressive (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 50), when we consider 
the total population, the dearth of teachers, and the limited finances. In 1950 the illiteracy rate amounted to 
90 percent of a total population of 70 million. This rate his been decreased to 57 percent in 1961.    
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years old text runs as it would had been written only recently, similar issues and problems are discussed, with the exception of illiteracy. 
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Concurrently  intensive  supportive  measures  were  taken  to  improve  secondary  and  tertiary  education.  As 
tertiary education was simply inexistent, it had to be set up from the start. Two days after the Proclamation of 
Independence  an  Association  of  Tertiary  Education  had  been  established,  which  evolved  into  the  public 
University of Indonesia in 1950. In 1949, the public Gadjah Mada University has been established in Yogyakarta. 
The first private tertiary facility was the Indonesian Islamic Academy established in July 1945 in Yogyakarta. In 
1948, the Academy changed its name to Indonesian Islamic University. Its Institute of Religion was taken over 
by the Ministry of Religion and was re-established as State Islam Religion Institute (Institute Agama Islam 
Negeri). Private tertiary facilities in the 1950s included amongst others, Islamic facilities in Yogyakarta, Solo, 
and in Bandung as well as Christian Universities.  
 
Politization and polarization of the population and economic decline characterized the period between 1959 
and 1965. Bad macroeconomic management, war with Malaysia, the isolation from the Western world, and 
domestic  political  instability  caused  poverty  and  stagnation  in  economy  and  education.  The  only  positive 
advance  Sukarno’s  first  development  plan  (1961-1968)  achieved  in  its  educational  component  was  the 
establishment in each of the nation’s 21 provinces of a public university and a public teacher’s college. (World 
Bank  Report  No.  26191-IND.  2003:  4)  In  this  context,  in  1962,  the  State  University  in  Bali,  Udayana,  was 
launched and in 1963 the first private Hindu Dharma Institute (now the Indonesian Hindu University). 
 
Ever since the first 5-year-development-plan (repelita), which is part of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy 
(Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN), was published in 1967 by the Suharto regime, the country underwent 
planning cycles. In order to facilitate development, planning and administration were the central government’s 
key control mechanisms to facilitate education and engineer scarce resources in the regions with little regard 
for local priorities. The major instrument of these planning processes was repelita, which decided much on the 
development spending, whether central or local. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 54) The first long term development 
plan (pembangunan jangka panjang, RPJP I) has been enacted from 1969-1994. Then the second long term 
development plan (pembangunan jangka panjang, RPJP II) has been launched from 1994-2019. 
 
In the era of reform from 1998 to 2002, there were important changes made to the planning instruments, 
including significant changes in the levels of decision-making, with a major move towards decentralization and 
a greater  focus on regional  issues.  This process triggered in turn the demand to reform, restructure, and 
decentralize the educational sector as well as the curricula. The Broad Guidelines of State Policy issued by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly in 1999, called for a restructuring of the entire national education system and 
the  drafting  of  a  new  bill  on  education  and  a  new  curriculum.  The  second  long  term  development  plan 
(pembangunan  jangka  panjang,  RPJP  II)  1994-2019  has  been  aborted  and  replaced  with  the  national 
development program (Program Pembangunan Nasional, Propenas) put into effect  with Act No 25/ 2000. 
There is considerable continuity between the first, second and third long term development plan. Within the 
first  RPJP,  the  development  trilogy  of  political  stability  and  security,  economic  growth,  and  equality 
(pemerataan)  formed  the  developmental  priorities,  whereas  in  the  second  RPJP  those  priorities  became 
equality (pemerataan), economic growth, and political stability and security. Then in 2000, the Propenas sets 
out five broad objectives to be achieved continuing the strategies and line of thought of previous planning 
instruments.  In  2004  then,  the  Consultative  Assembly  enacted  the  national  long-term  development  plan 
(Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional, RPJPN) for a 20 years period from 2005 to 2025. The key 
element of reform in the education sector was a shift from the transmission to the transformation paradigm. 
Prior to decentralization, administration and planning had been dominated by the center Jakarta as top-down 
structured processes, but decentralization has added a number of planning instruments at the regional levels. 
However, “Although participation of civil society and the village level has much increased, the process is still 
much like the repelita process, and can be thought of consisting of a top-down process and a bottom-up 
process”. (World Bank, Report No. 26191-IND. 2003: 4) 
   PART D | 208 
6.1.3. The religion class from 1950 to1965 
During colonial times, the curriculum was secular and scientifically oriented. In 1871 the colonial government 
decided that “Religion was not to be taught as a school subject in the Government schools”. (Kelambora 1976: 
233)  Thereby  the  colonial  administration  signaled  neutrality  in  matters  of  religion.  In  consequence,  the 
question  of  religious  education  had  been  dormant  from  the  1870s  up  to  the  early  month  of  Indonesian 
independence  and  it  quickly  became  a  great  political,  ideological,  cultural,  religious,  and  educational 
controversy. (Kelambora 1976: 236) The expansion of the secular education system directly corresponded with 
the intensification of the conflict between the colonizers and the Islamic  elite. Naturally, the Islamic elite 
strongly opposed the expansion of the secular system, while the Western secular educated elite drifted further 
away from their traditional roots and formed a significant social force by the proclamation of Independence. 
(Kelambora 1976: 235) 
 
Besides the first principle of One Supreme Lordship, the original and the amended 1945 Basic Law embodies 
two basic  rights,  which form the legal framework of  (Hindu) religious  education: 1.) the right to religious 
freedom in private and in public, however, public display has been restricted by consequential legislation, 
whereas the individual right of freedom of religion and conscience is maintained, and 2.) the universal right to 
education.  
 
By the Dutch capitulation to Japanese occupation in March 1942, Indonesia had a literacy rate of 10 percent 
and about 1000 fully trained academics. (Müller 1974: 164) In their three years lasting occupancy (1942-1945), 
the Japanese introduced Indonesian as instructional and national language and they established a socially equal 
school system for the people. The multi system of schools was dissolved into a single 6 years’-elementary 
school system (Peoples’ School, Sekolah Rakyat, Kokumin Gakkoo). The contemporary structure of the school 
systemis therefore a remnant of the Japanese period: Schooling was used to disseminate Japanese propaganda 
and the Hakko Ichiu ideology, the ideology of collective prosperity of greater East Asia. This ideology of the 
Eastern spirit should be promoted in schools to achieve following aims: 1.) sacrifice one’s own interests for the 
sake of the collective interest, 2.) respect God, parents, teachers, and community figures, 3.) develop skills in 
children in providing in-school training that benefits mental and physical self-confidence, and 4.) education has 
to be oriented towards the outcome. Instruction in class was added by practical out-of-class training, thereby 
education gained a military connotation, as military skills, discipline, and the spirit to defend one’s country was 
also nourished.  
 
Because  of  the  geographic  expansion  and  socio-cultural  diversities,  Indonesia  has  the  largest  educational 
system with the most complex problems to be solved among the Southeast Asian nations. Dutch colonialism 
had inherited Indonesia an unfavorable and disadvantageous education system; following the proclamation of 
independence in 1945 and the ending of the revolutionary war in 1949, a nation-wide education system had to 
be built up from the ground. (Müller 1974: 168; Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 49) The table shows the increase in 
participation in Western schooling from 1940 to 1950. As many Indonesians participated in the revolutionary 
war 1945-1949, the number of students and teachers decreased in those years. 
 
Period  People’s schools  Number of students  Number of teachers 
1940/1941  
Dutch colony 
17.848  2.259.245  45.415 
1944/1945  
Japanese occupation  
15.059  2.253.410  36.287 
1950/1951  
Indonesian Republic  
23.801  4.926.370  83.850 
(Tilaar 1995: 67) 
 
In December 1945, the Central National Committee of Indonesia issued a Declaration on Education that made 
mention of the religion class in public schools. It was stated religion should be given appropriate attention 
without reducing the freedom of those groups who want to follow their respective faiths. This idea of freedom 
later colored the provision of the 1950 Education Law on religion classes. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 227)  
 
The first Minister of Education appointed in 1945, Ky Hajar Dewantoro, promoted Javanese cultural values as 
part of moral education (budhi pekerti) in the national school system. Exactly this influence of Javanese ethics – 
which  are  intrinsically  linked  to  Javanese  mysticism  –  on  Muslim  children  seemed  to  particularly  worry 
orthodox Muslims as the Minister of Religion, Rasjidi. (Ramstedt 2004)  
   PART D | 209 
Later on, the impact of the Christian religion classes in private faith based schools from the primary to the 
tertiary level led to constant worries in Muslim orthodox, but also in Hindu circles, as Muslim or Hindu students 
had to participate in the Christian religion classes in Christian schools and Universities. This practice resulted in 
accusations of hidden Christian missionary efforts. (Interviews Sujana 2007) 
 
The  then  second  Minister  of  Education,  Schooling  and  Culture,  Soewandi  (1946-1947),  instructed  the 
Investigating Committee for  Education and Schooling that was chaired by KH Dewantara to reconsider all 
efforts  in  the  educational  sector  and  to  formulate  a  plan  of  objectives  and  strategies  in  education  and 
schooling. The plan comprised ten paragraphs and paragraph 4 on the objective of education reads:  
 
In the civilized lines of humanitarianism as contended in all religions teachings, the national education 
and schooling bases on religion and national culture and is directed towards the hail and bliss of society. 
(Ahmadi 1987: 71) 
 
Dewantara had successfully pleaded for religious education to be provided at public schools in order to take 
the monopoly of religious education out of the hands of private Muslim schools (madrasah and pesantren) and 
under the surveillance of the state. (Ramstedt 2004) Thereby the state could influence the curricula of the 
schools and prevent a spread of anti-nationalist Islamic teachings. At the same time, he had demanded that the 
quality of teaching at the private Muslim schools be improved by including even more secular subjects into the 
curricula. (Ramstedt 2004; Mujiburrahman 2006) 
 
Even with its liberal and Western value orientation, the government recognized the fact that religion is a 
significant element in society and it must be accorded at least some place in the school curriculum. (Kelambora 
1976: 237) Originating in the efforts of the Minister of Religion, KH Kafrawi (1946-1947), religious education 
was  introduced  according  to  Dewantara’s  proposal.  The  initial  struggle  on  the  administrative  location  of 
religious education, whether within the Ministry of Education or within the Ministry of Religion, was decided as 
Minister  of  Religion  Haysim  (1949-1952)  defined  the  work  of  the  Ministry  of  Religion  as  responsible  for 
supporting religious (not only Islamic) teaching in schools. The second congress on education in Yogyakarta 
held from 20 to 24 July 1949 under the chair of Dewantara produced a bill of a draft law on education, and 
submitted  it  to  the  Central  National  Committee  of  Indonesia.  Immediately  a  commission  was  formed  to 
elaborate on the content, but it brought no outcome. Initially, the legal range of the Act was restricted to the 
Indonesian Republic with Yogyakarta as its capital, because the East parts  of Indonesia were under Dutch 
control until 1949.  
 
In 1951, the Ministry of Culture and Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs jointly governed that the 
religion class has to comprise two teaching hours a week which starts at grade IV. In order facilitate special 
regional interests and to allow for regional variation, the religion class also could be provided from the first 
grade onwards and the teaching hours could be extended to four hours maximum. To Balinese Hindus all that 
regulations did not matter for two reasons, 1.) they were only part of the Republic after 1949, and 2.) their 
religion was not yet acknowledged from 1950 to 1963. Balinese reformers, however, organized a Hindu religion 
class and moral education (budhi pekerti) in the private Dwijendra foundation and the public Saraswati School 
(Bakker 1993, Titib 2006; Wiyana Interview 2010; Sura Interview 2007)  
 
Only after the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia was formed, the 1949 draft law on education was 
enacted as Act 4/1950 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools
300 and was endorsed as Act 12/ 
1954 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools. March 18
th, 1954. (Ahmadi 1987: 71) It contained 
17 sections and 30 articles and concerns education and teaching in schools only, as education in faith-based 
schools and community education are regulated in own laws
301. (Ahmadi 1987: 71)  In the following, I will 
summarize the crucial regulations of Act No. 12/1954 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools.  
The translations are my own.  
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Education and schooling is organized, if there are 10 or more pupils. The aim of education and teaching is to 
build a moral human
302 who is a skilled and democratic citizen having a sense of responsibility for the welfare 
of society and nation. Education and schooling base on the principles written down in the  Pancasila, the 
Constitution, and national culture. The instructional language is Indonesian. In the kindergarten or the first 
three grades in school the regional language may be used. Compulsory  school attendance is regulated as 
follows: Children from the age of six years onwards have the right and children at the age of eight years are 
obliged to attend school for a minimum of 6 years.  
 
Section VIII on the establishing and organization of schools introduces two types of responsible bodies: state or 
private. Schools entertained by the central or regional government are state or public schools (sekolah negeri) 
and schools entertained by individuals or groups are private schools (sekolah partikelir). The responsible body 
for state schools is the Ministry of Education, Teaching, and Culture. A minimum requirement to establish a 
school is the attendance of at least 30 pupils. In school girls and boys collectively join a class. Only if the 
situation requires it, divided education and teaching is held.  
 
Of  interest  to  the  present  study  are  subsequent  sections.  First,  with  regard  to  compulsory  schooling,  the 
required compulsory school attendance is met if the student attends a faith-based school that is registered 
with the Ministry of Religion. Second, the noteworthy section IX on private schools gives faith communities the 
right to establish and organize private schools as enshrined in on the principle of the liberty of every citizen to 
embrace a religion or belief systems (keyakinan hidup). Private schools that meet the requirements may apply 
for subsidies by the Ministry of Education. Remarkable is an article governing that teachers must respect all 
religious traditions or belief-systems in school. The 1954 elucidation of this article reads that it is prohibited for 
teachers to criticize, insult, or otherwise diminish the esteem of a religion or a belief-system. The term belief-
systems is said to comprise the political orientation. In this, it seems that in the 1950s, an era in which agama 
and  belief  systems  were  considered  by  the  government  to  have  the  same  rights,  there  have  been  some 
educational opportunities provided for belief systems.  
 
Finally, section XII concerning religious instruction states the religion class has to be held in all state schools; 
but the parents decide whether their children have to attend the lessons or not. Thus, attendance at religion 
class is optional in the sense that the either the parents, legal guardians of the student or the adult students 
themselves had the freedom to decide whether they attend or not attend the religion class. The method how 
religious instruction has to be carried out will then be regulated further by a joint decree of the Minister of 
Education, Teaching and Culture and the Minister of Religion. The 1954 elucidation of article 20 of Act 4/1950 
on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools states: (Kelambora 1976: 241) 
 
  Whether or not a type of school provides the religion class depends on the age and the intellectual 
level of its students;  
  Mature students can decide to or not to follow the religion class  
  The nature of the religion class and its teaching hour will be determined in regulations for the type of 
school in question 
  Religion class does not affect the promotion of a child  
 
In July 1951, the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Culture and Education released a Joint Regulation on 
the Religion Class at Schools. The regulation stated: (Mujiburrahman 2006: 243) 
 
  The religion class is provided according to the religious adherence of the respective students (only 
achieved in 2003) 
  The religion class is only provided if there are at least ten students of the religion in question in the 
class 
  Students who adhere to a religion different from the one taught in the class, or students who adhered 
to the religion in question, but whose parents do not allow them to follow class, are allowed to leave 
the religion class 
  Religion teachers are forbidden to teach something that could hurt the followers of another religion 
and belief  
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This  regulation  was  applicable  to  public  and  private  schools  -  to  private  schools  only,  if  their  respective 
authorities were willing to do so, or the parents of more than 10 students wanted their children to be provided 
with a specific religion class. The elucidation of the regulation stated that in this case, the Government would 
provide a religious teacher for the religion in question and help to find a place to carry out the class, if the 
authority of the private school does not allow its school building to be used for the class. (Mujiburrahman 
2006: 243) 
 
After failing to implement the Jakarta charter in the late 1950s, Islamic leaders argued that the optional religion 
class  was  nothing  but  efforts  to  secularize  the  country,  because  Pancasila  without  religion  was  empty. 
(Mujiburrahman 2006: 230-250) In line with the 1950 Act on Education and Schooling, the Provisional People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara) decided that the religion class was to be 
carried  out  in  public  schools  and  universities,  and  at  the  same  time,  the  Assembly  reaffirmed  its  non-
compulsory character in 1960. Even if the student decides to attend, the mark obtained for this subject should 
not in any way determine promotion. (Kelambora, 1976: 244) The sketched policy appears to be a compromise 
between the Muslim demand to have compulsory religion classes, and the view of the secular oriented groups 
that the Government schools had to be free from that class. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 228)  
 
Up to 1960, besides the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Christians, the two other strong political 
powers in the 1950s, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the army, also supported the non-compulsory 
religion class policy. It is reported that Sukarno was of the opinion that the issue of the religion class has the 
potential to disintegrate the nation. (Belen Interview 2007) 
 
The political development after 1959, however, paved the way for a realization of the Muslim aspiration for the 
compulsory religion class. This change was not because of the increase of the Muslim intellectual power but 
due to the serious political rivalries between the army and the PKI. The clash between a naturalistic and a 
religious approach on the religious class is shown in this paragraph, which is also exemplarily for the pluralistic 
style of forging alliances. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 227-230)  
 
Based  on  Sukarno’s  “synthetic  ideology”  of  Nationalism,  Religion,  and  Communism
303,  and  the  Manipol 
Usdek
304, the PKI could introduce Communism at every level of society and in most educational institutions of 
the country since 1959. In response to this development, the army encouraged religious groups to fight against 
the PKI. In Muslim majority areas in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, the army supported the Muslim 
demand for compulsory religion class. Behind this background we can understand why the Hindu Council 
(Parisada) joined the functional groups secretariat (Sekretariat Bersama Golkar) in 1964. As Hinduism was only 
yet  officially  acknowledged  in  the  early  1960s,  and  the  Hindu  community  could  be  easily  held  to  be 
Communists, that could be assaulted by militant Muslims, the Balinese religious authority thereby protected 
their Hindu brothers in the majority areas in Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. (Sudharta Interview 2008) 
 
During its fifth plenary session in Bandung in the end of 1960, the Provisional People’s Consultative Congress 
reaffirmed the non-compulsory character of the religion class in public schools and universities in Decree No 
II/MPRS/1960 on the Broad Outlines of Planned National Development First Step 1961-1969. In chapter II on 
general provisions, article 2 on Mental Sector/Religion/Spirituality/Research, Paragraph 2 introduces Pancasila 
and Manipol as subjects at all levels of education, whereas article 3 reads:  
 
It is stipulated that religious education becomes a subject in schools from public elementary schools to 
state universities following the understanding that the students have the right not to attend class, if legal 
guardians/adult students express their objection. 
 
These provisions should allow the citizens to develop Indonesian character and cultureand to reject negative 
influences from foreign cultures.  
                                                 
303 Nasionalisme, agama, and komunisme. The acronym is NASAKOM. 
304 Manipol is the Indonesian acronym of Political Manifest. Starting in 1959, Sukarno reiterated the five central concepts of the Indonesian 
revolution, combining the first letters of these five concepts, the acronym USDEK evolved. First, Basic Law of 1945 ( UUD 45); second, 
socialism  ala  Indonesia  (Sosialisme  Indonesia);  third  Guided  Democracy  (Demokrasi  Terpimpin),  fourth  Guided  Economy  (Ekonomi 
Terpimpin) and fifth, Indonesian character (Kepribadian Indonesia). This new state doctrine hence became known as Manipol Usdek. 
Sukarno even  compared the Pancasila, Manipol, and Usdek  to the al-quran and the Hadith, because both would constitute a unity. 
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In 1960, the Marxist Prof Prijono, Minister of Basic Education and Culture, who controlled elementary and high 
education, introduced the so-called Pancawardhana (five principles of development) and later in February 
1963 he linked his five principles of development with the PKI’s principle of Pancacinta (the five loves). While 
the Pancawardhana still mentioned religious morality, the Pancacinta did not include it. For the opponents of 
the PKI, both ‘Pancas’ were a PKI strategy to eradicate the religious dimension of education in the country. The 
Muslims,  both  traditionalist  of  the  Nahdlatul  Ulama  and  reformists  of  the  Muhammadiyah  followed  by 
Christians and Hindus opposed both ‘Pancas’. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 227-230, Kelambora, 1976: 243, Murray 
1981: 371) 
On August 25, 1965, Presidential Decree No.  19 on the  Basis of the National  Pancasila Education System 
(Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 19 Tahun 1965 tentang pokok-pokok system pendidikan nasional) 
presents the national education system as to constitute a categorical element (unsur mutlak) in nation- and 
character  building.  Education  functions  as  vehicle  of  revolution  and  constitutes  an  integral  part  in  the 
revolutionary process. Education means the gradual nation- and character building which allows the nation to 
complete its revolution understanding that agama constitutes a categorical element in order to foster nation 
building and character building. Interestingly, the Decree introduced Pancasila and Manipol-USDEK as bedrock 
of the education system, whether public or private and as the moral content to be taught in the education 
system. Then within this education system, the citizens could receive specialization according to their ideology 
(aliran)  or  religion  (agama):  Pancawardhana,  Islam,  Catholicism,  Protestantism,  Buddhism,  Hinduism,  and 
Pancacinta - as long as these ideologies were compatible to Pancasila-Manipol/USDEK.  
 
The first objective of the national education system was, however, to educate a “New Indonesian Human” who 
possess high morals and a religious dispositions/character (berakhlak tinggi). Certainly, the educational aim too 
was formulated in accordance with Pancasila and Manipol Usdek; the moral socialist human being, fair and 
prosperous in spiritual and material matters, expressing the spirit of  Pancasila became the pivotal aim of 
education, thereby superseding the  moral democratic human of the 1950s. (Yayasan  Dwijendra 2003: 42) 
Pancasila-Manipol/USDEK contained the basic principles of education as mentioned in Chapter I, Paragraph 1. 
These combined principles “constitute the morals and philosophy of the Indonesian nation and constitute the 
manifest of national and territorial consolidation (persatuan), likewise they are a distillation of the unity of soul 
(perasan
305 kesatuan jiwa) as the Weltanschauung of the Indonesian nation (…) as result, these combined 
principles must inspire all aspects of national education.” But as Suharto rose to power in Jakarta in October 
1965, Presidential Decree No. 19 has never been implemented. 
 
In essence, although Pancawardhana and Pancacinta survived due to the protection of Sukarno until 1965, the 
debates on the issue paved the way for the compulsory religious class policy in elementary and high schooling. 
Since  the  PKI  was  the  arch  enemy  of  the  Army,  the  Army  persuaded  Christians,  Hindus,  and  Muslims  to 
participate in the fight against PKI. In return the Army gave strong encouragement to the growing Islamic 
demand for the compulsory religion class in secular schools. (Kelambora, 1976: 243) In 1963 then, the new 
Minister  of  Education,  General  Sjarief  Thajeb,  who  brought  into  his  portfolio  a  rare  combination  of 
unquestionable  loyalty  to  the  Armed  Forces  and  a  profound  Islamic  background  (Kelambora,  1976:  243), 
enabled the army and religious groups to develop a policy of compulsory religion class at the tertiary level. For 
this, they created the Institute for developing religious teaching of higher education (LEPPA, Lembaga Pembina 
Pendidikan Agama Pada Perguruan Tinggi) headed jointly by the Minister of Higher Education and the Minister 
of Religion. LEPPA’s achievements were particularly responsible for making religion a compulsory subject at the 
tertiary level. It was able to make religion a basic subject in the curriculum and to develop an intricate syllabus 
for instruction in Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Hinduism. (Kelambora 1976: 243-244) 
 
In 1964, religion was made a compulsory basic subject in elementary, junior and senior high schools, but it was 
not explicitly stated that the mark obtained for the religion class affected the promotion of a student, “it was 
understood that it did since all basic subjects are usually taken as prerequisites or other subjects”. (Kelambora 
1976: 247) Thus, by 1965 religion was no longer an optional and non-compulsory subject as stated in the 
Education Act of 1950. The Ministry of Education abandoned its policy of the non-compulsory religion class and 
accepted  the  Moslem’s  demand  for  compulsory  religious  instruction.  It  changed  its  attitude  from  passive 
involvement in religious instruction into an active commitment to the teaching and promotion of the subject. 
(Kelambora 1976: 247)   
                                                 
305 The original document states perasan, distillation; however, I doubt, what is meant here is perasaan, feeling. Then it would read the 
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6.1.4. The Religion class from 1966 to1998 
The compulsory religious class became more strongly established after the abortive coup of 1965 and the rise 
of Suharto’s New Order. The strong emphasis laid on religion in education has to be interpreted against the 
backdrop of the pre-eminent importance religion played in the Indonesian society. Implicit is the objective to 
structure the affiliation to religion more rationally in order to develop this factor for national progress (Müller 
1974: 377) against traditional and cultural values (as represented in adat for example). Here is the origin of the 
important Indonesian triad of development – education – religion to be located.  
The New Order government’s basic educational development strategy was set in 1969. (Beeby 1979: 8-9) Three 
broad problem areas in  education were identified: curricula, infrastructure, and  financial resources. Other 
important issues included the growing number of students, the quality of education, and the relevance of 
education to the labor market, low government spending on education, efficiency, and unclear educational 
objectives. Under the New Order policies and with the success of economic growth, the next three decades 
saw a dramatic expansion in Indonesia’s education system. (Prijono 1999: 159) The success of the Suharto 
economic-development plans during the 1970s has influenced education in several ways. The infusion of funds 
into the government treasury from exports, loans, and grants permitted to the country to finance educational 
expansion and quality improvement at a level never before possible. The growing health of the economy in 
general enabled the supporters of private schools to improve private education as well. (Sudijarto/Thomas 
1980: 54)  
During  the  New  Order,  school-uniforms  and  a  nationwide  calendar  of  national  holidays,  events,  and 
ceremonies were introduced, which are imposed on all school children. In each schoolyard the national flag is 
flagged  and  on  Monday  the  national  anthem  is  sung.  Thus  participation  in  school  forced  the  ethnic 
communities to acknowledge and adopt a nationally regulated calendar, but also to collectively participate in 
the rituals of state-making. (Parker, 2004: 226) 
Decree No. XXVII/1966 on Religion, Education and Culture 
After the coup d’etat in 1966, religious affiliation became a matter of life and death, since Muslim groups and 
the government identified the idea of being anti-religious with being a communist, which posed a deadly threat 
to someone life. Prior to 1966, an option for parents, who did not subscribe to a religion, was to excuse their 
children from the hour of religious instruction provided each week. As the option was partially supported by 
the PKI and others, it became altered after 1966 and each student was required to participate in religious 
education  as  offered  by  an  advocate  of  the  student’s  faith  who  specializes  in  religious  instruction. 
(Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 53)  
 
In 1966, the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly released Decree No XXVII/1966 on Religion, Education, 
and Culture. (Ahmadi 1987: 97-105) This decree became the guideline of curricular contents in education, 
thereby replacing the never operative Presidential Decree No 19 Year 1965. The Decree states that agama, 
education, and culture constitute categorical elements (unsur-unsur mutlak) in order to build the nation and 
national character. The first Chapter on  agama, Article 1 amends the dictum of Decree No II/MPRS/1960, 
chapter II, article 2, Paragraph 3 that established a religion class from primary to tertiary education at public 
schools and universities by removing the clause “(…) following the understanding that the students have the 
right not to attend class if legal guardians/adult students express their objection (…)” and replacing it with 
“establishing the subject of the religion class beginning at primary up to tertiary level at public schools and 
universities.” As bedrock of education, article 2 introduced the doctrine of the Pancasila state. The objective of 
education aimed at building the true Pancasila human, and in order to achieve the objectives of education, the 
mental  and  moral  character  shall  be  increased  and  religious  convictions  shall  to  be  strengthened.  In  the 
elucidation of chapter one on religion, the decree sets out to systemize the hajj in order to raise participation in 
pilgrimage, to increase the budget of the State Islamic Institutes, to approve of the Hindu Bali pilgrimage 
(tirtayatra), to raise the status of the Bureau of the Catholic and Hindu community to a Directorate, and to pay 
special attention to the pesantren.  
 
Related to this legislation, the Hindu education sector boosted from 1966 until Suharto’s Islamic turn in 1989 
(Wandelt 1989: 208; Yayasan Dwijendra 2003: 42-43; Ahmadi 1987: 99) – a second boost has started with the 
transition to democracy and is still underway. Decree No. XXVII/1966 on Religion, Education, and Culture has 
been withdrawn with People’s Consultative Assembly Decree No V/MPR/1973 that changed legislation prior to 
the 1973 GBHN.  
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Decree No XXVII/1966 introduced the religion class as a compulsory subject from elementary to tertiary level: 
all students had to attend - willingly or not - the religion class. This even implied a freedom of choice, because 
the elucidation of the Decree stated that that 
 
  all religions recognized by the government will have the same opportunity 
  for the sake of tolerance and human rights, every student is free to choose a religion class according to 
personal conviction and will (Mujiburrahman 2006: 242) 
 
This  decree  seems  to  indicate  that,  although  the  religion  class  was  compulsory,  if  the  school  in  question 
provides different religion classes (supposed that there were 10 Christians and 10 Muslim students in the class, 
so the school could provide two religion classes according to the joint regulation) the students were free to 
choose one of them. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 242) In practice the students barely choose another than the 
religion  they  already  adhered  to.  Moreover,  the  teaching  hour  and  the  target  of  the  religion  class  were 
extended in 1967, when the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture ruled 
religious instruction should be started at grade I of the elementary school with two teaching hours for grade I 
and II each week; three hours for grade III, four hours for grade IV to VI and all subsequent grades of higher 
schooling, while the religion class for universities was two hours per week. In addition, the status of religion 
was elevated further to the position of a primary subject, one of a group of six basic subjects designed to 
develop the spirit of Pancasila. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 229; Kelambora 1976: 248)  
 
In October 1967 the first implementation of the  Consultative Congress Decree on Religion, Education, and 
Culture was implemented in Instruction No.1/1966 of the Directorate of Tertiary Education at the Ministry of 
Education and Culture. A conference held in October 1967 developed a structure of a studium generale (basic 
study) for all tertiary institutions in accordance with the decree. The studium generale comprised (Wandelt 
1989: 208-209):  
 
  Instruction in Pancasila-Philosophy (Pendidikan Falsafah Pancasila) 
  Confessional religious instruction (Pendidikan Agama) 
  Instruction in military skills/ideology (Pendidikan Kewiraan) 
  Instruction in Culture/Arts (Pendidikan Kebudayaan/Keseniaan) 
  Sports (Pendidikan Olahraga)  
Broad Guidelines of State Policy and Five-Year Development Plans (1969-1988) 
In the section on religion, the first Five-Year Development Plan
306 (repelita I) (1969/70-1973/4) Book I, Chapter I 
on Aims, Targets, and Policies formulated the scope of education to comprise a broad understanding of 
advancement of skills and intellect, religious education, and others. Attention is paid intentionally to  agama in 
order to develop the value and character of Indonesian citizens based on the Pancasila philosophy.  
 
Referring to the five principles of the state, Book II, chapter IX on agama obviously ascribes an important status 
to agama in the state. Agama is seen as to fulfill two functions: it is a form of religious service towards the 
Creator (Chalik) and it allows the citizen to develop the quality of a noble character (budi luhur). This mental 
attitude  is  considered  to  be  a  necessary  item  providing  for  the  success  of  development.  It  is  stated  (this 
formulation reappears in the GBHN 1999 and the contemporary Propenas in similar fashion and rhetoric) “it is 
proven by reality that the spirit of Pancasila and the spirit of agama - understood as fundamental items in the 
formation of morals, a noble character (acklak) and a strong mental attitude which is the main vehicle for a 
successful  development  program  -  is  not  yet  properly  implanted  in  all  strata  of  society.”  (Repelita  1:  9) 
Moreover, agama is said to constitute a strong fortress against the poison of Atheism-Communism that wishes 
to  overthrow  the  Indonesian  Republic  based  on  Pancasila.  Then  the  main  strategy  in  the  authoritarian 
management of religion is outlined which is actually broadly followed until today.  
   
                                                 
306 MPRS Decree No. XLI/MPRS/1968 ruled that the compilation and implementation of five-year development plans is one of the duties of 
the Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan), thus Presidential Decree No 319/1968 enacted the first five-year development plan. 
(http://www.bappenas.go.id/) Since the first REPELITA until the current Propenas, all development plans follow a congenial pattern: They 
comprise  between  one  and  five  books,  structured  in  chapters.  The  first  Book  and  chapters  comprise  general  aims/vision    and 
targets/missions. Their implementation is then structured according to several sectors  of which agama, education, Culture, and One 
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The  government  has  the  responsibility  to  provide  guidance  and  funding  to  accelerate  the 
development  of  agama  in  accordance  to  their  specific  religious  teachings  and  to  carry  out 
supervision to guarantee that every citizen can follow their religious teachings and that efforts to 
develop  their  agama  according  to  their  respective  belief  (kepercayaan)  may  proceed  swift, 
orderly and in an atmosphere of harmony. (Repelita 1: 9)  
 
In order to illustrate how first the ambiguity of the contemporary authoritarian religious pluralism as the main 
agenda, followed until today, evolved out of a specific historic situation, within Indonesia, that answered the 
political situation induced by President Sukarno; and second the dangerous situation of adherents to non-
recognized religions, and the pressing need to systematize and develop a Hindu theology as result thereof, I 
cite the three strategies outlined in the first repelita to achieve a betterment of assessed problems of Atheism-
Communism, because it is stated that former PKI members and their affiliated organizations as well as their 
families will meet special attentiveness. (Repelita 1: 5).  
 
a.  [Concerning  the]  groups  (golongan)  which  have  not  yet  (belum)/  have  no  agama  (tidak 
beragama) / do not believe in One Supreme Lordship (tidak berke –Tuhan –an Jang Maha Esa) 
including  the  atheist  and  animist  groups;  there  will  be  efforts  that  they  will  believe  in  One 
Supreme God following their own conviction and choice;  
b. [Concerning the] groups (golongan) which embrace agama (sudah beragama) / believe in One 
Supreme God (berke –Tuhan –an Jang Maha Esa); there will be efforts that they will increase 
their faith (keimannya) and noble character according to the religious creed they adhere to; 
c.  Guidance/development  and  growing  the  spirit  of  agama  tolerance  between  adherents  to 
different [state acknowledged] agama (Repelita 1: 10) 
 
In  the  sector  of  religious  education,  following  problems  were  identified  1.)  the  religion  class  and  the 
development of the soul of agama (jiwa agama) are not yet carried out smoothly in public schools and faith-
based schools, 2.) there is not yet a solid curriculum, 3.) there is a lack of professional teachers and 4.) there is 
a lack of other material facilities. To resolve these problems, efforts are undertaken to improve the curriculum, 
content, and methodology of the religion class, besides efforts to increase the number and up-grading of 
religion  teachers  at  state  education  institutions  and  at  private  faith-based  institutions.  Remembering  the 
extension of the private Islamic education sector and its history as a vehicle of resistance, such legislation was 
aimed to exert state-control over the pesantren and madrasah and to include secular objects in their curricula 
in  order  to  put  Islamist  anti-state  rhetoric  under  state  surveillance.  The  Hindu  education  sector  however, 
profited from this legislation and it began its first “boom” from 1966-1989.  
 
Repelita I, chapter IX on agama outlines four sectors of development of religious infrastructure: 1. Holy Books; 
2.  Places  of  Worship;  3.  Religious  education;  4.  Hajj/pilgrimage.  This  chapter  and  Book  II,  chapter  X  on 
education states with special reference to education in the sector of religion that the institutions of State 
Religion Teacher Colleges (Pendidikan Guru Agama Negeri, PGAN) and State Islamic Institutes (Institute Agama 
Islam Negeri, IAIN) and the curriculum shall be improved. The responsible governmental institution is the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs.  
 
In essence, the first Five-Year Development Plan stated that part of the efforts to enhance the facilities needed 
for the development of religious life was the inclusion of a religion class in the curriculum of state education 
from elementary schools up to universities. In the 1960s and 1970s, religious education and the religion class 
must be seen as a political vehicle in Indonesia, because the state tried to fight two fronts in the late 1960s: On 
one side against Atheism and Communism, and at the other side against radical Islamism and its preachers who 
wanted  to  establish  an  Islamic  state.  In  consequence,  public  education  increasingly  acquired  a  religious 
dimension after 1973. 
 
During the Consultative Assembly’s Congress session in 1973, Golkar and other secular oriented groups, who 
controlled the Government, wanted to weaken their main political rival, the Islamic groups by abolishing the 
religion class from state education and replacing it through Pancasila Moral Education, but they failed as the 
Islamic party PPP and other Muslim leaders in the Parliament opposed Golkar’s proposal. The Muslims argued 
that it was nothing but efforts to secularize the country because Pancasila without religion was empty and this 
would lead to the re-emergence of communism. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230-231) It seems that education in 
state-funded and guided religion at one side and Pancasila at the other side represented the outcome of the 
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The 1973 Broad Guidelines of State Policy
307 Chapter II on basic patterns of national development, Subsection D 
on the basic modalities and dominant factors (of development), sub-section e.) reads: the spiritual and mental 
modality of belief in and following the commands of God ( kepercayaan dan Ketaqwaan kepada Tuhan Yang 
Maha Esa) is the moving spirit of inestimable value to fulfill national aspirations. Likewise, national belief and 
faith in the Pancasila philosophy constitutes the modality of a mental attitude crucial for the nation to realize 
its  vision.  In  Chapter  II,  subsection  E  the  national  conception  (wawasan  nusantara)  outlines  four  broad 
objectives to be realized in the creation process of the Indonesian Archipelago (kepulauan nusantara) as 1. a 
political unity; 2. a cultural and social unity; 3. an economical unity; 4.) a defense and security unity.  
 
In Chapter III, Section B direction of long-term development, sub-section 15 b. on the Religion, Belief in One 
Supreme God and Social-Cultural Sector, it is stated “based on the Indonesian nation’s belief in the principle of 
One Supreme God (Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) it follows that human existence must maintain really harmonious 
relations  with  One  Supreme  God  (Tuhan  Yang  Maha  Esa),  with  each  other  and  the  natural  environment 
(…)”(author’s translation)Interestingly, the section on Religion, Belief in One Supreme God (Tuhan Yang Maha 
Esa) and Socio-Culture, point 1, mentions that religious life and belief in One Supreme God is in harmony with 
the comprehension and practice of the Pancasila (penghayatan dan pengamalan Pancasila). Here first mention 
is made of the later Pancasila indoctrination program. The sector aims to develop harmonious life (terbina 
hidup rukun) between agama and kepercayaan in order to strengthen national unity and consolidation and to 
increase good deeds (amal) in order to jointly build society. Development of agama and belief in One Supreme 
God  must  be  increasingly  practiced  in  the  private  sphere  and  in  public.  Efforts  are  continuously  made  to 
increase  facilities  needed  to  develop  the  life  of  agama  and  kepercayaan,  including  the  fact  that  religious 
education is included in the state curricula from primary to tertiary level. The 1973 GBHN draws a clear line 
between kepercayaan and agama, in stating literally (author’s translation):  
 
Belief in One Supreme God is no agama. Guidance for Belief in One Supreme God is executed in 
order to avoid first the formation of new agama, and second to make effective the necessary 
measures to be taken in order to guarantee that Belief in One Supreme God (Tuhan Yang Maha 
Esa) is really practiced according to the provision of the first principle Belief in One Supreme 
Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), based on fair and civilized humanity.  
 
Then the second Five-Year Development Plan (repelita II)
308 (1974-1979) laid out in the 1973 Broad Guidelines 
of State Policy (GBHN) introduced the 1945 Basic Law and Pancasila doctrine as national value base. Repelita II, 
Book I on the basic policies of development, Chapter I Aims and Direction of Development does not mention 
the term agama. It is stated that the aim of development is the creation of a fair and prosperous society 
balanced evenly in materialism and spiritualism (merata materil dan spiritual) which is based on the Pancasila. 
However,  Book  III,  chapter  21  on  agama  and  faith  in  One  Supreme  God  (Tuhan  Yang  Maha  Esa) 
interprets agama as crucial vehicle in national development processes, because universal and eternal values 
contained in agama are said to form one vital aspect in national life and culture. In this, those values of agama 
as one source of national enthusiasm/motivation (kegairahan bangsa) are required to develop and improve 
national fate. In consequence, it is stated, the enthusiasm  of religious life is one absolute requirement to 
realize the targets of national development. 
 
Reiterating  the  objectives  of  the  1973  GBHN,  repelita  II  has  the  aim  to  increase  and  raise  awareness, 
comprehension,  and  practice  of  agama  and  Belief  in  One  Supreme  God  with  the  purpose  to  create  an 
Indonesian  citizen  who  follows  the  commands  of  God  (bertaqwa  kepada  Tuhan  Yang  Esa)  and  loves  the 
Indonesian  state,  nation,  and  country.  The  objective  of  repelita  II  was  the  integral  development  of  the 
Pancasila human. The striking stress on religion and faith in One Supreme Lordship aimed at utilizing religion as 
a vehicle of development. (Müller 1973: 378-380), as agama is seen as factor to trigger development and to 
overcome social problems. “The general statements on religion reveal that the architects of the development 
plans were aware of the function that religious education and moral education fulfills in development, but 
these  functions have been understood entirely as indoctrination”. (Müller 1973: 444, author’s translation) 
Another point to note is the problematization of the equality of curricular content in state madrasah to public 
curricula.  Their  curriculum  should  contain  a  70  percent  curricular  load  of  secular  content  and  30  percent 
religious content.    
                                                 
307 Consultative Assembly’s Decree No IV/1973 on the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Ketetapan MPR No. IV/MPR/1973 tentang Garis-
Garis Besar Haluan Negara) (http://www.bappenas.go.id/) 
308 Presidential Decree No 11/1974 on the second five year development plan 1974/75 - 1978/79 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia 
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Repelita II identifies five problem areas of which religious education and training of religious officials is one
309. 
In the field of education and training for religious staff the main problem identified pertains to how to 
coordinate and adapt the guidance of religious education with the pattern of national education in general. The 
plan sets out the strategy to collect a database on religious education facilities in order to base future policies 
on those data. The purpose of development and guidance of religi ous education is enhancing the quality of 
religious education in order to achieve the targets of education and religious life. Primary focus is laid on the 
organization, curriculum, development of utilities and infrastructure. The improvement of the teachers’ quality 
is done with an upgrading program (penataran) of religion teachers following the development, technology and 
demands of society.  
 
As already stipulated in the 1973 GBHN, repelita II states that the religion class is included into the curriculum 
at all levels of public education. In this context, the standardization of the religion class shall be adapted to the 
level of education and the spirit of the pupil or student. Likewise, Book III, chapter 22, subsection1 on the 
foundation of education and development of the youth states in order to achieve the objectives of education, 
the  curriculum  of  all  levels  of  education  from  kindergarten  to  tertiary  level  at  both  public  and  private 
institutions must contain Pancasila Moral Education and enough curricular content to transmit to the young 
generation the spirit and values of 1945. Similarly, religious education is introduced into the curriculum at all 
levels of public schooling and universities; thereby REPELITA II strengthened the position of religious education 
and Pancasila Moral Education in schooling and universities.  
 
The 1978 Broad Guidelines of State Policy
310, identical in text with the 1973 Broad Guidelines of State Policy, 
again defined one educational aim as to mould human qualities , including the religious quality of believing in 
and  following  God’s  commands  (kepercayaan  dan  Ketaqwaan  kepada  Tuhan  Yang  Maha  Esa).  Since  the 
establishment  of  the  religion  class,  Islamic  leaders  in  favor  of  a  spiritual  dimension  of  education  oppose 
optional  religious  instruction  and  reiterate  arguments  that  without  compulsory  religion  classes,  education 
would lead to secularization or to the re-emergence of communism. Hindus argue along similar lines for the 
compulsory religion class, but they are motivated by different interests.  
 
After its inception in 1978, the Commission for the Reformation of National Education began to collect ideas for 
educational reforms. In July 1979 a provisional draft of an educational reform was published to encourage 
feedback  from  different  groups  in  society.  Concerning  differing  views  on  education,  the  Government’s 
educational policies were opposed by Islamic groups as there were plans to abolish the Islamic educational 
sector – so deeply ingrained was the distrust of the Suharto regime towards political Islam which had been 
suppressed and silenced until the era of reform when Islam again went public. However, the 1973 established 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) stated that one of the goals of education was to cultivate ‘takwa’ (Arabic: 
taqwa) that is to follow the orders of God and not break His prohibitions. In the Council’s perception therefore 
the Guidelines of State Policy dictated that education had a religious goal. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 219) 
 
In  1978,  the  New  Order  developed  the  Guide  to  Comprehension  and  Practice  of  the  Pancasila  (Program 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, henceforth P4-program) as an organicist philosophy for almost every 
part of society. The P4 Program has been introduced by repelita III. The regime began to promote its integralist 
ideals and specific interpretation of Pancasila through the P4-indoctrination-program passed by the MPR, as 
well  as  the  1978  school  curriculum  on  Moral  Pancasila  Education  (PMP,  Pendidikan  Moral  Pancasila). 
(Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 12-13; Mujiburrahman, 2006: 140) 
The P4-program defines Pancasila as twofold, first as the Weltanschauung of the Indonesian nation and second 
as  the  juridical-normative  base  of  the  State.  Further  Staatsnormen  that  is  ethical,  ideological,  and  moral 
teachings naturally emanate out of the five principles. In order to limit aspirations of political Islam, the Guide 
to Comprehension and Practice of the Pancasila interpret the first principle as the nation’s intrinsic avowal of 
faith and devoutness towards God.  
   
                                                 
309 The others concern 1. Improving guidance of religious life; 2. Increasing interreligious and interfaith in One Supreme God harmony; 3. 
Increasing  the  facilities  and  infrastructure  of  agama  and  kepercayaan;  4.  Religious  education  and  training  of  religious  staff;  and  5. 
Perfection and efficiency of the operational apparatus.  
310 Consultative Assembly’s Decree No IV/1978 on the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Ketetapan MPR No. IV/MPR/1978 tentang Garis-
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These programs appear to have been extraordinarily effective, first because organicist themes are still debated 
today, even bringing up the question about a possible common threat to Indonesian culture
311, and second 
because civics are a compulsory subjec t from the primary to the tertiary level of the Indonesian education 
system.  
 
Reiterating the objectives of the 1973 GBHN, the 1979 REPELITA III
312  puts religion on a par with the 
comprehension and practice of Pancasila. This indicates that Pancasila slowly evolved as national civil religion. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  term  agama  is  not  mentioned  in  Book  I,  Chapter  I  Aims  and  main  Targets  of 
Development. However, in Book II, Chapter 16 on Religion it is stated (author’s translation): 
 
The development of agama in private and in public triggers religious harmony, which is crucial 
for national unity and consolidation and for increasing the joint practice to build up Indonesian 
society. In this the policies on religion shall create interfaith harmony (kerukunan agama)which 
provides for stability and unity and in this guarantee the welfare of the nation – welfare is the 
aim of agama and the state. Therefore the efforts to increase and build out the agama sector 
including the integration of the religious class into the public school and university sector.  
 
Consequently, in Book II, Chapter 17, Section 2 (a) on education, and the young generation it is stated (author’s 
translation): 
 
National education is based on Pancasila and its aim is to increase devotion to (following the commands 
of) God (ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa), intellect, skills, to enhance moral character (budhi 
pekerti), strengthen personality, and to consolidate the spirit of nationhood in order to create developed 
humans (manusia pembangunan) who are able to develop their individuality and are jointly responsible 
for nation building.  
 
The present study did not find the text of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy 1983 that have been enacted 
with Consultative Assembly’s Decree No II/1983. It seems that they are quite identical with the 1973 GBHN. 
Continuing and refining prior legislation, 1983 REPELITA IV
313 makes mention of the term  agama in Book I, 
Chapter I Aims, and main Targets of Development. This repelita introduced the  asas tunggal policy which 
stated that all social and political organizations must have the Pancasila as their sole base. Development in the 
sector of religion shall continue the creation of interreligious harmony. The cultivation of  Pancasila in the 
religious congregations  is one condition to protect national stability in the proceeding process of national 
development. Schooling and tertiary education in religion shall be made to conform to public education at all 
educational  levels  and  shall  foster  an  atmosphere  of  scientific  thought  in  order  to  achieve  the  national 
educational aims.  
 
The sector of tertiary faith based education shall be improved to provide scientific staff and experts in the 
sector of agama which are capable to translate the doctrines of agama for an Indonesian modern social life 
which is grounded in the Pancasila and the 1945 Basic Law. Book II, Chapter 20 on Education assesses in 
Section  II  on  situation  and problems  that  due  to  the  increase  of  students  at  elementary  schools  370,300 
teachers are needed, of which 63,400 are religion teachers. Finally, in Section III on policies and strategies, 10 
broad strategies are outlined for the guidance of the young generations. In familiar fashion, the first strategy 
claims an increase in the quality of following the commands of God (ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha 
Esa), whereas strategy four demands the strengthening of personality and discipline and the improvement of a 
noble  character  (budi  pekerti  luhur).  Those  strategies  have  the  ultimate  ambition  to  mould  cadres  in  the 
developmental fields of economics, social-culture, agama, politics, and defense and security.  
   
                                                 
311 Ingo Wandelt identifies an attitude of fundamental suspicion toward the West and the USA as Indonesian civil-military elite consensus, 
entertained by elites since the referendum on Timorese independence and the Iraq invasion. Since the Australian operation in East Timor 
in 2002 and the USA led invasion of Iraq the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ is suspected to infiltrate Indonesian politics. It is widely assumed that 
every separation movement is backed up by the West, the inherent logic is unsurprising, for the fact that the coup d’etat in 1965 was CIA-
head mastered. 
312 Presidential Decree No 7/1979 on the third five year development plan 1979/80 - 1983/84 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 
7/1979 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun ketiga (repelita III) 1979/80 -- 1983/84 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/) 
313 Presidential Decree No 21/1984 on the forth five year development plan 1984/85 - 1989/90 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 
21/1984 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun keempat (repelita IV) 1984/85 - 1989/90 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/) PART D | 219 
In April 1985, the Minister of Education and Culture Nugroho Notosusanto and Minister of Religion Munawir 
Sjadzali
314 issued a joint decree on the impl ementation of religious education at elementary and high schools 
replacing the joint decree of 1951. The 1985 joint decree stated (Mujiburrahman 2006: 247): 
 
  at public schools, the religion class should be given for at least two teaching hours a week 
  the students are obliged to follow the religion class according to their respective religions 
  the students who follow Javanese mysticism or belief systems (aliran kepercayaan) must follow the 
religion class of one of the five religions that the student chooses 
  if there are at least 10 students of the same religion in a class, their religion should be taught in the 
class 
  if there is no teacher to teach a certain religion in a school, then a temporary teacher of the religion in 
question can be appointed 
  a religion class for the students whose religion is not taught in the class is to be given by a religious 
master (pembina agama) of that religion (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 247) 
 
This joint decree was not applicable to private schools. This is indicated by the fact that during the Consultative 
Congress’ session of 1988, the Muslims wanted to include in the Broad Guidelines of State Policy that the 
regulation on religion classes should be applied in private schools. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 247) This has been a 
concern of Hindu educational planners as well out of fear of conversion efforts, as students of other religions 
were forced to participate in the particular religion class and worship of the faith-based school.  
 
Consultative Assembly’s Decree No II/1988 changed and broadened the scope of the Broad Guidelines of State 
Policy 1983. However, I was not able to find the text of the 1988 GBHN. Continuing and refining prior legislation 
then, the 1988 REPELITA V
315 makes mention of the term agama in Book I, Chapter I Aims and main Targets of 
Development.  
 
Development in the sector of agama constitutes an integral part in the efforts to provide a strong moral, 
ethical, and spiritual base for national development as Pancasila practice. The ultimate ambition in the 
agama sector contributes to the creation of human and social qualities of having faith in God following 
the  commands  of  God  (beriman dan bertaqwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa)  and  thereby  manifesting 
conformity, concord, and harmony (keselarasan, keserasian dan keseimbangan) in individual and societal 
life and in the exchange with nature. (Repelita V: 95-96) 
 
Strategies  outlined  are  the  reactualization  of  agama  functioning  to  increase  the  understanding  of  agama 
doctrines and their relevance in the context of societal, scientific, and technologic advancement. Financial 
support is given to the expansion and building of houses of worship, the distribution of 10 Million scriptures of 
the  state  funded  agama,  and  the  improvement  of  the  religion  class.  Public  elementary  schools  shall  be 
provided with 8 million textbooks and teacher manuals and 45,000 religion teachers shall be upgraded. The 
junior secondary level shall be provided with 3 million books and 4,000 religion teachers shall be upgraded, 
whereas 2,5 million books are provided and 2,000 religion teachers are upgraded at the senior secondary level. 
All private faith-based tertiary units shall be given financial support for research, teacher upgrading, books and 
other  facilities.  Likewise,  the  educational  quality  of  state  faith-based  institutions  shall  be  improved  by 
distributing  textbooks,  docent  manuals  and  upgrading  programs  for  docents  and  lecturers.  Education  is 
considered as the leadoff gateway in advancing human resources for developmental purposes. In sum, Repelita 
V strengthened not only the implementation of the Pancasila Comprehension and Practice Program (Program 
Penghayatan  dan  Pengamalan  Pancasila,  henceforth  P4-program),  Moral  Pancasila  Education  (PMP, 
Pendidikan Moral Pancasila) but also most noteworthy, the religion class in public educational units.  
Very interesting is the following statement: “The belief-systems (kepercayaan) shall be continuously guided and 
advised to strengthen the unity and unification of the nation and as a good deed (amal) in jointly building 
society. This guidance shall not lead to the formation of new agama and shall be done in cooperation with the 
responsible  authorities.  The  efforts  to  inventory,  document,  and  evaluate  those  belief  systems  shall  be 
continued.” (Repelita V: 110)  
                                                 
314 Sjadzali (1925-2004) held a Master of Arts in political philosophy from Georgetown University in the USA, served as official in the 
Embassy to the USA (1956-1959-1963), as Ambassador to Sri Lanka (1965-1968), Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and 
Qatar (1976-1980), Minister of Religion (1983-1988; 1988-1993) and the first chairman of the Indonesian HR Commission (1993-1998). 
315 Presidential Decree No 13/1989 on the fifth five year development plan 1989/90 — 1993/94 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 
13/1989 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun kelima (repelita V) 1989/90 — 1993/94 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/) PART D | 220 
This line of argumentation is in my view, essentially Islamic, as belief systems which are not considered as 
people of the book, are under state surveillance and targets of proselytizing efforts in order to avoid the 
formation of new congregation. This line of thought surfaced clearly in the decision of the Constitutional Court 
in  April  2010  to  retain  the  controversial  Presidential  Decision  1/1965  on  the  Prevention  of  Abuse  and 
Desecration.  
Act 2/1989 on the National Education System 
The issue of the religion class became topical again when the Government proposed an education bill in 1988, 
because it did not mention religion as a compulsory subject. The Islamic leaders opposed the bill and reiterated 
the old arguments that without religious lessons, education would lead to secularism and that the 1988 Broad 
Guidelines of State Policy (as it had been the case since 1978) already stated that one of the goals of education 
was to develop human qualities, including the religious qualities of having faith in (iman) and following the 
commands  (takwa)  of  God.  (Mujiburrahman  2006:  230)  The  draft  on  the  education  bill  issued  by  the 
Commission for the Reformation of National Education did actually not accommodate Muslim educational 
interests, because it neglected the state madrasah and the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to 
administer it. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230)  
 
When the parliament responded to the bill, not only PPP, but also Golkar and the army (ABRI) supported the 
inclusion of religion as a compulsory subject in the Law, while the PDI, into which the Christian parties had 
fused, did not explicitly oppose it. The Hindu Council (Parisada) and the National Council of Catholic Education 
had recommended that the religion class should be included as one of the articles of the drafted Education Act. 
The bill was finally amended and introduced as Law 2 in 1989. The religion class was included as one of the 
compulsory subjects, madrasah education was mentioned and the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
in  its  administration  was  affirmed.  However,  furnishing  a  suitable  religion  instructor  at  private  and  state 
institutions when only a few children in a class or in a school are of a minority faith remained a crucial problem 
for the Hindu minority, whereas the  facilitation of a religion teacher who embraces the same faith as the 
student, were a point of concern for the Islamic majority and the Hindu minority alike in Christian institutions.  
 
Act 2/1989 on the National Education System provided the educational aims for schooling and tertiary levels 
and  set  the  structure  of  the  education  system.  Social  equity  requires  equality  of  opportunity  to  obtain 
education,  regardless  of  socio-economic  status,  religion,  or  geographic  location  (Article  7).  Article  11, 
subsection 6 defines faith based education (pendidikankeagamaan) as the type of education that prepares the 
student to perform a function which demands a special knowledge of the respective doctrine of agama. Article 
39 introduces a studium generale in Pancasila education, civics, and religious instruction at all types and levels 
of the education system, thereby religious education was made a compulsory subject at all grades and levels. 
Religious instruction is defined in the elucidation of article 39 as the effort to strengthen faith in One Supreme 
Lordship (iman) and following the commands of God (takwa) according to the commands and prohibitions of 
the respective agama the student adheres to while at the same time attention is paid to the need of respect 
for other religions in interfaith encounters in order to create national unity
316.  
 
Besides holding a qualification as teacher, chapter VII on teachers, article 28, subsection 2, rules in order to be 
appointed as teacher, someone has to have faith in God ( beriman) and must follow the commands of God 
(bertaqwa terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa), has to have insight into Pancasila and the 1945 Basic Law. Against 
Christian and PDI opposition, the Muslim faction supported by ABRI and Golkar factions in the Parliament had 
further successfully inserted a phrase into the elucidation of article 28, section 2 of the Education Law. The 
phrase stated that the religion teacher has to embrace the same religion as the students
317. Thus the Islamic 
groups successfully defended the compulsory religious class policy during the New Order.  
 
Government Regulation No. 29/1990 on secondary education, article 11, subsection 2 affirmed that faith based 
schools are operated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs; article 15, subsection 2 confirmed th e  studium 
generale in Pancasila education, civics, and religious instruction at this level of the education system, and 
article 17, subsection 2 affirmed the right of students to attain the religion class in the religion they adhere to.  
                                                 
316 Pendidikan agama merupakan usaha untuk memperkuat iman dan ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa sesuai dengan agama 
yang dianut oleh peserta didik yang bersangkutan dengan memperhatikan tuntutan untuk menghormati agama lain dalam hubungan 
kerukunan antar umat beragama dalam masyarakat untuk mewujudkan persatuan nasional. 
317 Tenaga pengajar pendidikan agama harus beragama sesuai dengan agama yang diajarkan dan agama peserta didik yang bersangkutan. PART D | 221 
Notwithstanding, the elucidation of the article reads that faith-based junior and senior secondary high schools 
are not bound to provide the religion class in another religion than the embraced one
318. In consequence, the 
government followed consistently the policy that the phrase should only be applied to public schools, but not 
to private schools. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 249) Unsurprisingly, the Islamic groups opposed this regulation, 
claiming it deviated from the Education Law and demanded that the Government review it. Yet, the New Order 
never changed it. Consequently, the efforts of the Islamic groups to implement the phrase never succeeded 
during the New Order.  
Broad Guidelines of State Policy and Five-Year Development Plans (1993-1999) 
Religion became a crucial item in the Consultative Assembly’s Decree No II/1993 on the Broad Guidelines of 
State Policy. The GBHN 1993 is quite identical in its text with the strategic aims outlined in Repelita VI, thus I 
give a brief synthesis of both documents. Practice of the first principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa denotes 
the first aim which is said to be the responsibility of all groups, those with an  agama and those with an 
kepercayaan (golongan beragama dan kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) who shall continuously 
and  jointly  lay  down  a  strong  spiritual,  moral,  and  ethical  base  for  national  development  as  practice  of 
Pancasila.  
 
The first principle and aim then logically translates into the strategic planning progress and shall be firmly 
adhered to in the national development principles, of which the first principle mandates faith and following the 
commands of One Supreme God (Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa). All efforts and 
activities  of  national  development  shall  be  inspired,  propelled,  and  controlled  by  faith  and  following  the 
commands of One Supreme God as noble value which constitutes the spiritual, moral, and ethical base for 
national development as realization of Pancasila. The documents mention two sources for the nation to realize 
a strong spirit and mind, that is first, faith and following the commands of One Supreme God (Keimanan dan 
Ketaqwaan  terhadap  Tuhan Yang  Maha  Esa)  which  constitute  the  propelling  force  with  priceless  value  in 
channeling national aspirations, and second, the belief and certainty in the truth of the philosophy of the five 
principles as national unity.  
 
In consequence, the first aim of national development shall be realized and practiced by raising the standards 
and support of education in religion and the religion class beginning from pre-school age to tertiary education. 
The religion class, the Pancasila class, and civics shall be developed in the efforts to strengthen faith and 
following the commands of One Supreme God (Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa), 
moral values, noble character, and the spirit of leadership.  
 
In conclusion, the education law of 1989 did not make any substantial change to previous policies since 1966 
(Mujiburrahman 2006: 230, 248), and religion remained a compulsory primary subject. After Suharto’s Islamic 
turn in1989
319, the Hindu education system was in a difficult position in the  Pancasila state, and only with the 
era of reform and democracy, the new governments tried to accommodate to a certain extent the Muslim, the 
Christian, but as well the Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian interests. It is interesting to note, the religion teacher 
in private schools was and remains a crucial problem in the selection and attendance of education between 
1989 and 2003. The phrase “the religion teacher has to embrace the same religion as the students” (elucidation 
article 28, subsection 2) most likely aimed at the allegedly hidden mission and proselytizing efforts carried out 
in  Christian-based  schools.  (Santika  Interview  2007)  Since  Christian  schools  have  higher  quality  standards, 
Muslim,  Buddhist  and  Hindu  students  alike  are  registered  with  them  and  were  forced  to  attain  Christian 
instruction, since under the law private faith-based schools need not offer religious instruction other than their 
own, if less than ten students attend class. (Santika Interview 2007) 
   
                                                 
318 Sekolah menengah  yang memiliki kekhususan atas dasar agama tertentu tidak berkewajiban menyelenggarakan  pendidikan  agama  
lain  dari  pada  agama  yang merupakan kekhususan sekolah yang bersangkutan.  
319  At  the  end  of  the  1980s,  “Suharto  began  to  recognise  the  emotive  and  familiar  message  of  Islam  by  introducing  a  policy  of 
accommodating Islam, focusing particularly on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse. Islam was thus systematically 
incorporated in the frame of reference of the state to offset the increasingly plausible challenge to the legitimacy of Suharto’s political 
leadership.”  (Hasan  2008:  27)  This  political  move  is  known  as  Islamic  turn  (Liddle  1996)  In  this  context,  the  Directorate  General  of 
Elementary and Secondary Education, for instance, issued a new regulation on student uniforms, lifting the ban for female students to 
wear headscarves (jilbab) at school. Suharto himself and his family went to Mecca to perform the hajj pilgrimage in 1991. (Hasan 2008: 28) PART D | 222 
Hindu  students  outside  Bali  were  instructed  in  pasraman  or  Sunday  schools,  but  the  pasraman  were  not 
systematized then, and were not authorized for grading. Therefore, Hindus had to attend Christian religion 
instruction. After attaining school and learning the Christian prayers and credo, the Hindu community students 
feared that students would identify with Christian religion and then convert to it. (Sujana, Protocoll 2007) After 
the fall of Suharto, the issue of the religion teacher became the centre of controversy during the debate on the 
drafting  of  the  bill  of  the  new  education  law  of  2003.  Despite  strong  opposition  from  the  Christians, 
(Mujiburrahman 2006: 250), the Islamic groups supported by the Hindu Council successfully included in the bill 
a provision stating that students are entitled to religious education in their own religion and to be taught by a 
teacher of the same religion.  
 
In short, religious education is a continuous point of concern in Indonesian policies of education and religion. 
Since the endorsement of Law 20/2003 on the National Education System, the government has taken a few 
concrete steps to implement the controversial provisions of the education law that require schools to provide 
religious instruction to students in their own faith, instructed by a teacher who embraces the same faith. This 
provision is a result of discriminatory practices by private faith-based schools in providing religious instruction 
to students who embrace a different faith. The lenient implementation of the law also applies to the holding of 
Hindu religious education, even if the students were more than ten pupils, some local district heads (bupati or 
camat) refused to offer Hindu religious education in public schools and Hindu children were forced to attend 
Sunday courses. Teaching material is then obtained by the religion instructor through the PHDI, either from the 
district office, by mail or via the internet, in order to assess the grading necessary to promote the student to 
the next level. 
6.2. Religion class 1999 – 2009 
6.2.1. Strategic planning instruments 1999-2009 
The  strategic  planning  instruments  present  a  fairly  clear  picture  of  the  general  direction  in  which  the 
Government wants the school system to move. In April 2000 Indonesia committed to the Education for All 
(EFA;  Pendidikan  untuk  semua,  PUS)  goals  and  in  September  2000  Indonesia  assigned  to  the  Millennium 
Development Goals. Indonesia is currently under the second human rights action plan. In fact, until 2005 the 
policies on religion and education are mainly based on national development objectives defined under the 25-
year long-term development plan (PJP, pembangunan jangka panjang) implemented from 1994 to 2019. These 
objectives  are  further  detailed  in  five-year  medium-term  development  plans  under  which  the  national 
objectives are directed to economics, environment, religion, culture, national defense, security, and politics. In 
2005, this long-term development plan (PJP) has been redrawn and replaced by a revised version,
.which is 
discussed in detail below.  
 
As the authoritarianism of the Suharto regime resulted in the indoctrination paradigm of education
320, the 
reformed  development  plans  indicate  the  reformer’s  interest  to  bring  about  a  paradigm  shift  from  the 
transmission to the contextual and student-centered educational transformation paradigm of education. But 
they  also  indicate  the  instrumentalization  of  religion  in  education  and  politics,  as  “secular”  educational 
reformers are motivated by the idea of changing the educational paradigm, whereas religious reformers are 
driven by the idea to islamize education. (Belen Interview 2007) In this, the legislation of the religion class 
increasingly became a battlefield for politicizing religion. In this context, Hasan (2008: 24) critically remarks, 
“The growing tide of religious conflicts after Suharto seems dissociated from the failure of Reformasi to touch 
upon  the  fundamental  issue  of  reforming  the  state’s  management  of  religious  diversity.  In  the  changing 
political  landscape  arising  from  the  opening  of  political  opportunity,  religion  has  increasingly  been  caught 
between political forces that are fighting for their own political interests.” Hasan (2008: 24) argues that  
 
                                                 
320 In Indonesia, the principal ingredients of the Suharto regime were: “a military deeply enmeshed in politics and business, the rigorous 
indoctrination of schoolchildren to trust in the wisdom of the state, and a political structure based on enforced “consensus,” designed to 
look democratic but to serve and approve the actions of a single leader. Backed by terror and a patronage system that guaranteed a 
lifetime  of  riches  for  every  compliant  minister,  general  and  tycoon,  the  New  Order  ensured  former  President  Suharto  32  years  of 
uninterrupted power.” (Colmey/Liebhold, The case against Suharto. Behind Indonesia's economic and political chaos, a familiar figure is 
pulling some strings. February 8, 1999; Time Asia, in:  http://www.angelfire.com/rock/hotburrito/suharto/timeasia080299.html; (22 08 
2011)  
In this context, Hasan (2008: 24) argues “Through the indoctrination program called the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila 
(P4) [Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the Pancasila], as well as other instruments, the Pancasila was systematically embedded in 
the minds of Indonesia’s citizens. The spread of the Pancasila doctrine served to isolate dissidents from the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ and 
ensured the constant threat of surveillance (…)”. (Hasan 2008: 25-26) PART D | 223 
the  Reformasi’s  failure  to  reform  the  management  of  religious  diversity  has  disrupted  the 
democratic consolidation and the reform direction itself. For religion is at the intersection of a 
struggle  between  state,  society  and  political  forces.  Individuals,  groups  and  political  forces 
thereby compete to represent the right to define boundaries in support of their organised claims 
and to delegitimise the rights of others. 
 
However,  with  regard  to  the  Hindu  class  and  Hindu  education  system,  this  opening  up  of  space  led  to a 
significant increase in Hindu educational opportunities, which culminated in the 2008 Act on the religion class 
and faith-based education systems that put Islamic education on a par with all other faith-based education 
systems. 
 
On October 19
th, 1999 the Consultative Assembly brought the 1999-2004 Broad Guidelines of State Policy 
(henceforth  1999  GBHN)  in  effect  with Consultative Assembly’s Decree No IV/MPR/1999.  The 1999  Broad 
Guidelines of State Policy state in Chapter II, General Condition that the challenge faced in the educational 
sector would be located in the education system itself. “(…) the current education system is insignificant in the 
development of a student’s person and character and causes the loss of personality and awareness about life’s 
intrinsic meaning”. In familiar fashion, the 1999 GBHN states, that it is based on the 1945 Basic Law by the 
Mercy  of  One  Supreme  God  (berkat  rahmat  Tuhan  Yang  Maha  Esa).  Continuing  the  1978  provision  that 
education  has  a  religious  goal,  one  of  the  stated  objectives  of  education  is  to  develop  human  qualities, 
including the religious qualities of having faith in God (imam) and following the commands of God (taqwa). 
 
It is criticized that the subjects of ethics (akhlak) and morality (moralitas), and the religion class would not be 
taught by using participative methods which aim to materialize the subject matter as a pattern of daily life. This 
would be the reason behind a tendency of the citizens’ and society’s lack of sensitivity to develop tolerance and 
togetherness, especially in the context of plurality
321. Faith-based life would not yet guarantee the raising of 
the quality of faith in (keimanan) and following the commands (ketakwaan) of One Supreme God (Tuhan Yang 
Maha Esa) in society. On top of this, the guidelines reckon a gap between the formal conduct of faith-based life 
(perilaku formal kehidupan keagamaan) and real everyday life behavior (perilaku realitas nyata kehidupan 
keseharian), as the outbreak of social diseases, corruption and the like, criminality, drug abuse and conduct 
deviating from and violating morality, ethics and decency would attest.  
 
The vision and mission set out in chapter III of the plan are cited in so far as they pertain to the religion class 
(pendidikan  agama)  or  faith-nbased  education  (pendidikan  keagamaan).  Among  12  strategies  to  be 
accomplished, the 1999 Broad Guidelines of State Policy purport the vision of realizing an Indonesian society 
that  observes  peace,  democracy  and  justice,  possesses  competitiveness,  progress,  and  prosperity  in  the 
institution  of  the  Unitary  State  of  the  Indonesian  Republic  (NKRI)  supported  by  citizens  who  are  healthy, 
independent, faithful (beriman), follow the commands of God (bertakwa); possess morals and noble religious 
dispositions (berakhlak mulia); love the country, observe the law, conserve the environment; master science 
and technology; and possess work ethos and discipline.  
 
To accomplish this outlined vision, the 1999 Guidelines comprise following missions: 1.) consistent practice of 
Pancasila  (pengamalan  Pancasila)  in  society,  nation  and  state;  2.)  enforcement  of  citizens’  sovereignty  in 
society,  nation  and  state;  3.)  advancement  of  agama  doctrines’  practices  (pengamalan  ajaran  agama)  in 
everyday life to create the qualities of faith in and following the commands of God (kualitas keimanan dan 
ketaqwaan  kepada  Tuhan  Yang  Maha  Esa)  in  life  and  [thereby  consolidating]  a  brotherhood  of  religious 
communities which possess morals and a noble religious dispositions/character (berakhlak mulia); act tolerant 
(toleran), harmonious (rukun) and peaceful (damai). 
 
In chapter IV, section D, the 1999 Guidelines set out the agenda of religion and section E covers education. 
Section D defines five general strategies to be implemented in the arena of religion putting religious education 
as a main point on the agenda.  
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1.  Consolidating the function, role and position of agama as moral, spiritual and ethical foundation in 
the  operation  of  the  state  and  seeking  to  warrant  that  all  legal  regulations  do  not  oppose  the 
morality  of  six  state-funded  religions.  (moral  agama-agama)  (The  term  religion  is  plural  in  the 
Indonesian document – therefore in line with HR).  
2.  Increasing the quality of religious education by improving the religious education system to become 
more integrated into and integral to the national education system as a result by supporting it with 
adequate media and infrastructure 
3.  Increasing and consolidating inter-faith harmony (kerukunan hidup antarumat beragama) to produce 
an atmosphere of life which is harmonious as result; and supports mutual respect in the spirit of 
plurality by means of inter-faith dialogue and the operation of descriptive, non-dogmatic religious 
education at the level of tertiary education 
4.  Subsection 4 facilitates the religious community (umat beragama) to perform religious service, the 
hajj and the management of zakat 
5.  Enhancing the role and function of religious institutions to participate in overcoming the impact of 
change that is underway in all aspects of life with the purpose to strengthen national identity (jati diri 
dan kepribadian bangsa), and to substantiate harmonious life (kerukunan hidup) in society, nation 
and state (in societal, national and state-affairs).  
It is interesting to note that the 1999 Guidelines officially demand the operation of an academic subject of 
descriptive,  non-dogmatic  religious  education  that  is  (comparing)  religious  studies  at  the  level  of  tertiary 
institutions. The author therefore points to the need of future studies in this topic, as its description and 
analysis has been far beyond the scope of the present study.  
 
The 1999 Guidelines were aborted during the Habibie presidency, but their line of thought has been continued 
in  subsequent  development  plans  thereby  representing  a  strong  continuity  with  the  integralist  stream  of 
thought of the Suharto Regime. (cf. Hasan 2008)  
 
Then, in 2000 the parliament and the president put Act 25 /2000 in effect that launched the five-year term 
national development program (PROPENAS, Program Pembangunan Nasional) in effect from 2000 until 2004. 
Again, in standard fashion, it is stated that “with the Mercy of One Supreme God”, the Program is based on the 
1945  Basic  Law  and  continues  the  legacy  of  the  1999  guidelines  of  state  policy  that  form  its  strategic 
substructure. The PROPENAS sets out five broad national objectives: 
 
1.  develop democratic politics and ensure national cohesion and social stability;  
2.  rule of law and achieve good governance;  
3.  accelerate economic recovery and strengthen the foundations for sustained growth;  
4.  develop the social sectors
322 and human welfare; and  
5.  strengthen regional autonomy, rural and urban development, and structural poverty programs.  
 
Besides the issues of poverty and the inefficiency of the education system, literally verbatim as the 1999 
guideline, the PROPENAS ascertains a gap between the formal conduct of religious life and actual conduct in 
everyday life. Social illnesses such as corruption, criminality, drug abuse, and a lifestyle and conduct deviating 
from and violating morality, ethics and appropriateness are widespread. Priority is ascribed to the development 
of social welfare, to increase the quality of religious life and endurance of culture. This priority is realized 
through achievement of progress in religious, educational, societal, and cultural fields. In its broad outline, the 
PROPENAS policy on the religious sector is identical to the tasks in the sector of religion as outlined by the 1999 
Guidelines: 
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  utilize the function, role and position of religion as moral, spiritual and ethical base in societal and 
national life  
  increase the quality of religious education  
  strengthen  and  stabilize  life  harmony  between  religious  communities  (interreligious  harmony; 
kerukunan agama) 
  enhance the ease of performance of religious worship for religious communities  
  strengthen the role and function of religious institutions in the participation of mastering the effects of 
chance ongoing in all aspects of life.  
 
PROPENAS contains one chapter (VI) on agama-building and one chapter (VII) on education. In chapter VI it is 
stated that in the process of nation building and development, agama has an important and strategic position 
and role as spiritual, moral and ethical base. Agama inspires national life and state affairs; therefore agama as 
a value system shall be understood and realized by each individual, in families and in society. For that reason, 
agama-building merits more attention, not only in relation to the interpretation and performance of religion, 
but also in the operation of religious education and the religious life’ service. In addition, the section C of the 
chapter sets out four objectives of the agama-building program: 
 
1.  enhance the service of religious life  
2.  strengthen the apprehension and implementation of religion, and inter-faith harmony  
3.  improve the quality of religious education  
4.  develop the improvement of social-religious and traditional religious education institutions 
 
The third point of the program sets out the objective to improve the quality of religious education. Religious 
education at public schools shall aim to improve the quality of interpretation and performance of religious 
teachings in the student in order to consolidate the qualities of having faith in and following the commands of 
God and development of noble morals and upright character
. (keimanan dan ketakwaan serta pembinaan 
akhlak mulia dan budi pekerti luhur). The decline of ethical and moral violations committed by pupils and 
students in the environment of both schools and society is the target to be reached. The pursued eleven main 
strategies to enhance the quality of the religion class are enlisted in the following:  
 
1.  perfect subject matters of religious education by giving them additional weight in real daily life  
2.  include moral building content integrated in the relevant subjects in the educational curriculum  
3.  carry out a teachers’ restructuring, equalization of diplomas (D2; D3 for religion teachers)  
4.  provide support for religious worship means  
5.  hold seminars for religion teachers in order to deepen the subject matter and develop the concept of 
education  
6.  perfect didactics together with the evaluation system  
7.  develop management of education  
8.  organize competitions in religious capability, pupil camp outs, religious academic work competitions, 
and appreciation of religious art  
9.  support and develop the talent of leadership and the increase of knowledge and realization of religion  
10.  foster pupils organizations  
11.  develop express pesantren and similar types (pasraman, Widyalaya)  
 
Those are the pursued main strategies to enhance the quality of the religion class on the tertiary level:  
 
  raise the amount of Semester credits (more than 2 hours a week) 
  increase the amount of religion class teachers  
  enhance the amount of literature, both textbooks, and reading books  
  improve the supporting facilities  
  carry out an consolidation of curriculum and syllabus in religious education  
  improve the quality of docents in undergraduate and postgraduate study programs  
  improve the methodology of teaching 
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In section VII, on the development of education, PROPENAS raises the duration of compulsory basic education 
(WAJAR, Wajib belajar) to 9 years. A competence based curriculum (Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi, KBK) shall 
be drafted that communicates not only the regionally specific demands and potentials, but also the national 
conception (wawasan nusantara) which promotes a religious and a knowledge dimension in education, as faith 
in God, following the commands of God, noble morals and the mastering of basic knowledge (math, science 
and technology, language and literature, English) are subjects contained in the curriculum. In improving the 
quality  of  education,  high  school  graduates  shall  be  moulded,  which  are  capable  to  compete  on  an 
international scale. (How those guidelines translate into the visions and missions of schools is illustrated here 
by the case study) 
 
Despite  still  being  under  the  PROPENAS,  the  Consultative  Assembly  launched  a  new  national  long-term 
development plan (RPJPN, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional) prepared for a 20 years’ period 
(2005-2025) promulgated by Act 25 in 2004 under the Megawati presidency on October 5
th, 2004. The RPJPN 
regulates  that  the  government  has  to  formulate  national  medium  term  development  plans  (Rencana 
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah, RPJM) for a period of five years (2005-2009). The RPJPN has been launched 
in 2005 under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It does not state development priorities in its elucidation part, but it 
formulates visions, missions and targets to be achieved in development,  which provide the ministries and 
regions with a greater room to maneuver for adjusting their specific conditions and needs to the visions and 
targets formulated in the plan. It is my hypothesis, continuing the legacy of the 1999 Guidelines and the 
PROPENAS,  the  RPJPN  defines  religion  as  a  noble  national  value  and  some  of  the  broad  objectives  and 
strategies set out by 1999 Guidelines are maintained. The RPJP is divided into seven sections, of which the first 
section is concerned with the socio-cultural sector and the third section with science and technology. I give a 
brief synopsis of its contents in the following paragraphs. 
 
In chapter II, 1 a (8) on the socio-cultural sector, the RPJP draws a rather pessimistic picture of the condition of 
agama in Indonesia. Among parts of society, their life would not yet reflect the comprehension and practice of 
the religious doctrines they adhere to (penghayatan dan penerapan nilai-nilai ajaran agama yang dianutnya) 
Therefore, in the section of agama, the plan attests a varying degree of awareness to practice the doctrine of 
agama as those parts of society would only demonstrate religious symbols but not the substantive values of 
agama doctrine. But there are parts of society, whose life approaches or even already reflects the agama 
doctrine.  
 
The RPJP assesses although the performance of religious worship would flourish, while in the circle of religious 
leaders  a  strong  consciousness  would  grow  to  build  social  harmony  and  peaceful  intra-  and  interreligious 
relations based on mutual respect, this increasing awareness would not fully guarantee the quality of faith in 
and following the commands of One Supreme Lordship in the citizenry. Unmoral conduct, corruption, collusion 
and  nepotism  practices,  abuse  of  drugs,  pornography,  porno-action,  gambling,  high  divorce  rates,  and 
inharmonic  family  existences  demonstrate  the  gap  between  religious  doctrine,  its  understanding  and  its 
practice. The goal to build intra and interreligious harmony is not yet achieved. Moral commands of religion 
could not yet fully be realized and noble conduct is not yet internalized in every individual. Interestingly, the 
plan criticizes the weakness of the nation’s capability to manage diversity, as demonstrated in the increasing 
orientation towards group, ethnic, and religion interests, which cause social conflicts and could trigger national 
disintegration. This problem increases in its seriousness due to the limited public space to be used by the 
multicultural society to channel their aspiration.  
 
Human development is interpreted as holistic (utuh). (Chapter II, 2 a (5) The vision and mission of national 
development outlines eight broad missions. The first mission sets out to “Build a society which has ethics 
(berakhlak mulia) and morals, is cultivated and civilized as that base on the Pancasila. Education shall aim to 
mould humans who follow the commands of God, (bertaqwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa), obey the legal 
system, maintain intra- and interfaith harmony, interact between cultures (…) and are proud to be Indonesian 
in the context of stabilizing the spiritual, moral, and ethical base of national development.”  
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The development of religions (agama-agama) shall stabilize the function and role of agama as moral and 
ethical base and aims at strengthening inter-faith harmony (kerukunan agama) by raising mutual trust and 
harmony between different fractions of society in a progressive Indonesia. Therefore agama-building aims to 
strengthen inter-faith harmony as it raises mutual trust between and equal rights of societal groups.  This 
harmonic dimension is crucial to maintain the Indonesian unity as it creates awareness of the multicultural 
diversity and true nature of social pluralism in realizing an atmosphere of tolerance, considerateness, and 
harmony. The development of religion directs at stabilizing the function and role of religion as the moral base 
of national development and as the base of social meta-ethics in the organization of the state, aiming to 
practice a clean government/good governance. Development and the stabilization of national identity strive to 
create a firm, unique, modern, and superior national character and social system. This identity consists of a 
combination between noble national values – as religious, togetherness, and unity – and modern universal 
values such as work ethos and good governance.  
 
The  first  phase  of  implementation  of  the  RPJPN  has  been  the  national  medium  term  development  plan 
(rencana  pembangunan  jangka  menengah  nasional,  RPJMN)  2004-2009  promulgated through Presidential 
Decree  7/2005  under  the  Yudhoyono  presidency. This  RPJM  2004-2009  forms the basis for ministries  and 
government agencies in formulating their particular medium term development plans, called strategic medium 
term plans of Ministries and institutions (Rencana Strategis Kementerian/Lembaga, Renstra-KL). Likewise, the 
regional  governments  must  take  into  account  the  RPJM  2004-2009  when  formulating  or  adjusting  their 
respective  regional  development  plans  (Rencana  Pembangunan  Jangka  Menengah Satuan  Kerja  Perangkat 
Daerah, Renstra-SKPD) to reach national development targets. The RPJMN is to be further elaborated into the 
annual Government work plan (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah RKP) which will then become the base for compiling 
the Draft Government Budget (RAPBN). On the regional level the annual regional development plan, is called 
annual work plan of regional governments. (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah; RKPD).  
 
Formulated by the Ministry of National education (henceforth MONE), the strategic plan of national education 
(2005-2009) states the goal of education is to produce as ideal type a holistic Indonesian citizen. By focusing on 
the  progress  in  education,  this  educational  aim  shall  be  realized  not  only  through  the  development  of 
intellectual skills, but also through the improvement of character and morals, and societal and physical aspects 
of education. Therefore one of the main activities of the MONE is to develop an interdisciplinary education 
program by intensively working together with the other Ministries and governmental agencies/institutions 
involved in the multi- administration system as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance, the National Development Board and the Parliament. As far as I know, that is intensively 
done.  
 
MONE’s strategic plan of national education (2005-2009) finds although education has been a goal of national 
development since 1969, its operation and organization is far from being optimal and the expected outcome of 
national education is not achieved. Referring to the three development missions set out in 2004 RPJM, the 
strategic plan of the MONE discovers that in order to realize the educational mission within the globalization 
era, the nation has to have high quality human resources, with skilled citizens capable to increase the quality of 
life and productivity, and able to compete in the international arena. National education has the vision of 
realizing an Indonesian society practicing peace and democracy; possesses expertise and competitiveness; and 
achieves advancement and prosperity in the Unitary Nation of the Indonesian Republic supported by citizens 
who are healthy, independent, faithful, and pious towards God; possess morals and noble character, love the 
country, observe the laws, and conserve the environment, master science and technology; and possess work 
ethos and discipline. To accomplish the vision, the Ministry of National Education (MONE) has 5 missions, of 
which the third mission is set out to improve quality of educational inputs and processes to optimize the 
building of moral character. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 611) 
 
Accordingly, the mission of the strategic plan is to operate an education system which is reorganized as to 
produce intelligent, holistic, and competitive Indonesians. In achieving the goals of quality education for all 
(EFA),  Indonesian  educational  planners  apply  the  four  pillars  of  education  promoted  by  the  International 
Bureau of Education of the UNESCO in educational reform.  
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1) Learning to know focuses on combining broad general knowledge and basic education “‘Learning to know’ 
presupposes learning to learn’, calling upon the power of concentration, memory and thought’, so as to benefit 
from  ongoing  educational  opportunities  continuously  arising  (formally  and  non-formally)  throughout  life.” 
(Zhou n.a.:n.a, emphasis in original) 
(2)  Learning  to  do  emphasizespractical  competences.  “Learning  to  do  thus  implies  a  shift  from  skill  to 
competence, or a mix of higher-order skills specific to each individual. ‘The ascendancy of knowledge and 
information as factors of production systems is making the idea of occupational skills obsolete and is bringing 
personal competency to the fore’.” (Zhou n.a.:n.a. emphasis in original)  
(3) Learning to live together is relevant in the current context of diversity and globalization. “It implies an 
education taking two complementary paths: on one level, discovery of others and on another, experience of 
shared purposes throughout life.” (Zhou n.a.:n.a.)  
 (4) Learning to be involves development of the human potential to its fullest. “‘Learning to be’ may therefore 
be  interpreted  in  one  way  as  learning  to  be  human,  through  acquisition  of  knowledge,  skills  and  values 
conducive  to  personality  development  in  its  intellectual,  moral,  cultural  and  physical  dimensions.”  (Zhou 
n.a.:n.a. emphasis in original)  
 
It is important to note that the four pillars of learning relate to all phases and areas of education. (Zhou 
n.a.:n.a.) In Indonesia, those four pillars are then contextualized in four fields of education (Belen 2007) In this 
context, Indonesian educational planners added the dimension of spiritual intelligence (UNHI 2007: xxv, Belen 
2007;  MONE’s  strategic  plan  of  national  education  2005-2009)  to  reorganizing  curricular  and  educational 
content and structure.  
 
Spiritual 
intelligence 
Self-actualization using intuition and heart to develop and strengthen faith, following the commands of God, morals, 
character, and a noble personality
323 
Emotional 
and  social 
intelligence 
Self-actualization using emotion to increase sensibility and appreciation of aesthetic and beauty of art and culture. 
Related to this, the competence to express this emotion. Self-actualization by social interactions, which cultivate and 
foster reciprocal interactions, are democratic, emphatic, sympathetic, bright, and self confident, respect human rights 
and diversity (kebhinekaan) in society and state, and finally display a national conception (berwawasan kebangsaan) 
with an awareness of the rights and duties of citizens 
 
Intellectual 
intelligence 
Self-actualization using reasoning to attain competences and autonomy in science and technology. Actualization of a 
critical, creative, and imaginative Indonesian.  
Kinesthetic 
intelligence 
Self-actualization by doing sports  
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6.2.2. The National Education System 
The current national education system is characterized by two peculiarities, first the extensive private school 
sector and second the administrative multi-system. Those peculiarities evolved out of the colonial legacy. In the 
1950s, Indonesia has operated a contextual education system (KPD 1950: 58-60), and with Act No. 20/2003 on 
the national education system she returns to this holistic, decentralized and contextual approach. The current 
education  system  is  a  result  of  legal  reform,  beginning  with  the  amendment  of  the  1945  Basic  Law.  The 
amendment stipulates that education is not only the right of the Indonesian citizens but it is now part of 
human rights. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 611) All Indonesians citizens are entitled to primary education and the 
government has to pay for it. The amendment also mandates at least 20% of the state budget at the national as 
well as regional levels to be allocated for education.  
 
The amendment was then elaborated in Law 20/2003 on educational system. Consequential regulation in the 
area of education comprise (the list entails the regulation the author reviewed until May 2009, but is most 
likely incomplete):  
 
1.)  Act 14/2005 on teachers and lecturers  
2.)  Minister of Education decree 19 in 2006 on the national education standard  
3.)  Minister of Education decree 22 in 2006 on the curricular content standard for schooling (curricular 
framework and structure)  
4.)  Minister of Education decree 23 in 2006 on the graduation competence standards 
5.)  Minister of Education decree 24 in 2006 on the operational implementation of the decrees 22 and 23,  
6.)  Several Decrees of the Minister of Education on the operational education standard to be followed by 
elementary  and  high  education  units  in  2007;  Decree  12/2007  on  supervision  standards  for 
schools/madrasah, Decree 13/2007 on the standard of school/madrasah principals, Decree 15/2007 
on annual planning system of the Ministry of National of Education, Decree 16/2007 on teachers’ 
academic qualification and competence standard; Decree 17/2007 on the in-formal education national 
exams;  Decree  18/2007  on  the  certification  of  in-service  teachers;  Decree  19/2007  on  the 
management  standards  for  elementary  and  high  schooling;  Decree  20/2007  on  the  examination 
standard of education; Decree 24/2007 on the material and infrastructure standards, Decree 43/2007 
on libraries, 
7.)  Government Regulation 47/2008 on compulsory school attendance 
Act No. 20/2003 on the national education system 
The strong emphasis on religion in the national education system has to be interpreted in relation with the 
third failure to implement the Jakarta Charter and with the problematic issue of the religion teacher at private 
schools. Albeit motivated by fully different ideas, Muslims and Hindus support the religious dimension of the 
education and both communities fear hidden conversion. As has been stated earlier, private Christian elite 
schools and universities are popular because they are known for their high quality, but Muslims and Hindus 
alike were in discontent with the regulation, that their children should attend Christian religious education as 
requirement for graduation. On the other side, as the Ministry of Religious Affairs allocates a large budget for 
the Islamic education sector, the Hindu minority has to struggle to have equal educational opportunities as 
given for the Islamic community in the education sector. (Sujana Interview 2007, Santika Interview 2007) 
 
On July 8
th 2003, the parliament enacted Law No. 20 Year 2003 on the National Education System. The current 
education system encompasses the entire archipelago, it is variably adjusted to the specific regional conditions 
and it may be therefore described as flexible, open,  multidimensional, contextual and lifelong process. In 
familiar  fashion,  it  is  stated  in  the  Law  that  with  the  mercy  of  God,  the  1945  Basic  Law  mandates  the 
government to organize and operate a national education system which strengthens faith in and following the 
commands of God (keimanan dan ketakwaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) and noble character (akhlak 
mulia) in order to educate national life as regulated in Laws.  Chapter I on general conditions, article 1 (1) 
defines education as conscious and planned effort to realize an atmosphere of study and learning process in 
which the students actively develop their own potential to have spiritual and religious strength (kekuatan 
spiritual keagamaan), self-control, personality, intellect, noble character/moral (akhlak mulia), and skills useful 
to them, society, nation, and state. Article 1 (2) states that education is based on the Pancasila and the 1945 
Basic Law, which are rooted in the values of agama, national culture and respond to the demands of epochal 
change. 
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Chapter II on the background, function and aim, article 2 states that the five principles and the 1945 Basic Law 
form the base of national education. Article 3 defines the educational aim according to the strategic visions and 
missions outlined in the RPJPN and RPJMN.   
 
The function of national education is to produce skills, to mould character and a prestigious 
national  civilization  in  the  framework  of  educating  national  life.  Its  aim  is  to  develop  the 
student’s potential in order to enable his/her to grow into a human who has faith in God and 
follows  God’s  command  (beriman  dan  bertakwa  kepada  Tuhan  Yang  Maha  Esa),  has  noble 
character/morals (berakhlak mulia), is healthy, learned, smart, creative, independent, and who is 
a democratic and responsible citizen.  
 
Chapter III on operational principles Article 4 (1) states that education shall be carried out democratically, just, 
and non-discriminative by respecting human rights, religious and cultural values, and national plurality. The 
national  education  system  is  dynamic  in  its  curricular  outlook,  because  it  can  be  flexibly  adjusted  to  the 
regional conditions in order to communicate specific regional contents of knowledge. In line with the Education 
for All conception, education is understood as a lifelong learning process. (III: 4,3) In Chapter V the rights and 
obligations of the citizens, the communities, and the government are clarified. All societal groups and citizens 
have the  equal right without discrimination to participate in education and to organize educational units. 
Citizens living in remote or  backward areas and  adat-communities have the right to receive and organize 
delivery of special education. (IV: 5) Compulsory school attendance is applicable from the age of seven to 
fifteen
324 (IV: 6, 1) and citizens are responsible for the operation of education. (IV: 6, 2) The  communities may 
participate  in  planning,  operation,  supervision  and  evaluation  of  education  and  are  obliged  to  provide 
resources for the operation of education. Therefore, the law demands the formation of an autonomous 
education council (Dewan Pendidikan) having as its  members’ prominent figures of society  with an active 
interest in education. (XV: 56)  
 
Talented children of economically poor parents are entitled to receive scholarships. (V: 12, 5) In 2005, the 
government  introduced  a  number  of  programs,  amongst  them,  the  school  operational  aid  (BOS,  bantuan 
operasional  sekolah)  funded  by  cuts  to  oil  subsidies  and  used  for  schoolbooks  and  scholarships  for  poor 
students to tackle the impact of poverty on education. There were several cases reported in the Bali Post in 
2007, illustrating how principals, officials, or even private individuals attempted or succeeded in adventurous 
manner to misappropriate those BOS funds. 
 
Following the decentralization of the education system, there are even more stakeholders in education then 
before, and the weaknesses of the education system are debated, criticized, and complained about in daily 
public discourse. The Indonesian central government, the regencies, society and the school committees
325 or 
the tertiary unit participate in planning, organization, and operation of the education system and define the 
curricular content according to the needs and conceptions of the respective education unit in question, the 
region in question, and the development plan in effect.  
 
The elucidation of Act 20 Year 2003 on the national education system sets out the vision and mission statement 
and the strategy of the national education system. The vision is to operate an education system as strong and 
powerful social institution to qualify all  Indonesian citizens to grow into qualitative humans skilled and 
perceptive to the demands of epochal change. According to that vision, five mission s are outlined, of which 
mission three set out to improve the subject matter and quality of the education pro cess in order to optimize 
the production of a moral personality. To realize that mission, thirteen strategies are to be accomplished, 
among others 1.) operation of religion class and moral education ( budi  pekerti),  2.)  implementation  of  a 
competence based curriculum (KBK) based on a contextual-dialogical didactic; 5.) raising the quality of teachers 
through qualification and certification; 7.) guarantee funding of the education system; and 9.) realizing the 
compulsory basic education program.    
                                                 
324 The nine-year program of compulsory basic education (WAJAR, Wajib belajar) had been implemented in 1992, but has only been 
enforced by PROPENAS, Act 20 Year 2003 on the national education system and Government Regulation No 47 Year 2008 on compulsory 
school attendance in order to arrive at the objectives laid out in the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All-program. The 
course of education every citizen is required to complete comprises nine years of compulsory basic education starting from the age of 7 up 
to 15 years. This compulsory basic education program seems to be at least partially realized across the Archipelago.  
325 Community-based education is then based on special traits in religion, society, culture, societal aspirations and potential, as a form  of 
education from, by and for the society and is operated by  society itself. Society takes part in the education units through the school 
committee that exists at every school. The school committee is an autonomous institution having as its members the pupils’ parents/ 
trustees, the school community and prominent figures in society which have an active interest in education.(XV: 56)  PART D | 231 
Eventually Law 20/2003 introduced the national education standard as benchmark to be followed in every 
formal educational unit and as statutory standard of operation. Whether operated by the state or private 
foundations, all educational facilities must be operated by a standardized education legal body (badan hukum 
pendidikan).  Prior  to  the  Law  20/2003  on  Education,  which  eventually  equated  the  private  and  state  run 
educational  sectors  by  setting  national  standards,  the  extensive  private  school  sector  signified  not  only  a 
specific issue concerning state authority, but as well the transfer of educational authority into institutions 
which are not controlled by the state. (Triguna Interview 2004, Sujana Interview 2011, Santika Interview 2011) 
 
Private schools in Indonesia  do not enjoy the same status as state institutions. State institutions are fully 
recognized by the MONE, while private institutions have schools or faculties with varying and mostly lesser 
levels of recognition. To control and assure quality, schools and faculties are subject to accreditation
326 by the 
National Accreditation Board at the MONE
327. The National Accreditation Board appoints members to rate and 
accredit schools and universities. Two types of rating s are used in higher education facilities and schoo ls. 
Education facilities which do not comply with the minimal standard are rated not accredited, whereas 
educational units which meet the minimal standard are categorized individually into three levels. Prior to 1998 
these were equalized ( disamakan),  or  recognized  (diakui),  or  registered  (terdaftar).  Since  1998  the  terms 
‘terakreditasi  A’,  ‘terakreditasi  B’,  and  ‘terakreditasi  C’  have  been  used  respectively.  At  the  lesser  levels 
students  must  pass  a  state  examination  in  addition  to  completing  degree  requirements  at  the  school.  In 
context with higher education, accreditation is carried out in a two-step-assessment of the minimal standard of 
quality and the assessment of the higher education facility
328.  
 
For the first time in Indonesian history, a national edu cation standard is set wit the Law on the Education 
System as minimum criteria in effect in the entire territory of the Unitary State of the Republic Indonesia. Since 
2005 the curriculum of the private or state faith -based schools ( madrasah,  widyalaya)  and  faith-based 
universities under the MORA and the public schools and universities under the MONE is equal. Hence the 
change of the curriculum equalized the position of madrasah graduates with those of the public schools.This is 
particularly important, as for the first time in history the curricula for state faith-based schools and public 
schools is identical – and this equalization had met resistance from the Muslim fractions for centuries.  
 
It seems that the provision of the religion class is an outcome of 60 years lasting conflict between secular and 
faith-based groups and their shifting alliances over the degree of secularism and pluralism in the country – 
therefore  the  current  education  system  is  the  outcome  of  the  debate  between  the  Islamic  approach  on 
education (as represented in the MORA) and the secular approach on education (as represented in the MONE) 
and proponents of those approaches. 
Article 12 (a) and Article 30 
In the reform era, the issues of faith-based schooling, the religion class, and the  religion teacher became 
tropical again during the debates on the draft of the bill of the national education system in 2003. Article 12 
and 30 of Act 20/2003 on the national education system explicitly concern religious education. Included in 
Article 12 a is a provision ruling that students have to attain the compulsory religious class in the religion they 
adhere to, which is instructed by a teacher of the same religion. Chapter V on students, article 12 subsection 1a 
states:  
 
Every participant in education in every education unit has the right to receive religious education 
in the religion he or she adheres to instructed by a teacher who adheres to the same religion.  
Elucidation:  The  religion  teacher  who  adheres  to  the  same  religion  as  the  participant  of 
education is facilitated by the government or the regional government according to the needs of 
the region, as enacted in article 41, 3. 
   
                                                 
326 Instruction of the Minister of Education and Culture, 0326/U/1994 
327 BAN PT Dirjen Dikti Depdiknas 
328 5 criteria are assessed: Relevance, Link, Match, Quality and Efficiency. First, the  institution executes an intern evaluation according to 
the standards set by the national accreditation board, and then the board examines the intern evaluation, and if necessary se nds a 
specialist team for further investigation to the to-be-accredited institution. The temporal repeated accreditation assesses the curriculum, 
quality, number of education staff, students’ welfare, materials and infrastructure, operation of the academic administration, finances and 
funding.  The  outcome  of  both  assessments  is  then  turned  in  to  the  Minister  of  Education.  Interconnected  to  the  outcome,  certain 
measures will be taken or proposed, like increase or decrease financial support, closing of study programs etc. To open postgraduate study 
programs, state and private facilities are to be accredited A or B. PART D | 232 
The efforts made by the Hindu Council (Parisada Hindu Indonesia) to enshrine public Hindu-based schooling in 
legislation were eventually successful, as Chapter VI, Article 30 on religious education, subsection 1-4, and 
especially subsection 4 on pasraman (Hindu Sunday Schools) show:  
 
1.)  Faith-based education is organized by the government and/or parts of the society which embrace that 
particular faith, according with legal regulations  
2.)  Faith-based education shall prepare the students to become members of society who understand and 
practices the values of their religious doctrine and/or to become a religious expert 
3.)   Faith-based education can be operated on every level of formal, non-formal and in-formal education 
4.)  Faith-based education has the form of education in diniyah, pesantren, pasraman, pabhaja samanera 
and other types of that kind.  
 
Interestingly, section XVIII, article 65, subsection 2 states that education units that are under the authority of 
foreign governments are obliged to provide religious education and civics for Indonesian citizens at the level of 
compulsory basic education. This article warrants that Indonesian citizens attend the religion class according to 
their faith at international schools. A Muslim at an International Australian school may now demand to receive 
Islamic religious education, but it is not known to me, if that ever happened, and who has to provide the 
teacher, according to the law Article 41, 3 it is the Indonesian national or the respective regional government in 
order to raise the quality of education. Hence Act 20 in 2003 on the national education system embodies the 
normative right of every citizen to receive religious instruction in his or her embraced faith held by a qualified 
religion teacher who adheres to the same faith in articles 12 and 30. The facilitation of that teacher is the duty 
of the national or regional government, but given the complex geographic and demographic condition, it is the 
most likely still the task of the concerned religious community in question.  
 
It is important to note in that context, the mark of the religion class is a compulsory item in the school report, 
Thus, a student’s promotion to the next level of schooling depends on the mark received in religious education. 
Although religion is not part of the national exams, it is examined at the level of the educational unit either by 
the educational unit or the official faith-based agency - in the Hindu context, by the Hindu Council (Parisada 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia) - and included in the certificate. The examination of performance and acquired skills 
in the religion and morals subject area is done by observation, that is, the teacher rates whether a change in 
behavior and attitude may be assessed in the student’s evolving affective capacity and personality. The grading 
of morality, defined as faith in God and following the commands of God, is done by the religion teacher after 
consultation  with  the  class  and  other  specialized  teachers  in  evaluating  how  those  qualities  are  put  into 
practice. In addition, to give the overall mark in the religion class – excellent, capable and less capable – the 
class and other specialized teachers regularly inform the religion instructor about a student’s conduct, and the 
overall mark in the religion and moral subject group is given by the teacher’s conference considering the 
religion teachers’ grading and the result of the school exams.  
 
Articles 12 and 30 concerning religious education are an outcome of the 60 years lasting conflict between 
secular and faith-based groups and their shifting alliances over the degree of secularism and Islamization in the 
country. Unlike the Islamic course of education, where from the basic levels profound knowledge of Islam is 
taught, qualifying for the training as religion teacher, in the Hindu education system, there are virtually only a 
few  faith-based  schools  providing  basic  education,(Arsada,  2006:  53)  which  are  not  even  similar  to  the 
madrasah system, and there are literally only a few graduates qualified and specialized in Hindu studies. This 
precarious situation prompted Prof Triguna, President of the Hindu University, to compare the state of the 
Hindu education system with a toddler in 2007.  
 
In  1994,  the  specialized  faith  study  program  at  the  senior  high  madrasah  has  been  disbanded,  as  a 
consequence those graduates were less qualified and specialized in Islamic studies and this had become a 
serious challenge to the State Institute of Islamic Studies. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 227) And this is exactly the 
problem Indonesian Hindus face today and the reason why they struggle to establish private or even public 
Hindu faith-based schools (widyalaya, a term prominent since 2006 and introduced into legislation in 2008). 
Only in 2010, the Dwijendra Foundation changed the names of all levels of schooling to widyalaya. Answering 
the protests of Islamic education experts, the specialized faith study program was introduced again by law 19 in 
2005 on the national education standard. Since the law on the national education system and the law on the 
national education standard list the widyalaya as public Hindu-based schools with a legal status equal to the 
madrasah, the regulation that faith-based communities may operate public general faith-based education units 
applies not only for Muslims, but also for Hindus.    PART D | 233 
This is of particular importance, since only faith-based schools offer a specialized faith-based study program at 
senior grades offering four additional subjects in faith-based matters. Whereas all students participate in a 
general program at grade X of the senior high level, four specialization programs are offered at grade XI and XII 
at public faith-based schools: (1) Natural science program, (2) Humanities and social sciences program, (3) 
language program, and (4) faith-based program. In addition to the allocated two class hours, the faith-based 
program  at  the  madrasah  provides  four  specialized  subjects  in  religious  education:  Quran  interpretation 
(tafsir), hadith, mystics (tasawwuf), and basics of jurisprudence (usul fiqh). Each of these four Islamic subjects is 
allocated three hours at each grade, which means that the total allocated class time for subjects in religion is 
fourteen hours a week. Analogously, public Hindu-based education may offer in its faith-based program four 
specialized subjects on Hindu tatwa (philosophy), upacara (ritual), ethics (susila), law, and governance. This 
specialization  program  shall  produce  profound  Hindu  graduates  who  may  be  employed  as  Hindu  religion 
teachers, street workers, clerics, religion experts, bureaucrats or politicians, after they have developed a stable 
Hindu personality.  
Organizational structure of the national education system 
Multi-administration and state and private sector 
The dual administration of the education system is a remnant from colonial times. In Indonesia, educational 
units have either the state or a private authority responsible for their operation. Traditionally, the private 
education  sector  is  significant  in  Indonesia,  as  Islamic  and  Christian  foundations  play  important  roles  as 
responsible non-state agencies in providing  education to either the economic weak, people in isolated or 
remote areas, or high-qualified education. In addition to the complex and politically explosive dual education 
system, a legal and fiscal multi administration system persists. The logical outcome has been a messy confusion 
in educational policies, inefficiency, and a waste regarding personal, institutional, and financial means. (Müller 
1974; Beeby 1979; Wandelt 1989)  
 
Today, faith-based educational units are either state run and under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (henceforth MORA), or if operated by a private faith-based foundation, they are under supervision of 
the Ministry of National Education (MONE). In short, the religion class in schooling and undergraduate studies 
and  state  faith-based  schooling  (madrasah,  widyalaya)  and  universities  are  under  the  guidance  of  the 
respective Directorate General in the MORA, whereas general education in public schools is controlled by the 
MONE.  
 
The MONE
329 decides on orientation, planning, and administration of educational policies and controls general 
and public education, state public schools and state public universities, and it subsidizes private faith -based 
schools. The Department of Internal and Home Affairs administrates elementary and vocational education. 
Several other Departments (Agriculture, Forestry, and Information) are involved in the operation of vocational 
schools or vocational subjects. The MORA has the authority over faith -based, to wit, Islamic, Christian, Hindu, 
and Buddhist instruction and over all public faith -based educational institutions. Consequently, the strong 
position of religion in education ascribes vast authority and power to the MORA.  
Funding 
In Indonesia, the funding picture of education is complicated, as the administrative multi-system of private and 
state education is maintained in the funding process. The budget for the MONE fails to reflect a major portion 
of public educational expenditures, since other Departments and especially the MORA are involved in paying 
operational  costs  and  teachers’  salaries.  Despite  the  regulation  that  compulsory  school  attendance  from 
elementary to junior high level shall be free of additional fees, the practice to charge tuition is continued. The 
fourth constitutional amendment mandates in section XII, article 31, subsection 4 the government to allocate 
at least 20 percent of the state budget (national and regional gross national product) on education. However, 
albeit varying in the regional districts, in 2006 the national allocation was around 9.1 percent of the state 
budget, or Rupiah 44.1 trillion, and 11.8 percent of the state budget, or Rupiah 54.06 trillion, in 2007
330. 
   
                                                 
329 The former Department of Culture and Education has been split into the National Education Department and the National Culture 
Department in 2005. In 2010 it was renamed to Ministry of Education.  
330  Maulia,  Erwida.    Incre asing  expenses  put  education  out  of  reach,  The  Jakarta  Post,  Jakarta.  Fri,  05/02/2008  (May  2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/05/02/increasing-expenses-put-education-out-reach.html) PART D | 234 
Similarly,Alwasilah/Furqon (2010: 615) state that the budget for education was around US$ 4.63 billion in 2007. 
This figure, however, does not include the education budget allocated at the provincial levels for 33 provinces 
and 440 districts or cities. With this allocation, MONE is the Ministry that has the highest budget. In general, 
the budget is allocated for social assistance (63.47%), buying goods (16.01%), paying salaries (15.22%), and 
investment (5.29%). As the teachers’ salaries, constituting about 12 -16 percent of the sum total to be allocated 
are included into the 20 percent, the national education system in an “unpleasant state”
331 because the pure 
percentage of budget allocation is minimal.  
Educational streaming 
As family, society, and state are listed as responsible bodies in the organization of the education system, 
general  education  is  localized  either  in-school  or  out-of  school  in  three  areas:  1.)  household  (family);  2.) 
schooling;  3.)  society  (neither  at  home  nor  at  school)
332. This conception is derived out of the historical 
emergence of several responsible authorities in the arena of education and out of demographic conditions, and 
it is operationalized in the national education system as follows: The current national education system consists 
of formal education, non-formal education, and informal education. In this, it consists of two streams: in-school 
education  (formal)  and  out -of  school  education  (non -formal)
333  plus  all  additional  measures  related  to 
education (informal)
334. The levels of education at school consist of private or state basic education, secondary 
education and higher education, while types of education include general education, vocational education, and 
special education. Education at school is organized in intra - and extra-curricular activities. The streams, levels, 
and types of education can take the form of an educational unit organized by the central government, local 
government, and/or community. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 613)  
 
Education is provided at class or/and as distance learning. Distant learning comprises individual or collective 
correspondence courses (packet A-C using radio, Audio/TV and computer networks) on all educational leve ls. 
Higher education is structured analogously to the schooling system but instead of three pillars, formal, informal 
and non-formal education, it is structured into two pillars, to wit, intracurricular and extracurricular education. 
Yet, there is no non -formal path at the tertiary level, making it somewhat difficult to realize the teacher 
qualification program in remote or backward areas or for minorities. The following tables show the Structure of 
the Indonesian education system. 
                                                 
331 Professor Dantes, informal personal communication in April 2008 
332 In this point, the national education system corresponds with the Hindu concept of four instructors ( catur guru). On the genealogy of 
this conception see Hinzeler 1993 and Bakker 1993. The Hindu education system reckons four types of educators: the parents (guru 
rupaka), the schools (guru pengajian), the government (guru wisesa) and One Supreme Lordship (guru swadaya).  
333 Non-formal education consists of education obtained outside schools. Nonformal education is designed for citizens who need education 
service that functions as replacement, complement, and/or supplement to formal education within the framework of providing li felong 
education. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 613) For example, to arrive at the objectives of Education for All (EFA,  Penddikan untuk semua, PUS), 
the Department of Education provides students in remote and underdeveloped areas with an alternative model of schooling (Paket a, b,c). 
The three packets (Packet A (elementary level), B (junior high level), and C (senior high level) are of the same standard as formal education. 
These packets provide compulsory basic education to remote regions without access to schooling.  
334 Informal education consists of all educational measures carried out in family and society outside schools. Informal educ ation can be in 
the form of self-learning, provided by families and communities. The outcomes of informal education shall be recognized as being equal to 
the outcomes of formal education and nonformal education after successfully passing an assessment acco rding to national education 
standards. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 613) PART D | 235 
 
(Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 612) 
 
 
Source: I Made Santika 
   
Education structure Education structure
VoctechSSS
Playgroup
Kindergarten Islamic KG
Package A Primary School Islamic PS 7-12
Package B Junior Secondary School Islamic JSS 13-15
Voc training Package C General SSS Islamic SSS 16-18
Diploma 1-3
S1: bachelor Islamic S1 19-22
S2: magister Islamic S2
S3: doctorate Islamic S3
Islamic                                         General  Islamic                                         General 
Formal Education  System                              Formal Education  System                             Non-formal Ed.  System
 
COMPULSORY COMPULSORY
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The educational streams are equal and switching schools between those streams is possible. For the first time 
in Indonesian educational history, citizens may switch between non-formal and formal and between public and 
private education units according to their educational needs and preferences.  This is also true for  special 
schools. The education system levels and paths are compatible and replaceable providing and guaranteeing the 
opportunity  of  a  systematic  life-long  in-school  or  out-of  school  contextual  and  child-centered  education 
according to the needs of the student. Hence, education is operated either by state or private authorities in a 
complementary and replaceable manner referring to the national educational standard.  
National Standards on Education 
Curriculum and Textbooks 
Besides  the  administrative  multi-system  of  private  and  state  education,  in  the  1950s,  a  compromise  was 
manifest in the curriculum: the schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs taught secular subjects of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, while general education included the religion class, which is organized by 
MORA.  (Mujiburrahman  2006:  220-230)  In  1968,  the  first  national  curriculum  was  organized.  The  second 
nation-wide  curriculum  was  compiled  in  1974,  when  the  government  changed  the  school  curriculum, 
introduced a curriculum reform for the Islamic madrasah and began to implement Pancasila Moral Education, 
which had to be taught as a compulsory subject at all state or private schools. Law 2 in 1989 on education tried 
to adjust the varying secular and Islamic curricula into one unitary national curriculum and education system. 
The law laid the focus on value-based science and technology, the labor market, and productivity. Following 
the curricular reform in 1994, the madrasah curriculum has become only slightly different from that of the 
state schools.  
 
In the context of the Hindu class, there was no nationwide curriculum compiled for the Hindu class during the 
Sukarno presidency. In Bali, specific schools offered the Hindu class, but the content depended on the skills and 
interpretation of the teacher, who was usually not a trained religion instructor, as a result the approach of the 
1950s was unsystematic and unequal. (Gede Sura Interview 2007) In 1968, the first national curriculum for the 
Hindu religion class was compiled by I Gusti Made Ngurah (see Parisada policies on the Hindu class), Hindu 
General Secretary. Thus, a first nation-wide curriculum including a systematized approach on the Hindu class 
was applied in 1968, but it has never been implemented equally and evenly across Indonesia. According to I 
Gede Sura (Interview 2007), the very structure of this 1968 curriculum was never really reformed in the years 
to follow. Merely, it was adjusted in compliance with developments in home affairs and international policies, 
but not with an eye on improving the quality of the subject matter in curricular content and teaching and 
learning methods. In 1984, the third nation wide curriculum was implemented. With the 1984 curriculum, the 
first centralized approach on a Hindu religion curriculum was adopted. Content and syllabus were compiled by 
the Hindu Directorate General with little input from the Hindu Council (Parisada), whereas a special team of 
officials from the Regional Office of Religion and the Regional Office of Education in Bali, delegates from the 
governor’s office, and local religious experts in Denpasar compiled the text books.  
 
The reform era and transition to democracy mandated a fundamental rethinking on education, motivated the 
paradigm shift in education from the transmission to the transformation paradigm, and led to the compilation 
of two new curricula. For the first time in Indonesian history, Law 20/2003 claimed the application of a national 
standard of education to warrant the quality of education in the entire territory of the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia. In consequence, the law  equalized the position of private and public education by 
equating the curricula in setting national standards, which of course were then to be developed first (see 
chapter on national education standards). These national standards of education are used as benchmarks in 
the improvement of curricular quality and content (standar isi), examination/assessment (standard kompetensi 
lulusan), teachers and lecturers, resources and infrastructure, organization, and funding.  
 
Law 20/2003, Chapter IX, Article 35 (3) mandated the establishment of an independent national center for 
education standards (BSNP, Badan Standard Nasional Pendidikan), which is tasked to control the quality of 
education and regularly reports to the government. After its inception in 2005, the center acts as partner of the 
MONE in the development, monitoring and controlling of the national education system’s quality. Located in 
Jakarta,  the  BSNP  is  an  independent  and  autonomous  institution  in  charge  of  drafting  and  compiling  the 
national curriculum standard (standard isi), evaluating the achievement of the graduates’ competence through 
the national exams (standard kompetensi lulusan) and adjusting the curriculum according to the principles of 
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At all levels of education, the curriculum is based on the diversification principle relevant to the education 
units, local potential and students. In context with regional autonomy and decentralization, the principle of 
diversification  is  thought  to  provide  the  adjustment  of  the  national  education  system  with  special 
characteristics given in the respective region, where the education unit is situated as regions, society and 
school committees participate in the organization and operation of the education system and develop the 
syllabus of the national curriculum and the curriculum of local contents. The curriculum is compiled referring to 
the national education standard in order to achieve the respective educational aims.  
 
Applying a holistic approach to curricular renewal according to the guiding principle of learning throughout life, 
the curriculum reform followed the four pillars of education set forth by the International Bureau of Education 
of UNESCO in 2000
335. The curriculum and syllabus is compiled at all educational levels and  areas of education 
in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, bas ed on the following principles outlined in Chapter X on 
curriculum, Article 36 (3):  
 
1.  strengthening faith (iman) and following the commands of God (takwa)  
2.  improving noble character/morals (akhlak mulia) 
3.  increasing potential, intellect, and interest of students 
4.  respecting diversity of local potential and environment 
5.  considering local and national development demands 
6.  considering employment demands 
7.  considering development in science, technology, and arts 
8.  considering religion,  
9.  considering the dynamic of the global developments and  
10.  considering national unity and national values  
 
The potential to be developed reflects a specific Indonesian approach on curricular renewal. Consequently, as 
the enhancement of faith (iman) and following the commands of God (takwa) is the first principle of state it 
translates top-down into the first objective of national development and the first goal of the national education 
system and curricular reform.  
 
Chapter X on curriculum, Article 37 continues the previous policy of a studium generale. In basic education and 
secondary education this studium generale or the compulsory curriculum comprises:   
 
1.  religion class 
2.  civics 
3.  language (Indonesian, regional language, and English) 
4.  math 
5.  natural science 
6.  social science 
7.  art and culture 
8.  physical education and sports 
9.  skills/vocational education 
10.  local content 
 
In higher education this compulsory curriculum comprises:  
 
1.  religion class 
2.  civics 
3.  language (Indonesian, regional language, and English) 
 
   
                                                 
335 1) learning to know, which focuses on combining broad general knowledge and basic education; (2) learning to do, with emphasis on 
practical skills necessary for a profession or trade; (3) learning to be, the underpinning principle of which involves development of the 
human potential to its fullest; and (4) learning to live together, which is relevant in the current context of globalization. (April 2009, 
http://www.eric.ed.gov; http://www.unesco.org/delors/)  PART D | 238 
Elucidation of article 37 states that the religion class shall form students which have faith in God, follow the 
commands of God and have noblemorals/character
336. 
The  conception  of  the  post -reform  competence-based-curriculum  (Kurikulum  Berdasarkan  Kompetensi, 
hereafter:  KBK)  and  the  brand  new  curriculum-at-the-level-of-education-units  (Kurikulum  Tingkat  Satuan 
Pendidikan, hereafter: KTSP) adopted in 2006 substantiated the problem-based context learning and study-
centered  approach  of  the  transmission  paradigm  and  the  learning  throughout  life  model.  The  KBK  was 
compiled in 2002, enacted in 2003 and applied until 2007. Still, professionals in the educational sector regarded 
the  KBK  as  too  centralistic,  and  what  competence  actually  stands  for  was  perceived  as  vague  or  even 
mysterious.  In  consequence,  principals  have  refused  to  establish  the  KBK  and  a  more  decentralized  and 
contextual approach was drafted. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007) 
After the national standard was codified by Minister of Education Decree 19 in 2006 on the national education 
standard, the KBK (competence-based-curriculum, Kurikulum Berdasarkan Kompetensi) was standardized into 
the  KTSP  (curriculum-at-the-level-of-education-units,  Kurikulum  Tingkat  Satuan  Pendidikan),  which  was 
enacted with Minister of Education’s decrees 22 on content, 23 on graduation, and 24 on organization in 2006. 
Following those decrees, it became clearer for what competences actually stand for, because the national 
standard of education regulated the curriculum, the syllabus, and the graduate’s competence standard for 
compulsory schooling, junior and senior secondary high school and higher education in a generally intelligible 
way. In 2007, 30 percent of the schools used the KTSP and 70 percent will adapt it.(Made Santika, Protocol 
27.04.2007) 
 
Until  2009,  all  schools  were  required  to  adopt  the  KTSP  and  its  textbooks.  The  legal  documents  define 
competence as to encompass standard competences (SK, standar kompetensi) and basic competences (KD, 
kompetensi dasar). These competences are the targets the participants to education are required to attain in 
order to fully develop their human potential as a complete person. The core competences outlined in the KTSP 
for  both  the  public  and  the  faith-based  schools  are  identical  now,  this  facilitates  a  national  standard  in 
examination/assessment, as in schooling 70 percent of the syllabi are uniform across the Archipelago, and only 
30 percent of the students’ performance which communicates the regionally specific knowledge is examined at 
the level of the educator, the educational unit, the offices of education and religion on behalf of the regional 
government. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007) The compiling process of the KBK and KTSP syllabus are quite 
similar, yet the core competences of the KTSP have been defined according to guidelines from the national 
center for education standards (BNSP, Badan Nasional Standard Pendidikan), which appointed members were 
drawn from experts in all subjects, originating from all ethnicities, and religions. The KTSP compilation process 
is virtually and literally complex. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007) The KTSP is to be further developed by all 
agents in the arena of education applying a subsequent pattern: 
 
(1) student-centered and oriented at the potential, evolving capacity, needs, and interest of the participants in 
education,  
(2) uniform and integrative,  
(3) the progress of science, technology and art is integrated,  
(4) relevant for the daily needs of the stakeholders,  
(5) comprehensive and continuous,  
(5) life-long learning, and  
(6) balances national and regional interests.  
 
Following this pattern, the curriculum and syllabus of the Hindu class is compiled by the following agents using 
the legal and administrative hierarchy of Indonesia: The Hindu Directorate General at the MORA consulted the 
Hindu Council (Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia) and other experts in the field of Hindu religion in order to 
collect the raw material and subject matter to be compiled as national standard. After consulting and re-
consulting the Hindu Directorate General at the MORA, the standard of the Hindu class, and the core and basic 
competences to be acquired in schooling were compiled by the MONE applying the recommendations of the 
national center for education standards (BNSP, Badan Nasional Standard Pendidikan). (Made Santika, Protocol 
27.04.2007; Made Sujana Interview 2007)  
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Therefore, the MONE provided for the regulations, the national education standard (standards of competence 
and evaluation), in our context the national Hindu KTSP, after having consulted the Director of Hindu Education 
at the MORA. The budget for the Hindu class is provided by the Directorate General for Hindu Affairs at the 
MORA.  Those  competence  and  evaluation  standards  are  uniform  and  implemented  uniformly  throughout 
Indonesia. Due to the principle of diversification then, the syllabi are further developed and adjusted according 
to the needs and potentials of the educational units, the regions and/ or the faith-based community in question 
in order to communicate regionally specific knowledge.  (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007; Made Sujana 
Interview 2007) 
 
In accordance with the local genius of the region, 30 percent of the syllabus at basic and secondary education 
level is compiled by the respective school and its school committee, which is coordinated, supervised, and 
facilitated  by  the  regional  offices  and  agencies  of  education  and/or  religion  at  the  provincial  or 
district/municipality level. The district/municipality is responsible for basic education and the provincial level is 
responsible for secondary education. The provincial level is tasked with the contextualization of the textbooks, 
the provision of models, the accommodation of regulations, and the provision of grants and subsidies.  
 
Consequently, the agency of education at the municipal or district level is tasked to build an education board 
(dewan pendidikan) – in 2007 there were deliberations on its establishment, but it was not yet formed in Bali’s 
districts-, to form a syllabus compilation team, to develop the structure of the syllabus, to allocate grants and 
subsidies,  and  to  equip  schools  with  resources  and  textbooks.  The  schools  then  further  elaborate  on  the 
syllabus, this is to say, the principals are in charge to warrant the organization of curricular development by 
installing a syllabus planning unit and to implement the then reformed and contextualized syllabus.  
 
The special subject teachers, in our case the Hindu religion instructors, then develop the syllabus further and 
compile  in  the  learning  organization  plan  (RPP,  rencana  pelaksanaan  pembelajaran)  as  contextual 
concretization  of  the  national  standard  competences  and  basic  competences  outlined  in  the  national 
curriculum.  The  RPP  comprises  the  standard  competence,  basic  competence,  competence  achievement 
indicators, learning aim, content, class methodology, learning activities, resources, and examination. For that 
reason, the specialized subject teachers meet regularly in the specialized subject teachers’ conference (MGMP, 
musyawarah guru mata pelajaran) at the level of the province or regency/municipality and in the Teachers’ 
working group (KKG, kelompok kerja guru) at the district level to discuss matters related to their profession and 
to develop the syllabus and the learning organization plan. (Ny Gusti Ayu Kartika Interview 2007; personal 
observation at such a conference) 
 
The textbooks are another issue in the educational arena. The standard procedure of compiling textbooks is 
regulated in Minister of Education decree 11 in 2005 on textbooks. But as teachers still have to cope with their 
new autonomous role as educators, syllabus developers and researchers as mandated during the educational 
reform,  the  teacher-centered  paradigm  prevails  in  class  and  the  textbooks  remain  the  primary  resource 
teachers rely on in structuring their lessons. (Ny Gusti Ayu Kartika Interview 2007; personal observation in 
class) 
 
The development of the syllabus and the compilation of textbooks follow the same procedure. The BNSP issues 
a recommendation guideline, how textbooks shall be designed in questions of lay out, content, and illustration. 
Then the Hindu Director of Education at the MORA appoints a textbook compilation team, which works out the 
syllabus of the KTSP in a draft of the teachers’ raw material manual (buku pedoman guru), giving models of 
texts, practices, exercises, and revisions. The draft of the textbook is then handed in to the BNSP, and after a 
reworking, the draft returns to the Hindu Director of Education at the MORA. Here the final draft is compiled 
and turned in to the MONE. In consequence, the MONE approves of the draft and then the Hindu Directorate 
at the MORA prints the textbooks or gives a publisher the permission to print the textbooks. (Sujana Interview 
2007, Santika Interview 2007, Kartika Interview 2007) 
 
In this, the Hindu Director of Education at the MORA drafts and implements the standard type of textbook, 
which after printing is distributed complimentarily to the regional and local offices  of religion throughout 
Indonesia. Afterwards the specialized subject teachers’ conference (MGMP, musyawarah guru mata pelajaran) 
commissions a team to develop further on the raw material, as content and methods of the Hindu class vary in 
the regions due to the diversity and plurality within Indonesian Hinduism itself.  
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The office of religion at the provinces then accommodates the contextualized teachers’ manual. However, 
there are several private publishers that publish the final textbooks. Since 2002, every year new textbooks 
were printed, and one might speculate, the textbook printing press profits more from educational reform than 
the families, which have to buy new textbooks every year. In the next step, textbooks to be used in schooling 
are chosen from the all textbooks available during a joint conference of all Hindu religion teachers and are 
approved  by  the  school  committee  in  question.  (Sujana  Interview  2007,  Santika  Interview  2007,  Kartika 
Interview 2007) 
 
In  the  final  analysis,  the  reform  of  the  Hindu  curriculum  paradigm  shifted  the  orientation  from  teacher-
centered  content  learning  (bahasan)  towards  student-centered,  problem-based  context  learning  and 
competence (kompetensi), therefore it situated the pupil in the center of the learning and teaching process. 
The contents of the curriculum however, have not been reformed, merely adjusted to the new educational 
paradigm. The KTSP is not fully determined by the nation-state as only core competences are outlined in the 
national curriculum, therefore it is contextual and decentralized, since the school-communities, as well as the 
tertiary educational institutes develop the syllabus. In addition, the schools compile and evaluate the local 
content curriculum. This diversification is considered necessary to preserve the local genius, or specific local 
features in the regions, which otherwise would be homogenized or vanish. (Sujana Interview 2007, Santika 
Interview 2007, Kartika Interview 2007) 
 
Critical captions of the Bali Post read, ‘Our schools are turned into professional professors!’, or ‘Teachers, the 
new researchers! Why not?’ These captions reflect the critical discourse on the fact that it is now left to the 
schools and teachers themselves, with the support of the civil society at large, to push for a better educational 
system that will equip Indonesian students with the basic skills to meet the challenges of the future world. 
Therefore  one  might  get  the  impression  that  the  operation  of  the  Hindu  class  would  be  the  task  and 
responsibility of Hindu religion instructors only. Yet, as it is the principal educational duty of parents and the 
society to educate the youth in the religious tradition and values, a tight cooperation between school and 
parents seems necessary. But the importance of a profound education in Hindu religion is less valued in the 
lower social classes of Balinese society, which have not yet built a proper awareness of the importance of a 
proper understanding of religion. (Arsada 2006: 5, 55) In this sense the educated Hindu elites gave themselves 
the mandate to play the formative role in the constitution of the Hindu education system. 
National standardof education 
As state funded agama are understood as first concern and prime national value, strategic element in and aim 
of the national development process, the advancement of faith in God and following the commands of God is 
the  first  objective  of  the  new  contextual  and  student-centered  education  system.  In  order  to  realize  this 
objective,  the  national  curriculum  comprises  a  compulsory  religion  class  for  students  of  all  state  funded 
religions at all levels of education (with the exception of postgraduate studies), held by a teacher of the same 
religion, who has to be provided by the central or regional government.  
 
Minister of Education Decree 19 Year 2005 implemented the national standard of education, curriculum and 
syllabus as benchmark in the development of the national education system in order to monitor the quality in 
the application of the KTSP (curriculum-at-the-level-of-education-units, Kurikulum Tingkat Satuan Pendidikan). 
The scope of the national education standard in schooling encompasses levels of competence in: 
 
  content standard: (SI; Standar Isi) encompasses the competences of graduates, resources, and the 
national curriculum and syllabus that students have to master at a certain level of education in order 
to achieve the graduates’ competence standard  
  standard of process denotes the operational standards at educational units in order to achieve the 
graduates’ competence standard 
  graduates’ competence standard: (SKL, Standar kompentensi lulusan) lays out the basic framework of 
capacity students need to acquire comprising attitude, knowledge and skills  
  educators and educational staff standard teacher’s competency 
  resources and infrastructure standards: competence of teaching material, textbooks and facilities 
  financing standard: Budget 
  examination standard: examination of the students’ performance through the educator, the education 
unit or the government (in case of non-formal HRE the Parisada) 
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The content standard (SI; Standar Isi) stipulated in the Minister of Education Decree 22 in 2006 encompasses 
the basic framework and structure of the curriculum, the study load, the KTSP, and the academic calendar. The 
compulsory nation-wide unitary curriculum comprises five learning areas: 
 
1.  religion and morals subject area  
2.  civics and personality subject area 
3.  science and technology subject area 
4.  aesthetics subject area 
5.  physic, sports and health subject area 
 
All these subject groups are offered in an integrative and interdisciplinary manner in order to foster a holistic 
understanding. Holistic is defined as integrative and interdisciplinary learning process between the subject 
areas that aims to attain the legally prescribed competences. The religion and morals subject group aims to 
transform the student to such an extent that he/she becomes human, has a noble disposition (ahklak mulia) 
and faith in God (beriman). Noble disposition (ahklak mulia) is understood to comprise ethics, character and 
morals as realization of the subject matter of the religion class.  
 
In consequence, the aim of the religion and morals subjects group in schooling is to build the spiritual potential 
of the student, and the group encompasses learning activities in the field of recognizing, understanding, and 
nurturing religious values, and the implementation of these values in individual or collective social life. By 
raising the spiritual potential, it is targeted to ameliorate the diverse potentials intrinsic to human beings, 
whose actualization reflects their dignity and worth (harkat/martabat) as God creatures. Note the inherent 
organicist logic of argumentation. Interestingly, it is mandated that the subject matter and content of the 
religion and morals subjects group is integrated in an interdisciplinary manner into the science and technology 
subject group. In consequence, the development of technology in Indonesia shall be based on religious ethics. 
The  Dwijendra  foundation  provides  an  outstanding  example  how  these  national  guidelines  are  locally 
implemented.  
 
Accordingly, the curriculum for basic education and secondary education comprises ten compulsory subjects:  
 
1.  religion class 
2.  civics 
3.  language (Indonesian, regional language, and English) 
4.  math 
5.  natural science 
6.  social science 
7.  art and culture 
8.  physical education and sports 
9.  skills/vocational education 
10.  local content 
 
In higher education the compulsory curriculum comprises:  
 
1.  religion class 
2.  civics 
3.  language (Indonesian, regional language, and English) 
 
The graduates’ competence standard is set for each stream, level and type of the education system: at the level 
of basic education, the graduates’ competence standard aims to impart or lay down competences, whereas at 
the level of secondary education the aim is to raise/build intellect, knowledge, personality, morals, and skills to 
be  able  to  lead  an  independent  life  and  to  continue  education  at  the  next  levels.  In  consequence,  the 
graduates’ competence standard at the higher education level aims to prepare the students to become a moral 
member of society, who has knowledge, skills, autonomy, and the attitude to find, develop, and apply science, 
technology, and art, which are of use for humanity.  
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Regarding Hindu religious education, the KTSP standard allocates three class hours for religious instruction 
from grade IV to VI at the level of basic education. From grade I to III the methodology is integrative and 
interdisciplinary,  while  from  grade  IV  to  VI  a  subject-based  approach  is  used.  At  the  level  of  secondary 
schooling, two class hours are allocated for the religion class from grade VII to XII. At grade X of the senior high 
level, all students participate in a general program. At grade XI and XII then, four specialization programs are 
offered: (1) Natural science program, (2) Humanities and social sciences program, (3) language program and (4) 
faith-based program, especially at the madrasah, but this special study program shall be opened at the public 
Hindu-based schools (widyalaya).  
Teachers 
As agents of instruction, educators (teachers, lecturers and others involved in teaching) at all levels and types 
of education (pre-school, basic education, secondary education and higher education) are required to have 
four competences available which have been outlined in the national standard of education:  
 
1.  pedagogical competence,  
2.  personality competence,  
3.  professional competence  
4.  social competence  
 
The Minister of Education Decrees 15 in 2005 on teachers and lecturers and Decree 16 in 2007 on teachers’ 
academic  qualification  and  competence  standard  regulate  the  academic  qualifications  and  competencies 
educators need to have or acquire. Competencies are defined as behaviors and skills that educators must have, 
or  must  acquire,  to  perform  effectively  at  work.  Those  competencies  are  categorized  as  educators’  core 
competencies, which are then further diversified into teachers’ competencies according to the level and type of 
education under question.  
 
As a nation state based on Pancasila, following competences are interesting to note. In the area of personality 
competence, the core competence an educator has to posses is the ability to act in line with and communicate 
the  norms  of  religion,  law,  society,  and  national  culture.  This  competence  is  then  diversified  into  specific 
teachers’ competencies. The primary competence is defined as respecting all students without discrimination 
with  respect  to  their  embraced  conviction  (keyakinan),  ethnic  group,  adat-istiadat  (customs  and  usages), 
region  of  origin,  and  gender.  Interestingly,  in  this  document  the  term  conviction/creed  (keyakinan)  is 
mentioned, which does not actually discriminate between agama and kepercayaan, but is itself implied that 
the document refers to agama as only agama can provide a conviction or creed, however, the teacher may not 
discriminate belief systems (kepercayaan). This perspective on the non-discriminatory attitude of teachers has 
been already mentioned in the first law on education.  
 
The  second  specific  competence  educators  shall  acquire  in  the  area  of  personality  competence  refers  to 
conduct which mirrors the norms and values of the  embraced agama, law and social norms of a specific 
society, and of the plural Indonesian national culture. Further, educators’ conduct shall follow the commands 
of  God  (takwa)  and  morals  (akhlak).  It  is  very  interesting  to  note,  that  faith  in  a  specific  image  of  God 
(Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) is not mentioned here, because religious practice is considered to be a tradition-
specific  set  of  actions,  whereas  piety/following  the  commands  of  God  (takwa)  and  morals  (akhlak)  are 
interpreted as universal.  
Furthermore, in the area of social competence, an educator is expected to act in an inclusive, objective, and 
non-discriminatory way, based on grounds of sex, religion race, physical condition, family background, and 
social  economic-status.  Likewise,  educators  are  required  to  be  capable  of  communicating  effectively, 
empathetically, and courteously with the students, other educational staff, the parents, and the society at 
large.  
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Higher education 
In 1851, a school for the training of native medical assistants was established in Java, and after 1880, there 
were  three  chiefs’  schools  for  the  education  of  the  local  elite  in  Java.  The  embryo  of  Indonesian  tertiary 
education using Dutch as language of instruction were the Training Schools for Native Officials (OSVIA) and the 
1902 opened School for the Education of Native Doctors (STOVIA). In 1920, the first tertiary institution was a 
technical college and established at Bandung. In 1924, a law facility was established at Batavia (Jakarta), the 
embryo of the Law Institute of the contemporary Indonesian University. In 1927, a medical academy  was 
opened in Batavia. In 1940, the forerunner of the Institute of Literature and Philosophy of the Indonesian 
University (UI) was established. 1941 the Agriculture Institute was established in Bogor. (Frederick/Worden 
1993; Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 57; Bunge 1982: 22) 
 
Considering the state of tertiary education in 1945 (see chapter XY), in 1995
337, and in 2006, the expansion of 
the tertiary system is remarkable in terms of quantity nonetheless quality remains a point of concern. In 2006, 
there were 2,838 (526 Islamic) higher education institutes, of which 83 (50 Islamic) were state run and 2 ,756 
(476  Islamic)  were  private  institutions.  There  were  225 ,687  docents  employed,  of  which  2 ,754  held 
professorships. Of the 2, 7 million registered students, the share of wom en was 48 percent, a remarkable fact 
for a majority Muslim country. Of the total number of students , around 43 percent were registered at law, 
economics or management faculties, aro und 18 percent were enrolled at engineering disciplines including 
architecture and planning, only 10 percent were registered at natural sciences faculties including math and 
informatics, and finally 13 percent had registered with social science or humanities faculties. This data does not 
reflect enrollment at Islamic institutions of higher education. There were about 5,000 PhD students distributed 
across Indonesia in 2006
338.  
 
Minister of Education decree No. 30/1990 on higher education has been substituted by Decree 60/1999, which 
has not yet been replaced by new legislation and is thus still in effect, but consequential legislation amended 
specific regulations. In autumn 2006, I found a bill on a draft of a new tertiary education system at the 
Department of Education’s website, but the link was dead in spring 2007, and Mr Santika at MORA said the bill 
is  still  in  the  process  of  drafting.  There  was  no  new  bill  available  in  2009.  Higher  education  is  classified 
according to institutional types and functional activities by Law 20/2003: universities, institutes
339, colleges or 
schools of applied sciences
340, academies
341, polytechnic institutes or colleges of advanced technology
342. 
Tertiary institutions have the right to carry out academic programs, professional training s and vocations. This 
work will only focus on Universities and Institutes as defined in Law 60/1999 and Law 20/2003, because the 
case study was conducted at a University and an Institute and therefore other facilities were excluded.  
 
Tertiary institutions administrate autonomously their respective institutes as centers that put the triple mission 
of Indonesian higher education (tri dharma perguruan tinggi) into practice: providing teaching, research, and 
public service. Teaching
343 encompasses the wide variety of higher educational courses available in Indonesia. 
Research
344 should show outcomes that are of use in the economic and social progress of the country. Public 
service
345 refers to the provision of assignments to community that result from teaching and research activities.  
   
                                                 
337 In 1995 there were 51 state higher education instituions and 26 Polytechnic facilities spread over the entire archipelago. The number of 
private facilities reached 1,220 in the same year (251 Universities, 47 Institutes, 256 colleges, 396 academies, and 8 Polytechnic facilities). 
The total number of students amounted 436,133 and the number of docents 46,735 at state facilities. On the private sector, 1,450,171 
students were enrolled and taught by 110,912 docents. (Departemen Pendidikan 1996: 7) 
338 In: http://evaluasi.or.id/; http://www.daad.de/berichte/Jakarta.pdf (February 2009) 
339 Considering the administrational aspect, there is no difference between universities and institutes, but Universities comprise fo ur 
faculties at least and institutes comprise two faculties, with each faculty offering a variety of departments and study programs.  
340 Colleges or Schools of applied sciences comprise one faculty in one discipline only with a variety of specialized programs 
341 Academies offer a specific discipline only 
342 Polytechnic institutes or colleges of advanced technology operate a study professional program in a number of specialized disciplines 
343  The target or duty of education ( pendidikan)  appears  as  the  preparation  of  the  participant  as  citizen  having  academic  and/or 
professional skills at his or her disposal and capable of applying, developing and/or producing science and technology; expanding and 
disseminate science, technology and striving for its application in order to increase societal life and enrich national culture. 
344 The aim or duty of Research (penelitian) is expressed in the efforts to deliver empirics, theories, concepts, methodology, models and 
information pointed to enrich science and technology. 
345 The objective of public service (pengabdian kepada masyarakat) constitutes the effort to put science and technology, which is realized 
by higher education in institutionalized manner or directly, in use for society that societal welfare may be increased. The objective of 
community-service is directed to the general public in the form of the distribution if information, consultation, guidance and training 
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Higher education is defined as to comprise academic and professional education. Academic education gives 
priority to quality improvement and the advancement of science, whereas professional education aims to 
produce a skilled and competitive work force. Academic education comprises study programs ranging from 
undergraduate studies as associate degrees or diploma  (D I-IV) to bachelor  study programs  (stratum one, 
Sarjana 1, S1) and to postgraduates studies as master studies (stratum two, Sarjana 2, S2) and the Doctorate 
(stratum 3, Sarjana 3, S3). However, in line with quality improvement, Law 20/2003 abolished the operation of 
the Diploma I-III. The table shows the Indonesian Study Programs. 
 
Study Program  Credit point  Endurance 
(semester) 
Diploma I (DI)  40-50  2-4 
Diploma II (D2)  80-90  4-6 
Diploma III (D3)  110-120  6-10 
Diploma IV (D4)  144-160  8-14 
Stratum 1 (Sarjana 1) equivalent to a bachelor degree  144-160  8-14 
Stratum 2 (Sarjana 2) equivalent to a master degree  36-50  4-10 
Stratum 3 (Sarjana 3) equivalent to a bachelor degree  40-50  4-10 
 
The  educational  reform  introduced  the  organization  of  tertiary  education  in  semester s,  and  the  division 
between a national core curriculum and a regional institutional curriculum by Minister of E ducation Act 
232/U/2000. Semester is defined as the smallest time unit expressing the length of educational program in an 
educational level each comprising 16 to 18 learning weeks. The amount of students’ attendance is recorded 
with a system called semester credit system (SKS, Sistem Kredit Semester). The credit points system is an 
educational coordination system in which the student study load, the lecturer workload, and the organization 
of the institutional education program (SAP) are defined in credit points. In the Bachelor program the content 
of the core curriculum comprises between 60 and 80 percent of the number of required SKS, and in the Master 
program it is between 40 and 60 percent of the number of required SKS. The content of the institutional 
curriculum is the remaining percentage that is under the responsibility of the Higher education facility. The 
compilation of the core curriculum is the duty of the Hindu Directorate General and the development of the 
institutional curriculum is achieved by responding to the specific regional situation as local needs, labor market 
and environmental condition as well as the socio-religious potential.  
 
The structure of state universities is uniform; the presidium is structured into three units, academic affairs, 
administration, and student affairs. Private universities are more varied in structure, as decisions on structure 
are the prerogative of the organizations or foundations that run them. The university president is responsible 
to the operating educational legal body, which is either state run, or private run but state coordinated. The 
operation of state universities is controlled directly by Jakarta, with university presidents being responsible to 
the  Department  of  Education  only  via  the  Directorate  General  of  Higher  Education.  In  comparison,  the 
operation of Hindu state universities is controlled by the Hindu General Director, who is in turn responsible to 
the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Education. The Ministers are appointed by and responsible to the 
President, who is, since 2005 elected directly by the Indonesian citizenry. Subsidies can be applied for by the 
MONE, in case of faith-based institutions also by the MORA. In general, higher education is financed by four 
sources:  
 
1.  Budget, subsidies and grants allocated from the central or regional government  
2.  Foreign financed loans and grants  
3.  Research and enterprises of the University 
4.  Funds or donations allocated by stakeholders (community) 
 
The presidium of the private University is responsible to the executive board of the foundation that runs the 
respective educational unit and to the private higher education cooperatives (Kopertis, Koperasi Perguruan 
Tinggi Swasta) (as it is the case with UNHI and YD). The government requires that all private universities are 
administered  under  the  umbrella  of  regional  private  higher  education  cooperatives  (Kopertis,  Koperasi 
Perguruan  Tinggi  Swasta).  There  are  currently  twelve  such  Kopertis  in  Indonesia,  of  which  Kopertis  VIII 
comprises  the  province  Bali,  West  Nusa  Tenggara  (Lombok,  Sumbawa)  and  East  Nusa  Tenggara  (this  area 
consists of more than 500 islands, the main islands are Flores, Sumba, and West Timor).  
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In  consequence,  all  private  tertiary  institutions  are  run  by  a  private  contractor  that  is  an  operating 
organization/foundation. Also, all private universities are under supervision of the MONE via its regional private 
higher  education  cooperatives  (Kopertis,  Koperasi  Perguruan  Tinggi  Swasta).  Each  Kopertis  is  run  by  an 
implementation  secretariat  headed  by  a  coordinator,  who  is  an  established  administrator  from  a  state 
university run by MONE’s regional office. Whereas the coordinator is directly responsible to the Minister of 
Education, the secretariat is under the aegis of the Director General of Higher Education. The aim of this system 
is  to  ensure  that  private  universities  maintain  the  national  standard  of  education  set  by  the  central 
government
346.  
 
In  Bali  three  state -run  universities/institutes  (UNUD,  ISI,  IHDN)  are  located  and  around  40  private  run 
universities/institutes are under the guidance of  Kopertis VIII, as amongst others: Dwijendra University, UNHI, 
School  for  Applied  Pedagogy  and  Educational  Science  in  Amlapura  and  School  for  Applied  Pedagogy  and 
Educational Science in Singaraja
347.  
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347 (March 2009, http://www.pocesoft.com/perguruan%20tinggi/direktori%20pts/kopertis%20wilayah%208.html) PART D | 246 
6.3. The Hindu Class and Hindu Competences 
6.3.1. National Standard and Basic Competences of the Hindu class 
It would be best to impart ethics not by religious knowledge to be memorized but by observing older people 
who serve as role models. In the past, our parents conveyed merely a general orientation to us: as Hindus, we 
are advised to act in a good way towards fellow people, we shall not take what is not our due, and we shall 
never to hurt the feelings of fellow people. This broad outlook orientation was supplemented with the principle 
of karma phala. If we do wrong, we will suffer the same wrong in the future. Or in the context of the doctrine 
of tat twam asi, it is implied that if we hurt somebody else, we simply hurt ourselves. In other words, religious 
ethics would be taught at best by providing a practical model to be followed.  
(Prof Ida Bagus Yudha Triguna, Questionnaire)  
 
The competence-based curriculum (KBK) formulated the aim of the Hindu class at school so as to consolidate 
and increase sradha (iman, faith) and bhakti (ketakwaan, following the commands of God) in Ida Sang Hyang 
Widhi Wasa/Brahman (Hindu-Balinese, One Supreme Lordship
348) by nourishing Hindu doctrine in the students. 
As a result of this effort, the student shall develop into a dharmic Hi ndu who is able to realize the noble 
destination of Moksartham Jagadhita (release from the cycle of rebirth, physical wellbeing and bliss). 
 
The function of the Hindu class, as codified in the KBK, is to 
 
  implant the values of Hindu teachings as manual or device to attain release from the cycle of rebirth, 
welfare and bliss (Moksartham Jagadhita) 
  increase sradha (iman, faith) and bhakti (ketakwaan, devotion/following the commands of God) in Ida 
SangHyang WidhiWasa 
  teach religious doctrine in general, explain the system and function of religion 
  build a qualified mental and physical attitude in the students that enables them to continue schooling 
at the next level 
  prepare maturity and a sense of resistance in the student in the process of adapting to the global 
social and physical environment 
  adjust students’ misunderstandings and weaknesses in having faith, understanding, and practicing 
religious teachings in daily life.  
  shield the students from negative influences which are the result of encounters with the external 
world.  
 
The KBK and the KTSP for the Hindu religion class comprise eleven learning areas.The first three learning areas 
comprise the pillars of Indonesian Hindu Dharma as they have been outlined in the Upadeca. 
 
1.  creed(Tatwa (philosophy/metaphysics) and five creeds (Panca Sradha)  
2.  ethics (Susila)  
3.  ritual (Yadnya), and in addition  
4.  sacred scriptures (kitab suci)  
5.  sages and seers (orang suci),  
6.  sanctuaries and holy places (tempat suci)  
7.  religious holidays (hari suci)  
8.  governance and leadership (kepemimpinan) 
9.  nature
349 (alam semester)  
10.  culture (budaya) and  
11.  history of Hindu Dharma 
   
                                                 
348 As Hindu Dharma Indonesia should not be understood as a coherent belief system, but more as a collection of several Hindu inspired 
traditions, the ethnic groups adhering to Hindu Dharma Indonesia have varying names for their One Supreme Lordship. Indian Hindus in 
Medan revere Kali, whereas the Sikh community in Banten and Jakarta  
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Minister of Education Decree 23 in 2006 regulated the graduates’ competence standards in all learning areas; 
in this, the graduates’ competence standards for the Hindu class are also regulated in the Decree 23 Year 2006. 
At the level of basic education, six standard competences to be achieved are outlined in the religion and moral 
subject group. At the level of junior secondary education, seven competencies to be acquired are outlined, and 
at the level of senior high school, eight competences to be achieved are codified, which are to be continuously 
developed from one level of schooling to the next.  
 
The  six  competences  to  be  acquired  in  the  religion  class  of  all  state  funded  agama  at  the  level  of  basic 
education encompass: 
 
1.  practicing  the  teachings  of  the  embraced  faith  according  to  the  evolving  capacity  of  the 
child/adolescent.  
2.  showing an honest and fair attitude 
3.  recognizing  plurality  of  religions,  culture,  races,  ethnic  groups,  and  social-economic  classes  in  the 
social environment (life-world) 
4.  communicating  correctly  and  in  courteous  manner,  which  reflects  dignity  and  value  as  God’s 
creatures. 
5.  demonstrating a clean, hygienic, healthy, and safe lifestyle and to use leisure time  according the 
requirements of religion 
6.  showing love and care for fellow human beings and the environment as beings created by God. 
 
In consequence, following the legally prescribed competences to be acquired, the Hindu class shall nurture in 
following standard competences at the level of basic education: 
 
1.  having faith in the omnipotence of IdaSang Hyang Widhi Wasa (One Supreme Lordship) as sublime 
creator, the three forms of God (Tri Murti) as creation (Brahma), maintenance (Vishnu) and dissolution 
(Shiva), the three manifestations of God in nature
350 (Tri Purusa) and the four energies or powers of 
Shiva (Cadusakti)
351 
2.  comprehending Hindu doctrine of Panca Sradha (the five creeds) and Tri Sarira (three bodies) 
3.  understanding  Hindu  ethics  (susila)  which  comprises  following  areas:  Tri  Kaya  Parisudha  (proper 
thought, speech, and action), Tri Mala (threeignominies: negative emotions and thoughts, arrogance, 
and  harmful  behavior),  Catur  Paramita  (four  noble  attitudes:  softness,  compassion,  happiness, 
respect), Tri Parartha (three ends/objects that cause bliss, love, ownership, bhakti (devotion of the 
Divine)), Panca Bratha (five acts of self-control: not killing, not indulging in pre-marital sex, not lying, 
not arguing or buying-selling, arrogance, not taking others’ possession without their consent), Panca 
Nyama Brata, Catur Guru (the four teachers), Dasa Yama, dan Dasa Nyama Brata in daily life 
4.  showing the ability to proper Hindu worship attitudes (Tri Sandhya), and materials needed for worship 
5.  appling the five types of ritual (Panca Yadnya) as daily obligation (nitya karma) and occasional or 
puncturay obligation (naimitika karma)  
6.  understanding that the Vedas are the sacred scripture and revelation of Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa 
(One Supreme Lordship) 
7.  understanding about Hindu sainthood and the tasks and duties of saints 
8.  comprehending the religious feasts, and the basics of the Hindu calendar (wariga) in order to appoint 
the proper days at which those feast are to be held 
9.  understanding good leadership, which shall serve as role model in the respective region 
10.  comprehending the macro cosmos (bhuwana agung) and micro cosmos (bhuana alit) 
11.  knowing religious dances, devotional chants and prayer (yadnya) and the history of Hinduism prior to 
and after Independence 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
350 These three manifestations may refer either to the Tridewi (dewi Uma, Dewi Sri, and Dewi Saraswati) or to the three emanations of One 
Supreme Lordship as manifested in Siwa or Iswara, Sadasiwa and Paramasiwa.  
351 The second emanation of One Supreme Lordship, Sadashiva sits on a padmasana (lotus throne, also symbolized in the Balinese shrine). 
This padmasana is said to be his four sakti (energy/power): wibhusakti (energy to be everywhere), prabhusakti (the power to control), 
jnanasakti (the power to know), and kriyasakti (the power to create or do).  PART D | 248 
The seven general competences to be acquired in the religion class of all state funded agama at the junior 
secondary school level encompass: 
 
1.  regularly practicing the teachings of the embraced faith according to the evolving capacity of the 
adolescent 
2.  applying the values of honesty and fairness 
3.  understanding the plurality of religions, culture, races, ethnic groups, and social-economic classes (life-
world) 
4.  communicating and interacting effectively and in a courteous manner thereby reflecting the dignity 
and value of humans as God’s creatures 
5.  applying a hygienic, healthy, and safe lifestyle, using leisure time according to the requirements of 
religion 
6.  using the environment responsibly as the nature which has been created by God 
7.  respect differences of opinion in the practice of religious teachings 
 
The standard competences to be nurtured in Hindu religious instruction at the junior high level are then: 
 
1.  having faith in the omnipotence of  Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa (One Supreme Lordship) as  Asta 
Aiswarya, Awatara, Dewa, and Bhattara 
2.  understanding the doctrine of sad ripu, sad atatayi, sapta timira as negative aspects of each individual 
personality which have to be overcome 
3.  understanding the background and meaning of rituals (yadnya)  
4.  comprehending the Vedas as sacred Hindu scriptures and the sages (resi) as their receiver 
5.  understanding the condition of Hindu sainthood  
6.  comprehending the religious feasts and their meaning  
7.  understanding Hindu leadership and governance doctrines  
8.  comprehending the relations between macro cosmos (bhuwana agung) and micro cosmos (bhuana 
alit) 
9.  knowing  the  Dharma  Gita,  the  history  of  the  advent  of  Hinduism  to  Indonesia,  and  the  Hindu 
kingdoms in the Archipelago 
 
The eight general competences to be acquired in the religion class of all state funded agama at the senior high 
school level encompass: 
 
1.  behaving proportional to the rules of the embraced faith in accordance with the evolving capacity of 
the adolescent 
2.  respecting the plurality of religions, nations, races, ethnic groups, social-economic classes, and culture 
in a global dimension 
3.  taking part in upholding social rules  
4.  understanding individual and collective rights and obligations in society 
5.  respecting differences of opinion and being empathic towards other people 
6.  communicating and interacting effectively and in a courteous manner using various media including 
information technology, which is based on the dignity and value as God’s creatures 
7.  taking care of purity, hygiene, the body’s immune system and health following the requirements of 
religion 
8.  using the environment responsibly as the nature which has been created by God 
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The standard competences to be nurtured in Hindu religious instruction at the senior high level encompass: 
 
1.  understanding atman (individual soul) as the fountainhead of life, karma (actions that cause cycle of 
cause and effect and in this rebirth) and purnabhawa (reincarnation law), and the doctrine of mokhsa 
(spiritual release) as superior goal 
2.  understanding  the  virtues  of  Triguna  (In  Indonesian  samkhya  philosophy,  there  are  three  major 
qualities that serve as the fundamental operating principles of nature(prakriti)) Dasa Mala (ten sins), 
the tat twam asi doctrine, Catur varna(classification of Hindu society into four groups), Catur Asrama 
(four stages of life), and Catur Purusharta (four aims of human existence) 
3.  comprehending  the  worship  systematic,  performance  of  offerings,  rituals  (yadnya)  and  marriage 
(wiwaha) according to Hindu law  
4.  understanding the central themes contained in the Vedas (sruti and smriti) as source of Hindu law 
5.  comprehending the structure, reality, and conservation of Hindu sanctuaries’ purity 
6.  understanding the calculation of Hindu holy days  
7.  comprehending Hindu leadership and governance doctrines according to niti sastra 
8.  understanding the process of creation and disintegration of nature  
9.  comprehending the values of the Dharma Gita culture, sacral Hindu arts and the history of Hinduism in 
India, and other countries 
 
The Minster of Education Decree 19 in 2007 on the operational standard of basic and secondary schooling 
places a school under the obligation to phrase an ethical code or a school ethos for its community, which then 
shall be nurtured in the students. In  consequence, in order to raise their respective communities’ ethical 
awareness, schools need to formulate a clear program, which is applied by the principals. It is regulated in the 
Decree that the first norm of the school ethos shall be to practice the agama the student embraces.  
6.3.2. The Hindu class 
After having outlined the standard competences to be acquired according to Indonesian educational policies, 
here I summarize the perspectives on the Hindu class held amongst the participants in my study. Since religion 
permeates every dimension of life, religion or the religion class cannot be separated from other social areas or 
from the educational sector and it is carried out by families, communities, and schools. Religious education is 
seen as an enterprise beginning at birth and ending in the funeral pile, in consequence, religious learning takes 
place throughout the entire life cycle. For the reason that the Hindu class moulds identity aspects as a type of 
social learning, all participants in my study agreed that Hindu educationshould begin with pre-school age and 
the religion class should be taught until university. The practical effect is to increase religious knowledge and 
competence with the hope that the students will be acquainted with the basic principles of Hindu religion and 
can put those principles to practice in daily life. 
 
At preschool age and in the lower grades, religious education should be entertaining, serve as role-model for 
proper conduct, tell folk stories, legends and tales, and teach how to chant religious songs (Dharmagita) that 
include religious values. (Suryani Protocol 2006, Sura Interview 2006, Triguna Protocol 2007) The focus is laid 
on oral religious-folk narratives and religious songs, in which holy men serve as role models for heroism, self-
sacrifice and justice (Mahabharata, Ramayana, Balinese legends and tales), and their values are then absorbed 
in the personality of the pupil who puts to practice these values in daily life, without being aware of it.  
 
The concept of four educators (catur guru) introduces the parents (guru rupaka), the school (guru pengajian), 
the government (guru wisesa), and One Supreme Lordship (guru swadaya) as primary sources of learning. 
(Bakker 1993: 135-136; Hinzeler 1993) The path of education in religion can be formal (religion class in school), 
non-formal (pasraman), and informal (family, community). Hindu education should be attained not only in-
school but it should also be organized in non-formal express-Sunday schools (pasraman kilat) and informally, 
that is community based, intraditional neighborhood units (banjars) and in temples (pura). This reflects the 
Hindu concept of contextual learning and individual spiritual progress throughout life. Hindu education may be 
carried out in dyads, small groups, classes, large groups, online education, print and broadcasting media. One 
participant to the questionnaire writes, children which attend the Hindu class in school are more ethical and 
have a much more clear set boundaries in social interactions, in other words their morals are way higher than 
children that do not attend the Hindu religion class.  
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The main function of religion in the Hindu class is seen by the participants to my study in following aspects:  
 
  The religion class shall produce a suputra (good child) who knows how to practice Hindu Dharma, can 
put to practice Hindu values, and is able to lead the community 
  The religion class provides knowledge about the Hindu style and way of life 
  The religion class may be used as a torch to illuminate the obscure paths   
  Compared  with  nonreligious  people,  agamais  more  convincing  as  motivational  force  to  perform 
beneficial deeds, and as a resistive force to cope with ailments  
  The religion class in the ideal case transfers emotional tranquility and liberates people from distrust 
and protracted fear 
 
The religion class supports parents and the religious community to put to practice the Hindu value theory in 
regularly performing religious service A fundamental introduction to Hindu Dharma Indonesia is given in the 
religion class, with the aim to strengthen the students’ Hindu identity and Hindu knowledge. The students shall 
comprehend  the  sacred  scriptures  and  traditions  in  accordance  with  their  evolving  cognitive,  emotional, 
affective  and  spiritual  capacities.  In  consequence,  the  aim  of  the  religion  class  is  to  introduce  the  basic 
principles of Hinduism as laid down in the Upadeca and with this the students can gradually identify with the 
overarching values promoted by Hindu Dharma Indonesia while simultaneously adhering to and practicing their 
local cults. In school, the religion class applies teaching methods that fit with the evolving learning capabilities 
and the development of the child. The national standard of education and the statutory basic competences are 
the direction and base to develop further the subject content, the learning activities and the competence 
attainment indicators. In consequence, it is seen as a major achievement that assessment of the competencies 
acquired in the Hindu class is now unitary for all Hindu ethnicities in the Indonesian archipelago. 
 
Logically, the Hindu class shall mould attitudes based on Hindu Dharma values and spirituality. In addition, the 
concept of suputra (good child or noble descendant) is the central aim of all streams of Hindu education 
whether within the core family, the community, or at school. In other words, the function of the Hindu class is 
to  guide  the  students  in  becoming  descendants  of  noble  morals/character,  proper  conduct,  and  striking 
aptitude, who illuminate their families and communities (suputra sadhu gunawan mamadangi kula wandhu 
wandhawa). In this context, it is of importance to recognize the main objective of marriage in Hindu and in 
Balinese  society in order to  understand the importance  of the suputra conception.  There is an important 
limitation to the concept though, as it is a concept which is common in the cultural Hindu Javanese-Balinese 
context, but I do not know how far it is valid for other Hindu ethnics. But, as far as I know, ancestor veneration 
is of central importance in all Indonesian Hindu Dharma communities. As the participants in my study have all 
been Balinese, the concept of suputra has been uniformly referred to, but this concept might be formulated 
with great variation in other Hindu Dharma ethnicities – however, these variations are absorbed in the local 
content curriculum.  
 
The main objective of marriage in Hindu Balinese society is to produce moral descendants who understand 
their individual and collective Hindu Dharma obligations in order to secure the continuation of the family 
lineage. Oversimplified, as in all social groups who practice ancestor worship and veneration, the descendants 
have the obligation to help the departed crossing over from our material world otherworld (neraka-preta) to 
the divine sphere (surga, pitr). Only a suputra may save his (or her) ancestors from sticking in hell, and only a 
suputra may become an august leader in his community. The reverse is the kuputra, who, as a single rotten 
fruit in a basket full with fruits, blights the entire basket. (Donder 2004) 
 
Today, many Hindu experts attest that the community in general, and the parents in particular, have a limited 
capacity and insufficient ability to properly nurture Hindu Dharma values and competencies in the children. 
(Suryani  Protocaol  2006,  Triguna  Protocol  2007,  observation  at  workshops)  The  reasons  for  this  are 
modernization and inclusion into nation state policieswhich press the aim to understand religion on the Hindu 
communities  which  have  been  traditionally  orthoprax  instead  of  orthodox.  The  politization  of  religion  in 
Indonesia, however, triggered the orthodoxation or scriptualization (Howell 2003) of Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
to such an extent that the newly conceptualized religion is compiled in curricula and taught in schools. (Geertz 
1973; Howell 1978, 2003; Sura Interview 2006) Many parents understand the rituals they have to perform, but 
they are unabale to explain the deeper meaning of those rituals. (Personal experience as a researcher doing 
more than ten years research in Bali) usually they say mulo keto (as it has always been), but the nation state 
presses the need on the religious community and the students alike to legitimize and understand the traditions 
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In this light, the fundamental introduction to Hindu Dharma Indonesia provided by the religion class shall 
strengthen and adjust the education in Hindu Dharma Indonesia and praxis given in families and community. 
The function of the religion class is to assist parents in nurturing religion into their offspring, since not all 
parents  are  able  to  explain  religion  to  their  children  sufficiently.  The  net  effect  is  that  the  religion  class 
gradually plants religious competences in the next generations. (Sura Interview 2006) Another value of the 
religion class is seen in its function as controlling and motivational device for life, a manual for life is provided, 
which has practical consequences for daily life. The religion class assists the young generation in understanding 
the content and teachings of religion in a structured and integrated way, thereby pupils learn to critically 
interpret, explain and transform the values of religion, since they do not obtain holistic guidance in their family 
and community. (Suryani interview 2006, Sura Interview 2007) The participants in my study outlined three 
practical effects of the religion class in public schooling:  
 
  The  Hindu  class  in  schools  is  easy  to  monitor  and  to  supervise  by  state  authorities,  because  the 
curriculum sets the national standard of competence to be achieved. Otherwise it would be difficult to 
control whether the content of teachings outside of schools, especially in the community, is adequate 
or not adequate.  
  A broad difference exists between the conduct of religious and not religious pupils. The attitude, 
morals, and logical reasoning of pupils well informed of their religion is more comforting. 
 
In sum,as juvenile delinquency is not only criticized by Hindu clerics (Interview Ida Pedanda Telabah 2006, 
Interview Ida Pedanda Bajing 2006) and Hindu educators (Interview I Gede Sura 2006, Donder 2004) but by all 
Indonesian  education  planners  (see  all  development  plans),  the  Hindu  class  shall  not  only  provide  Hindu 
knowledge, but also a model or manual for proper behavior. In consequence, the Hindu class shall nurture in 
Hindu  creed  from  early  childhood  aiming  to  standardize  the  students’  conduct.  During  class  and  in  the 
curricula, instances of good character, morals, and personality are adduced which aim to strengthen students’ 
moral, ethical, and spiritual qualities. In consequence, Hindu education aims to nurture in Hindu competencies, 
as information on Hindu Dharma, knowledge about Hindu Dharma, Hindu behavior, and practical skills which 
are used by the participants to classify and control their experiences in daily life. Thereby, Hindu education 
shall provide the students with a “manual for behavior” (Triguna protocol 2007) helping them to put their 
Hindu competencies to practice. In brief, Hindu religious education is necessary to balance secular education in 
adding spiritual knowledge and competence on the rational content of curricula, therefore it serves to support 
the gradual germination and growth of student’s spiritual intelligence, which enables them to cope with their 
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6.3.3. Hindu teachers 
According to Minister of Education Decree 16 in 2007, the special competence a Hindu religion teacher must 
possess is the ability to interpret and analyze the curriculum, resources, structures, concepts, and patterns of 
scientific thought which have relevance for the Hindu class. With regard to Hindu educators, the participants to 
my study assessed five main points of concern:  
 
1.  low quality of teachers 
2.  economic welfare of teachers 
3.  status discrimination of Hindu teachers  
4.  the problems of appointment outside Bali 
5.  dearth of Hindu teachers in Bali and Indonesia (see Hindu Directorate General) 
 
In its effort to raise the teachers’ quality and economic welfare in 2005, the Indonesian government launched a 
stunning teachers’ certification program in order to certify the 2, 7 million state and private school teachers in 
service  until  2015.  The  national  education  standard  has  set  the  standard  for  those  mandatory  teachers’ 
qualifications, which in turn shall better their economic welfare. The teacher certification program is part of a 
national  educator  certification  system  that  aims  to  improve  teachers’  and  lecturers’  professionalism  and 
welfare, and it is one of the most important regulations in the arena of education.  
 
The certification program is promulgated by Law 14 in 2005 on teachers and lecturers, which requires teachers 
and lecturers to possess professional certificates. At the level of basic education and secondary education, the 
minimal qualification for pre-school nurses and teachers is graduation from undergraduate studies, in other 
words, to hold a four-year associate degree (Diploma-IV) or a Bachelor degree (Sarjana1) from an accredited 
higher education institution. The required qualification for lecturers at higher education institutions has been 
raised, it is now mandatory for lecturers to hold a postgraduate degree as a Master Degree or a PhD. Educators 
employed at Diploma-programs are required to be awarded a four-year associate degree (Diploma-IV) or a 
Bachelor degree (Sarjana 1) at minimum. Educators employed at the Bachelor program (Sarjana 1) are required 
to be granted a magister-degree (Sarjana 2) at minimum, whereas a doctorate (Sarjana 3) is the obligatory 
requirement for educators employed at the master- and doctorate- programs.  
 
The teacher certification program - and the salaries and grants in turn - are restricted to those teachers who 
already hold four-year associate degrees (D4), Bachelor, Master or Phd degrees. Educators considered fulfilling 
the competence standards by their principals and supervisors are entitled to certificates, professional salaries 
and  grants.  Since  the  principal  and  the  supervisor  conduct  the  assessment,  this  process  is  not  free  from 
personal interests, relation and social networks. Qualified junior teachers are promoted to take part in the 
teacher certification program that lasts two semesters; senior teachers are required to take part in teacher 
certification  through  portfolio  assessment.  Educators  who  are  not  considered  to  fulfill  the  competence 
standard are given time to complete their portfolios by their  principals, and/or the opportunity to attend 
training  courses  and  to  take  a  competence  exam.  Since  most  of  the  teachers  have  lower  educational 
backgrounds,  they  have  to  attain  the  teacher  qualification  program,  which  then  requires  them  to  pursue 
undergraduate studies.  
 
In this context, educators in the religion and morals subject group are explicitly mentioned; they are required 
to  hold  the  same  minimum  qualification  and  certification  as  all  other  educators.  Though,  the  Minister  of 
Religion may give additional criteria, which leaves loopholes for practices ranging outside the standards that 
could  threaten  the  national  quality  standard  of  education.  With  regard  to  Hindu  instructors,  the  Hindu 
Directorate  General  is  authorized  to  issue  the  final  certificate  and  it  provided  600  scholarships  for  Hindu 
teachers  in  2007  and  1,000  scholarships  for  Hindu  teachers  in  2007  to  complete  undergraduate  or 
postgraduate studies.  
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In this context, it is interesting to note that the Dwijendra University offers a Hindu-based special didactic 
program for teachers (Akta Mengajar IV), and UNHI and IHDN were appointed by the Minister of Education as 
in-service  teacher  certification  institutions.  In  addition  to  the  direct  certification  programs,  the  Hindu 
Directorate General started a long-distance certification program, which is not explicitly covered by Law 20 in 
2003 on Education. But considering the demography and geographic distribution of the Hindu ethnic groups in 
Indonesia, the scope of the long-distance program shall answer the special needs of the Hindu community. 
Therefore UNHI and IHDN offer special didactic programs for the training of Hindu teachers in order to assess 
the quality and certify the in-service Hindu teachers and lecturers at all levels in all Indonesian provinces. 
Consequently, all Hindu teachers in Indonesia are certified by either UNHI or IHDN in their statutory function as 
in-service religion educator certification centers. Either the educators attain the direct education programs at 
the respective institutions or they attain the far-distance learning courses and open lecturers (kuliah terbuka) 
which are offered by both institutions at special learning centers to those regions, where teachers cannot 
attain the regular weekend courses in town.  
 
With  relevance  to  the  status  discrimination  and  economic  welfare  of  Hindu  teachers,  the  current  study 
assesses a complex picture. As a result of the administrational multi-system, the civil employment status of 
teachers  in  general  and  Hindu  teachers  in  particular  is  complicated  in  Indonesia.  There  are  six  different 
categories depending on an educators’ appointment and on who pays the salary. The Hindu teachers paid and 
appointed by the MONE to be employed at public or private schools belong to the first category. Generally, the 
civil servant number (NIP, nomor induk pegawai) of those teachers starts with 13
352. Those teachers enjoy the 
securest position, they are assigned a fixed number of courses, they receive a fixed salary, they are entitled to 
regular raises of salary and subsidies, they can become class teachers and finally their civil rank can rise in 
hierarchy as they may be promoted as principal or as supervisor of other teachers in the certification programs. 
The second category of Hindu teachers is paid and appointed by the MORA to be employed at state or private 
schools. The civil servant number (NIP,  nomor induk pegawai) of those MORA appointed teachers starts with 
15. They enjoy a less favorable position, as they cannot become class teachers, they cannot be promoted as 
principals, they cannot act as supervisors to other teachers, their salaries are paid by honorarium, and they do 
not receive subsidies. The third category of teachers refers to those teachers who are permanently appointed 
and  paid  by  the  respective  private  school  foundation.  The  next  two  types  are  non-permanent  teachers 
contracted and paid by either the central or the regional government. The last type is the non-permanently 
employed teacher, appointed and paid by the public or private school. (Kartika Interview 2007, interviews 
during workshops) 
 
In addition to quality and welfare problems, Indonesia’s geography of widely distributed, mountainous islands 
causes staffing problems. Apt young teachers who have attended teacher-education institutions in cities are 
often unwilling to take teaching jobs in remote areas, particularly if the customs and language of the area differ 
from their own. (Sudijarto/ Thomas 1980: 50) This is particularly true for Hindu teachers and lecturers. Ethnic 
differences among Indonesian Hindus cause problems for the training and placement of religion teachers in 
Indonesia. (Own fieldwork 2009-2010 in Bali and Palangkaraya) Teachers from Bali might be uncomfortable or 
unwelcomed, if assigned to a school outside Bali. Or the Hindu community they are assigned to may not accept 
the teacher. In addition, in most cases the social environment changes to be majority Muslim and this may 
impose serious conflicts within the teacher and with his or her environment.   
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6.3.4. Hindu higher education and tertiary Curriculum 
The number of Hindu institutions of higher education is insignificant in comparison with the Islamic education 
sector, there are eleven institutions at all of which four institutions are public facilities under the supervision of 
the MORA  
 
1.  State Hindu Dharma Institute (Institut Hindu Dharma Negeri) in Denpasar 
2.  Pedagogical Faculty, Manado State University in North Sulawesi, which operates a Hindu pedagogy 
undergraduate study program 
3.  State Hindu Dharma School for Applied Science (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri) Gede Puja in 
Mataram, Lombok  
4.  State  Hindu  Dharma  Schools  for  Applied  Science  Tampung  Penyang  in  Palangka  Raya,  Central 
Kalimantan  
 
Whereas the remaining private Hindu institutions are operated jointly by regional private higher education 
cooperatives (Kopertis, Koperasi Perguruan Tinggi Swasta) and are under supervision by the MONE and the 
Hindu Directorate  
 
1.  Universitas Hindu Indoensia (UNHI),  
2.  Universitas Dwijendra,  
3.  Hindu Dharma School for Applied Science in Klaten, Central Java,  
4.  Agama Hindu School for Applied Science Dharma Nusantara in Jakarta 
5.  Agama Hindu School for Applied Science in Lampung, Lampung 
6.  School for Applied Pedagogy and Educational Science in Amlapura, Bali  
7.  School for Applied Pedagogy and Educational Science in Singaraja, Bali.  
 
In 2008, I was not able to collect comparative data for all Hindu higher education institutions, since the data set 
was still being compiled by the Hindu Directorate.  
 
The tertiary curriculum is structured into intracurricular and extracurricular activities. Intracurricular activities 
are structured, programmed, and compulsory:  
 
1.  Lectures  
2.  Group meetings (seminar, group discussion, review discussion, students’ engagement is furthered) 
3.  Supervision of the final work (mini-thesis, thesis, and dissertation), practical or lab work 
4.  Individual tasks (review, report, observation, test etc.; the students utilizes his or her scientific skills 
and the docents serves as advisor) 
5.  Autonomous or autodidact learning 
 
In contrast, extracurricular activities are unstructured, not programmed, and compulsory. These activities can 
be followed in or outside the campus. To extracurricular activities belong:  
 
(1)  Advancement  of  reasoning/intellectual  capacity  and  science  (targets  scientific  quality,  scientific 
attitude, and broadens scientific insight, introduces academic norms, values, ethics and tradition. In 
short, it comprises all activities aimed at imparting good scientific practice). These activities include: 
(a) academic forum/academic meeting of the students, 
(b) competition of students’ academic works 
(c) training in students’ managerial capabilities 
(d) organizational activities between campuses 
(2)  Advancement  of  students’  interests:  students’  sports,  students’  art,  students’  scouts,  students’ 
regiment, students’ campus magazine, nature conservation, Indonesian Red Cross voluntary corps;  
(3)  Production of students’ welfare (strengthening faith (beriman) and following the commands of God 
(bertakwa), subsidizing economically weak but intellectual outstanding students):  
(a) students’ spirituality 
(b) scholarships 
(c) students’ cooperation (selling food, material, photo copies etc.) 
(d) students’ boardinghouse 
(e) guidance and counseling 
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The curriculum is divided into the national obligatory core curriculum (kurrikulum inti) and the institutional 
curriculum (kurrikulum institutional). The core curriculum is standardized for the whole Archipelago, since it 
follows the national education standard set by the MONE. It contains the educational aim, the content of 
academic teaching, and the minimal competencies each student needs to acquire in order to graduate in his or 
her  study  program.  Guided  by  the  national  standard  of competencies,  link-and-match  considerations,  and 
development objectives, tertiary education is operated by each tertiary facility applying the core curriculum 
according to the aims of the study program outlined in the course syllabus (SAP, satuan acuan pembelajaran). 
The core curriculum of undergraduate studies comprises a studium generale in  
 
1.  religious education  
2.  civics,  
3.  language (Indonesian and English) 
 
The institutional curriculum on the other hand, is compiled entirely by the course lecturers at the respective 
institute  and  communicates  regionally  specific  knowledge  and  skills.  Therefore  on  the  tertiary  sector  “the 
asymmetric  relation  pertaining  to  quality  between  state  and  private  institutions  moves  now  away  from  a 
competitive pattern, in which the private institutes were considered below state institutes, to a pattern of 
cooperation and partnership as all use the national education standard as reference standard”
353. Applying 
UNESCO’s  four  pillars  of  education,  the  tertiary  curriculum  has  been  grouped  into  five  learning  areas  or 
components by the Minister of Education Act 23/U/2000.  
 
1.  Personality development subject group (MPK, mata kuliah pengembangan kepribadian) 
2.  Knowledge and skills subject group (MKK, mata kuliah keilmuan dan ketrampilan) 
3.  Professional work subject group (MKB, mata kuliah berkarya) 
4.  Work attitude subject group (MPB, mata kuliah prilaku berkarya) 
5.  Social coexistence subject group (MBB, mata kuliah berkehidupan bermasyarkat) 
 
The personality development subject group (MPK, mata kuliah pengembangan kepribadian) aims to develop 
the  Indonesian  human  who  has  faith  in  One  Supreme  Lordship  (beriman),  follows  the  commands  of  God 
(takwa), has high morals (akhlak mulia), a steady personality, is independent and responsible for society and 
nation. The contents and courses comprised under the second and the third learning area shall transfer basic 
knowledge and skills, as analytical and synthetic skills, mastering of modern technologies, management, and 
communication skills. In detail, the second area of the knowledge and skills subject group (MKK, mata kuliah 
keilmuan  dan  ketrampilan)  enables  the  student  to  learn  how  to  learn  and  to  master  the  basic  special 
knowledge and skills of the study program. The contents and courses comprised in the third learning arena, the 
professional  work  subject  group  (MKB,  mata  kuliah  berkarya),  aim  to  produce  professional  and  skilled 
graduates who have developed occupational/vocational and technical skills and can apply them in practice. 
Based on the learned special knowledge and skills of the study program, the professional work subject group 
shall enable the student to learn to do. The forth arena then targets the attitude-building in work and transfer 
basic skills in leadership, teamwork and cross-cultural work. In consequence, the fourth learning area, the work 
attitude subject group (MPB, mata kuliah prilaku berkarya) provides contents and courses which shall build 
attitudes and work habits of the graduates corresponding to the achieved knowledge and skills in the study 
program. Finally, the fifth learning area offers courses that nurture competencies that are related to the labor 
market, as work ethos, understanding globalization processes and flexibility in applying for work. The social 
coexistence subject group, (MBB, mata kuliah berkehidupan bermasyarkat), enables the student to learn to live 
together, as the patterns of living together in the specific working environment according to the study program 
are trained. In the postgraduate programs curriculum courses again are grouped into leaning arenas. 
 
In  the  context  of  Hindu  education,  the  Hindu  Directorate  General  is  responsible  for  the  facilitation  and 
supervision of the religion class in public and private schooling, in private or public undergraduate studies
354 
and in faith-based education. Again, the Hindu Directorate General is responsible for the  core curricula of the 
Hindu-based  tertiary  institutions,  whereas  the  institutional  curriculum  is  compiled  by  the  institution  in 
question.  
                                                 
353 Prof Dr Baharuddin AB, Coordinator of Kopertis Region VIII, October 10, 2007 at the graduation ceremony of UNHI at the Grand Inna 
Beach Hotel, Sanur. 
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From 2006 to 2007, the Hindu Directorate General appointed in-service lecturers and docents from all eleven 
Hindu tertiary institutions to attain four organized three-day conferences in which the syllabi for the tertiary 
Hindu  institutions  were  less  or  more  enthusiastically  compiled  (personal  observation  at  three  of  those 
conferences). In my analysis, especially for Hindus, this national standard of the religion class and the tertiary 
curricula for Hindu institutions is revolutionary. But it appears that some of the educators involved are less 
impressed by the historical weight of their activity; rather they regard it as necessary duty. However, I did 
observe that non-Balinese Hindu were keen to develop a national standard of education in order to facilitate a 
syllabus which also comprises the specific particularities of their traditions.  
 
Minister of Education Act 44 in 2006 on the pattern of compiling the Hindu tertiary education curriculum 
governed  that  the  curriculum  is  divided  into  an  institutional  and  a  core  curriculum  of  which  the  latter  is 
compiled based on the graduates’ minimal competence standard by the Hindu Director General. Considering 
that the graduates of all Hindu tertiary institutes shall have an equal minimal graduate’s standard, the Hindu 
Director  General’s  regulation  DJ.V/137/SK/2007  dated  31
st  August  2007  endorsed  such  a  standard  core 
curriculum  structure  for  all  (currently  eleven  private  and  public)  Hindu  tertiary  institutes  under  the 
Directorate’s  Guidance.  The  core  curriculum  is  nationally  in  effect  for  all  undergraduate  studies,  and  the 
respective institutions had to adjust and reform their curriculum according to the national core curriculum. The 
curriculum structured the Hindu tertiary education system into three faculties according to their specialization: 
Dharma Acharya (education), Dharma Duta (social and cultural) and Brahma Widya (theology). To illustrate an 
example,  the  national  Hindu  core  Dharma  Acharya  curriculum  for  the  bachelor  study  program  in  Hindu 
pedagogies is represented in table 22: 
 
Nr  Learning arena 
(subject areas) 
Main competence 
(Core Curriculum) 
SKS 
1  MPK  
(personality development subject group) 
1  Civics  3 
  2  Pancasila instruction  3 
  3  Basic principles of Agama Hindu   3 
      Total  9 
2  MKK  
(knowledge and skills subject group) 
1  Classroom management  3 
  2  Educational psychology  4 
  3  Education management  2 
  4  Teaching strategies (didactics)  4 
  5  Educational assessment (examination)  3 
  6  Media and Resources  2 
  7  Educational statistics  2 
  8  Comparing religious studies  2 
  9  Education administration and supervision  2 
  10  Research methods  2 
  11  Curriculum development program   4 
      Total  30 
3  MKB  
(professional work subject group) 
1  Vedas  3 
  2  Darsana (Hindu-Philosophy)  2 
  3  Acara Agama Hindu (Ritual)  3 
  4  Bahasa Kawi (Old Javanase)  2 
  5  Sanskrit   2 
  6  Hindu governance and leadership  3 
  7  Yoga  2 
  8  Tata susila (value system and ethics)  4 
  9  Ithiasa (Hindu epic poetry)  2 
  10  Hindu sociology  2 
  11  Purana (religious texts)  2 
      Total  27 
4  MPB (work attitude subject group)  1  Teaching practice (one semester)  4 
  2  Guidance and counseling   2 
  3  Thesis  6 
  4  Dharma Gita (Chanting and religious songs)  2 
      Total  20 
5  MBB (Social coexistence subject group)  1  Principles of social and cultural science  3 
    2  Principles of natural science  3 
    3  Work practice (Praktek kerja lapangan)  2 
    4  Public service (KKN)  2 
      Total  10 
      TOTAL  90 
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6.4. Dwijendra Foundation - Centre 
May Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa and the ancestors who have attained Amoring Acintya
355 always provide the 
path and strength to realize the vision and mission of the founders of Yayasan Dwijendra 
Ida Bagus Gede Wiyana
356 
6.4.1. History 
From the 1920s up to the 1950s, Balinese originating from distinct educational and social backgrounds were 
engaged  in  manifold  socio-religious  reform  organizations.  (cf  Bakker  1993:  39-44)  “Their  emphasis  on 
education  is  striking.  They  obviously  had  the  idea  that  in  traditional  Balinese  society  there  was  too  little 
information  about  religion.”  (Bakker  1993:  44)  In  1952,  some  of  those  reformers  decided  to  establish  a 
foundation that actively participated in societies’ education. According to Government Regulation No 21/1950, 
the islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, West-Timor and Sumba were included into the province Sunda 
Kecil (Lesser Sunda Islands). The capital was Singaraja in North Bali
357. Thus, in 1952 the Balinese kingdoms 
were still in power (swapraja), as the young republic struggled to maintain full legal and political dominance 
over the archipelago. In consequence, the reformers, who planned to establish a foundation engaged in Hindu 
religion education efforts, appealed to the kings of Bali and Lombok for financial support and a labor force. 
During a joint assembly with the founders, the Kings’ Council as guardian of Balinese religion, practices, and 
rituals assented on supporting the founders’  efforts to increase formal  education in religion and thus the 
religious literacy of their society and agreed upon the establishment of the school. In order to honor the 
“founder” of Agama Tirtha and progenitor of the Brahmana-wangsa, Dang Hyang Dwijendra, the foundation 
was named Dwijendra. The naming shall recollect his spirit of defending, unifying and revitalizing Hinduism in 
Bali  after  Empu  Kuturan  (Wiyana  Interview  2010).  “Dang  Hyang  Dwijendra  is  not  only  important  for  the 
Brahmanwangsa but for all Balinese. He is enshrined in numerous temples and may be compared to a prophet 
(nabi).” (Wiyana Interview 2010) 
 
First  they  allocated  the  land  on  which  the  school  building  should  be  erected.  Until  today,  the  land  is 
government  property.  (Wiyana  Interview  2007)  Second,  every  day  the  labor  force  of  another  Banjar  was 
provided.  But  also  the  parents  and  the  founders  helped  in  the  construction process.  Third,  the  regent  of 
Kesiman and the king of Karangasem donated “contributions”
358 (Yayasan 2003: 30) and timber, while the kings 
of Klungkung and Bangli aided with Bamboo. Keys and nails were donated by local shop houses. Thus, the 
school was built by the Balinese community. (Wiyana Interview 2010) As the foundation’s building has been 
erected  “with  bare  hands  on  the  ethics  of  Hindu  lore  within  an  unceasing  climate  of  support  in  society” 
(Yayasan 2003: 31), I suspect that as the document and my interviews exemplify, the founders imagined the 
foundation to belong to the “whole of Balinese society” (Wiyana Interview 2010), not only to an exclusive 
group, because society supported the construction of the buildings with human labor force, materials, and 
land. As even the kings made contributions, I suspect that since its establishment, the foundation is considered 
to incorporate a spiritual quality in disseminating Hindu teachings. Rightly, it had the image of a “sekolah 
pemangku”,  a  lay  priest  school  until  recent  years.  (Wiyana  Interview  2010)  Informal  discussions  with  the 
Balinese community tend to confirm the image as a foundation which is held in high esteem.  
 
The “Hindu nuanced” (Wiyana Interview 2010) Dwijendra Foundation and the public Saraswati School were 
built adjacently and at the same time. The Dwijendra Foundation is considered to be the “embryo” of all Hindu 
institutions  in  Indonesia.  All  other  Hindu  institutions  used  the  Dwijendra  building  for  their  meetings, 
assemblies, and for educational activities. As the process of modernization, to wit, institutionalization and 
systematization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia had its seeds with its establishment, the Dwijendra foundation 
should be regarded as the embryo of all Balinese and thus Indonesian Hindu institutions, as the Hindu Council, 
Indonesian Hindu University and the State Hindu Dharma Institute. (Wiyana Interview 2010) In addition, many 
of the contemporary educated elites that work at the MORA, the local Office of Religious Affairs, UNHI or IHDN, 
who are forming the future course of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system, went to school at 
Dwijendra. (Wiyana Interview 2010) 
   
                                                 
355 Amoring Acintya means moksa, or release from the cycle of rebirth 
356 Chairman of Dwijendra Foundation, Opening address January 2009, (http://sma.dwijendra.com/) 
357 With Law 64/1958 the Lesser Sunda Islands Province was split into three provinces: Bali, West Nusa Tenggara Barat, and East N usa 
Tenggara. According to the Minister of Home Affairs Instruction 52/2/36-136 Year 1960, the municipality of Bali moved from Singaraja to 
Denpasar in the South. 
358 The text uses seseh here. Seseh is a material or monetary contribution to the service of a priest. The foundation was thus understood to 
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Founded  on  January  28,  1953,  the  foundation  was  legally  established  on  July  7
th,  1953  in  Denpasar.  The 
following founders signed the foundation charter (Yayasan 2003: 29-31, 54, 80): 
 
  Ida Bagus Wayan Gede (Head of the Peoples’ school in Denpasar; Brahmin from Sanur, the current chairman Ida Bagus Gede 
Wiyana is his grandson. He also was a member of the legation which met Sukarno in 1958 to claim the recognition of Agama 
Hindu and later member of the national parliament under Sukarno) 
  Putu Serangan (Clerk at the governor’s office)  
  Ida Bagus Alit (Ida Pedanda Putra Telaga) (Judiciary clerk in Denpasar)  
  I Wayan Reta, (Peoples’ school teacher in Penatih, Denpasar) 
  Anak Agung Gede Agung  
  Gede Merta Inggas  
  I Wayan Korea  
  I Gusti Alit Deli  
  Tan Siong  
  Tjokorda Rai Pajangan  
  Nengah Tjilik  
  I Gusti Oka Puger  
  Ida Bagus Tapa  
  I Gusti Made Tamba  
  I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa (Gusti Bagus Sugriwa is credited with giving the several religious practices in Bali the common name 
Agama Hindu Bali instead of Agama Hindu Dharma, as the modern educated elite proposed) 
  Pak Blongo  
  A frequent visitor and likeminded actor was Pandit Shastri. (Pandit Shastri introduced prayer and was a missionary from Arya 
Damaj in India (Sura Interview 2006) 
 
From 1953-1982, the foundation was managed by the Chairman Ida Bagus Wayan Gede (the grandfather of the 
incumbent Chairman). Putu Serangan officiated as vice chairman. The office of the first secretary was held by I 
Wayan Reta. Ida Bagus Alit acted as second secretary. The treasurers were Anak Agung Gede Agung and I Gede 
Merta Inggas. The corporate charter, article 4, sets out the objectives: 
 
1.)  to  establish  a  kindergarten,  elementary  school,  high  schools,  a  vocational  school,  and  a 
university;  
2.) organize long time and short time courses and seminars; 
3.) offer speeches and lectures, which are not conflicting with the law, using several media 
4.) publish books, brochures, and other printed media 
5.) be prepared to cooperate with similar oriented institutions (Yayasan 2005: 5) 
 
The objective of the Dwijendra Foundation was increasing and continuing Hindu heritage and knowledge. Given 
the fact that social change resulted in the need to understand religion, which had prior to the Dutch conquest 
and  intrusion  in  internal  affairs  not  been  conceptualized  as  a  separated  category,  explanations  on  Hindu 
religious, cultural, and literary issues to the broad Hindu community should be provided. Or in other words, a 
modernized  and  rationalized  knowledge  and  understanding  of  agama,  culture,  and  literature  should  be 
increased in the Agama Hindu Bali congregation and/or people interested in it.  
 
On July 17, 1953 the private Dwijendra Foundation opened a secondary high school. Since the construction of 
the buildings was still under work, the first lessons were held at the neighboring Saraswati School, the first 
public school in Bali. The first teachers at Dwijendra were the musician and son of I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, I Gusti 
Nyoman Suwastha, who acted as Principal, Pandit Shastri, who also taught at the Saraswati school, Luh Rinang, 
I Nyoman Regug, and I Nyoman Rota. As there was no curriculum, the curricular content of the Agama Hindu 
Bali class depended on the Hindu teacher (Sura Interview 2006) For example, the first activity conducted at the 
Dwijendra Foundation was a Hindu religion course held by Narendra Dev Pandit Shastri, Arya Samaj missionary 
from India (Bakker 1993: 57; Sura Interview 2006). For the first time in history, Pandit Shastri introduced and 
taught a uniform style of prayer at Dwijendra, the contemporary Tri Sandhya (Sura Interview 2006, Wiyana 
Interview 2010) Pandit Shastri introduced facing East while praying, and he taught Old Javanese, Balinese and 
Sanskrit at Dwijendra. (Sura Interview 2006)In sum, the basic idea for the establishment of the foundation was 
that the first efforts taken there aimed to deepen Hindu knowledge and competencies using the streams of 
formal and non-formal education (Yayasan 2005: 2), as those reformers regarded the Western model of secular 
education as an important investment in the future of Balinese society. Until today, the foundation aims to 
improve the educational and cultural opportunities of the Balinese Hindu congregation. In consequence, the 
Dwijendra  Foundation  as  an  institution  was  born  out  of  the  Balinese  reformers’  conceptual  and  political 
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In consequence, the Dwijendra Foundation (henceforth YD, Yayasan Dwijendra) played a significant role in the 
recognition  process  of  Indonesian  Hindu  Dharma  and  the  implementation  of  the  Hindu  class  and  Hindu 
education system, because YD was the epicenter of the reformers’ rationalization and systematization efforts 
the 1950s and early 1960s.  
 
Several organizations and individuals concerned with the recognition of Agama Hindu Bali assembled regularly 
there to discuss the course of action to be taken. Thereby they did not only provide ideas, but they also 
realized and facilitated their ideas. It is therefore worth noticing, that YD is the “mother” or “embryo” of all 
Hindu  nuanced  educational  institutions.  Unsurprisingly,  YD  was  one  of  the  Hindu  Councils’  founding 
organizations. During the first five years after the Council’s inception, the great annual assemblies were held at 
YD secondary high school and the foundation is still connected closely with the Council. Further, the idea was 
born at YD to establish higher educational institutes as Koperasi Kekarawitan Bali (SMK 1 Kekarawitan, Batu 
Bulan, Vocational School for Arts), Agama Hindu Bali Teacher Training College, (Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama 
Hindu  Bali,  PGAAHB,  now  IHDN),  and  the  Institute  Hindu  Dharma  (IHD,  now  UNHI).  The  first  lessons  and 
courses of those institutions were held in the Dwijendra building.  
 
In 1959, the Agama Hindu Bali Teacher Training College (Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama Hindu Bali, PGAAHB) at 
the level of a senior high school was launched. The school was the first higher educational unit which provided 
vocational training for Hindu teachers to be employed at secondary and higher education in Indonesia. The 
basic structure of the curriculum was compiled by I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, who acted as first teacher. It was 
Sugriwa, who insisted on the naming of the religious practices as Agama Hindu Bali, thereby opposing the 
better  educated  elite,  who  proposed  Agama  Hindu  Dharma.  I  Gede  Sura  was  one  of  his  first  students. 
Graduates from the Dwijendra secondary high school, or even public schools were trained at the PGAAHB. 
Those graduates were the first appointed Hindu teachers. Similarly, after its establishment in 1963, the first 
educational activities of the Institute Hindu Dharma (IHD, now UNHI) were held at the YD building before the 
institute moved to its new campus in Tembau, Denpasar.  
 
The Minister of Education acknowledged the right of the private Dwijendra secondary high school to receive 
governmental funding and subsidies in 1964. In 1965, showing its great popularity in society, the junior high 
school has been split into two schools (SMP 1 and SMP 2). The foundation was even able to open a junior high 
school branch in Gianyar on September 1, 1965. In 1968, the Dwijendra elementary school was established, 
which has been split into two schools in 1977. In the same year, 1968, complying with their objective to 
produce skilled teachers, YD opened a Teacher Training College (Sekolah Pendidikan Guru, SPG). In 1972, the 
kindergarten  was  established.  In  1978/1979
359, the senior high school (SMA  Dwijendra)  was  opened.  The 
Director General of Elementary and Secondary Education Instruction 007/C/Kep/1985, dated January 17th, 
1985 transferred an equal status as state schools (status disamakan) on the SMA; a predicate only a few 
private schools held in Bali at that time.  
 
As can be deduced from my data, between 1965 and 1985, the foundation boomed as it was able to open 
Hindu faith-based schools at all levels of schooling and Teacher Training institutes across Bali and even outside 
Bali
360. This boom is, as I suspect, related to national policies, as it is situated between Suharto’ take over and 
his Islamic turn in 1989. In 1982, YD not only opened four new high schools throughout Bali, but it also opened 
the  Technical  College  of  Balinese  Traditional  Architecture,  the  precursor  of  the  contemporary  University 
Dwijendra. In 1984 the Dwijendra University was formed with five faculties.  
   
                                                 
359 The Dwijendra Senior High School was established by the Bali Province’ Educational Office Decision 496/UM1.4/77 dated December, 6th 
1977 and began to operate in 1978/1979. 
360 Further institutions in Bali under the guidance of Dwijendra Foundation -Centre are: SMP Gianyar (established in 1965); SMP Buala in 
Kuta (established in 1975) , SMA Kapal in Badung (established in 1982); SMP Negara in Jembrana (established in 1984-1985); SMP Singaraja 
(established in 1976-1977), SMP Kalianget (established in 1982), SMP Musi (established in 1985), SMP Tajun (established in 1981 -1982), 
SMA Banjar in Buleleng (established in 1985-1986), and SMP Dwijendra in Petiga, Tabanan (established in 1979-1980).  
Outside Bali the YD acts as patron of: 
Dharma Wiyata foundation, which runs the Hindu teachers’ training college Dharma Wiyata (PGAH Dharma Wiyata) in Blitar, East Java 
(established in 1978);  
Parentas Kaharingan foundation operates the PGAH Parentas Kaharingan in Palangkaraya, East Kalimantan (established in 1981-1982) and 
the Yayasan Dwijendra in Mataram, and Lombok. Additional HinduTeacher Training Colleges were established in Negara, Tabanan (PGAH 
Darsana), in Amlapura (PGAH Saraswati Bajra), Gianyar, and Bangli (Widhya Shanti). (Yayasan, 2005: 6-9; Arsada, 2006: 53) PART D | 260 
During the second period from 1982-1993, the executive board was composed of I Wayan Reta, the former 
secretary, who had been appointed Chairman, and Putu Serangan continued to officiate as vice chairman. I 
Made Anom held the office of the first secretary and Nengah Tjilik was appointed as treasurer. In the third 
period from 1993-2004, the board was restructured. I Gede Sura was appointed chairman, and Tjokorda Raka 
Dharana held the position of the vice chairman. I Ketut Renda acted as general and development secretary, I 
Nyoman Gunadi served as educational secretary, and Luh Rinang officated as treasurer. The current fourth 
period  executive  board  was  legally  established  in  2004.  It  is  structured  into  three  boards:  The  boards  of 
advisors, the supervision board, and the executive board. The position of secretary of the supervision board is 
held by Ida Ayu Ratna Wesnawati, the chairman’s wife and dean of the Faculty of Communication Studies
361. 
The Chairman position in the executive board is held by Ida Bagus Wayan Wiyana, grandson of the founder, the 
vice chairman is Made Sumitra Chandra Jaya, the secretary is I Made Rinting and the treasurer is Luh Rinang.  
6.4.2. Profile 
After being accepted to study at Dwijendra, the students are required to accomplish an orientation period at 
the school, which is closed with a study-initiation ritual (pawintentan) called Upanayana. After graduating, the 
pupil  participates  in  a  study-closing  ritual  (pawintenan)  called  Samawartana.  Analogous  to  the  guru-kula 
system, students, who are accepted, are bound to spiritually prepare and purify themselves in a ritual. The aim 
of those rituals implies that a human should be mentally, spiritually and physically prepared to study, because 
it is the religious duty of a Hindu to submit oneself and to venerate a guru. In order to achieve the national and 
institutional  educational  aims,  YD  has  implemented  the  KBK  in  2004,  and  the  KTSP  in  2007.  In  2007,  YD 
provides education at following levels: 
 
1. Kindergarten (TK)  
2. Elementary School (SD) (accredited A in 2007) 
3. Junior High School (SMP) (accredited A in 2006) 
4. Senior High School (SMU) (accredited A in 2006) 
5. University (UNDWI, Universitas Dwijendra):  
1.  law faculty (accredited A in 2006);  
2.  agriculture  faculty,  social  economy  agriculture  and  agro  business  study  program  (accredited  B  in 
2006);  
3.  communication studies, public relation study program (accredited B in 2006);  
4.  the  pedagogy  and  educational  sciences,  with  the  departments  of  civics  and  Pancasila  studies 
(accredited B in 2006),  
5.  national and local language and art education (accredited C in 2006),  
and  additional  programs:  pedagogy  and  social  sciences  (Akte  Mengajar  IV),  and  coaching  and 
counseling, technical faculty, architecture program (accredited C in 2006) 
 
According  to  the  foundation’s  self-perception  (Yayasan  2003:  31),  the  faith-based  school  ethos  fulfills  the 
function of the social development, if it  
 
(1) makes the effort to impart courage, autonomy and initiative, sensibility towards the rights 
and needs of fellow human beings, ability to cooperate for public needs;  
(2) attempts to impart a strong motivation into the students to study and understand society’s 
social reality;  
(3) attempts to stimulate students to put their religious convictions to practice;  
(4) tries to integrate and synchronize non-religious subjects.  
 
Besides general subjects taught at all public schools, the special educational content of the Hindu nuanced 
education at the Dwijendra educational units is in consequence Agama Hindu. Following an interdisciplinary 
approach, Agama Hindu is included in all subjects. Without such an interdisciplinary and integrative approach 
of  religious  and  non-religious  contents,  it  is  feared  that  the  Hindu  class  and  Hindu  nuanced  education, 
especially in public  schools,  becomes a mere ornamentation of the  curriculum.  The  enclosure of religious 
instruction  in  the  curriculum  serves  mere  political  means  as  it  satisfies  the  wishes  of  “a  particular  faith 
group”
362 (Yayasan 2003), but it does not aim to create a generation, which is more eligible than the previous 
one, to manage societal development and changes in a meaningful way. (Yayasan 2003)  
                                                 
361 The brother in law of IB Gede Wiyana studied space technology in the Netherlands.  
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In consequence, the special feature of education at YD is the Hindu nuance, as expressed in religious, cultural, 
and literary aspects of Agama Hindu Bali included into the curriculum according to regional, national, and 
international educational policies and the spirit of the age. This Hindu faith-based education shall nurture in 
sraddha (conviction, berimam) and bhakti (devotion, taqwa) in the students. In providing Hindu faith based and 
Bali culture based education, the foundation combines Hindu Balinese religion, culture, and literature with 
education  in  technologies  and  foreign  languages  aiming  to  mould  graduates  able  to  participate  in  global 
competition. As two factors, namely increasing community’s religious literacy and perpetuating the values of 
the Balinese ancestors, motivated the establishment of the foundation, the contemporary vision of Dwijendra 
is to create balance between intellectual, emotional, and spiritual intelligence in its students in the teaching 
and learning process. The ideal educational outcome is a graduate, who has high morals, puts to practice values 
of Balinese culture contained in literature, has required globalized ideas, thoughts, and knowledge, and is able 
to participate in current development and progress.  
 
To improve the function and role of the school as cultural centre, in extracurricular teachings students are 
encouraged to develop skills and morals (budi pekerti), which are based on the concept of Solah-Bhawa-Tata 
Cara  in  Bali.  According  to  the  incumbent  Chairman  Wiyana  (Interview  2010),  the  acculturation  of  Indian, 
Javanese, and Balinese religions and cultures in Bali led to the basic framework of Agama Hindu Bali, expressed 
in the Vedas, in Mantras (sacred group of words or verses that encourage spiritual transformation), and in 
tembang (sacred songs as kakawin and kidung). This basic framework requires a Hindu to perform the five 
rituals  (Panca  Yadnya)  and  to  follow  the  five  basic  creeds  (Panca  Sraddha).  Students  at  YD  are  educated 
profoundly in the basic framework of Agama Hindu Bali, which transforms them spiritually. This transformation 
is then expressed in their spiritual conduct (solah). Their spiritual conduct in turn demonstrates their religious 
attitude or mental preparedness (Bhawa), which in turn implies that they know how to behave according to 
proper Balinese etiquette, social order, and norms (tata cara). To demonstrate this fact, the moral education 
subject (budhi pekerti) – a concept introduced by the Taman Siswa Movement of KH Dewantara
363 - is allocated 
two hours a week in the curriculum since the establishment of YD. Contrary to national e ducational policies, in 
which budhi pekerti has been an optional or a compulsory subject, it has continuously been taught at YD since 
its establishment in 1953, and always been a basic feature of YD’s educational mission.  
 
In  this  context,  YD  adopted  the  secular  Western  model,  but  continuously  upheld  the  spirit  of  the  Hindu 
tradition. Since the establishment and the engagement of YD in the educational sector began, YD tries to 
synergize the religious and the secular approach. By accomplishing this integration, synchronization, or synergy 
of religious and secular education, education at YD aims to produce graduates, who have developed a deep 
seated Hindu conviction, high morals, courage, initiative and scientific, cognitive knowledge and skills, and 
master the latest technologies with all their strength and weaknesses. (Yayasan 2003: 48) Since religion and 
culture, especially literature, are part of Dwijendra’s corporate identity, Hindu religious content is included in 
the subject of history, moral education (budi pekerti), and in sports. The weight laid on Hindu religion and value 
based education is  maintained in an inclusive and  contextual approach throughout all subjects as  well as 
extracurricular activities since the foundation’s establishment.  
 
Students and teachers perform twice daily the prayer of Tri Sandhya at 7.15 and at 12.30. The intention of the 
prayer activity is to enable all students to flawlessly lead the Tri Sandhya in public. In addition, compulsory 
extracurricular activities teach students the basic religious-cultural skills as for instance, manufacturing ritual 
paraphernalia, local martial arts (Pencak Silat), literature, drama, handicraft, dances, chanting (Weda, Mantra, 
Tembang),  writing  lontar,  ritual  knowledge,  regular  charitable  work,  island  wide  pilgrimages,  and 
environmental care around YD’s compound.  
Those  extracurricular  activities  are  provided  to  improve  YD’s  function  and  role  as  Hindu  nuanced  cultural 
centre and to enhance Hindu personality development and specialized Hindu nuanced skills in the students. 
The students help to organize a major ritual (Bhattara Turun Kabeh) at the main temple in Besakih, they 
decorate temples, and help to set out the ritual offerings, sacrifices, temporary buildings and paraphernalia. 
They participate in the holy water preparation ritual in the annual New Year’s animal sacrifice (Tawur Agung) at 
the puputan square in Denpasar, and they are active at the main temple in Denpasar (Pura Jagatnatha). And 
they carry the flag of the guardians of the nine directions (Dewata Nawa Sangha) during the opening ceremony 
                                                 
363 Inspired by Rabindranath Tagore’s model of education, which originated in the ashram education model and considered nature and life-
world as integrally belonging to education, KH Dewantara had tried to establish his concept of the Taman Siswa school system in the 1950s.  PART D | 262 
of the annual Art Festival in Denpasar. All this activities shall habituate a Hindu Bali identity, and the ability to 
perform the acquired skills in society, and thereby becoming respected members and leaders of society.  
 
In sum, YD offers various extracurricular activities, and most of the students are apt in all those skills, which are 
practiced at regular intra-school, inter-school and regional contests. As YD wins many contests, the efficacy of 
YD’s approach to integrate knowledge and skills in students is proven by their performance. Consequently, YD 
has been successful in linking the religious or spiritual approach on education with a secular approach – in 
consequence YD still plays an active part in social development and change. Consequently, YD has not only a 
long history in fostering religion and education in Bali, but also holds a unique and honorable position in 
educational  circles  and  wider  society.  (Wiyana  Interview  2010:  Yayasan  Dwijendra  2003:  48)  Education  at 
Dwijendra  is  Hindu  nuanced  or  faith-based,  but  the  teaching  and  learning  process  is  directed  likewise  to 
produce human capital able to compete in the global market.  
 
Since 2004, discipline is the top item on the daily agenda by Chairman Wiyana. Every morning at 7.15 sharp, 
the lessons start with a Tri Sandhya, chanted over the school loudspeakers by the chairman IB Gede Wiyana. If 
he is unavailable, someone is appointed to replace him. At 12.30 the Tri Sandhya is chanted again. Teachers 
and students who are late, have to wait in front of locked school gates, unable to enter the school yard, as the 
security has strict orders to lock the gates twenty seconds prior to joint prayer and only to unlock the gates 
after the prayer has ended. The intention is to embarrass latecomers in public. This strategy proves to be really 
effective, as my son and I were late only three times. Once we met the deeply blushing principal in front of the 
gate. Likewise, if the chairman summons all staff to the regular meetings, they hasten to be on time, otherwise 
the doors are locked. As in all schools in Bali, private or public, at religious holidays at full moon, new moon, 
and Saraswati, the Hindu students wear Balinese ritual dress in school, bringing offerings, incense and young 
palm leafs to school, needed for collective prayer at the YD temple (Pura Mahawidya Yayasan Dwijendra Pusat 
Denpasar).  At  every  level  of  schooling,  a  few  mostly  female  students  are  tasked  to  make  offerings  every 
morning. Regular health and body hygiene checks are conducted by teachers. Pak Kumis (Master Mustachio) 
was highly respected, as he regularly picked students from the yard to check on the condition of their nails and 
hairdo. If the nails were too long, or dirty, the students have find and borrow a cutter to clean and cut their 
nails, otherwise they were not permitted to attend class. Hairstyleis military short for boys; girls shall wear 
pigtails or braids.  
 
Interestingly, there are a few Christian, Muslim, and Buddhist students, who attend Hindu religion class, as YD 
offers no other religious instruction than Hindu instruction. This is in some conflict with the law, as they are 
required by Act 20/2003 to provide a religion class for all religions. Since parents enrolling their children at 
Dwijendra are aware of the Hindu school ethos, I was told by the Chairman and staff, they accept in advance 
that their children are educated in Hindu religion. Interestingly, as a school built by society, YD does not apply 
an elitist approach, but it follows a Hindu based social justice approach, as the monthly schooling fees and the 
single building contribution fee are the lowest in Denpasar and are used to maintain the building. School 
uniforms that are cheaper than the average are sold as well. 
 
In 2007, the Chairman Ida Bagus Gede Wiyana, who is also the chair of the Inter-faith Harmony Forum (FKUB) 
in the Province Bali, successfully applied to the Department of Religion for a renaming of all levels of the school 
to use the Hindu faith based name for the schools. The renaming completed in 2009. The kindergarten is now 
called Pratama Widyalaya
364Dwijendra, the junior high school Madya WidyalayaDwijendra, the senior high 
school  Utama  WidyalayaDwijendra,  and  the  university  has  changed  to  Maha  WidyalayaDwijendra.  This  is 
particularly  important,  because  now  YD  has  two  responsible  bodies,  the  MONE  and  the  MORA
365.  In 
consequence, the routine budget of YD increased considerably because it may apply for funding and teachers 
from both Ministries. This option is thus in line with the mission and vision of YD as  a centre for the protection 
and advancement of Hindu religion and Balinese culture. 
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6.4.3. Location and Facilities 
The school building and the institutions managed by the YD-Centre are located at Kamboja Street in the centre 
of Denpasar. Following the rehabilitation of the pavement surface, the Kamboja Street was made a one way 
street and is named the Education Boulevard. YD is situated at a very strategic location, as the huge market and 
public transport terminal Kereneng is located just at the opposite side, and public transport is easily facilitated 
at this location. In the close nearby neighborhood there are several schools and a University. The YD centre 
area has between 7,000 and 8,000 square meters.  
 
As is common in Indonesia, school hours are either morning or afternoon – thereby the building can be used in 
shifts by all students. The Aula was built in 1978, and has an area of 20,648 square meters. In 2007, the main 
building had three floors and three wings centered on a basketball court, one three-floor building, and two 
one-floor buildings. The kindergarten and the elementary school have their own buildings and schoolyards. In 
2008 and 2009 the elementary school building and its schoolyard were extended and renovated. The statue in 
front  of  the  entrance  shows  Ganesha  and  Dewi  Saraswati.  Entering  the  front  building  from  the  Kamboja 
Education Boulevard, we find the office of the chairman (“Please take off your shoes!”).  
 
The chairman’s secretariat is located at the right hand side, and the foundation’s administrative unit at the left 
hand side. The administrative unit of the foundation and its university are located in the front building on an 
area of 63,612 square meters. The university however, borrows offices and rooms of the high school buildings, 
which are located in the right and left wing. The primary school and one of the three floor buildings and 
restrooms  have  been  enlarged  and  renovated  in  2008  and  2009;  the  entire  complex  is  in  a  brand  new 
condition, and the laboratories, libraries, and the technical equipment are modern. YD has an air-conditioned 
computer terminal for students, and next door to the storage room, where 47 original palm-leaf manuscripts 
are stored, the students run their own managed radio-station. The Dwijendra community Radio was officially 
inaugurated by the Bali Region Broadcasting Commission on November 5
th, 2008. The program is broadcasted 
at  the  frequency  of  107.7  FM.  The  Chairman  explained  proudly:  “Here  at  Dwijendra,  the  values  of  our 
ancestors, our history, and latest technologies coexist”.  
6.4.4. Funding 
In 2007, YD is financed by the single building fee, by school fees, by central, regional, and local governmental 
aide and by private donations. After its renaming into widyalaya in 2009, YD is entitled to apply for funds and 
subsidies of MONE and MORA – an advantageous position. The single building contribution fee is used to 
maintain the building. In 2005 and 2006 the Japanese and the Dutch government subsidized the elementary 
schools with grants and materials (musical instruments, art). The data reproduced were obtained from the 
Chairman in 2007, either as photocopy, or copied manually into my field note-book. As between 2007 and 2011 
(and for the period of fieldwork), the exchange rate of 12,000 Indonesian Rupiah was 1 €, thus I took this 
exchange rate as basis for all following tables. The table shows the annual budget of the elementary school in 
2006/2007: 
 
Break down of received fees (in Rupiah)  Break down of expenditures (in Rupiah) 
  Source  Amount    Expenditure  Amount 
  Balance at start of the year  -      - 
1.  Parents/society  -  1.  Operation  of  teaching  and 
learning process 
10.228.000 
  A) building fee  10.010.000  2.   Materials  of  teaching  and 
learning process 
5.005.000 
  B) School Committee fees  -  3.  Salaries/ welfare aid  70.805.000 
  C) other income/ fees  -  4.  Maintenance of Materials  5.005.000 
2.   Sub district/municipality  -  5.  Extracurricular activities  10.000.000 
  A) Teacher salaries/ welfare aid  70.805.100  6.  Other expenditures  26.120.000 
  B)  Education  Operations 
Subsidies (DOP) 
-  7.  Professional guidance  - 
  C) DOB  -  8.  Transferred to the Foundation  156.480.000 
  D)Grants  120.000       
3.  Province government  -       
4.   Central Government  -       
  A) School operations aide (BOS)   46.228.000       
  B) Grants  -       
5.   Others  -    Balance at the end of the year  0 
  Total of revenue  283.549.000 
(23-24.000 €) 
  Total of expenditures  283.543.000 
(23-24.000 €) 
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The following table shows the annual budget of the Junior High School in 2006/2007: 
 
Break down of received fees (in Rupiah)  Break down of expenditures (in Rupiah) 
  Source  Amount    Expenditure  Amount 
1  Balance at start of the year  623.000  1.  Teacher Salaries/welfare aid   
2  Regional  government  Sub-
district/municipality 
-    a. Teacher salaries  145.000.000 
  a) Teacher salaries/ welfare aid  -    b.  State  Teacher  salaries 
(private) 
12.900.000 
  b) Staff salaries/ welfare aid  -    c. Teacher paid by honorarium  190.905.000 
  c) Free lance teachers/ welfare 
aid 
-    d. Free lance teacher  261.000.000 
3.   Regular  school  operations 
subsidies (BOS) 
-    e. Welfare Aid  45.000.000 
4.  School  operations  subsidies: 
Books 
-  2.  Staff Salaries/welfare aid   
5.  Quality  management 
operational aide (BOMM) 
-    a. Staff salaries  119.262.000 
6.  Special aide for students (BKM)  -    b.  Staff  paid  by  honorarium 
salaries  
 
7.  Education  operation  subsidies 
(BOP) 
-    c. welfare aide  29.628.000 
8.   Educational  Foundation 
(private) 
-  3.  Learning and teaching process  24.000.000 
  a. Staff salaries  120.268.000  4.  Maintenance  of  infrastructure 
and materials 
 
  b. Operational/ Maintenance  5.435.000    a. building  175.458.000 
  c. Administration  -    b. tools   41.000.000 
9.  Non-educational  private 
institutions 
-    c. furniture  3.000.000 
10.  Parents/society  -  5.  Rehabilitation   
  a) building fee  118.930.000  6.   Provision of infrastructure and 
materials 
 
  b) School Committee fees  749.309.000    a. Books  5.000.000 
  c) extracurricular  60.000.000    b. others  8.000.000 
  d) others  31.309.000  7.   Extracurricular activities  3.400.000 
11.  Production units  -  8.   Capacity and service  2.000.000 
12.  Other sources  -  9.   Management/Administration  20.000.000 
.     -  10.   Other expenditures   
    -  11.   Balance at the end of the year  316.000 
  Total of revenue  1.085.869.000 
(90.500 €) 
  Total of expenditures   1.085.869.000 
(90.500€) 
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The table shows the annual budget of the Senior High School in 2006/2007: 
 
Break down of received fees (in Rupiah)  Break down of expenditures (in Rupiah) 
  Source  Amount    Expenditure  Amount 
1  Balance  at start of the year  89.468.000  1  Teacher Salaries/welfare aid   
2  Regional  government  Sub-
district/municipality 
    a. Teacher salaries  335.655.600 
  a) Teacher salaries/ welfare aid  52.723.200    b.  State  Teacher  salaries 
(private) 
 
  b) Staff salaries/ welfare aid      c. Teacher paid by honorarium  418.200.000 
  c) Free lance teachers/ welfare 
aid 
    d. Free lance teacher   
3.   Regular  school  operations 
subsidies (BOS) 
    e. Welfare Aid  468.516.200 
4.  School  operations  subsidies: 
Books 
  2  Staff Salaries/welfare aid   
5.  Quality  management 
operational aide (BOMM) 
50.000.000    a. Staff salaries  100.426.800 
6.  Special aide for students (BKM)  17.690.000    b.  Staff  paid  by  honorarium 
salaries  
4.587.600 
7.  Education  operation  subsidies 
(BOP) 
    c. welfare aide  223.890.000 
8.   Educational  Foundation 
(private) 
  3  Learning and teaching process  25.000.000 
  a. Staff salaries  120.268.000  4  Maintenance  of  infrastructure 
and materials 
 
  b. Operational/ Maintenance  5.435.000    a. building  245.150.000 
  c. Administration      b. tools   39.660.000 
9.  Non-educational  private 
institutions 
    c. furniture  47.350.000 
10.  Parents/society    5  Rehabilitation  545.000.000 
  a) building fee  186.400.000  6   Provision of infrastructure and 
materials 
 
  b) School Committee fees  118.500.000    a. Books  13.920.000 
  c) extracurricular      b. others  29.927.000 
  d)  others  (school  fee,  exam 
fees) 
2.383.200.000  7.   Extracurricular activities  12.275.000 
11.  Production units    8.   Capacity and service  67.250.000 
12.  Other sources    9.   Management/Administration  23.000.000 
      10.   Other expenditures  33.125.000 
      11.   Balance at the end of the year  480.661.000 
  Total of revenues   3.113.594.200 
(260.000 €) 
  Total of expenditures   3.113.594.200 
(260.000 €) 
 
The Senior High School received following subsidies from 2005 to 2007: 
 
Nr  Year  Type of Subsidies  Source of subsidies  Amount  Additional aide  Utilization 
1  2005  Internal  School  Quality 
Subsidy  (Bantuan  Internal 
Sekolah, BIS) 
Central government  75.000.000  22.228.000  Computer 
2  2006  Furniture  Regional government  25.000.000  17.972.000  Tables 
3  2006  BIS   Central government  100.000.000  50.000.000  Computer 
4  2006  BIS  Regional government   265.000.000  200.000.000  New class rooms 
5  2007  Rehabilitation  Central government  50.000.000  -  Office renovation 
6  2007  Quality  management 
operational aide (BOMM) 
Central government  50.000.000  41.910.000  Excellent class 
7  2007  Block grant  Central government  150.000.000  207.547.724  Building, tools. furniture 
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6.4.5. Organizational structure 
Educators, staff, and students 
The numbers of staff and educators employed by YD Centre (Yayasan 2003: 60; Yayasan, 2005: 19), and the 
numbers  of  graduates  and  students  in  2003  and  in  2005  (Yayasan,  2003:  63-64;  Yayasan,  2005:  17)  are 
demonstrated in the following tables. As can be deduced from the high attendance rate, both, the Junior High 
School (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, SMP) and the Senior High School (Sekolah Menengah Atas, SMP) are very 
popular. The Elementary School is a little less prominent. Visiting the Junior High School would impart a really 
good value base in the students, I was told by former students, but at the Senior High School the faith-based 
approach would not suit all characters. The table shows the number of staff and educators at Dwijendra in 
2003. 
 
Staff in 2003  Number of  
individuals 
Employed permanently by the Foundation  29 
Civil servants  - 
Employee paid by honorarium   9 
Teachers   
Employed permanently by the Foundation  21 
Civil servants  41 
Paid by honorarium   58 
Docents  - 
Employed permanently by the Foundation  4 
Civil servants  37 
Employee paid by honorarium   60 
Students  - 
Kindergarten  73 
Elementary School  135 
Junior High School   467 
Senior High School  679 
University  500 
 
The table shows the number of students and graduates in 2003 and 2005. 
 
Nr.  School  Number of  
Graduated students 
In 2003 
class  Number of  
students in  
2002/3 
Number in  
2004/5 
(male/female) 
1.  Kindergarten  1.255  A 
B 
C 
13 
23 
25 
Total: 61 
18 (9-9) 
19 (8-11) 
22 (7-15) 
Total 59 
2  Elementary School  1.644  1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
38 
28 
32 
28 
35 
37 
Total: 198 
32 (20-12) 
36 (15-21) 
26 (11-15) 
31 (16-15) 
25 (15-9) 
32 (22-10) 
Total 182 
3  Junior High school  17.350  I 
II 
III 
252 
244 
237 
Total: 733 
247 (149-125) 
243 (124-119) 
231 (134-97) 
Total 721 
4  Senior High school  6.940  I 
II 
III 
294 
307 
285 
Total:886 
367 
279 
299 
Total: 945 
Kindergarten 
The kindergarten is a one level building, has one classroom, three playrooms, equipped with toys and books, 
one playground, one teacher’s lounge, and one restroom on an area of 40,897 square meters. Note, as a guru 
(teacher) is an honorable and respected position in Indonesia, kindergarten care-takers are called teachers in 
Indonesia. There are 6 teachers, one headmaster and one assistant. The extracurricular activities comprise a 
traditional music band, Balinese dance, and traditional painting or drawing. Languages taught are Indonesian, 
Balinese, and English. The children participate in local competitions in traditional painting, Balinese clothing, 
traditional music, and they take part in cultural performances.    PART D | 267 
Elementary School (SD Dwijendra) 
Next to the kindergarten, the one level elementary school building is located. It is the oldest of the buildings, as 
it  was  one  of  the  first  buildings  erected  in  1953,  and  it  was  only  recently  renovated  in  2007-2008  (after 
renovation it has two levels and air-conditioning). In 2007 and 2008, the elementary school has six classrooms, 
one library, one teacher’s lounge, and one principal’s office. There are 6 class teachers, 4 specialist teachers 
(religion, physical education, and English), one principal, and one secretary. The elementary school has one 
governmental paid Hindu religion instructor appointed by the Department of Education, Ibu Sarwi. From grade 
one to six at elementary level, three class hours are allocated to Hindu religious instruction, and one hour to 
character building or moral education (budhi pekerti).  
 
In  order  to  guarantee  educators’  quality,  teachers  are  encouraged  to  partake  in  continued  education  at 
courses, trainings, and seminars. The elementary school places weight on the teaching of the Balinese language 
and script, and the graduate of the elementary level shall be able to read and write Balinese fluently. The 
students shall also learn to respect and to continue Balinese language and literature in their daily life. In order 
to  meet  the  educational  aim  to  link  secular  knowledge  with  Hindu  Bali  based  religious  traditions,  the 
extracurricular  activities  are  chanting  (mekidung,  macepat,  mewirama),  tabuh  (gamelan),  and  mejejahitan 
(offerings). There were no students dropping out or repeating class in 2007/2008. All students were promoted 
to the junior high school after passing the national exams. The following table shows the religious affiliation of 
the students at the elementary school in 2006. 
 
Islam  Protestant  Catholic  Buddhist  Confucian  Hindu  Total 
12  1  6  2  -  160  181 
 
Junior High School (SMP Dwijendra) 
Passing the chairman’s office in the main building, turning to the right, the Junior High School is located in the 
right wing and in one additional one floor building. The Junior High School was renovated in 1998 and 2007 and 
has an area of 99,220 square meters. It has 14 classrooms, one principal’s office, one teacher’s lounge, one 
administration  office,  one  library,  one  IT  lab,  one  natural  science  lab,  one  basic  technology  lab,  and  one 
storeroom. The library is used by the Junior High School and the Senior High School, the Junior High School has 
16,868 books, whereas the Senior High School has 8,044 books. The University has 1,812 books. All students 
except one were promoted to the next level after passing the national exams. I have no dropout data available. 
The following table shows how many students registered, how many were actually accepted and how many 
graduated at the junior high school from 2001 to 2008
366.  
 
Year  enrolled  accepted  graduated 
male  female  total  male  female  number  number 
2001/2002  149  126  275  137  112  249  (no data available) 
2002/2003  166  107  273  142  98  240  (no data available) 
2003/2004  164  133  297  124  125  249  227 
2004/2005  159  142  301  149  125  274  241 
2005/2006  202  147  347  181  130  311  228 
2006/2007  250  200  450  210  164  374  232 
2007/2008  259  241  500  194  188  382  (no data available) 
 
The Junior High School’s graduates shall be intelligent, excellent, moral, honest, and capable of solving future 
challenges.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Junior  Secondary  High  School  states  that  each  student  would  own  an 
excellent  potential,  in  consequence  during  the  learning  process,  the  effort  is  made  to  provide  qualified 
educators and impart best Hindu based values. The Vision of the Junior Secondary High School is to produce a 
qualified, skilled, and moral (budi pekerti) student, who has faith in God and follows the commands of God 
(beriman dan bertaqwa) in order to be able to lead a a fine life. The school’s mission is to provide teaching and 
ethical guidance in the process of developing intellectual capabilities, skills, emotional stability, a healthy body 
to mould moral and honest citizens capable to face future challenges.  
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The approach of the Junior High School is a combination of Hindu based value education, ritual skills, and 
modern  technologies.  Since  2007  the  school  applies  the  national  KTSP.  In  addition,  intra-curricular  and 
extracurricular contents taught in the framework of the local content curriculum (curriculum muatan local) are 
education and subjects in basic technology, language (Balinese, Japanese, English, Mandarin, German), sports 
(Pencak Silat, Yoga, chess, basket ball, soccer) and traditional art and culture, advanced skills in manufacturing 
offerings (Majejahitan), Balinese dance, Lontar (palm-leaf manuscripts) writing, traditional carving and painting 
skills, chanting, and ceremonial dances, shadow play (Wayang), and traditional music (tabuh/gamelan). The 
subsequent table shows the status of teacher qualification at Junior High School.  
 
Function  Certificate 
Senior 
high 
school  
Diploma 1  
 
Diploma 
2 
 
Diploma 3 
 
BA 
 
Master/MA 
 
Doctorate 
(m/f) 
Total 
m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f 
Principal  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  1  - 
Permanently 
employed 
-  -  -  2  -  -  3  -  9  21  1  -  -  -  13  21 
Non-
permanently 
employed 
1  -  1  1  -  -  -  1  5  4  1  -  -  -  8  6 
Total Teacher  1  -  1  3  -  -  3  1  14  25  3  -  -  -  22  29 
 
The Junior High School employs 4 Hindu religion instructors, of which one is a permanent governmental paid 
teacher, appointed by the Department of Education, two are permanently employed by the foundation, and 
one non-permanent employed teacher is paid by honorarium.The Junior High School claims furthermore a 
shortage of two Hindu instructors in 2007/2008. The Hindu class is allocated three hours, and budi pekerti one 
hour a week from grade seven to nine. The following Table shows the religious affiliation of the students at 
Dwijendra Junior High School in 2006. 
 
Grade  Islam  Protestant  Catholic  Buddhist  Confucian  Hindu  Total 
I  9  3  4  -  -  366  382 
II  8  2  1  -  -  353  363 
III  12  1  1  -  -  293  307 
Total  29  5  6  -  -  1.012  1.052 
 
Senior High School (SMA Dwijendra) 
Turning to the left, the Senior High School is located in the right wing and in one additional building covering an 
area  of  992,  20  square  meters.  It  has  22  classrooms,  one  principal’s  office,  one  teacher’s  lounge,  one 
administration office, two student lounges, one air-conditioned computer terminal (37 pc), one language lab, 
one natural science lab, one technical operations unit (UPT), and one room for the student organization (OSIS).  
 
The Senior High School’s Vision sets the agenda for playing an active role in protecting and continuing or simply 
strengthening (mengajegkan) Balinese adat and culture. Based on education in Agama Hindu literature and 
scientific technological progress, qualified Hindu human capital shall be prepared having the skills necessary to 
compete in the era of globalization. The targets to be reached are:  
 
a)  to be superior in faith and following the commands of God/devotion [sraddha and bhakti, keimanan, 
and ketaqwaaan (imtaq)]  
b)  to be superior in discipline  
c)  to increase the outcome of the national exams  
d)  increase the quality of registration tests  
e)  be superior in creativity, sports and art 
f)  to excel in scientific writing  
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The mission of the Senior High School is to  
 
a)  organize a teaching process, which directs the students to an understanding of faith and following the 
commands of God/devotion  
b)  orient students to become a sujana human being that has morals, individuality and a noble character 
c)  direct students to become clever, intelligent, skilled, independent, and responsible human beings 
d)  direct students to master technology and informatics  
e)  produce a human being that has a firm character, life skills, and ability to compete in the globalized 
era 
 
The aim of education at Dwijendra Senior High School is to produce students, who 
 
  have religious literacy that is to understand not only the given religious and moral teachings, but are 
also able to apply these teachings in practice either in family, school, or in society 
  have moral skills, and being accepted by their social environment 
  have cognitive skills, that may be used to solve future societal issues 
  are able to use existing technologies (that are not technology illiterate) in order to participate in 
modern civilization  
  are willing to work hard, are tough, able to take proper decisions in varying situations and to have the 
courage to take responsibility for responsible decisions 
 
Being based on Hindu Bali religion and culture, the Senior High School Dwijendra compiles the KTSP curriculum 
and structures its teaching by adding the local content of moral education (budhi pekerti), manufacturing ritual 
paraphernalia, preparing offerings, and other types of Balinese cultural art. The extracurricular content offers 
yoga, preparing offerings (mejejahitan), chanting (kidung), traditional painting and carving, traditional dance, 
music  (gamelan),  and  vocals,  scientific  pupil  contests  and  competitions,  Japanese,  pencak  silat,  athletics, 
badminton, soccer, volley, basket ball, table tennis, scouts (pramuka), Balinese scripture, literature, Olympiads 
in math, physics, chemistry, biology, accounting, English, and computer skills.  
 
In 2007, 556 students registered at Senior High School. Actually it was planned to accept 320 students, but due 
to the increased demand, the administration decided to accept 408 applicants. In 2007, only one pupil had to 
repeat grade II, whereas the dropout rate was considerably low, nine boys dropped out at grade I, and four 
boys at grade II and only one girl at grade III. Out of 346 participants of the national exams, 344 passed the 
exam successfully.  
 
The Senior High School employs five Hindu religion instructors, of which Ibu Kartika is a permanent government 
paid  teacher,  appointed  by  the  Department  of  Education,  and  the  remaining  four  are  non-permanently 
employed  and  appointed  by  MORA.  Senior  High  School  claims  a  shortage  of  two  Hindu  instructors  in 
2007/2008. Three hours of Hindu religious instruction and one hour of moral education (budhi pekerti) are 
given from grade ten to twelve. The Senior High School teachers I have interviewed, agreed with the paradigm 
shift in education and value the KBK and the KTSP as very positive, since not only theory is transmitted, but 
practice is also taught. Thereby the possibility to forget the subject matter is reduced, as the students not only 
are required to memorize and comprehend theory, but they are educated to truly master the subject matter in 
ways relevant to their lives, which enable them to apply the acquired skills in practice. In attaining school, the 
students  acquire  the  national  competence  standards  while  experiencing,  exploring,  and  working  out  the 
curriculum. Ibu Kartika said by using the KTSP methodology, the Hindu class transforms the pupil spiritually. In 
this process, they acquire morals and respect towards the catur guru (parents, teachers, society and God; cf. 
Bakker 1993: 135-6). Thus,the KBK and the KTSP revised and revitalized the subject matter of the Hindu class. 
The following table shows the religious affiliation of the students at Dwijendra Senior High School in 2006.  
 
Grade  Islam  Protestant  Catholic  Buddhist  Confucian  Hindu  Total 
I  7  1  -  -  -  400  408 
II  3  1  -  -  -  375  379 
III  9  1  -  -  -  392  402 
Total  19  3  -  -  -  1.167  1.189 
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The following table demonstrates the teacher qualification at the Dwijendra Senior High School in 2006. 
 
Function  Certificate 
Senior 
high 
school  
Diploma 1  
 
Diploma 2 
 
Diploma 3 
 
BA 
 
Master/MA 
 
Doctorate 
(m/f) 
Total 
m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f  m  f 
Principal  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  1  - 
Permanently 
employed 
1  -  -  -  -  -  2  1  9  10  -  -  -  -  12  11 
Non-
permanently 
employed 
8  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  21  10  5  -  -  -  34  12 
Total Teacher  9  -  -  -  -  -  2  2  30  20  6  -  -  -  47  23 
Administratio
n Staff 
5  3    1  -  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  6 
 
The Technical Operations Unit (UPT) offers out-of-school-education, and has three major areas of activity: 
curriculum, laboratories, and extra-curricular content. The UPT evaluates the local curricular contents, equips 
the libraries with textbooks, and the laboratories (physics, chemistry, biology, basic technologies, clinic) with 
materials and media. The extra-curricular activities of the UPT are (1) to offer computers and IT courses from 
kindergarten to senior high level, (2) courses in English, Japanese, and Balinese, (3) courses in Art and Culture 
(Gamelan, Dance and Music), (4) spiritual bathing rituals, (5) pasraman/ Hindu Sunday school for children, (6) 
Workshops for teachers at all grades, (7) health service (clinic) for students at all grades and the neighborhood, 
(7) publishing and printing books, modules, tests, and letters. 
6.5. Universitas Hindu Indonesia: Survival of the fittest! 
 
 
The symbol of the Indonesian Hindu University (Universitas Hindu 
Indonesia, henceforth UNHI) shows a sacred lotus flower(Nelumbo 
nucifera).  The  roots  of  the  lotus  are  planted  in  the  soil  or  river 
bottom, while the leaves float on top of the water surface or are 
held  above  it.  The  flowers  rise  several  centimeters  above  the 
leaves. The lotus symbolizes how the knowledge, technology, art 
and agama teachings that students obtain at UNHI emanate into 
the dimensions of earth, water and air. In consequence, the symbol 
is  given  the  name  Dharma  Widya  Prawerti  (Learning  process  to 
achieve Dharma).  The  University’s  motto is  Amertham  Tu Widya 
(Knowledge is the source of life). Since 2006, the catch-cry of UNHI 
is  ‘survival  o  the  fittest’,  the  slogan  is  written  below  the  lotus-
symbol of UNHI on all cars used by the University, and if one leaves 
the campus area, there is a board stating: “Thank You, survival of 
the fittest!” 
 
Established in 1963, the Hindu Dharma Institute (Institut Hindu Dharma, henceforth IHD) – the institutional 
forerunner of UNHI - targeted the preparation and training of Hindu experts and Hindu reformers. In 1993, the 
Institute has been restructured into the Indonesian Hindu University (Universitas Hindu Indonesia). President 
Sukarno  himself  opened  the  University.  The  graduates  should  play  an  important  role  in  protecting  and 
continuing  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia,  as  they  were  given  the  mandate  to  systemize  and  represent  Hindu 
Dharma Indonesia in society and politics. At IHD (UNHI), a specific Bali-centric and conservative expert group, 
the “Brahmana Gang”
367 is represented, as the institution is closely affiliated to the Hindu Council and the 
Directorate General of the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation.  
 
As stated earlier, the Brahmana Gang refers to the circle of new-jero and super-jero (brahmins and educated, 
religiously literate intellectuals), who either centre around or constitute the inner circle of the Hindu Council, 
the Directorate General of the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation, and UNHI, as their “cadre training unit”. 
However, despite their religious literacy and expertise, they belong to the new jero or super jero, as they are 
seen to lack traditional authority in religious issues by some individuals and at certain villages.  
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UNHI’s graduates are appointed as officials to the regional government offices or to national government 
offices;  they  are  appointed  to  MORA,  and  the  Ministry  of  Culture.  Following  the  National  Education  Act 
20/2003 and the extensive educators’ certification program, many Hindu teachers complete their bachelor and 
master studies at UNHI. The academic and professional activities of UNHI have an impact on Balinese as well as 
Hindu discourse and identity. The ethos is modern-reformist yet Balinese conservative traditional. Incumbent 
President Triguna focuses on improvement of Hindu human resources paying great attention to the spiritual, 
emotional, and cognitive potential of individuals and the needs of the labor market.  
6.5.1. History 
After the Hindu Council’s establishment in 1959, the Hindu Council adopted the first national Hindu document 
calledCampuhan Ubud Charter in November 1961. In its second article, the document urged the formation of 
an Asrama Pangadyayan (Hindu-based higher education institute). This institute should be the place, where 
Hindus could study Dharma and a future Hindu cadre could be educated. This cadre then should be slipped into 
strategic positions in the national and regional government, the clerical center in the national army, and the 
private sector. In consequence, the call for Hindu-based higher education enunciated in the Campuan Ubud 
Charter represents the historical point of origin of the Hindu Dharma Institute (Maha Widya Bhawana, High 
knowledge of the World) and of Hindu-based higher education in general. 
 
On October 3 1963, the Institute Hindu Dharma, the first Hindu institute of higher education on Indonesian soil, 
was established with two faculties: The faculty of religion and culture, and the faculty of teacher training and 
biology pedagogy. The biology pedagogy department has been established to preserve and develop traditional 
medical knowledge (usada) and to increase the popularity of usada in society. It was, however, only established 
on paper, because the Hindu Council did not own land to build the institute. Therefore, the first lectures were 
held at the Dwijendra building. Then the Institute was located in the Panjer district. In the 1970s, it was given 
land and moved to its current location in the Penatih district in East Denpasar.  
 
The Institute’s formation document No 77 in 1964 enlists two founders: I Gusti Bagus Oka (governor of Bali 
from 1958 to 1959) and Ida Bagus Mantra (governor of Bali from 1978 to 1988). Dr Ida Bagus Rai, medical 
doctor, author, and religion expert, who had  studied in  Java and the Netherlands,  was appointed as  first 
president  (Dharma  Adyaksa)  from  1963  to  1968.  In  1964,  the  Directorate  General  of  Higher  Education 
authorized the IHD to carry out final exams equivalent to national exams. Dr Ida Bagus Oka, pulmonary expert, 
was appointed second president from 1968 to 1976. From 1976 to 1979, the former director of the provincial 
office for Hindu and Buddhist Affairs of the province Bali in Denpasar, dean of the faculty of Religion and 
Culture, I Gusti Agung Gede Putra was appointed interim president. From 1985 to 1994 he officiated as Director 
General in Jakarta. 
   
In  1979,  I  Gusti  Agung  Gede  Putra  has  been  replaced  according  to  the  proposal  of  the  Hindu  Council. 
Commander  of  the  Military  Region  XVI/Udayana  in  Denpasar,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Prof  Ida  Bagus  Suanda 
Wesnawa, acted as fourth president from 1979 to 1993. Under his term, the students had to line up once a 
week and were mustered on the campus’ clay court. When I studied from 1998 to 1999 at UNHI, asenior 
student showed me his scarred knees. He explained, prior to 1993 less disciplined students had to crawl with 
bare legs around the court for hours. Yet, after 1998, this military ethos was softened and the courtyard is 
overgrown with grass and a huge green meadow today, used by students for campus activities, or to sit and 
chat while accessing Facebook and neighboring children play volley or soccer.  
 
IHD’s graduates were employed in the central or local government service, and many of them were employed 
by the Army Center for Clerics (Pusat Rohaniwan TNI). Those Hindu clerics employed at the Army Center were 
appointed all over Indonesia. In consequence, they were in regular contact with Parisada’s regional branches 
and they certainly played a role in the joining in of ethnic religions into the fold of Indonesian Hindu Dharma. 
Since there were only a few students, it is safe to assess, however, that the interest to study at IHD was very 
low throughout the 1970s. The IHD, as Dwijendra, had the image of institutions providing education suitable 
for priests only. In the 1970s and 1980s, the economic standard of the Indonesian population increased and 
students were interested in modern, progressive study programs, giving them the chance to participate in the 
service sector. Education in Hindu religion and culture had a backward image. Due to the minimal budgets of 
the Hindu-based institutions, the quality of education and teachers’ was very low.  
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The few students honestly willing to study Hindu religion, culture or traditional medicine (usada) strengthened 
the  perception  of  IHD  in  society  as  a  Hindu  center,  which  either  provided  Hindu  information  personnel 
(penyuluh) or served as a place, where society could inquire into matters of religion – a function the traditional 
priesthood  never  provided.  Despite  having  only  a  few  students  and  docents,  IHD  gained  considerable 
popularity in society. It became a respected institute of higher Hindu learning. Despite its marginal position, the 
esprit  of  the  IHD  remained  intact.  In  the  1980s,  societal  interest  to  study  at  IHD  increased,  and  the 
organizational structure of the IHD changed according to the contemporaneous demands of society. IHD has 
been  restructured  into  four  faculties:  1.)  Hindu  religion  faculty,  2.)  Hindu  pedagogy  faculty  and  biology 
department, 3.) Hindu law faculty, and 3.) Hindu literature and philosophy faculty. After its restructuring, the 
IHD increased its popularity as arbiter of Hindu-based higher education. As my study shows, all Hindu-based 
institutions now enjoy a favorable position in society and continuously expand their services. 
 
One objective of IHD’s establishment was finding solutions and replying to the drastic and rapid changes and 
challenges faced by the Balinese society. Those solutions should be found by emphasizing the consolidation of 
Hindu doctrine and knowledge. After almost 30 years of operation, the IHD still constituted the singular Hindu 
institute of higher education in Indonesia. As result of its minimal budget and poor human resources, IHD 
graduates were not able to compete with graduates of other tertiary institutions, and they became increasingly 
unemployed. This resulted in turn in a dramatic decline of enrollment, because IHD did not reply to the rapid 
and drastic social changes and did not produce graduates able to compete in the labor market during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
 
In  the  context  of  teacher  quality  improvement  stipulated  by  Education  Law  2/1989,  the  Teacher  Training 
Colleges and the Hindu Teacher Training Colleges were closed. As the majority of those graduates continued 
education at IHD, only a few students enrolled at IHD from 1990 to 1993. Not only was the existence of the 
Hindu class in danger, as there were virtually no institutions to produce qualified Hindu teachers. But the only 
operational institute of higher Hindu education battled for its existence, as the management of a tertiary 
institute with only a few enrolled students is highly uneconomical. In consequence, the decrease of students in 
Hindu religion subjects was feared to cause the closure of the institute in 1993. 
 
In the early 1990s, an idea to restructure the Institute and to expand its educational services into the “secular” 
sector arose in the Hindu Council, the Widhya Kerthi foundation (funded by the Hindu Council, the foundation 
operates the IHD), and the administration of IHD. The 1983 Broad Guidelines of State Policy and the 1988 Five 
Year Development Plans required all groups in society - including the Hindu community - to participate in the 
creation of a holistic Indonesian. Using the developmental target of a holistic citizen as room to maneuver, the 
Hindu Council and the IHD had submitted an application to the Department of Education to nationalize the 
institute. But this proposal was not approved.  
 
On the initiative of Prof Dr Ida Bagus Mantra and Prof Dr I Gusti Putu Adnyana (former president of UNUD), 
members  of  the  executive  board  of  the  Widya  Kerthi  education  foundation  that  operated  IHD,  aimed  to 
increase its status from an institute into a university. According to Indonesian education laws, the minimum 
formation  requirement  for  a  university  is  the  operation  of  four  faculties.  In  consequence,  the  IHD  was 
restructured and opened an economics faculty, a civil engineering faculty, a natural science faculty and a Hindu 
studies faculty. This restructuring targeted to attract students interested in non-Hindu studies, and thereby to 
broaden the educational scope of the institute. 
 
Minister  of  Education  and  Culture  Decree  No  75/D/O/1993  dated  May  19  1993,  officially  established  the 
Indonesian  Hindu  University.  Prof  Dr  I  Gusti  Nala,  medical  doctor  and  traditional  medicine  expert,  was 
appointed first president from 1993 to 2001. The appointed presidents in succession were Prof Dr I Gusti 
Ngurah Gorda (2001-2003), followed by two interim presidents, and Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gunadha (2004-2006), 
who was assigned as head of postgraduate studies in 2007. The years between 2001 and 2006 reflect a serious 
leadership crisis and crisis of orientation at UNHI, which is related to the restructuring of the PHDI. In 2004, 
UNHI created a new corporate image for itself, thereby trying to overcome the old image that all graduates of 
UNHI become priests. It represents itself now as up to date (‘gaul’) and/or cool (‘keren’), and it increasingly 
broadens its international and national cooperation with universities from outside Bali and abroad, the Indian 
government, Indian spiritual organizations, and NGOs. Following Prof Dr Ida Bagus Triguna appointment as 
acting president on January 10 2006, academic and campus life at UNHI underwent a rapid and amazing revival, 
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6.5.2. Widya Kerthi Foundation 
Since its establishment, the Hindu Council regards education as key area to achieve individual and communal 
spiritual and social competences and knowledge. Education is interpreted as vehicle to overcome the marginal 
position  of  the  Balinese  society  following  its  incorporation  in  the  nation-state.  In  consequence,  the 
establishment of a Hindu tertiary institute has been demanded in the Campuhan Ubud Charter in 1961. As all 
private higher education institutions, IHD (1963-1993) and UNHI (1993-present) are operated by a foundation.  
 
On December 22 1982, the central Hindu Council set up the Widya Kerthi Foundation (Yayasan Pendidikan 
Widya  Kerthi)  to  operate  IHD.  Signatories  were  Prof  I  Gusti  Ngurah  Sindhiya,  Prof  Dr  Ida  Bagus  Suanda 
Wesnawa, and I Gusti Putu Raka. Since the central Hindu Council acted as founding entity of the Foundation, 
the right to appoint or to discharge the founding body, the management board and the supervision agency lies 
with the Hindu Council. Inconsequence, IHD/UNHI is under the direct patronage of the Hindu Council via its 
foundation. The vision and mission statement of the foundation are  
 
1.  organizing and assisting educational institutions tasked with the education of citizens, especially the 
Hindu community, with the objective to increase elementary to tertiary education,  
2.  assisting the efforts of the central Hindu Council to organize education and guidance for the Hindu 
community by use of education.  
 
The Widya Kerthi Foundation has been restructured based on Law 16/2001 on foundations. The management 
board of the 2003-2007 period consists of 13 members (Chair: I Made Sutama) and three supervisors (I Nengah 
Dana).  In  2003,  the  annual  great  assembly  (pesamuhuan  agung)  of  the  Hindu  Council  appointed  the 
management board. In 2004, its executive board was established. The first appointed chairman was I Mangku 
Pastika, who was appointed in succession: Balinese police chief, Head of the National Drug Institute, and is 
currently  elected  governor  of  Bali  since  2008.  Pastika  is  assisted  by  four  functionaries.  This  restructuring 
reformed and improved considerably the work of the foundation and the cooperation with the presidium of 
UNHI, especially since Prof Yudha Triguna was appointed president. Since 2006, educational management and 
the provision of facilities was continuously improved, due to the concerted action of Pastika and Triguna, who 
both have vast political and social networks with donors from inside and outside Indonesia. On October 10 
2007, Pastika appointed the executive board and the boardof supervisiors on behalf of the Hindu Council for 
the period 2007-2012. I Nengah Dana, former military officer and currently secretary of the Hindu Council was 
appointed as chairman of the board of supervisiors, and Prof Dr Wayan Wita former president of UNUD, was 
appointed chairman.  
Funding 
As the foundation is responsible for finances, I did not obtain exact data on UNHIs funding. The sources of 
funding are, however, student’s registration fees, tuition and examination fees, subsidies from the Balinese 
provincial government, subsidies from the Bali Region Development Bank, subsidies from the municipality of 
Denpasar, subsidies from the Department of Education, and the Department of Religion (teacher certification 
and qualification) and its regional offices, own revenues and private donors, whose donations are non-binding. 
These revenues are entirely spent on teaching activities, research, and  the community service assignment 
program. In 2006, UNHI received a 4 billion Indonesian Rupiah scholarship grant from the MONE to release 633 
students  from  education  progress  fees  (DPP,  dana  pengembangan  pendidikan)  and  625  scholarships  for 
educators attaining the Bachelor program at the Hindu education department from the Hindu Directorate 
General. Since 2005, the education and training unit for guiding and culture in Bali (P4BB, Pusat Pendidikan dan 
Pelatihan Pramuwisata dan Budaya Bali) is established. The offered courses have to be paid. If the program 
finds  interest  in  society,  it  would  be  a  good  source  for  financing  UNHI,  but  society’s  response  is  low.The 
pasraman building is hired by the Hindu Council and the local governments, and therefore the pasraman is a 
way to finance UNHI, still it is not used optimally. 
6.5.3. Profile 
In its vision statement outlined in the strategic plan, UNHI sets itself the task of becoming a university of 
excellence and a Hindu center on the regional and international level for the interpretation, development, and 
application of Hindu values. Its first mission statement outlines the target to operate competence based Hindu 
higher  education,  which  is  oriented  at  the  Tri  Dharma  (education,  research,  and  public  service)  of  higher 
education. The ethos is based on Hindu values, which aim to increase the outcome of education, research and 
public service.  
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The second mission statement implements the target of playing an active role in developing and improving the 
capacity of Hindu human capital that is well-versed in information and technology sciences, with the aim to 
increase human capital competences and professionalism in support of the improvement of academic and non-
academic service quality. The third mission outlines the strategic steps to be taken to introduce a Hindu center, 
which improves Hindu religion and culture by education, research and public service.  
 
The academic community of UNHI is hoped to realize the vision and mission statements in order to integrate 
UNHI  as  a  highly  regarded  general  but  Hindu-based  tertiary  institute  in  Indonesia,  ASEAN  and  the  world. 
Thereby the leading competitive position of UNHI in the era of global competition shall be increased using 
ritual (yadnya), devotion (bhakti), and reliability (satya wacana) as parameters. In addition, the image of UNHI 
shall  be  developed  continuously  and  without  knowing  despair  as  a  brand  of  pride  among  other  tertiary 
institutes. In the academic year 2007-2008, 941 regular and qualification program students registered with 
UNHI.  
6.5.4. Location and facilities: ‘Mewah’ 
The campus of UNHI is located at the Sanggalangit Street, in the district of Tembau, Penatih  in Northeast 
Denpasar. According to Prof Triguna’s favorite joke, the campus of UNHI is luxurious (mewah). In this context, it 
might be recalled that Indonesians are “acronym-mad”. The adjective mewah is an acronym of two words, and 
the punch line sounds like the campus is mepet sawah or cornered by rice-fields, as indeed vast rice-fields 
extend next to the campus. The joke directs at the revival potential of UNHI, since prior to 2002 the campus 
could be described virtually as rural.  
 
Its  area  comprises  35,000  square  meters,  with  a  built-up  area  of  12,000  square  meters.  All  buildings  are 
designed according to Balinese architecture. In the north, the municipal office for building permits is located, 
next  to  it,  we  find  the  auditorium,  and  on  the  right-hand  side  a  new  three-floor  building  comprising  the 
technology faculty, the renovated and well organized library, and the computer pool. The national telecom 
company has installed a hot spot at UNHI, yet, regrettably access was only free for one month after installation. 
In 2010 and 2011, four free hot spots are installed. In the east, the new aesthetic three-floor master program 
building is located, which was constructed during 2006 and declared open by the governor in February 2007. 
The fifteen air-conditioned rooms are equipped with beamers for presentations, and the well-managed master 
study program library is placed here on the first floor. Each room is named after a character of the Hindu epic 
Mahabharata. In the northeast corner, the bungalow of Mr Gede, the heart-warming custodian is located and 
by its side, a wide variety of plants grow in the botanic garden primarily to be used for scientific purposes. 
 
Besides the master program building the tennis court is located. Especially the president loves to play tennis, 
therefore  on  Friday  morning,  campus  life  is  vivid.  Every  Friday  at  7a.m.  sharp,  the  educational  and 
administrative staff has to do sports, as do all Indonesians employed in the civil service. In the southeast and 
the south of the compound is the Mensa, all bachelor study programs and their class rooms, a small branch of 
the Indonesian Red Cross practicing orthodox and local medicine, the prestigious Language Education Training 
Center (LETC), the computer lab, the upakara-lab and the training center for priests (pasraman sulinggih), the 
student corporation run copy shop and the P4BB building (Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Pramuwisata dan 
Budaya Bali, education and training unit for guiding and culture in Bali) are located. In all there are around 30 
classrooms most of them are now air conditioned.  
 
When I studied at UNHI in 1999, there was no air conditioning; most of the time there was even no lecturer 
present. I still remember the raining seasons: as all students use a motor bike as transport, we were of course 
all wet entering class. But Balinese are used to this and we all sat simply dripping in class. Two fellow students, 
one from Singaraja and the other from Kintamani were housed in the Boarding House of UNHI. Since there was 
no running water, they showered and washed at the two campus bathrooms. The boarding house is now 
renovated and is located close the campus. Since 2005, the first Hindu-based kindergarten was established at 
campus UNHI. Today a huge parking area is also promoted by the UNHI as facility.  
 
In the southwest there is another cantine. Located in the centre of the compound, we find the Mahawidya 
Mandira temple, a balai (open meeting hall), the grass court and the newly built four-floor building, where the 
administrative departments of the S1 study programs and the presidium are situated. This building is still under 
construction. In 2010, it became fully operational. The renovation and expansion of the campus were financed 
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The campus site’s expansionconsumed 3, 3 billion Indonesian rupiah (approx. € 290,000 by the rate at January 
1, 2006).The expenses for the postgraduate’s studies building were provided by the Hindu Directorate General, 
the provincial government and private stakeholders. 2, 75 billion Indonesian rupiah (approx. € 240,000 by the 
rate at January 1, 2006) for the presidium buildingwere provided by the provincial government and private 
stakeholders
368.  
6.5.5. Organizational structure and academic cycle 
UNHI provides undergraduate and postgraduate studies. In all, three study programs (PRODI, program study) 
were  operated  in  2009:  the  Bachelor  study  program,  the  master  study  program,  and  the  doctoral  study 
program. Bachelor  studiesare operated at the economic facultywith the departments of management  and 
accounting  that  provide  a  Hindu-based  approach  on  economics;  the  civil  engineering  faculty;  the  natural 
science faculty withits department of biology and traditional medicine (usada) which was restructured by Prof 
Nala into an ayur veda faculty. The objective of the natural sciences faculty is to conduct research and to 
scientifically cultivate local plants and animals that are used in usada (traditional medicine) or upakara (ritual 
offerings and sacrifices). With the broadening of the concept into  ayur veda, the medical component has 
gained weight.  
 
As the study is concerned with Hindu instruction, these study programs were not investigated in the present 
study. The Hindu studies faculty (status accredited A) is structured into three departments: Hindu philosophy, 
Hindu law, and Hindu pedagogy. The postgraduatestudies at the Hindu Studies faculty offer a master degree in 
religious  and  cultural  studies  and  in  Hindu  pedagogy  and  evaluation  of  Hindu  pedagogy.  The  brand  new 
doctoral program offers a structured doctorate either in religious and cultural studies or in Hindu pedagogy. In 
addition to academic and professional programs, UNHI operates training programs: The pasramanare used for 
orientation and training courses in ritual and religion offered for priests and masters of ceremony (tukang 
banten), or for teachers and civil servants.  
6.5.6. Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi 
UNHI has autonomy in the organization of the learning and teaching process which comprises the admission of 
students, lecture activities, examination, issue of diplomas and certificates. As common in Indonesia, lecture 
hours are either held in the morning or in the afternoon from Monday to Saturday. The morning classes start at 
8 am and end at 13.00 pm. The regular classes start at 17.00 pm and end at 21.30 pm. The postgraduate 
studies lectures are held from 16.00 to 20.30 on Thursday and Friday and on Saturday from 9.00 am to 17.00 
pm.  
 
The curriculum forms the base of the organization of all study programs. It consists of a core curriculum (60%) 
and an institutional curriculum (40%). The core curriculum is compiled by the MONE or in our context by the 
Hindu Director General at MORA. The Bachelor study program (Sarjana 1, stratum 1) has a total credit load of 
144 SKS allocated in eight semesters, but the study program may be accomplished earlier. In case a student 
was not able to collect 152 credit points after seven years, he or she has to quit studies.The post-graduate 
Masters program (S2) has a total credit load of 48 SKS allocated in three semesters and the doctoral program 
has a total credit load of 64 SKS allocated in six to eight semester. Since 2008, UNHI operates a doctoral study 
program. 
 
Research at UNHI follows a double-strategy; it shall benefit humanity, reply to demand of societal progress, 
and increase the quality of education and theory in its environment. Research projects were conducted in the 
fields of religion and culture (Hindu and Islam), biology, forestry, gender issues, Hindu and Islamic banking, and 
smaller projects were conducted at UNHI to investigate students’ happiness and management issues. In sum, 
UNHI has conducted several research projects and won national and local tenders.  
 
Concerning the publishing sector, UNHI has published and edited several books and two quarterly journals, the 
Majalah Widya Werta (BA program) and the Jurnal Dharmasmrithi (MA program). Academic life at UNHI is vivid 
and energetic, regularly (bi-weekly) seminars, book reviews and lectures on regional, national and international 
level are held in the Aula. Academic activity is known as the students’ learning cycle which commences from 
the admission process until they accomplishes studies. The term public service denotes the direct and practical 
application of methods, skills, and theory acquired in academic activities in small out-of campus projects at the 
end of the study program that aim to reach society with projects unrelated to formal education.    
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Service to the community may be carried out in the following modes: educational activities in society (sermons, 
offerings),  community  service  assignment  (voluntary  work,  assist  priests,  assist  in  temples,  and  assist  in 
ceremonies), regional progress projects (forestry, usada, access to water), action research and social research 
methodology (KKN, kuliah kerja nyata). The social research methodology is an intra-curricular activity in the 
form  of  an  assignment  to  community-service,  education  and  research  which  is  carried  out  in  an 
interdisciplinary approach. The social research methodology is a compulsory part of academic activity.  
 
The total credit load of a social research methodology unit has 3 SKS and the social research methodology may 
be conducted only after having gathered 125 SKS. The social research methodology projects were conducted in 
Bali and East Java. Community service assignment activities undertaken are distribution of books, voluntary 
work, religious exegesis (dharmawacana), planting trees, greening, fish seeding, blood donation, and a weekly 
radio  broadcasting  program  and  a  monthly  Bali  TV  presence.  In  the  operation  of  the  social  research 
methodology program, UNHI cooperates with several governmental and private international and national 
institutions, the Delhi University, the Goethe University in Frankfurt, UNUD, IHDN, the Constitutional Court in 
Jakarta, the Denpasar district police, the military base in Denpasar, local branches of the Departments of 
Education and Religion, banks, hospitals, Bali TV, and the provincial and regional governments. 
6.5.7. Academic staff and students 
There were 120 professional permanent and non-permanent academic educators lecturing at UNHI: two of 
them hold a BA degree, 109 a Masters degree and nine hold a professorship in 2007. (UNHI, 2007: xvi) Out of 
the 89 permanent lecturers, eleven hold a professorship, thirteen lecturers hold a doctorate, 45 educators - of 
which seven were following a doctoral study program in 2007 - held a Masters degree, and only seven lecturers 
held a Bachelor degree, of which six attend a Masters study program.  
 
It is planned that all educators shall hold a doctorate in  the near future. However, due to the immobility 
tendency of Balinese, most hold cultural studies doctoral degrees from the national Udayana University in Bali, 
and this uniformity in academic scope made Prof Triguna literally force Hindu educators to register in non-
cultural doctoral study programs outside Bali in order to amplify the academic and professional profile of Hindu 
institutions.  Then,  guest  lecturers  are  invited  from  national  universities  across  the  Archipelago,  as  the  UI 
(Jakarta), UGM (Yogyakarta), UIN Yogyakarta, UNPAD (Badnung), UNUD (Denpasar), UNDIKSA (Denpasar), ISI 
(Denpasar), IHDN (Denpasar), and Undiknas (Singaraja).  
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The table shows the development of students at all faculties’ from 2000 to 2008. 
 
Year  Department/ under and postgraduate  new  old  total  graduated  Drop 
out 
2000  Hindu study (including pedagogy/Akta VI)  11  57  69  9   
  Economics  8  40  8  9   
  Natural science  2  14  16  -   
  Engineering  -  6  6  4   
  Master  -  -  -  -   
  Total  21  117  138  22   
2001  Hindu study  17  59  76  4   
  Economics  4  39  73  8   
  Natural science  11  16  27  -   
  Engineering  -  2  2  -   
  Master  -  -  -  -   
  Total  62  116  178  12   
2002  Hindu study  12  72  84  12   
  Economics  17  74  91  -   
  Natural science  105  27  132  1   
  Engineering  -  2  2  2   
  Master  78  -  78  -   
  Total  212  175  387  15   
2003  Hindu study  19  72  91  31   
LAW 20/2003  Economics  24  86  110  33  5 
  Natural science  19  123  142  11  10 
  Engineering  -  -  -  -  - 
  Master  53  78  131  -  - 
  Total  115  359  474  75  15 
2004  Hindu study  31  60  91  28   
  Economics  59  77  136  12   
  Natural science  40  89  129  4  42 
  Engineering  -  -  -  -   
  Master  97  131  228  57   
  Total  275  357  632  101  42 
2005  Hindu study  479  59  538  11  22 
Teacher   Economics  35  124  159  24  7 
certification  Natural science  9  80  89  25  9 
program  Engineering  -  -  -  -  - 
  Master  105  53  68  68  18 
  Total  625  416  128  128  56 
2006  Hindu study  717  523  1240  24  34 
scholarships  Economics  166  128  294  16  13 
  Natural science  19  55  74  16  9 
  Engineering  -  -  -  -  - 
  Master  118  185  303  64  18 
  Total  1020  891  1911  120  74 
2007  Hindu study  311  1182  1493  404   
  Economics  131  265  396  53   
  Natural science  16  55  71  24   
  Engineering  18  -  8  -   
  Master  169  216  385  34   
  Total  645  1718  2363  515   
2008  Hindu study    1089    305   
  Economics    343    14   
  Natural science    47    1   
  Engineering    16    -  2 
  Master    331    36   
  Total    1826    356  2 
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6.5.8. Profile of the Hindu StudiesFaculty (FIA, Fakultas Ilmu Agama) 
The Hindu StudiesFaculty operates academic and professional education. Academic education (Sarjana 1) is 
offered in Hindu philosophy, Hindu pedagogy, and Hindu Law. The Hindu Studies Faculty was accredited with 
status A by the national accreditation board for tertiary education in the years 2000 and 2007. Professional 
teacher  training  provided  was  the  special  didactic  and  qualification  program  Akta  MengajarIV.  The  Hindu 
studies faculty operates activities on three fields as any Indonesian faculty: 
 
1.  Academic sphere: (a) type of education, (b) curriculum, (c) operational system, (d) study load and 
study length, (e) study load allocation, (f) teaching and learning process, (g) examination, (h) Social 
research methodology and thesis, (i) graduation exercise and graduation.  
2.  Administrational and financial sphere: (a) organization and staffing, (b) enrollment/registration, (c) 
students  swap,  (d)  material  and  infrastructure,  (e)  funding,  (f)  student  regulation  and  other 
administrative matters.  
3.  Student organization affairs: (a) students affairs and (b) organizational affairs 
 
In line with the Tri Dharma of Higher Education, the Hindu Studies Faculty pursues and achieves prestige in the 
academic sphere, in research and in public service based on Hindu doctrines, which will be furthered and 
applied  in  everyday  life.  Thereby  a  Hindu  center  shall  be  set  up  that  is  able  to  function  as  a  center  for 
education,  instruction,  research,  and  development  of  Hindu  religion  and  culture.  This  centershall  produce 
qualified graduates, who respect sraddha and bhakti which isbased on dharma.  
 
The outlined task of the Hindu Studies Faculty is to analyze critically the Balinese social system and social order 
to provide solutions in order to counteract the looming dehumanization process from growing into a chronic 
condition in Bali. The deepening of sradha (faith, iman) is carried out to revitalize belief or faith in society. In 
consequence, the aim of Hindu faith is seen as a basic property in the progress of humanity. As the core 
convictions of Hindu Dharma Indonesia are the panca sradha, the structure and commitment standard of the 
Hindu Study Faculty root in sradha. Sradha are understood as universal and transcendent Hindu values, which 
are contextualized in the way of life of specific human beings or groups.  
 
In contemporary times, agama has to be interpreted critically and contextually, that is to say religion has to be 
directed to elaborate on and concretize those universal and transcendent values into an understanding which 
is practicable and contextual. Therefore thematic interpretations of religious scriptures are undertaken by the 
faculty in a contextual approach that reflects pragmatic needs of life. It is assumed that  universal truth is 
contained in scriptures and local wisdom of specific life worlds.  
 
The contextualization has the result that religious teachings are truly  applicable in life and encourage the 
growth of humanitarian values. In essence, this means that a conception of education, especially Hindu-based 
education has to be constructed while paying attention to the equilibrium of religion, humanities, and science. 
The 2006 academic guide gives an account of the ideals of the faculty: 
 
  The Hindu Studies Faculty shall become a vehicle for efforts in the retrieval, exposition, and interpretation 
of Hindu scriptures, whose are still hidden mysteriously by traditional authorities and conflicts between 
social groups in Bali.  
  The Hindu Studies Faculty shall transfer moral values into a more pragmatic life; thereby a peaceful and 
prosperous life shall be created for society and humanity. 
  The Hindu Studies Faculty shall become an information center for Hindu religious and cultural teachings 
with the result that it can take part in creating the splendor, excellence, and peculiarity of Balinese culture 
as one item of national culture.  
  The Hindu Studies Faculty is hoped to become the source of inspiration for the construction of a structure 
of Hindu-based social life while humanity progresses into a peaceful, prosperous, fair and democratic 
world. 
  The Hindu Studies Faculty shall become a Hindu visionary and missionary in order to protect the perpetuity 
of the ideal model of life in line with catur purusa artha. 
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Hindu educators training at UNHI 
According to its vision statement, Hindu pedagogy and educators’ training program operated at the Hindu 
Studiesfaculty has the objective to become 1.) popular as a training institution for professional and moral Hindu 
religion  educators  which  provides  one  of  the  best  Hindu  pedagogy  trainings  and  2.)  a  center  for  the 
interpretation, guidance, and quality improvement of Hindu religion in the Indonesian republic. The stated 
missions to realize the vision statement are to: 
 
1.  carry out education, research and public service in order to produce professional and moral Hindu 
educators 
2.  operate education based on a rational, transparent, innovative procedure  
3.  operate an efficient and outcome-oriented education process capable of producing skilled graduates 
in a short time 
4.  carry out guidance and development for the quality of the operation of Hindu education 
5.  establish  cooperation  and  partnerships  with  various  institutions  active  in  the  guidance  and 
development of the quality of Hindu education.  
 
The target of the Hindu pedagogy and educators training program is to produce ‘super’ Hindu educators with 
the following virtues:  
 
1.  Faith (sradha, iman) and devotion (bhakti, takwa)  
2.  have a high Pancasilaistic awareness as citizen and community member in the nation 
3.  master patterns of thinking, theory, generalizations, process, concepts, and important facts as a base 
to advance knowledge  
4.  have a pedagogic mindset, attitude, and skills for developing the process and managing of education 
at school  
5.  have personal habits, values, and tendencies supportive to the educator’s profession 
6.  are capable of professionally communicating in society and with colleagues  
7.  educate competent Hindu educators able to further develop their own competences in line with their 
professional  field  and  latest  technologies  and  capable  of  solving  issues  of  pedagogy  in  their 
responsibility  
 
The designed profile of graduates of the Hindu pedagogy and educator’s training specifies four components: 
The basic profile, the professional educator profile, the researcher profile and the expert profile. The basic 
profile of an educator covers four competences: Educators shall orient themselves to Hindu values which are 
rooted in faith (iman, sraddha) and devotion (takwa, bhakti), shall put to practice moral values, realize the 
values of Pancasila, act as responsible citizens in line with national norms, and respect the academic ethic code 
as  educated  members  of  the  academic  community.  This  basic  profile  is  nurtured  in  the  personality 
development lectures group (MPK, mata kuliah pengembangan kepribadian). The professional Hindu educator 
profile covers five competences: the graduates develop a deep knowledge in the study field of Hinduism. In 
order to develop the potential of the students, the teachers learn to understand and develop their students’ 
intellectual, social, emotional, and physical characteristics and background.  
 
Teachers shall have vast knowledge in their discipline and the skill to chose and manage Hindu knowledge in 
such a way that it can become the  subject  matter in curriculum and students’ life  worlds.  Teachers  shall 
provide instruction that educates. Education involves the skills to plan and carry out instruction, to assess and 
grade the instructional process and outcome, and the skill to continue the assessment result to continuously 
improve instruction. This involves the willingness of the teacher to continuously further his or her professional 
skills  with  the  result  that  instruction  organized  advances  of  the  students’  potential.  This  basic  profile  is 
nourished in the professionalism and skills lectures group (MKK, Mata kuliah Keilmuan dan Ketrampilan) and in 
working lecturers (MKB, Mata Kuliah Berkarya).  
 
The researcher or expert profile covers four competences: the graduates shall be capable of employing their 
scientific  knowledge  as  benchmarks  to  provide  solutions  to  problems  by  doing  research;  to  utilize  their 
research and academic activities as basis for scientific development, to understand the scientific reality in the 
epistemological perspective, and their pragmatic function in daily life. This basic profile is achieved in the 
working attitude lectures group (MPB, mata kuliah Prilaku Berkarya) and in the social coexistence lecturers 
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Last, but not least, the experts’ profile covers three competences: able to master and apply their Hindu expert 
knowledge in professional work performance, capable of utilizing their accumulated knowledge as bedrock to 
continuously develop their Hindu expertise. At any rate, the expert has to demonstrate a professional ethos in 
professional work performance. 
Undergraduate studies: academic and professional 
The Hindu StudiesFaculty offers three study programs: Hindu philosophy, Hindu pedagogy, and Hindu Law. The 
Hindu pedagogy program is structured as follows. One credit point (SKS) comprises 50 minutes of face to face 
lecture, one to two hours structured academic activities and one to two hours independent academic activities. 
The bachelor program comprises 95 core curriculum credit points and 58 institutional curriculum credit points. 
After having gathered 120 credit points, the student may turn in his or her thesis proposal. After collecting 152 
credit  points,  and  having  submitted  thesis,  which  has  been  accepted,  the  student  is  allowed  to  take  the 
bachelor certificate. Subsequent table shows the Hindu education curriculum at the Hindu pedagogy faculty in 
2006.  
 
Nr  Lecture  SKS  Nr  Lecture  SKS 
  Core Curriculum      Institutional curriculum  2 
  Pancasila Education  2  1  Natural science basic  2 
1  Civics  2  2  Wariga (Astrology)  2 
3  Religious education  3  3  Lay priest or high priest skills  2 
4  Philosophy basics  2  4  Sacral Art (Rerahinan)  2 
5  Cultural Philosophy  2  5  Traditional Balinese Architecture  2 
6  Anthropology of Religion  2  6  Usada   
7  Niti Sastra  2  7  Balinese   
8  Sociology of Religion  2  8  Pedagogy basics   
9  Psychology of Religion  2  9  Development of students   
10  Research Methodology  3  10  Teaching and Learning   
11  English  2  11  Educational media   
12  Philosophy of Religion  2  12  Examination of learning progress   
13  West- Philosophy  2  13  Didactics   
14  Philosophy of Humans  2  14  Development of subject matter   
15  Philosophy of Ethics  2  15  Basic teaching skills   
16  Hindu Philosophy I (Sradha)  2  16  Teaching and Learning strategies   
17  Hindu Philosophy II (Upanisad)  3       
18  Hindu Philosophy III (Darsana)  4       
19  Hindu Philosophy IV (Shiva Siddhanta)  4    Practical Lectures   
20  Weda I  2  1  Yoga   
21  Weda II  4  2  Dharmagita   
22  Hindu religion history  2  3  Offering and sacrifice practice   
23  Hindu ethics I  2  4  Hindu information practice   
24  Hindu ethics II  4  5  Community  assignment  /  Social  research  methodology 
(KKN/KKL) 
 
25  Hindu literature I  2  6  Teaching practice   
26  Hindu literature II  3  7  English   
27  Ritual (Dewa/ Manusia Yadnya)  2  8  Computer skills   
28  Ritual (Buta, Rsi, Pitra Yadnya)  4       
29  History of South Asian Religion and Culture  2    Selection Lectures   
30  History of Indonesian Religion and Culture  3  1  Basic Statistics   
31  Comparative religious studies  2  2  Education supervision   
32  Mini-thesis  6  3  Education management   
33  Old Javanese  4       
34  Sanskrit  4       
35  Philosophy of Science  2       
36  Indonesian  2       
  TOTAL  95    TOTAL  54 
 
In 2002, as a measure to counter the critical lack of Hindu teachers, the Hindu Studies Faculty opened a special 
didactic education program (Akte Mengajar IV) for bachelor graduates of all disciplines to attain an advanced 
training required for teaching qualification. National Education Law 20/2003 had stipulated the certification 
procedures and qualification trainings for educators. Since 2005, the didactic education program is operated 
and executes the qualification of Hindu instructors in Bali. In two years, 980 students registered  with the 
program.  The  following  table  gives  a  comparison  of  the  subject  groups’  statutory  distribution  of  teacher 
education in the bachelor program and the Akta IV. 
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No  Program  Study load 
S1  AKTA IV 
1  General Subject  10  - 
2  General Specialist Subjects  54  - 
3  Specialist Subjects  74  40 
4  Social research methodology (KKN)  2  - 
5  Thesis  6  - 
  TOTAL  146 credit points  40 credit points 
 
As the Director General for Guidance of the Hindu -Community is at the same time p resident of UNHI, the 
program has the right to organize the qualification of all Indonesian Hindu instructors given by the Hindu 
Directorate General Decree No. DJ.V/142/SK/2007. In academic means the , didactic education program has 
demonstrated its competence since the Decree of the Minister of National Education No. 057/O/2007 dated 
July 13, 2007 appointed UNHI as cooperation partner of IHDN to manage the assessment of the  Hindu class 
educators’ certification procedure in all Indonesian provinces. UNHI is further given the permit to carry out 
long-distance  certification  programs,  which  is  really  outstanding,  as  there  is  no  non-formal  long-distance 
education path provided by National Education Act 20/2003.  
 
As this fact was identified as major obstacle in the qualification process of Hindu teachers, and the Minister of 
Religion and the Director General may pass additional legislation, Prof Yudha Triguna followed the example of 
the Catholic long-distance modules and reintroduced the former concept of the Open University (Kute, kuliah 
terbuka). The issue and quality of long distance programs was debated vividly by teachers and bureaucrats 
alike, as I conducted the field work. The special didactic program has 40 credit points. After collecting 40 credit 
points, the student may take the certificate. The length of study is three or six semesters, if the students do not 
have a collected 40 credit points after two years, they must quit studying and drop out. The following tables 
show the curriculum of Akta Mengajar IV. 
 
Semester I 
no  Subject  SKS 
1  Introduction: Education  3 
2  Teaching and Learning resources and media  2 
3  Teaching and Learning strategy (didactics)  4 
4  Development of students  3 
5  Learning and Teaching  4 
6  Basic instruction skills  3 
  TOTAL  20 
Semester II 
no  Subject  SKS 
1  Assessment of students performance (examination)  3 
2  Educational Research   2 
3  Revision teaching  4 
4  Curriculum Development   3 
5  Education planning  4 
6  Teaching practice  3 
  TOTAL  20 PART D | 282  
 
Postgraduate studies programs 
The ambitious vision of the postgraduate studies program is to establish UNHI as a university of excellence. This 
shall in turn improve the progress of UNHI, society, and the state as the graduates will be able to compete on a 
national  and  international  scale.  The  target  of  the  program  is  to  produce  graduates,  who  master  and 
understand  theories  in  the  field  of  religion  and  culture,  can  apply  those  theories  in  debates  on  issues 
concerning religion and culture and can develop new concepts in the field of religion and culture by conducting 
their own independent, professional, multidisciplinary, and integrative research. As the bachelor program of 
the Hindu Studies faculty has beenaccredited A in 2000, postgraduate studies were established by the Director 
General  of  Tertiary  Education,  Department  of  Education  Decree  319/D/T/  in  2002  for  those,  who  are 
committed to deepen religious and cultural knowledge on October 28 2002
369. Since 2002 thepostgraduate 
program operates a religious and cultural studies Masters program.  
 
In 2007, the Masters program has been rated B ( Decree No. 019/BAN-PT/AK-V/S2/IX/2007). Since 2004, the 
postgraduate study program of Hindu pedagogy is operated.  The Masters study program was designed to 
implement the basic pattern of development in the Region Bali (Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah Bali), which 
is based on the Hindu Bali culture inspired by Hindu religion. In consequence, the Masters program has the aim 
to produce academic teachers, docents, researchers, analysts in the field of Hindu religion and Hindu culture 
which acquire (1) sharp and reliable scientific and scholarly analytical skills to investigate religious and cultural 
issues concentrated on religious and cultural studies, pedagogy of religion, Usada research, and Hindu politics 
and  governance;  (2)  skills  in  analysis  and  contextual  interpretation  of  religion  and  culture;  and  (3)  broad 
understanding of dynamic process in the arena of education and religion.   
The output of the program shall meet the requirements of expert staff mastering the interpretation of Hindu 
religious and cultural symbols and phenomena. Those graduates shall be qualified to work at all sections of the 
regional,  provincial,  and  national  government.  In  October  2008,  Minister  of  Religion  Decree  No  139/2008 
restructured the Masters program into three study programs: religious and cultural studies, Hindu pedagogy, 
and evaluation of Hindu pedagogy. In 2008, as director of the postgraduate program acted Prof Dr Ida Bagus 
Gunadha, as vice director of academics Prof Dr I Putu Gelgel, as vice director of administration A. A. Ngurah 
Gde Sadiartha, as head of the Masters study program I Wayan Budi Utama and as head of the doctoral study 
program A. A. Anom Kumbara. Standard competences to be required are motivation, attitude, skills, capacity, 
and interpretation. The matriculation fee amounted to 1,5 million Indonesian rupiah in 2008/2009, and the 
education operation contribution amounted to 15 million Indonesian rupiah. Registration fees, examination, 
and graduation fees are not included. The curricular structure of the Hindu pedagogy and Hindu pedagogy 
evaluation magister program is shown in following table:  
 
Hindu pedagogy  Hindu pedagogy assessment 
Group  Lectures   SKS  Lectures   SKS 
MKK  Philosophy of science  2  Philosophy of science  2 
  Research methodology  2  Research methodology  2 
  Hindu philosophy  2  Hindu philosophy  2 
MPB  Theory of education  4  Education assessment theory  4 
  Theory of religion  3  Pedagogy and didactics theory  3 
  Shiva Buddha Tatwa  2  Theory of religin  3 
  History of Hindu evolution  2  Shiva Buddha Tatwa  2 
  Social theory  2  History of Hindu evolution  2 
      Social theory  2 
MKB  Learning psychology  3  Statistics  4 
  Hindu ethics  3  Education Psychometrics   3 
  Hindu management and leadership  2  Hindu  management  and 
leadership 
3 
  Basics of Hindu education  2     
  Quantitative  and  qualitative  research 
methodology 
3     
Thesis  Research proposal  0  Research proposal  0 
  Thesis  8  Thesis  8 
  TOTAL  40  Total  40 
 
                                                 
369 The permit of the master program has been renewed in the Directorate General of higher education decree No. 2327/D/T/2005 on 
October 7
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In 2007, the doctoral program was established comprising three programs: religious and cultural studies and 
Hindu pedagogy. The developed standard competences are the same as for the Masters study program. The 
registration fee is at 350 thousand Rupiah and the education operation contribution amounted to 75 million 
Indonesian rupiah. The curricular structure of the Hindu pedagogy doctoral program is shown in the following 
table:  
 
Group  Lectures   Credit points 
MKK  Philosophy of science  3 
  Research methodology  3 
  Philosophy of education  3 
MPB  Theory of education  3 
  Theory of religion  3 
  Quantitative research methodology  3 
MKB  Research: Religious psychology  2 
- choice  Research: Hindu management and leadership   2 
  New trend in the field of education  2 
  Research: education need assessment  2 
Additional lectures  Social theory  2 
Pre-requisite  History of Hindu evolution  2 
  Shiva Buddha Tatwa  2 
  Critical issues in education  2 
Dissertation  Comprehension  4 
  Seminar research proposal  4 
  Reviewing academic work   
  Closed disputation  16 
  Open disputation  4 
  TOTAL  64 
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6.6. State Hindu Dharma Institute Denpasar 
 
 
Whereas  UNHI  has  been  established  and  operated  by  the  Hindu 
Council,  the  State  Hindu  Dharma  Institute  (Institute  Hindu  Dharma 
Negeri, IHDN) is closely connected to the Directorate General of the 
Guidance of the Hindu Congregation and even its structure reflects 
the administrative divisions of the Directorate. Since the State Hindu 
Dharma Institute is a state run institute, the president is responsible 
to  the  Minster  of  Religion.  Interestingly,  the  State  Hindu  Dharma 
Institute is not based on a Hindu motto (since the sole base policy of 
the  Sukarno  regime  has  been  abolished,  organizations,  parties  and 
institutions may be based on Hindu or Pancasila values, as UNHI or 
Dwijendra) but on the Pancasila.This has not been changed during 
Indonesian democracy.  
6.6.1. History 
The early history of the IHDN and the history of the Dwijendra foundation are closely linked. Established under 
the patronage of the Dwijendra foundation in 1959, the embryo of all State Hindu Teacher Training Institutions 
and the State Hindu Dharma Institute was the Agama Hindu Bali Teacher Training College (Pendidikan Guru 
Atas Agama Hindu Bali, PGAAHB) at the level of a senior high school.  
 
It was the first school in Indonesia to train Hindu religion instructors for higher schooling. I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, 
who had proposed the term Agama Hindu Bali in 1958, compiled the basic structure of the curriculum and 
acted concurrently as instructor at the college. The students of the first-generation came from the Dwijendra 
junior  high  school  or  elementary  schools  and  were  trained  at  the  PGAAHB.  In  1968,  the  government 
nationalized the PGAAHB and renamed it as the State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN, Pendidikan Guru 
Agama Hindu Negeri), and authorized the college to perform national exams and to issue state certificates. The 
students were trained in Hindu religion for three years; the curricular contents also comprised psychological, 
didactical, methodical, and pedagogical aspects. The school then moved to its current location in Ratna Street 
in East Denpasar. 
 
In Indonesia and Bali, the demand for qualified guidance of Hindu cadres became more pressing during the 
1990s, as the Suharto government increasingly included Islam into their political agenda. In the period between 
1990  and  1999  the  equal  status  of  Hinduism  sometimes  became  threatened.Education  Law  No  2/1989 
provision required all in-service teachers at elementary schools to hold a Diploma II qualification and all in-
service teachers at higher schooling to hold a Diploma III qualification. As result in 1990, the State Hindu 
Teacher  Training  College  (PGAHN)  was  closed,  whereas  all  State  Islamic  Teacher  Training  Colleges  (PGAI), 
including the one in Negara, Bali were restructured into State MadrasahAliyah at the level of undergraduate 
studies. Although the restructuring of the State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN) into a State Hindu 
Academy at the level of undergraduate studies would have been possible, this has not been done. Only Islamic 
institutions were upgraded but not the Hindu based education institutions. (Arsada 2006: 53) This development 
should be seen in connection with Suharto’s Islamic turn in 1989, and the strengthened role of political Islam in 
national policies and the MORA and MONE. 
 
The Hindu Directorate redeployed the PGAHN staff and the educators in the regional office of the MORA in 
Denpasar. However, “by courtesy of the Director General, Ketut Pasek, the governor of Bali Prof Dr Ida Bagus 
Oka, regional and national executives and the prayers of the entire Hindu community”, (IHDN 2007/2008: 2) 
the state opened the State Agama Hindu Educator Training Academy (APGAHN; Akademi Pendidikan Guru 
Agama  Hindu  Negeri)  in  1993.  Its  faculty  of  Hindu  pedagogy  provided  Diploma  II  and  Diploma  III  study 
programs, as required by Educational Act 2/1989. I Gede Sura was appointed rector and the facilities and 
materials  of  the  disbanded  State  Hindu  Teacher  Training  College  (PGAHN,  Pendidikan  Guru  Agama  Hindu 
Negeri) in Denpasar were used to provide the resources and materials needed, as funding was problematic. 
Furthermore, Gede Sura was busy redeploying the former staff and educators from the State Hindu Teacher 
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On December 9 1994, I Nyoman Warjana was appointed president. During his term, organization and teaching 
became clearer and more structured. He recruited permanently employed docents in order to improve the 
functioning of the Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi. I Gusti Made Ngurah was appointed third president in June 
1996. He tried to improve the quality of the teaching and learning process by political lobbying. He proposed to 
raise the status of State Agama Hindu Educator Training Academy (APGAHN) into a School of Applied Science. 
In addition, the teaching process at the State Agama Hindu Educator Training Academy has been improved 
concerning  staff,  educators,  resources  and  materials.  In  consequence,  the  State  Agama  Hindu  Educator 
Training Academy is not the immediate successor, but the heir of the embryo of the Agama Hindu Bali Teacher 
Training College (Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama Hindu Bali, PGAAHB) under the patronage of the Dwijendra 
foundation.  
 
Then during the era of reform, “by courtesy of the former governor of Bali and Minister of Family Planning and 
Population, Prof Dr Ida Bagus Oka, the Hindu Director General I Wayan Gunawan, the governor of Bali I Dewa 
Beratha, regional and national executives and Hindu non-governmental organizations, and the prayers of the 
entire  Hindu  community”  (IHDN  2007/2008:  3),  the  status  of  theState  Agama  Hindu  Educator  Training 
Academy  (APGAHN)  was  raised  by  Presidential  Degree  20/1999.  It  was  renamed  into  State  Agama  Hindu 
School  For  Applied  Sciences  (STAHN,  Sekolah  Tinggi  Agama  Hindu  Negeri).  The  reform  government  had 
endorsed the decree, which was signed by president Habibie and the Minister of Religion A. Malik Fajar on April 
10
th, 1999.  
 
According to the decree, the STAHN has been authorized to organize undergraduate study programs (DII, DIII, 
DIV, S1) at four faculties: 1.) Hindu pedagogy faculty, 2.) Hindu information faculty, 3.) Hindu law faculty, and 
4.) Hindu philosophy faculty. The school was set up officially by Minister of Religion Prof Malik Fajar, while 
Wayan  Suarjaya  was  appointed  the  first  rector,  though  six  month  after  he  was  appointed  Hindu  Director 
General and moved to Jakarta. Suarjaya’s policies concentrated on motivating the educators to continue their 
qualification in postgraduate studies in Bali, outside Bali, and in India. Thereby the continuous improvement of 
Hindu training centers’ quality should be guaranteed. Note, the State Agama Hindu School For Applied Sciences 
(STAHN, Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri) was the singular state Hindu institute of higher education in 
Indonesia at that time. With regard to the quality of education, he urged that the operation of the Tri Dharma 
were to be bettered by extracurricular courses in upakara (ritual materials), dharma gita (chanting), tabuh 
(gamelan), tari (dance), foreign languages and Yoga. Suarjaya made the IHDN popular in Bali and introduced it 
to the regional  government  and other tertiary institutions in order to obtain feedback how to better the 
condition of the school.  
 
The second president in succession was Dr. I Made Titib who was appointed on June 26
th, 2000. Prof Titib, who 
has studied in India, has been the only appointed professor of the institute in 2008 and was reappointed as 
president in 2009. He continued his predecessor’s polices in urging the academic staff to continue their studies, 
and the cooperation with other tertiary institutions as the Udayana University, the Gadjah Mada University, 
and the Institute for Pedagogy and Education in Singaraja. Prof Titib also pioneered the cooperation with the 
government of the regency Bangli, and the twin campus of the STAHN was erected on an area of 75 thousand 
square meters at Kubu, Bangli.  
 
The first Hindu-based postgraduate study program concentrated on Hindu theology (Brahma Widya) has been 
established by the Hindu and Buddha Director Instruction No. H/20/tahun/2001 dated May 1 2001. Following 
Prof Titib’s appointment as Director of the subdivision of Hindu Affairs at the MORA in 2002, I Gede Rudia 
Adiputra, who previously served as official at the Department of Religion in Jakarta, was appointed president 
on March 8 2002. Adiputra continued the strategic policies of his predecessors and during his term STAHN has 
been accredited  as  B in  August 2003. After the rapid renovation efforts in 2002, the  new and renovated 
buildings  were  inaugurated  in  August  2003  and  a  big  animal  sacrifice  wasperformed  as  a  sign  that  the 
renovation process had been completed.  
 
As  State  Agama  Hindu  School  For  Applied  Sciences  (STAHN,  Sekolah  Tinggi  Agama  Hindu  Negeri)  was 
accredited as B in 2002, the school was officially given the permit to provide  Masters postgraduate study 
programs in Agama Hindu or Agama Hindu Pedagogy by Minister of Religion Instruction No. 494 in 2003. The 
continuous efforts to improve quality of the STAHN were successful.  
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Presidential Regulation 1/ 2004, dated November 8, raised the status of the STAHN into an institute. It was 
renamed  into  State  Hindu  Dharma  Institute  (IHDN,  Institute  Hindu  Dharma  Negeri).  The  president  of  the 
institute is appointed by and responsible to the Minster of Religion. In consequence, the director  has full 
autonomy to manage the institute under the guidance of the Hindu Directorate General and according to 
legislation in effect. In consequence, the IHDN is funded by the Department of Religion. On March 23 2005, the 
Minister of Religion M Maftuh Basyumi officially opened the Institute. Consequential legislation was Minster of 
Religion Regulation No 6 in 2005 on the organizational and administrational structure of the IHDN and Minster 
of Religion Regulation 4/ 2005 on IHDN’s statutes. On recommendation of the senate and personal support, I 
Gede Rudia Adiputra was reappointed as president on July 7
th, 2005. IHDN operates 3 faculties: Dharma Acarya 
faculty (pedagogy), Dharma Duta faculty (social and cultural studies), and Brahma Widya faculty (philosophy). 
The president of IHDN endorsed the study guide for 2007/2008 on June 18
th 2007. In 2009, I Made Titib has 
been reappointed President. 
6.6.2. Profile 
In its vision statement outlined in the 2005 statutes, the IHDN  shall be empowered in such a way that it 
produces Hindu human resources who are versed firmly in Agama Hindu values. Its first mission statement 
outlines the task to realize IHDN as an institute of excellence which takes responsibility in the consolidation 
process of agamaHindu, the development of science, technology, art and culture based on the philosophy of 
Tri Hita Karana. Note the congruent vision statement of the IHDN and the province of Bali. Another endeavor 
aims to develop IHDN into an institute of higher education, which is competitive, adaptive, and responsive 
towards the changing spirit of the ages. The institute’s last mission aims to manifest IHDN as a reliable institute 
of  higher  education  in  the  development  process  of  qualified,  professional,  independent,  democratic, 
responsible, and firm human resources, which apply Hindu values in society and nation. The outline’s objective 
sets out to prepare the students to become valuable members of society, have academic, professional or 
vocational skills, can work out, create and apply technologies, sraddha and bhakti. In short, the objective of 
IHDN is to consolidate and apply Hindu teachings and values in society and the nation in order to raise society’s 
standard of life and to enrich the national culture 
6.6.3. Location and facilities 
The IHDN campus is located in the Ratna Street in Denpasar. The regional office of the Parisada is located just a 
few  meters  up  the  street.  On  the  campus  area,  there  is  a  four  floor  presidium,  were  the  deaneries,  the 
presidium and the administration are located. Cars are allowed to park in front of the presidium and motor 
bikes have to park in the dense packed parking area behind the presidium. Behind the presidium, two four-
floor buildings are located, and one Mensa. Since 2005, the twin campus in Bangli (Kubu district) was upgraded, 
and parts of the administration in Denpasar were out housed to Bangli in 2007 and 2008. Facilities at the 
campus in Denpasar are the presidium, the auditorium, the ritual lab, resources for extracurricular activities, 
the language lab and the boardinghouse. The campuses in Bangli and Singaraja have their own boardinghouses 
and resources for extracurricular activities. In 2010, two additional campuse swere opened by the Directorate 
General for the Guidance of the Hindu congregation. These two new campuses are located in the parallel 
Kenyeri street  
6.6.4. Organizational structure and academic cycle 
The IHDN provides academic and professional education at three faculties in bachelor undergraduate studies 
and postgraduate studies, as the DIII, DIII and DIV study programs have been closed in 2007. The Dharma 
Acharya faculty is concentrated on pedagogy, education and teacher training. The Dharma Acharya faculty 
provides two academic and one professional study programs: the Hindu pedagogy department provides an 
academic bachelor study program in Hindu pedagogy, the Language and Art Department offers the academic 
bachelor  study  program  in  Balinese  regional  language,  and  the  professional  Akta  VI  program  provides 
educators’ qualification courses.  
 
The  Dharma  Duta  faculty  provides  Hindu  information  management  on  the  social  and  cultural  sector,  and 
professional and academic education at two departments. The bachelor study program in agama information 
and the DII study program for professional tour guides are offered by the agama information department, 
whereas the department of Hindu law provides the bachelor Hindu law study program. In 2007, Prof Titib acted 
as the dean of the Brahma Widya faculty, which specializes in Hindu theology and Hindu religion. The faculty is 
structured into two departments, of which the department of Eastern philosophy provides a bachelor study 
program in Hindu philosophy. The department of Hindu theology offers the singular Hindu theology bachelor 
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The president of the postgraduate study program is Dr I Ketut Widnya, who obtained his PhD in India and is a 
highly professional academic with a controversial position in Bali, since he is allegedly too fond of Indian Hindu 
influences. In 2009, he was appointed as President of STAHN Gede Pudja in Mataram, Lombok. The program 
offers two Masters study programs, in Hindu theology and in Hindu pedagogy. The capacity building of the 
students  in  extracurricular  activities  is  organized  by  the  students’  activity  unit,  and  comprises  activities 
preparing the student to become a Hindu scholar and professional employee. The activities aim to deepen the 
practice and knowledge of agama Hindu, to sharpen analytical skills, and to enrich the Hindu perceptions of 
the students by applying the Council’s and the Directorate’s sad dharma methodology of teaching: dharma tula 
(discussion), dharma wacana (lecture, speech), dharma yatra (pilgrimage), dharma gita (kidung, chanting), 
dharma  sadhana  (spiritual  practice,  yoga),  dharma  santhi  (religious  reception).Further  activities  include 
competitions in academic writing and innovative and productive works, sports, student organization, a student 
corporation, student regiment, dancing and gamelan (tabuh).  
The guidance of students in extracurricular activities is directed at the creation of a national progress manager 
elite (kader pelaksana pembangunan nasional) in the arena of agama Hindu and to create a people struggle 
elite  (kader  perjuangan  bangsa),  graduates  of  brave  Indonesian  personality.  Compulsory  extracurricular 
activities  at  the  bachelor  programs  comprise  dharmagita  (chanting),  upakara  (ritual  materials),  dharma 
wacana (lecture speech) and yoga asana (meditation, yoga). 
6.6.5. Academic staff and students 
I could not obtain dataon the current state of educators’ status and number. But, I obtained data on student 
enrollment at the Dharma Acharya faculty in the second semester in 2006/2007. The following table shows the 
number of students enrolled at the Dharma Acarya faculty in 2006/2007. 
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Since the IHDN is authorized to organize long-distance bachelor programs for in-service, it maintains small 
learning  centers  (pondok  belajar)  throughout  Bali  in  Pupuan,  Banjar,  Busung  Biu,  Kintamani,  Gianyar, 
Negara,and Tabanan. The students attend class four hours a week and the remaining credit points are collected 
by autonomous academic work, which is assigned by the docents coming from Denpasar or Singaraja.  
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The following table shows the number of Hindu pedagogy students according to study programs. 
 
HRE  SMT Genap 2007/2008  TOTAL 
    II  IV  VI  VIII  X  XII  XIV   
S1    398    178    388    226    27    20    12    1.249 
DII        111                        111 
DIII    -2    51    43                    94 
  SMT Ganjil 2008  1.454 
  I  III  V  VII  IX  XI  XIII  XV   
S1  208    396    677    454    137    24    15    8  1.919 
DIII  -  -  -  -  44                      44 
                                1. 953 
 
The table demonstrates the students’ enrollment in Hindu pedagogy following the abolition of the Diploma II 
and III study programs. Students of the diploma II and diploma III program either graduated or registered with 
the bachelor program or dropped out. The drastic rise in student numbers is caused by the in-service teachers 
registered at the respective level of their graduation, in other words teachers holding a diploma II continue 
their  studies  in  the  third  semester.  The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  students  enrolled  at  the 
theological faculty (Brahma Widya) from 2002 to 2008 for comparison 
 
Year  Total 
student 
enrollment 
Capacity  Accepted 
students 
New 
students 
Amount  of 
graduates 
02/03  50  20  14  10  - 
03/04  60  20  15  13  7 
04/05  65  20  15  11  6 
05/06  75  40  25  22  14 
06/07  60  40  20  16  6 
07/08  125  80  70  62  11 
 
The master program is operated in cooperation with the STAHN Gede Puja in Mataram, the administration of 
the study program is located at the campus in Denpasar, where the examination of the students’ performance 
is  carried  out  also.  The  following  table  shows  the  students  registered  with  the  Hindu  pedagogy  Masters 
program. 
 
Generation  Year  Amount  of 
enrollments 
Accepted 
students 
male  female 
I  2004/2005  36  34  31  3 
II  2005/2006  74  57  38  19 
III  2006/2007  99  67  48  19 
 
6.6.6. Profile of the Dharma Acharya faculty 
The Dharma Acharya faculty is specialized in the Hindu educators’ sector and provides two academic and one 
professional study program. The Language and Art Department offers the academic bachelor study program in 
Balinese  regional  language,  the  Hindu  pedagogy  department  providesa  bachelor  study  program  for  Hindu 
teachers, and teacher qualification courses are offered in the professional Akta VI program. The dean of the 
faculty is Made Girinatha. The objective of the bachelor program is to prepare professional Hindu educators for 
elementary and higher schooling. The function of the faculty is to organize academic activities in the fields of 
education, research and public service. Its duties are to develop agama Hindu by carrying out instruction, 
research, and other academic duties, to prepare educators in programmed and structured lecturers, theory, 
practice, and field experience, and to report on administration and the teaching and learning process.  
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According to the Act on Higher Education, the curricular structure consists of 5 learning areas, the distribution 
of the learning areas in the application of the curriculum is shown in following table: 
 
  Learning area / curricular component   Legislation   Application at IHDN 
1  MPK  
(personality development subject group) 
8-10%  10,81 
2  MKK  
(knowledge and skills subject group) 
12-20%  18,91 
3  MKB  
(professional work subject group) 
40%  43,24 
4  MPB  
(work attitude subject group) 
20%  21,62 
5  MBB  
(Social coexistence subject group) 
0-10%  05,40 
 
The following table shows theUndergraduate Hindu pedagogy curriculum at Dharma Acarya faculty. 
 
  Learning  area 
(subjects group) 
Main competence  
(core curriculum) 
Credit 
points 
Supporting competences 
(institutional curriculum) 
CP   
1.  MPK  
(personality 
development 
subject group) 
Civics  2  Principles in social science  2   
Indonesian  2  Principles in natural science  2   
English  2       
TOTAL  6    4  10 
2  MKK  
(knowledge and  
skills  
subject group) 
Educators profession  2  Teaching methods for religion  2   
Educational Psychology  2  Sociology of education  2   
Education  administration  and 
supervision 
2  History of Hindu culture  2   
Education management  2  Teaching strategy (didactics) I  2   
Teaching strategy (didactics) I  2       
Educational assessment (examination)  2       
Curriculum development program   2       
Media and Resources  2       
Educational statistics  2       
Classroom management  2       
TOTAL  20    8  28 
3  MKB  
(professional work 
subject group) 
Introduction to Vedas  2  Essence of Vedas  2   
Upanisad I  2  Upanishad II  2   
Darsana I  2  Darsana II  2   
Acara Agama Hindu (Ritual) I  2  Acara Agama Hindu (Ritual) II  2   
Saiwa Siddhanta I  2  Saiwa Siddhanta III  2   
Saiwa Siddhanta II  2  Old Javanese (Kawi) III  2   
Old Javanese (Kawi) I  2  Sanskrit III  2   
Old Javanese (Kawi) II  2  Regional language II  2   
Sanskrit I  2  Priesthood  2   
Sanskrit II  2  Nitisastra II  2   
Regional language  2  Yoga II  2   
Wariga I  2  Ithiasa (epic poetry) II  2   
Nithisastra I  2  Tantra  2   
Yoga I  2  Hindu Law  2   
Ethics (Tata Susila) I  2  Darsana III  2   
Tata Susila II  2  Pujastawa  2   
Ithiasa (epic poetry) I  2       
Hindu sociology  2       
Purana  2       
4  MPB  
(work  attitude 
subject group) 
TOTAL  38    34  72 
Comparing studies of religion  2  Dharmawacana  2   
Dharmagita I  2  Psychology of Religion  2   
Guidance and Counseling  2  Sacral Art  2   
Research methodology I  2  Hindu evolution history  2   
Research methodology II  2  Academic works evaluation techniques  2   
Cultural Anthropology  2  PPL/PKM  2   
Design instructional and micro teaching  2  Journalism  2   
TOTAL  20    18  72 
5  MBB  (Social 
coexistence 
subject group) 
Thesis  6  Tour guiding  2   
Practice (Praktek kerja lapangan)  0  Computer application  2   
Public service (KKN)  4  Seminar proposal  0   
TOTAL  4    66   
TOTAL  88    66  154 
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If a student studies six to eight hours at day and 2 hours at night during six consecutive days, as the IHDN study 
guide calculates, then the study time of a student to comprise 48 to 60 hours in a week. Since one credit point 
comprises three hours of academic work, one credit point comprises 50 minutes teacher centered learning 
(lecture), 60 minutes structured academic activities assigned by the teacher (homework, presentation, review, 
summary, paper) and 60 minutes independent academic activities to deepen course matter, the student should 
collect 18-22 credit points each semester.  
 
The bachelor program comprises 88 core curriculum credit points and 66 institutional curriculum credit points. 
After having gathered 140-150 credit points the student may turn in his or her thesis proposal. Then the 
student is allocated six months to finish the thesis and if the thesis is approved, the student is allowed to take 
the certificate during the graduation ceremony. Students who do not collect 144 credit points in fourteen 
semesters are advised to change the study program or to drop out.  
 
The Dharma Acharya faculty operates the special didactic education program (Akte Mengajar IV) for bachelor 
graduates (S1) of all disciplines to attain training to obtain the teaching qualification. The program has shown 
its competence since the Decree of the Minister of National Education No. 057/O/2007 conferred the right to 
organize the qualification of all Indonesian Hindu instructors on IHDN. Also in 2007, UNHI was appointed as 
IHDN’s cooperation partner in the certification assessment procedure of instructors in the subject of Hindu 
religion in all Indonesian provinces. After collecting 36 credit points, the student will be awarded the certificate. 
The length of study is three or six semesters. If the students have not collected 40 credit points after seven 
years, they have to quit studies.The following table shows theAkta Mengajar IV curriculum 
 
Semester I 
No  Subject  SKS 
1  Introduction: Education  2 
2  Learning and Teaching Strategies (Didactics)  Teaching and Learning media  2 
3  The educator profession   2 
4  Classroom management  2 
5  Psychology of education  2 
6  Curriculum development program   2 
7  Hindu religion basics  4 
  TOTAL  16 
Semester II 
1  Guidance and counseling   2 
2  Assessment of students performance (examination)  2 
3  Teaching and Learning resources and media  2 
4  Classroom management   2 
5  Educational research   2 
6  Applied theory of education (Design instructional and micro teaching)  2 
7  Real teaching practice  6 
  TOTAL  20 
 
I could not obtain the curriculum for the current Masters study program in Hindu pedagogy as it has been 
under compilation during my field work at the IHDN. 
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PART E 
7. Conclusion: Parts of the Ensemble 
In the pre-colonial Indian subcontinent and in the Archipelago individual and collective identities were plural, 
fluid, flexible, segmented and contextual. There was no unitary, across-the-board identity which transcended 
the frameworks of kinship and clan, region, village, and faith community. Those pre-colonial communities had 
fluid boundaries for the reason that collective identities were not defined territorially, but relationally through 
ritual, personal relationships, and social networks. Distinctions and interactions between collective identities 
were determined by ritual and context, expressing a continuous contention about the rule of precedence in the 
social hierarchy. These plural and ‘fuzzy sets’ of membership and identity pertained to the historical period in 
which  the  world  was  not  yet  charted,  mapped,  and  enumerated.  Probably  related  to  extensive  maritime 
trading networks in the region, a cognizance of other  societies resided at the core  of each  society’s self-
definition.  
 
The  change  from  a  traditional  to  a  pluralistic  society  demands  amongst  others  a  change  of  attitude  and 
perception of neighboring communities. In traditional societies rather a collection of communities living side by 
side as groups existed instead of a ‘society’
370. Each of these communities based on one of the primordial 
bonds  like  blood  (ethnicity  or  race),  religion,  functional  or  social  stratum.  (Schumann  2001:  23)  Their 
prosperity, especially those of their leaders who symbolized the unity of a system, was safeguarded by their 
functioning together in a complementary fashion. In Southeast Asian policies, there are loose parts constituting 
one  ensemble,  usually  one  part  of  the  ensemble  is  located  in  the  center  and  by  making  use  of  personal 
relations, social networks, and short lived fluctuating shifting alliances, the respective periphery is integrated 
by  processes  of  affiliation  or  association.  (Tambiah  1985;  Dellios  2003;  Parker  2004;  Munoz  2006)  Those 
structures are highly dynamic and constant tensions are constitutive parts of the system. Once a center is 
defined, then the center’s perspective is taken and all other parts are located at the periphery of the center.  
 
In general, socio-religious plurality as well as interaction and negotiation of varying vested interests and shifting 
alliances denote the key feature of Indonesia’s society. In consequence, the present study demonstrated that 
first an exclusive understanding of religion actually contradicts the traditional archipelagic way of life, the 
constitution, and legal framework of Indonesia, and second the plurality of religious and other world views 
represented in Indonesia results in endless negotiation processes represented in shifting alliances steered by 
vested interests with high fluctuation.  
7.1. Indonesia: Southeast Asian Model for organizing religious plurality? 
The Indonesian state seems to have a considerable capacity for improvisation or as the World Bank put it, 
“muddling through”. Faced with multiple crises in almost every field, Indonesia often seems to be moving in 
the direction of collapse but it never happens. Somehow at the last moment a way is always found to avert the 
looming disaster, not through basic reforms but by improvisation. Immediate problems are fixed when they 
become really threatening to the system but the solution is usually temporary. (Harold Crouch 2003: 33) 
                                                 
370  Schumann  refers  here  to  a  differentiation  introduced  by  Tönnies  between  community  (Gemeinschaft)  and  society  (Gesellschaft). 
Community embodies natural will (Wesenswille) and is maintained by face-to-face interhuman relationships and a sense of solidarity 
governed by traditional rules. Society, however, is a more complex entity reflecting rational will (Kürwille) and characterized by indirect and 
impersonal relationships motivated by rational self-interest. Students of religions generally apply Tönnies’s notion of the community type 
to both archaic and contemporary tribal communities, in which the religious and natural will coalesce. They also acknowledge that a more 
stratified society usually develops from a community, even though smaller religious or ethnic communities may continue to exist within the 
framework  of  a  larger  society.  Buddhism,  Christianity  and  Islam  considered  their  fellowship  to  be  “religious  communities”  or  “faith 
communities” that united different segments with a society or even crossed ethnic, linguistic, cultural and national lines. These larger 
communities gave birth to a variety of religious societies that often became de facto a religious community, even if they retained the 
nomenclature of “society” as in the case of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). The category of religious community must include (Kitagawa, 
1987: 302): 
1.  Tribal communities, both natural and religious, archaic or contemporary 
2.  Sacred national communities 
3.  Founded religious communities such as the Buddhist, the Christian, and the Islamic 
4.  Various religious societies-turned-communities, as for instance orders of monks and nuns   
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7.1.1. Indonesia: A possible Model for Arab spring countries? 
“(A)s a developing country, Indonesia is making a painful transition to democracy facing a myriad of problems. 
If handled properly, Indonesia can become a model for other Islamic countries by demonstrating that 
democracy and Islam are not incompatible” (Amitav Acharya 2007: 87) 
 
Researchers  on  Southeast  Asia  and  Indonesia  have  long  pointed  at  the  discursive  uses  of  Pancasila  as  a 
platform for dialogue and model of pluralism. During the reform area, there was a fair amount of discussion in 
the media and the public sphere in general, about whether to retain the five principles, given their history as 
tools  of  control  and  manipulation.  It  became  evident  during  the  reform-era  that  the  five  principles  and 
pluralism was not merely rhetoric to Indonesians, but something which the majority felt was integral to the 
national culture and something that they wished to retain, even when given the freedom to discard it, and to 
re-actualize it in national discourse. (Yudhoyono 2006 in Raillon 2011; Habibie 2011; Zoelva Interview 2011)This 
indicates that there is some level of commitment and political will within Indonesian society towards pluralism. 
(International IDEA 2000: 209) 
 
This pluralism remains not uncontested though. For example, the Indonesian Ulama’ Council (MUI, Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia) issued 11 fatwa (religious decrees) in July 2005. These decrees arouse controversies and 
heated debates. Three of these fatwa were highly controversial and banned secularism, pluralism, and religious 
liberalism
371. A controversial issue is primarily about the definition that MUI uses to define pluralism. Practicing 
contextual Muslims argued, MUI could not ban M uslims from thinking, because pluralism, liberalism, and 
secularism are not ideologies but ways of thinking and they hold that these fatwa are against freedom of 
expression and human rights in general
372’. (Nahrowi 2005) On top of that MUI banned Ahamadiyah’s doctrine 
and forbid collective inter-faith prayer
373. (Nahrowi 2005) 
 
Oversimplified media and scholarship portray two very distinct features of religious life in Indonesia, in this 
they are portraying the ambiguity of the  Pancasila – one feature shows the more legalistic and normative 
aspects of the Pancasila, the focus of interest is the potential for conflict solution mechanisms, a peaceful 
coexistence of religions contained within the principles and the numerous cases of actual peaceful existence. 
The  other  feature  shows  discriminative  legislation,  lenient  police  in  the  enforcement  of  equal  rights,  and 
localized and specific group-targeted violence against religious minorities and members of certain “sects” and 
terrorism.  International  media,  Human  Rights  organizations,  and  scholarship  regularly  report  on  religious 
violence in Indonesia. Recent events show an Indonesian reality where religious pluralism is in peril, which 
reveals that “diversity is such a threat to one group that it feels it must be met with violence” (Gunawan 2010). 
In  this  context,  the  Indonesian  Institute  for  Peace  and  Democracy,  SETARA  (2009:  18-19),  draws  a  rather 
negative picture of the state of religious freedom in Indonesia.  
 
The State, either at legislative, executive or judicative level, was still not able to create a constructive 
breakthrough  for  the  fulfillment  of  constitutional  rights  of  its  citizens  to  have  religion/belief  freely. 
Instead, in 2008, there were systemic efforts to create uniformity through legislations and policies by 
using a monolithic view based on religion and morality. The political movement of creating uniformity is 
not only monopolized by particular political powers, Islamic mass organizations that so far often have 
acted intolerantly, but has been obsessed by the State executors and integrated in the State body. (…) 
Collective fraud was created by the State executors who have authority to legislate; all of those were 
done to continuously build up and accumulate political support and to be in power. The logic of politics of 
the majority versus the minority, moral versus immoral, good versus bad have dominated the practices of 
the  Government  of  Indonesia.  The  Constitution  which  should  be  a  consensus  and  an  instrument  to 
regulate relations among citizens and relations between citizens and the State has been removed and 
replaced with the logic of politics to create uniformity. 
 
In 2008, freedom of religion/belief once again failed to have intact recognition from the Constitution due 
to biases in interpreting the Constitution, which are still carried on by the political elites of the State. 
                                                 
371 MUI considered these things as bad because they only employ rational ways of thinking freely, not religious-based thinking. MUI defined 
secularism as a concept that considers religion only to be concerned with the relationship between religion and God, while the relationship 
among  humans  is  not  a  religious  concern.  Additionally,  MUI  defined  pluralism  as  the  concept  that  every  religion  is  the  same,  and 
characteristically relativistic so that no one can claim the truth of the religion. (Nahrowi 2005) 
372 Nahrowi 2005: 10 (The Jakarta Post.com, August 1, 2005: MUI’s fatwa encourage the use of violence) 
373 MUI considered that such prayer is halal (allowed) only if the leader of the prayer is Muslim. Yet, if another religious lead er leads a 
prayer, it is prohibited for Muslims to participate.  
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Instead, at the same time, the State produced policies which legitimize uniformity by using the dishonor 
of and defamation of religion as an excuse. In such situations, the violations of freedom of religion/belief 
increased. This opinion emphasizes the hypothesis that reformation merely provided political liberties, 
but has seized civil liberties. 
 
In essence, the Institute comes to the conclusion that contemporary politics are dominated by the moralistic 
discourse of elites, and that despite the fact that political liberty is guaranteed, civil liberties continue to be 
severely limited. In this, civil liberties are at stake in Indonesia. A recent study by the Pew Research Center’s 
Forum on Religion & Public Life on Global Restrictions on Religion is concerned with governmental restrictions 
on religions and social hostilities between faith communities. I found it fruitful to sketch those trends, in order 
to locate the specific Indonesian situation in a broader statistical context.  
 
Among the world’s 25 most populous countries, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and India stand out as having 
the most restrictions, when governmental restrictions and social hostilities are taken into account. The report 
finds that 64 nations (one-third of the total sum) have either high or very high governmental restrictions on 
religion in the period studied (mid-2006 through mid-2008). Since nearly 20 of the more populous nations 
among the Asian and Pacific region figure very high (Iran, China, Burma) or high scores (Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and India) on governmental restrictions on religion, more than half of 
the world’s 6.8 billion people live under high restrictions on religion. (Pew December 2009: 14) The list of 
countries with the most restrictive governments differs from the list of those with the highest levels of social 
hostilities. Only one country, Saudi Arabia, appears on both lists. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Somalia and Israel score in the high range on government restrictions and very high in social hostilities. 
 
In 178 countries (90%), religious groups must register with the government for various purposes, and in 117 
(59%) the registration requirements resulted in major problems for (19%) or outright discrimination (40%) 
against certain religious groups in almost three-in-five countries (59%)
374. Indonesia’s legislation requires all 
religious groups to register with the government. Adherents to non-sanctioned religions face problems in civil 
registration and the free choice of profession. In 2008, the dissemination of religious material through the 
‘deviant’ Islamic Ahmadiyyahh currently has been banned, effectively criminalizing the religious practice of the 
group and causing increasing violent conflict since then. In 1966, the government de-registered Confucianism, 
which  has  been  re-established  as  a  state-funded  religion  2001.  In  137  countries  (69%)  the  governments 
harassed or attempted to intimidate certain religious groups, and in 91 countries (46%) there were reported 
cases  of  the  use  of  physical  force  against  religious  individuals  or  groups  by  governments  or  government 
employees. For instance, the religious police of Darul Aceh Darussalam or other communal security forces 
enforces the wearing of Islamic attire, restaurants are require to close in the daytime during the holy month of 
Ramadan in specific regions; national authorities do not intervene. (Pew December 2009: 10; SETARA 2009) 
 
In 75 countries (38%), national or local governments limit efforts by religious groups or individuals to convert 
others. Nearly half of all countries either restrict the activities of foreign missionaries (41%) or prohibit them 
altogether (6%). In Indonesia, Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of 
Agama limits most proselytizing, and Article 156 of the Criminal Code makes heresy and blasphemy punishable 
by up to five years in prison. (Pew December 2009: 10; SETARA) Religion-related terrorism caused casualties in 
17 countries; thus nearly 9% of the states are affected by religious-related terrorism worldwide (Pew December 
2009: 4). The problem of religious-related terrorism in Indonesia is not discussed here.  
 
Governmental founding of religions remains a hotly debated issue. The Pew study (and the author) considers 
government support for religious groups a restriction only if it involves preferential treatment of some group(s) 
and discrimination against others. (Pew: December 2009, GRI Question No. 20.3, p. 61) A vast majority of 
governments  (86%)  provide  funding  or  other  resources  to  religious  groups.  But  in  151  countries  (76%), 
governments provide this assistance in ways that are either clearly imbalanced or that favor only one religious 
group (Pew December 2009: 8). Indonesia funds and protects six religious communities and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs regulates the interpretation of religion.  
   
                                                 
374 In this context, it is important to note that a number of countries in Western Europe have governmental restrictions on religions: 
Germany, France and Austria, which have laws aimed at protecting citizens from what the government considers dangerous cults or sects. 
(Pew: December 2009)  
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Like government restrictions, social hostilities range widely. Some degree of public tensions between religious 
groups was reported in the vast majority (87%) of countries.
.(Pew December 2009: 4)In 126 countries (64%), 
these hostilities involved physical violence. Countries that figure very high scores in social hostilities are Iraq, 
Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Somalia, Israel, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia.  
 
Crimes, malicious acts or violence motivated by religious bias were reported in nearly three-in-four countries 
(72%). With unclear state regulations and hesitant or lenient national police, much public animosity is aimed at 
the minority Ahmadiyyah community in Indonesia but also against Christians and small religious movements. In 
49 countries (25%), private individuals or groups used force or the threat of force to compel adherence to 
religious  norms.  In  more  than  half  of  all  countries,  however,  it  is  religious  groups  themselves  that  make 
attempts  to  stop  other  religious  groups  from  growing.  Indeed,  in  22  countries  (11%),  there  were  acts  of 
sectarian or communal violence between religious groups (Pew December 2009: 19). Following the peak of 
religion-related violence (1998-2001) in the reformation era in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Maluku, Sulawesi and Java 
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/), Indonesia faced a series of religion-related terrorist attacks (1998-2005). After a 
four years period in which Indonesia experienced a break in terrorist activities, two International Hotels were 
bombed in Jakarta in July 2009. (http://www.crisisgroup.org/) 
 
How far then can the Indonesian Pancasila and organization of plurality provide a model for the organization of 
religious plurality and religious freedom and contribute to the global debate on pluralism or religious freedom? 
What are the limits of the Pancasila and such a model’s function? The present study proposes that the inter-
religious, non-confessional aspects of Pancasila might be regarded as a possible modus vivendi or model of 
religious pluralism for countries with religious plurality; however, the principles are not universally transferable 
as they are specifically Indonesian. (Sukarno 1961 in Purdy 1994: 91; Zoelva Interview 2011) 
Let us now consider first President Sukarno’s (1945 – 1966) conception of the principles as he is one of the 
founding fathers of the Indonesian nation. Asian African solidarity was the central concern of Sukarno since 
1955, when Indonesia initiated and hosted the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung. (Purdy 1984: 87) As 
Sukarno moved to establish Indonesia as a leader of  the emergent Asian-African nations
375, that quest for 
leadership steadily shifted its ideological banner from non -alignment to an increasingly exclusive emphasis on 
Asian-African  solidarity  from  1957  to  1965.  (Brunnel  1966;  Schindehütte  2006)  Manifesting  his   idea  to 
implement Bhinneka Tunggal Ika at a global scale, Sukarno invited 29 states to the conference
376 –in order “to 
build the world anew”. On August 17
th 1960, Sukarno made the ultimate claim for the Pancasila, that is, as a 
universal phenomenon that could be recommended to all nations: “Pancasila is universal (and has a) basis that 
can be used by all nations (…) that can guarantee the welfare, peace, and brotherhood of the world”. (Purdy 
1994: 90)  
 
Choosing then the dramatic occasion of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September, 30
th 1960, 
Sukarno reiterated his belief in the universality of Pancasila in a major address titled “to build the world anew” 
to the heads of the states, in which he also expressed his concept of a new world order. (Brunnel 1966; Purdy 
1994:  90;  Indonesian  and  German  translation  of  the  original  in  Schindehütte  2006)  The  address  also 
incorporated the draft resolution of Ghana, India, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia calling for 
the reduction in cold war tensions between the US and the Russian blocs. Recalling the global conflict of 
ideologies in 1960, Sukarno argued that the way out of this confrontation is the “universal application of 
Pancasila”.  (Purdy  1984:  90)  Somewhat  claiming  the  recognition  of  non-Western  values,  Sukarno  thus 
proposed the inclusion of Pancasila into the UN Charter – as the organization would merely be a representative 
of the Western systems of states. (Brunnel 1966; Schindehütte 2006) 
   
                                                 
375 In April 1955 the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement held a Conference of Asian and African states in Bandung hosted by 
President Sukarno. The founding fathers of the NAM, apart from Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Tito of Yugoslavia, were Gamal 
Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Their actions were known as ‘The Initiative of Five’. The attending nations declared 
their desire not to become involved in the Cold War and adopted a ‘declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation’, which 
included Nehru’s five principles: (1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) Mutual non-aggression, (3) 
Mutual  non-interference  in  domestic  affairs,  (4)  Equality  and  mutual  benefit,  (5)  Peaceful  co-existence.  Six  years  after  the  Bandung 
Conference, an initiative of Yugoslav president Tito led to the first official Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which was held in September 
1961 in Belgrade. On Non-Aligned Movement see: www.sukarnoyears.com/311nonaligned; htm; www.en.wikipedia.org (May 2008) 
376 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against 
any major power bloc. As of 2007, it has 118 members. www.en.wikipedia.org (May 2008)  
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I firmly believe that the adoption of these five principles and the writing of them into the Charter (of the 
United Nations) would greatly strengthen the U.N. I believe it would bring the U.N. into line with recent 
development of the world. I believe it would make it possible for the U.N. to face the future refreshed 
and confident. Finally, I believe that the adoption of Pancasila as a foundation of the Charter would make 
the Charter more wholeheartedly acceptable to all Members, both the old and the new. (Purdy 1994: 90-
91) 
 
The resolution was not acceded, but it demonstrates the fervent awareness of the then president to take 
responsibility toward global security in a “fair play” fashion. (Brunnel 1966; Purdy 1984: 89-91; Schindehütte 
2006: 72-75; 187) A year later, in 1961, Sukarno stated in front of the Council for World Affairs in Los Angeles: 
“If you don’t understand Pancasila, then you cannot begin to understand Indonesia.” However, in the same 
speech, he spoke of Pancasila as although universally applicable, yet unique to the Indonesian experience. 
(Purdy 1994: 91)  
 
Recently, Tibi (1995), Stepan (2001), Franke (2006), and US President Obama (2009) positively discussed the 
function  of  Pancasilaas  a  model,  whereas  former  president  Habibie  (2011),  the  former  head  of  the  state 
intelligence agency, Hendropriyono (2007)
377, and Balinese anthropologist Prof Bawa Atmaja (2005) call for the 
re-actualization and revitalization of the five principles in social and political reality. Tibi
378 asks whether the 
Southeast Asian country Indonesia offers a model for religiously and ethnic-culturally different communities to 
live together in peace and mutual respect for the Islamic civilization or civilizations in general. And he is of the 
opinion that the Pancasila can serve as a model for Islamic countries regarding religious pluralism and religious 
freedom in a Muslim majority country (Tibi 1995). Franke (2006: 62) points to the significance of a study of the 
Indonesian model of religious pluralism  for the history of religions, thus also in religious studies,  such an 
analysis could also provide a momentum in the perception and organization of religious plurality in European 
contexts. In international forums, Indonesia is often portrayed as a role model for countries with a plural 
population with respect to its capacity to reconcile democracy, pluralism and Islam and celebrate tolerance and 
diversity.For instance, US president Obama stated in November 2009
379: 
Indonesia is not only regionally important, but as a member of the G20, as one of the world’s largest 
democracies, as one of the world’s largest Islamic nations, it has enormous influence and really is, I think, 
a potential model for the kind of development strategies, democracy strategies, as well as interfaith 
strategies that are going to be so important moving forward. 
 
Certainly such positive evaluations remain not unopposed. Like SETARA, the Asian Human Rights Commission 
disagrees  with President Obama, “While his statement is no doubt true in some respects, the essence of 
Obama’s  remark  is  at  odds  with  the  current  situation  in  Indonesia”
380.  Similarly,  the  United  Nations
381  is 
disturbed about continuous religious violence and expresses discomfort about religious discrimination and 
intolerance in the country and speaks of “continuing concern at the distinctions made in legal documents 
between  the  six  recognized  religions  of  Islam,  Protestantism,  Catholicism,  Hinduism,  Buddhism  and 
Confucianism, and the adverse impact on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of people belonging 
to minorities, ethnic groups and indigenous peoples in Indonesia”.  
 
The  following  paragraphs  present  an  overview  of  the  debates  on  a  possible  model  character  of  the  five 
principles. If understood as system of five basic values intrinsic to the Indonesian cultural area, and therefore to 
the Indonesian nation-state, Wandelt (1989: 9-11) has argued, then these five principles indicate a specific trait 
of the archipelagic socio-cultural area. Since every political group could interpret the five principles according 
to their particular Weltanschauung, intentions, and vested interest, Pancasila’s functionality was theoretically 
unlimited.  
   
                                                 
377 Antara News 07/25/2009, in: (www.antaranews.com/berita/1248509382/revitalisasi-pancasila-cegah-terorisme) 
378 Written three years before the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime and the monetary crisis, some claims and consideratio ns are 
outdated as the article is uncritical of the Suharto regime, but the here cited considerations remain reflective of actuality. 
379 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2009: Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of Indonesia after Bilateral 
Meeting, 15.11.2009, in www.whitehouse.gov/ (10.05.2010) 
380 Asian Human Rights Commission 2010: Indonesia: Freedom of religion not protected, in: www.ethicsinaction.asia/ (10.05.2010) 
381 Asian Human Rights Commission 2010: Indonesia: Freedom of religion not protected, in: www.ethicsinaction.asia/ (10.05.2010)  
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“As  the  national  collective  is  superior  to  the  concept  of  Lordship,  although  the  quintuplicate  manifested 
monotheistic Lordship is allocated in the state, it bears no political relevance for governance”
382. (Wandelt 
1989: 193) In consequence, Wandelt interprets the Pancasila state as a secular state. This has certainly been 
the understanding of the Suharto regime, but as in Indonesian democracy, religion plays a significant public 
role, the present study only partially supports this proposition, because first a religious dimension is always at 
present in national discourse, in policy making processes and influences civic and political alliances, second, 
religion is used by the state in the public to balance relations between faith communities, and third, religion is 
understood as a noble national value promoting development.  
Schumann notes the five principles were promoted as a model and platform for societal dialogue during the 
first years after the proclamation of Independence.  
Later on it was used  – or misused  - as a justification for the enforcement of partial and ideological 
interests, which actually had nothing to do with  Pancasila. (…) The Pancasila, was (…), originally not 
meant to be a doctrine, a philosophy, or an ideology. It was a Weltanschauung, expressing some basic 
convictions  in  general  terms,  but  leaving  its  concrete  expressions  open  to  later  circumstantial 
interpretation and, if necessary, adaptations. Its Silas mentioned (…) principles in a general way, but did 
not define their meanings (Schumann, 1990: 30-1 
If we look behind the scenes, it becomes clear that, contrary to Schumann’s argument, the state itself indeed 
does interfere as has been shown 1.) in the distinction between the term agama and kepercayaan, 2.) state 
funding of six agama only, 3.) the state denies the right to negative religious freedom, and 4.) the state limits 
the right to freedom of belief and thought.  
The most basic political functions of the five principles, as Canonica-Walangitang (2003: 26-29) has argued, has 
been to legitimize authority. The generalized nature of its principles allowed both Sukarno and Suharto, despite 
their very different policy orientations, and one must add also the contemporary government, to base their 
authority on it. Hence, under the Sukarno government, Pancasila was defined as a national minimal consensus 
which functioned to keep the plural republic united. The five principles were designed to keep the military, 
Islam and Islamic groups and communist forces in balance. Suharto used Pancasila even more as the political 
formula to legitimize his authority. In 1966 the five principles were implemented as basic principles of the state 
and supreme base of jurisdiction. Invented as a formula to unite the nation, Pancasila was invested with almost 
sacred status by the ideologues of the New Order, during which religion became a crucial factor of Indonesian 
everyday politics. There was no other official interpreter than the New Order government. Suharto himself was 
the leading Pancasila-ideologue and became increasingly obsessed with Pancasila, taking it and its integralist or 
organicist interpretation as the only acceptable state ideology and basis of the state. (Canonica-Walangitang 
2003: 26-29) 
The five principles were thus used as effective instruments to control the social and political organizations, to 
legitimize the ruling groups, and to delegitimize political challengers. Consequently, Pancasila was interpreted 
as an Indonesian cultural concept as expressed in the values of harmony, family, and religious tolerance that 
naturally emerged as a constitutional base. The New Order regime used Soepomo’s integralist ideals of family-
ism, cooperation, harmony, unity, and paternalism to interpret Pancasila as opposed to the three ideological 
alternatives: Islam, Communism, and Liberalism. Referring to this interpretation Canonica-Walangitang speaks 
of an ideological offensive designed to guide the political discourse. The strategy of ‘Pancasilaization’ was an 
instrument  for  de-politicization.  Pancasila  took  on  mystical  and  Javanist  connotations,  and  the  idea  of 
Pancasila  Democracy  (Demokrasi  Pancasila)  gave  the  New  Order  an  alternative  to  Western  democracies. 
(Canonica-Walangitang 2003: 26-29) 
Vickers and Parker identify Indonesia as “a paradigm, if not a paragon, of state attempts to regulate society 
through the manipulation of systems of values”. (Vickers/Parker 1999: 383) Antlöv (Antlöv 2005: 13) argues the 
five principles would merely be a modern political construct. The assumed or ‘imagined’ (Antlöv 2005: 13) 
indigenous pre-colonialist archipelagic culture would confer some kind of authenticity to the five principles, 
“while simultaneously turning it into a  powerful ideological instrument that brought legitimacy to political 
restriction and centralization”. (Antlöv 2005: 13)    
                                                 
382 Das Kollektiv der Nation ist gegenüber der Gottesgestalt souverän, zwar findet die fünffach sich offenbarende monotheistische Gottheit 
einen Platz im Staate, eine politische Relevanz für die Staatsführung besitzt sie nicht. Der Nationalstaat Indonesien versteht sich als sekulär. 
(Wandelt 1989: 193, author’s translation)  
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This argument certainly holds true for the Suharto regime, because the New Order established a dominant 
discourse which drew on the manipulation of the 1965/1966 events and the resulting collective trauma: key 
features were anti-Communism, the concept of dwi-fungsi (the Armed Forces dual, military and socio-political 
function), discourse of national security, public order, developmentalism, and national unity.(Stockmann 2004: 
28) 
Discussing the place of Islam under the Pancasila, Abalahin demonstrates Islam was the religion that was active 
in a great part of the nationalist struggle and informs Pancasila itself, even as Pancasila evades and determines 
the limits of Islamic claims. In the ways it has structured the negotiation of religious identity, he has remarked, 
the Pancasila state makes an overall concession to Islamists in its language, but leaves loopholes for other 
constituencies. Consequently, the Pancasila state is structured more along the lines of traditional, historical 
Islamic states than along the lines of an Islamic state projected by radical Islamists. This argument was similiarly 
made by TIBI (1995). 
Far from detaching itself from organized religion as a secular state would, the Indonesian state attaches 
organized religion to itself without subordinating itself to any single manifestation of it. Indeed, it can be 
argued  that  through  the  four  directorates  general  under  the  Ministry  of  Religious  Affairs,  the  state 
subordinates the religions. However, (…) in practice, the principle of “Belief in one God” imposes an 
Islamic framework on the State. (Abalahin 2005: 121) 
Abalahin  shows  that  the  “Pancasila  state  displays  unequal  pluralism  of  such  polities  as  the  Ottoman  and 
Mughal  empires”  (Abalahin  2005:  141).  Howell  (2003)  speaks  of  “delimited  pluralism”,  I  decided  to  use 
authoritarian pluralism. Abalahin draws the conclusion that “the Pancasila state accords theoretical equality to 
all the religions it recognizes. Thus, depending on one’s political position, Indonesia can be regarded as a semi-, 
quasi-, or pseudo-Islamic republic”. (Abalahin 2005: 121-122) This thesis is only partially supported here, as 
there is neither reference to the Koranic formula nor Islam in the Constitution, rather Indonesia defines herself 
as a religious state (Smith-Kipp 1987) grounded-in-the Belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship, a unique approach to 
structure the relation between state and religion. It is noteworthy, that all national laws start with the formula: 
With Mercy of One Supreme God, the Government of Indonesia (Dengan Rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 
Pemerintah Republik Indonesia…) and so on. 
In conclusion, scholars hold varying views on Pancasila’s historical authenticity (Dharmaputera 1989; Wandelt 
1989; Antlöv 2003; Abalahin 2005) and view Pancasila more or less enthusiastically as a model and platform for 
societal dialogue, but whether its principles are seen to be rooted in archipelagic history as inherent cultural 
features or are interpreted to be social constructs to manipulate and exploit the citizenry is in ardent dispute. 
Some view Pancasila as a collectively acceptable consensus of minimal values; others interpret Pancasila as a 
nationalist recompense to Islamic aspirations, as a compromise between two contesting camps, as guiding 
principle or as an instrument to legitimize authority.  
With the exception of most of the 32-years of the Suharto regime, religions go public as they occupy the public 
sphere to articulate their demands and ideas. This process began during the period of national awakening, 
while  it  continues  through  all  processes  of  nation-building,  development,  cultural  engineering,  and  lately, 
transition to democracy and democratization. Today, faith-based parties and nationalist parties compete in 
elections. It is an everyday experience for Indonesians, that the various interest groups in Indonesian society 
bargain their political value. In “Law, Religion and Pluralism”, John Bowen (2005: 5, emphasis in original) notes, 
 
Indonesian society is (...) criss-crossed by competing claims about how people ought to live and about 
what Indonesian society ought to become. These claims draw on highly local ideas, on national values, 
and on universal rights and laws. To make matters still more complicated, ideas from what is at stake 
change from one level of society to another. 
 
In consequence, social and cultural diversity induced the chronic culture of negotiation in Indonesia’s public 
sphere about the suitable nature of the Indonesian nation, constitutional framework, and its national ethics as 
represented in Pancasila or in Islam (Hilmy 2011, Hasan 2008, Hosen 2005). “Despite a consensus on the 
wording of Pancasila, there is no common understanding of how it should be interpreted.” (Raillon 2011: 110)  
 
In every era, Pancasila must pass the dialectics of civilization that test its strength as the basic philosophy 
of the Indonesian nation whose development does not stop at a certain terminal within history. (Habibie 
2011)  
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In this, the five principles reveal a certain ambiguity. (cf. Raillon 2011: 110) Within the context of religious 
pluralism, the first principle allows for plurality, but it is open to manipulation by the state, religious elites, and 
other interest groups. Whereas the wording of the five principles remains constant, how to implement and 
manifest their actual content is continuously renegotiated, reshaped, and reinterpreted during the eras of 
revolution(1945-1950),  parliamentary  democracy  (1950-1959),  Guided  Democracy  (1959-1965),  New  Order 
(1965-1998),  reform  (1998-2001)  and  the  contemporary  multi-party  democracy  (2001  onwards).  Albeit 
President Sukarno (1945-1966) and President Suharto (1966-1998) have differently interpreted the religious 
pluralism  of  the  Pancasila,  the  state  apparatus  continuously  maintains  a  legal  plural  perspective  on 
multireligiosity as national standard (Triguna Interview 2007; Zoelva Interview 2011).  
 
Today,  the  five  principles  have  somewhat  lost  their  public  acceptance.  “It  seems  as  if  national  collective 
memory has forgotten about Pancasila. The principles are less frequently mentioned, referred to, and debated 
in the context of state, nation and society”. (Habibie 2011) This collective amnesia of the national “Grundnorm” 
has been triggered by its mystification, sacralization, and systematic use as indoctrinatory ideology by the 
authoritarian Suharto regime (1966-1998). “Despite the observed social amnesia, the five principles will be 
there as long as Indonesia exists as a nation.” (Habibie 2011) Despite their unpopularity, and because of their 
ambiguity,  the  five  principles  seem  to  constitute  the  adhesiveness  that  keeps  Indonesia  together  –those 
concepts appear apparently to continue traditional ideas and concepts and thereby form a synthesis of models 
and concepts of organizing human coexistence. (Franke 2006; Habibie 2011)  
 
The  constitutional  amendments  (Stockmann  2004,  King  Blair  2005,  Hosen  2005)  showed  that  Pancasila 
continues  to  function  as  “Grundnorm”  embedded  in  the  Basic  Law  and  as  guardian  of  the  “nusantara 
conception” (wawasan nusantara)
383and a common point of reference to the Indonesian people. In 2006, 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono indicated that the Pancasila is final and stated: ‘In fact, the debate is 
over,  the  founding  fathers  of  the  Republic  have  already  found  the  right  solution.’  (in  Raillon  2011:  101) 
Likewise, in a commemoration speech on the Birth of the Pancasila in 2006, the president said: “We should end 
the debate on alternatives to the Pancasila as our ideology.” (Witular 2006
384) In this, four pillars of the modern 
Indonesian state that have to be reinvented are the five principles (Pancasila), 1945 Basic Law, the state motto 
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and national unity. (Habibie 2011) In sum, in a perpetual process the meanings of the 
Pancasila  are  reconstituted  and  reinterpreted  through  consequential  legislation  which  all  must  be  in 
accordance with the five principles. Raillon (2011: 110) states Pancasila is a “mandatory locus for ideological 
and religious competition.  
 
But it has a power of its own, since the various actors of Indonesia’s political and religious scene cannot 
help but refer to it, sometimes to the verge of irrationality, as though the Pancasila was an azimat, an 
‘amulet’ whose possession would give its holder an irrefutable privilege and advantage over everyone 
else. Rather than a properly religious struggle, the battle for the control of Pancasila and ultimately the 
state, is a political struggle. The ultimate goal is God, not power. (Raillon 2011: 110) 
On  the  whole,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  instrumentality  of  the  five  principles  derives  out  of  their  cryptic 
character. Whether created to achieve consensus or to serve as compromise between contesting political and 
faith  groups,  Indonesia  is  built-on-the-belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship  as  Staatsfundamentalnorm  or 
Grundnorm – and this is to be implemented in politics, law, and state funding of religion. Indeed, the religious 
national Weltanschauung is clearly expressed in its civil religion: the nation is embedded in the-belief-in-One-
Supreme-Lordship. The first principle inspires thus the following four principles which emerge as immediate 
consequence of the first and thereby introduce constitutional state theism as represented in monotheism or 
integral  monism.  The  second  principle  embodies  equality  of  all  human  beings  and  the  condemnation  of 
discrimination on a normatively level. The five principles form the integrative ethos of a religious and civilized 
nation which follows the command of a sixfold manifested One Supreme Lordship. By taking morals, religious 
values, and public order into account, the freedom of religion is however limited to guarantee national security 
and stability. 
                                                 
383 The “nusantara conception” of the Indonesian state prescribes multi-religiosity and national territorial unity. Both are achieved through 
the  four  pillars  of  Indonesia.  In  this,  four  pillars  of  the  modern  Indonesian  state  that  have  to  be  reinvented  are  the  five  principles 
(Pancasila), 1945 Basic Law, the state motto (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and national unity (NKRI). 
384  Witular, RA 2006/02/06 SBY urges end to  debate  on  Pancasila’s  merits.  The  Jakarta  Post,  Jakarta.  In:  www.thejakartapost.com/ 
(September 2010)  
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The  present  study  assumes  that  despite  many  civil  liberties,  may  it  be  individual  or  collective  rights,  are 
compromised in political and social practice in Muslim majority Indonesia, the five principles may be seen as to 
serve as a model for religious pluralism and religious freedom especially for Muslim majority countries. Tibi 
(1995) and Weber (2002) criticize the Arab core countries of Islamic civilization for not offering a cultural-
ethnical and religious foundation for inner peace. In promoting an exclusive version of Islam, Weber (2002) 
sees them as acting un-Islamically. In this context, the Muslim Indonesian intellectual N. Madjid (1994: 69) 
writes,  “it  is  therefore  ironic  that  when  tolerance  and  pluralism  are  among  the  values  most  needed  in 
globalized human interactions, the tolerance and pluralism of classical Islam has almost disappeared.” Thus one 
might promote Indonesia as to provide such a model for domestic peace. Tibi (1995) even wonders if “(…) it is 
Southeast Asia that will become the center of Islamic civilization while moving into the 21st century because of 
its model capabilities”. “The Mediterranean Islam can learn a lot from the Southeast Asian Islam. Can the 
periphery become thereby the center?” (Tibi 1995)  
 
16 years of political history following Tibi’s prophetical question showwhereas most countries with Muslim 
majority or Muslim plurality live under undemocratic political and unfree social conditions (Freedom House 
2009; PEW 2009), the two exceptions to the overall trend of non-democratic or illiberal politics in the Muslim 
world  are  Indonesia  and  Mali.  (Freedom  House  2009;  Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani  2009:  20).  Both  are 
predominantly Muslim democracies, and both have relatively high levels of political freedom. But in Mali, 
laïcité is enshrined in the constitution, which explicitly forbids political parties  from  appealing to religious 
principles. (Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani, 2009: 21)  
 
In this context, Casanova predicts the rise of another sort of democracy among Muslim societies based on the 
parallel experiences of Confucian and Catholic societies (….) that proved to be democratic later on. (Hilmy 
2010: 255) In August 2011, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Greg Moriarty noted that the Arab Spring 
developments have raised interest in whether Indonesia’s emergence as the third-largest democracy can show 
how to reform movements elsewhere in the Muslim world
385. He asks whether Indonesia can provide a model 
for Arab uprisings 
 
In Indonesia, Belief in One Supreme Lordship is established in the five principles of the state, religious freedom 
is enshrined in the Basic Law and parties advancing a religious agenda compete with secular parties in national 
elections. The terrorist attacks in 2009 prompted the statement by Prof. Komaruddin Hidayat, then president 
of the leading Islamic university “Indonesia is not a battlefield but a Muslim country. The hard-liners’ militancy 
and energy are better spent if used for building civilization”
386. 
 
Pancasila (…) is not a democracy of European pattern but it would be the best an Islamic state could ever 
achieve. And only because of this reason Indonesia is a country that could serve as a model for Islamic 
civilization. It would be eurocentric to put the European yardstick to the Indonesian model. (Tibi 1995) 
 
From a Quranic perspective (3:64), the established Muslim intellectual Madjid holds,  Pancasila denotes “a 
common term between religious factions that God commands to seek and find” (Madjid 1994 63) in order to 
coexist peacefully in monotheism
387.  
 
Say: “O People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: That we worship none but 
God; that we associate no partners with him; that we erect not, from among ourselves, Lords and patrons 
other than God.” If then they turn back, say ye: “Bear witness that we (at least) are Muslims (bowing to 
God’s Will)”. (http://www.jannah.org/qurantrans/quran3.html; 3.08.2011) 
                                                 
385  Alford,  Peter.  August  27,  2011:  Indonesia  model  for  Arab  uprisings.  The  Australian.  In:  
(www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesia-a-model-for-arab-uprisings/story-e6frg6so-1226123161330), August 2011 
386 AsiaViews 2009: 14 (September-October) 
387 The degree of pluralism, that is amongst others, the acceptance of non -monotheistic beliefs, is an important controversy amongst 
Islamic scholars since the classical period. In Islamic history, one finds instances of intolerance and tolerance to other religions. Madjid 
notes critically, the problem of Islam vis-à-vis pluralism would be the problem of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern age. This 
process is related to “how they see and assess the history of Islam, and how they see and assess problems of change and the necessity of 
bringing  universal  and  normative  Islam  into  a  dialogue  with  temporal  and  spatial  realities”.  (Madjid  1994  67)  For  an  international 
discussion, see the open letter “Common Word”, launched on October 13th 2007 signed by 138 leading Muslim scholars and intellectuals 
to the leaders of the Christian Churches and denominations all over the world, including H.H. Pope Benedict XVI. In essence, it proposes 
that Islam and Christianity share at their core, the twin “golden” commandments of the paramount importance of loving God and loving 
the neighbor. Based on this joint common ground, it is an interfaith theological document which calls for peace and harmony between 
Christians and Muslims worldwide. (http://www.rissc.jo/index.php/english-publications.html)  
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In Madjids opinion, the five principles are five terms which the different cultures and religions in Indonesia 
agreed  to  be  common  amongst  them.  This  view  on  the  organization  of  plurality  is  also  supported  by 
Constitutional Judge Prof Dr Hamdan Zoelva, who agrees with the view that the Pancasila are the point of 
common  reference  (kalimatunsawa)  to  the  Indonesian  people.  Sukarno,  the  first  president  (1945-1966), 
“commonly credited as the inventor of Pancasila”(Madjid 1994: 57), proposed the five principles as the “modus 
vivendi” (Madjid 1994:  57) between  secular nationalism  advocated by the nationalists and the  idea of an 
Islamic state demanded by the Islamic oriented politicians.  
 
The principles have been further Islamized in various ways during the course of the national history. During the 
1945 Committee of 62 the idea of national monotheism as the first principle is the Islamization of Sukarno’s 
original  concept  of  a  more  universal  or  generalized  belief  in  God  that  also  may  include  other  types  than 
monotheistic faiths (national monism). Whereas he proposed “Belief in God” as the fifth principle, the Islamic 
groups wanted it to be implemented as the first and synergizing one. Due to objections from the Islamic side, 
the third principle “nationalism” was amended to “Unity of Indonesia”, whereas the forth principle “Democracy 
led by wisdom through deliberation and representation” may be seen as a common term between secular-
national and Islamic ideas of statehood or nation, which made it acceptable to Muslims and religious minorities 
alike and may explain Pancasila’s survival.  
 
The founder of the Indonesian national news agency Antara and foreign minister Adam Malik compared the 
Pancasila with the Madinah Charter
388 , which he regarded as “a formula for a state based of the idea of social 
and religious pluralism” (Madjid 1994: 66). Today, the modernist Islamic party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) 
opts for an introduction of the Madinah Charter. (Hosen 2005; Hilmy 2010) It is interesting to note, as Tibi 
(1995)  points  out,  that  original  Islam  knew  neither  Confucianism  nor  Buddhism  nor  Hinduism,  and  the 
Indonesian model would thereby enrich Islam by recognizing these world religions but by putting them on 
equal standing with Islam.The decisive point would be that the first monotheistic principle came from the 
Islamic  periphery  and  not  from  the  Islamic  center,  where  the  definition  of  Christians  and  Jews  as 
“dhimmi/protected ones” i.e. second-class believers is still dominant.  
 
I suspect that the notion of religious freedom in Islam is evident in the toleration of people of the book outlined 
in  the  prophet’s  Madinah  Charter,  the  practice  of  religious  toleration  and  legal  pluralism  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire, the management of religion in the medieval Indian Mughul Empire, and in contemporary Indonesian 
religious policies. It is interesting to note in this context,  that cultural and religious diversity had been an 
intrinsic feature of Austronesian cultures and diversity and plurality have therefore a longstanding trajectory in 
Indonesia.  Whereas  Indian  law  courts  have  faced  difficulties  regarding  the  nature  of  religion,  (Sen  2007; 
Scheifinger 2009: 4) in Indonesia the Ministry of Religions operates with a monothetical definition of religion 
(agama) and legislation approves of six state funded agamas. Despite the Muslim majority, Indonesia follows a 
definition of religion along Islamic principles; Hindusim, Buddhism, and Confucianism are funded and protected 
by  the  state.  This  remarkable  legislation  shares  some  features  with  the  classic  Ottoman  Empire
389. An 
important distinction to the Ottoman conception of religious freedom is that Indonesia’s constitution is not 
based on Islam but on One Supreme Lordship as the first principle of the state and the office of the president 
has  no  official  religious  functions;  in  fact  the  office  bearer  does  not  have  be  a  Muslim  –  in  theory.  The 
administration of religion is delegated to the Ministry of Religion, similarly to the Department of Religious 
Affairs in modern Turkey
390.  
   
                                                 
388 Madinah Charter, 622 AD. For a full text of the document see Hilmy 2010: Appendix 1, pp. 265-269 
389 In1453, Mehmet II granted religious freedom to all non-Muslim communities. “They were allowed to choose their religious leaders who 
were approved by an Imperial decree. In addition, being free to practice their religion under the guidance of their religious leaders, 
minorities were governed, in matters of their personal status, by their own religious laws. Thus, matters such as marriage, divorce, child 
custody and support, alimony and inheritance were under the jurisdiction of the community’s religious authority. Article 11 of the Ottoman 
Constitution also confirmed religious freedom by stating: the State shall protect the free exercise of all religions recognized in the Ottoman 
Empire,  and  the  integral  enjoyment,  in  accordance  with  previous  practice  of  all  religious  privileges  granted  to  various  communities, 
provided such religions are not contrary to public morals nor conducive to the disturbance of public order.” (Law Library 2000: 130) 
390 The Department of Religious Affairs gives advice to the public on the fundamentals of Islam and Islamic worship, and is also responsible 
for mosques and the appointment of imams. In addition, a Ministry of Religious Affairs was established under the Ministry of  Education 
and is charged with supervising religious cultural and ethics education. (Law Library 2000: 138)  
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Both Abalahin (2005: 121) and Schumann (2000:31) use the expression to “invite religious communities to 
define their faith”, meant here is the compliance with the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Islamic model. For 
example, Schumann reads, “(l)ikewise, the Christian and other religious communities were invited to give the 
first principle a meaning corresponding to their own understanding. This may be a weakness, but it also may be 
strength. This is because it invites every religious community to realize that there are other communities who 
keep to the same principle, even if they explain it through different conceptions” (Schumann 2000:31) 
7.1.2. Indonesian pluralism: state theism and spirited statehood 
In order to explain - on what score the Indonesian state concerns itself with defining what is and what is not a 
religion - as opposed to either simply approving of some religions or refusing to take up taxonomy altogether 
(Abalahin: 2005) -, I paid great attention to significant details of negotiation processes amongst the political 
and religious camps. In this context I demonstrated that the Indonesian approach on managing plurality of 
religions may be typified as delimited pluralism (Howell 2003) or authoritarian rights-based pluralism. In my 
view,  Islam,  but  also  local  religions,  Hindu-Buddhist  legacy,  contemporaneous  Hindu  and  Buddhist 
organizations, Christian churches and the encounter with Western thought have contributed to the emergence 
of the Indonesian approach to coexistence of religions and the conception of One Supreme Lordship.  
 
‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’ represents the culmination of a long Indonesian history that includes not only 
Islamic but also Hindu and Buddhist traditions. ‘Ketuhanan’ is understood by minority religious congregations 
as a principle of religious pluralism. Therefore it should not be understand in terms of the Islamic concept of 
God (tawhid) but rather as a general and neutral concept of Lordship that gives room to all funded faith-based 
communities to interpret the first principle in terms of their respective traditions and more important, it also 
grants them the right to do so. In this, the first principle functions as a civil religion. However, the shift from the 
term One Supreme Lordship (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) to God Almighty (Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) in all legal 
and developmental documents indicates an increasing exclusive understanding of the principle, as public Islam 
attempts to impart an understanding of the Islamic concept of God (tawhid) on the religious minorities via the 
backdoor of religious policies. Yet, Hindu strategic planners are not too concerned with this trend, since the 
Hindu conception of One Supreme Lordship allows for transcendent, immanent, personal, and impersonal 
images of God. In consequence, I assess that the first principle promotes state theism (integralist monism or 
national monotheism). 
 
Having been recognized as people of the book (ahl-al kitab), Hindu communities were integrated into the 
Pancasila state as people of the dhimma. This case is exceptional as it deviates from classical Islam. As people 
of the dhimma they are protected by the state. Although Hindus in the Pancasila state are theoretically granted 
equal rights, it could be argued, that this is only partial restoration of the dhimma, because practice differs 
from  theory.  In  practice,  these  rights  are  compromised  by  national  and  regional  governmental  backdoor 
lobbying and policies. Notwithstanding, Indonesia represents a singular case of a Muslim majority country 
which grants the Asian religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism equal rights and funding. As the 
Islamic  differentiation  between  Islam,  people  of  the  book,  and  non-Muslims  is  maintained  in  Indonesian 
legislation,  it  could  be  said  that  Indonesia’s  basic  law  only  recognizes  Islam,  but  tolerates  certain  other 
religions. (cf. Abalahin 2005)  
 
In structuring the negotiation of religious identity in a specific Indonesian-style, the state rhetoric makes an 
overall concession to the political and public on one side, but it leaves loopholes for other constituencies at the 
other  side.  In  this,  the  Pancasila  state  grants  theoreticalequality  to  all  the  religions  it  recognizes,but  the 
plurality of religion is organized in an authoritarian pluralism as those rights are frequently compromised by 
individual  actors,  groups,  and  local  government  employees  under  a  ‘conspiracy  of  silence’  by  police  and 
military. Accordingly, the Pancasila state might rather be compared to traditional Islamic Empires (Ottoman, 
Mughul), in which the state (dawlah al islamiyah) was not identical with the Muslim community (ummah) and 
other congregations and faith communities were accommodated as people of the  dhimma. This attitude is 
closer to the spirit of the Charter of Medina than are several Islamic states in Middle East, which suppress 
religious plurality.  
 
On the whole, the Indonesian nation state  is based not on a naturalistic, but a religious interpretation of 
statehood and citizenship, therefore I employ the term spirited statehood. State theism (integral monism or 
monotheism) as represented in the first principle inspires the remaining four principles and the entire hierarchy 
of  legislation.  Although  religion  is  subordinated  to  the  state,  legislation  is  increasingly  given  an  Islamic 
framework.   
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Despite  this  assessed  Islamic  framework,  Indonesia  leaves  loopholes  for  other  religious  traditions  and  I 
described how the Balinese Hindus made use of this open space for room to maneuver. Thereby they set a 
precedent to be followed by other ethno-religious communities in Indonesia.  
 
The present study maintains that despite all theoretical equality an Islamic model is imposed on religious 
systems by the MORA, may it be Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, or traditional belief systems, which does 
not allow for an own bottom-up interpretation and model, but merely for a top-down interpretation along the 
lines of the Department’s model. Hence, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, traditionally staffed with Muslims of 
more orthodox learning, has been at liberty to dictate with little opposition what they claim as the proper 
model of religion. In the Islamist conception, religion must be made public, since there is no reason to hide it 
from the public sphere. When religion is hidden away from the public, there is no heavenly guidance for all the 
members of society. (Hilmy 2010: 215) This is to say that Muslim culture shapes institutional practices of 
Hindus. In the final analysis, however, it has to be pointed out that the consolidation of Indonesian Hindu 
Dharma has not only been influenced by the Islamic framework as standard setting parameter, but also by the 
early Hindu reformers who were organized in the Hindu Council and worked at the Hindu Bali section within 
the Ministry, who established cadre training units to produce Hindu religion engineers. 
7.2. Bali Shantishanishanti (Bali is at peace) 
This section critically analyzes the contemporary social situation of Bali that may not really be said to be at 
peace. Being concerned about the possibilities in which the ethnic and religious identity of “a million intelligent 
people living a simple and logical life” as Covarrubias (1965: 403) has put it in 1935, nowadays a three-and-half 
a million people, exposed to Indonesian immigrants which bring cultural values alien to Bali with them to the 
island, as well as foreign influences from tourists and expatriates, “can be preserved from distortion, losing 
their  entire  cultural-socio-religious  background  and  rooting,  proselytizing,  and  mere  stamping-ground  for 
traders” is worth a closer look.  
In historical times both, continuously feuding regencies as well as volcanic eruptions, slavery, diseases, plagues, 
and fatigue constituted an incalculable social and natural environment, in and to which Balinese commoners 
had to render services. They rendered feudal services to the kings, the centers of power, whose task was to 
spiritually and materially ensure the safety of the kingly subjects. Using surrogates for human flesh to barter for 
their freedom, Balinese ethnic religion propitiates and placates chthonic elements and renders homage to 
ancestral spirits (bhattara) and gods (dewa dewi). The imagined or constructed identity of Bali as paradise was 
introduced by the Theosophical Society, Javanese nationalists, and the Dutch (and other Western influences) as 
early as the 1900s. (cf. Schulte-Nordholt 1986) In this period the image of Bali as a living museum of ancient 
Javanese court culture etiquette was created.  
The modern image of Bali as paradise contradicts its old image of being ruled by savage and violent regents, 
who sell their subjects as slaves to Batavia in order to fund their habbits of celebrating flippant and risqué 
parties and indulging in gay practices and opium consumption. In addition, the image of Bali as Paradise belies 
the cruelty of the puputan between 1906 and 1946 and the massacres from 1965. Finally, the 2006 branding of 
Bali is at peace (Bali shantishantishanti) disguises the nature of contemporary social problems, conflicts and 
tension and silences about the collective memory of the 1965 massacres. The introduction of the Hindu class in 
1966 and after the reform area must be seen in relation to extra insular developments in the nation state and 
the international community from which the Balinese Hindu reformers somehow profited. 
The colonial power itself had been humiliated by its cruelty. In order to make the public forget the causalities 
they had caused between 1846 and 1908, they set out a program (Baliseering) to protect the allegedly entheal 
culture. Prevention of Christian and Islamic proselytizing in Bali targeted to perpetuate the feudal system 
sympathetic to Dutch interests on one side. On the other side, the prohibition of Malay as the language of 
instruction aimed to limit pro-national and anti-colonial activities among the Balinese, which similarly could 
have affected colonial interests. It was of utmost necessity to preserve the ethnic religion, viewed as the crucial 
and most important element of the social order constructed as as limb of the organism that was finally dubbed 
Hindu as result of an encounter and intercourse between Dutch colonizers and the Balinese clerical class and 
feudal regents. Balinese royalty and priesthood welcomed that attitude because their status quo and privileges, 
which the feudal system guaranteed, were preserved as allegedly authentic and an eternal reality of Balinese 
society.   
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In my opinion, the agents were motivated by a large part to act in order to preserve their hedonistic lifestyle as 
contemporary  practices  among  Balinese  upper  classes  impressively  demonstrate.  In  this  context,  Dutch 
colonialists created a romantic picture in portraying Bali as a heavenly garden, a paradise, and serving as a 
recreational spot to comfort colonial civil servants and the European upper class and Jet Set, which in turn 
collaborated to indulge in the above mentioned practices of partying.  
Although Balinese natural resources (rice) never were exploited as in the Moluccas, Java, and Sumatra, Balinese 
social and human capital was and is exploited since colonial times. The history of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, 
when many Balinese were deeply involved in party politics and debates over issues like modernity, feudalism, 
land  distribution,  gender  and  international  capitalism,  were  swept  away  with  the  broom  of  tradition 
(Santikarma 2005: 318) which were to be found in concepts as Tri Hita Karana. In consequence, not natural 
resources, but religion, culture, and art emerged as a means of covetous gain located at the heart of distinct 
colonial, national, and local group interests and desires. This image of Bali as a harmonious paradise had been 
upheld by the Sukarno-government, but especially after the 1965 mass murders this image was pro-actively 
encouraged  and  promoted  by  Balinese  circles  and  the  Suharto-government  to  develop  Bali  as  touristic 
destination and as a money printing press for the Bali region, the central government, and foreign investors 
with little interest or consideration of local interests of the lower classes.  
“Bali’s retreat from the national arena into a postmodern nostalgia for a museum-worthy past was encouraged 
not only by Balinese and their foreign guests”, Santikarma (2005: 318) analyzes sharply, “but by middle class 
Jakarta culture enthusiasts who need Bali to provide them with a kind of “fantasy island” offering respite from 
the stress and turmoil that have spread through other regions of Indonesia”. But alarmingly, not only tourists, 
and the Jakarta executives, but also foreign researchers somehow chose to ignore the situation in Bali, which 
they regard as a resort island too, perfectly tailored to suit their recreational needs after hardnosed field trips 
to Papua, Aceh, Central Sulawesi, and Java. Most of the Indonesinists laugh out loudly, if I tell them about 
conflicts in Bali. I have the impression that they chose to believe that in Bali, their recreational spot, there is 
peace – despite poverty, social inequality and conflict lingering everywhere – at the beach, behind the luxury 
hotels, and in the vicinity of their acclimated superior rooms. Other areas in Indonesia, yes, they have conflicts, 
poverty, inequality, but in Bali, well, even researchers need to spend a good time! In the context of the mass 
killings in 1965 and 1966, Geoffrey Robinson has remarked that  
(T)he strength of support for the militant and combative PKI and BTI, the prolonged and bitter 
fighting among Balinese during the National revolution (1945-1949), and the evidence of caste 
conflict even before the war, all suggest that such ideals of harmony were not shared by all 
Balinese. Rather, the historical evidence suggests that there has been ample room for  – and 
possibly even a robust tradition of – disagreement and conflict within Balinese society. What has 
been portrayed as “traditional” belief in harmony shared by all “Balinese” appears instead to 
represent  a  social  ideal  espoused  by  a  particular  segment  of  the  population  –  and  by  their 
supporters at home and abroad – in the name of collectivity. (Robinson 1996: 121, emphasis in 
original) 
In the small domain of cultural and religious capital, tight rivalry and competition are on the daily agenda 
interconnected  to  accumulating  status  and  prestige,  exertion  of  political  influence,  accessing  economic 
advantages, and the power to shape public discourse. These conflicts arose amidst a small fraction of Balinese 
society, the old and new elites. In consequence, at a closer look in contemporary Bali manifold conflicts exist; 
rarely leading to an outbreak of mass violence, but small scale violence is always part of the daily agenda. 
Greed,  envy,  hatred,  and  jealousy  can  be  noticed  in  nuclear  and  extended  families  and  kinsfolk,  often 
culminating in betrayal, deception, fraud, even murder, and most likely black magic.  
As the pace of modernization is rapid in Bali, another factor refers to the democratization and secularization of 
Balinese religion and culture and the erosion of ancient social systems. To put aside pressing contemporary 
economical issues such as poverty, joblessness, and low economy, it is reiterated repeatedly that the current 
climate of materialistic thinking leads to the overall sell out of property and land. This sell-out endangers in 
turn Balinese religion and culture, since villages, banjars or the sanctity of temples are traditionally not defined 
by boundaries, but by rituals conducted by several customary communities bound to overlapping pluralistic 
local units. “The phenomena of confusion of meaning and change of practices are empirical facts in Bali.” 
(Informal communication Prof. Phalgunadi 2005)    
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According to Prof Phalgunadi there is a big confusion about Balinese Hindu concepts which are too easily mixed 
and  thereby  confused.  This  statement  especially  refers  to  the  difference  between  Hindu  Bali  and  the 
sampradaya (Hindu currents that practice Indian Vedanta Hinduism). The Vedanta concept of ahimsa (non-
violence) seems to contradict the continuity of the megalithic practice of the blood sacrifice or animal sacrifice, 
central to the Balinese ritual.  
Many religious groups called sampradayah (currents) make their appearance in contemporary Bali. (cf. Howell 
2003,  2004)  This  may  indicate  that  people  are  feeling  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  the  institutionalized 
religious practices and state-organized religion. The mainstream religion promoted by the Parisada during the 
New Order regime pandered too much to the government and religious expression was controlled and limited 
by the government. The mainstream Hindu religious practice has been accused of being overly preoccupied 
with rituals and offerings – with religious praxis – and with increasingly ostentatious and expensive displays of 
wealth and status concurrently neglecting the content – doctrines and philosophy, the discipline of fasting, 
meditation, and charity – of religion. The Vedanta conception of ahimsa (not killing) and vegetarianism is not 
known in traditional Bali, but has been recently imported from India. As the blood sacrifice of animals is the 
cornerstone  of  Balinese  ritual,  the  Vedanta  conception  endangers  the  indigenous  ritual  concept. 
Oversimplified, in sacrifice animals are used as surrogate for human meat in the ritualistic efforts Balinese 
make to neutralize malevolent energies (bhuta kala) in order to turn them into benevolent ones. This shows 
that the negotiation of Hindu identity is a continuing dynamic process. In consequence, Balinese face not only 
immense areas of social problems related to rapid social and economic change, but as adherents to a living 
religion they also face a dilemma: expressing their faith in a living, dynamic and meaningful way by at the same 
time keeping the balance between religious fundamentalism and secularization or individualization of religious 
traditions.  
After the first Bali assault in October 2002, the extent to which the international and national media coverage 
debated  the  question  whether  or  not  the  tiny  island  of  Bali  had  ever  been  a  peaceful  paradise,  whose 
innocence might now be destroyed and lost forever. According to my judgment, this question is wholesale and 
indiscriminative  and  has  to  be  deconstructed.  In  Bali  nothing  was  or  is  mere  harmony  and  peace.  Multi-
dimensional conflicts smolder beneath the calm surface for over a millennium, of which the bunch of sweeping 
past tourists is not aware, taken in by the delusional service smile of the Balinese tourism industry. A short 
glance into some editions of the Bali Post or Nusa Bali, the local newspapers, discloses immediately that the 
rates of environmental pollution, criminality, suicides, drug abuse, prostitution, and violence increase steadily 
in Bali. This development belies the promoted concepts of  Tri Hita Karana, which is merely a theorem of 
tolerance  and  harmony  constructed  after  the  1965  massacres  to  avoid  victim  families’  revenge  on  their 
murders. As the death list provided the tameng (people that took the alleged Communists and killed them) 
with the names of alleged Communists, actually the families of the victims know that person X or person Y from 
the neighboring village came to kill their relative. But as Bali is a small island and dependent on its interlocking 
social networks, those events have never been disclosed, communicated, or brought to closure. Occasionally, 
at Balinese New Year’s Eve (Nyepi) those old grievances surface and mass violence erupts suddenly. (Interview 
Windia 2010) This even more belies the brand new slogan of Bali shantisantisahnti (Bali peace-peace-peace) 
which is in my eyes designed to attract foreign tourists, investment, and dollars to the island - from which only 
a small local, central, and foreign elite profits. 
In the aftermath of two bombings in Kuta, the tourists continue to come in ever increasing numbers to spend a 
“Bali-holiday”,  although  some  exponents  of  Balinese  culture  “do  hope  the  tourists  will  not  come  again”. 
(Interview Prof. Suryani, protocol on 26.07.2006) In the conservative view, only then the Balinese can realize 
that their contemporary materialistic world view differs sharply from all values prescribed in their religion. 
There is a continuous debate in dailies and in public discourse about what steps are to be taken in order to face 
the  radical  and  rapid  change  of  Balinese  everyday  life.  Today,  conflicts  between  religious  currents,  clans 
(wangsa), intra-clan conflicts (soroh), disputes over land ownership occur frequently. Furthermore there are 
conflicts between traditional villages (desa pakraman) concerning their boundaries and resources, between 
traditional villages and international hotel chains at their territory that are not always dissolved by consensus 
achieving assemblies but are sometimes solved violently. In rare cases, if Balinese citizens are unsatisfied with 
practices of their local government or the police, precincts, offices, or private compounds are burned down or 
violently attacked. Clans continue to struggle about the right to perform ceremonies up to certain levels.  
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In addition, sometimes when elections are held either at district, provincial or national level, certainly violence 
breaks out; even ninjas sometimes make their appearance. Beheaded dead bodies are sometimes found at 
Kuta beach. A salient feature of contemporary society is alcohol and drug abuse, prostitution, gigoloism, and 
adultery. Nobility, the upper classes, expats and tourists (in short, all who can afford it) engage regularly in 
flippant and risqué parties, a phenomenon which is termed Discotheque-ism (Dugem, Dunia gemerlap, night-
life) and Café-ism in local discourse. The police hunt down illegal alcohol, drug abuse, prostitution, gambling, 
cock fights, and adultery with minor success. Although almost everyone takes part unofficially, partying is 
officially viewed as amoral, illicit and out of place. Partying is a feature of resilience, because all concerted 
actions  of  the  executive  and  the  exponents  of  a  sober  culture  to  break  down  on  those  practices  are 
unsuccessful.  
Thus in my judgment, the ethical slogans developed by Hindu cultural engineers indicate a strong effort to 
provide an alternative to such practices. The process of engineering the image of Bali as a peaceful and tranquil 
paradise outlined above culminates in three phenomena: first, if we recall that the history of Bali is a history of 
shifting alliances, violent reinforcement of the status quo and asymmetric hierarchies, the brand new branding 
of the Bali province Shanti-shanti-shanti (peace) is quite ironical, if we consider the power asymmetries in 
Baliand it is a mere utopian vision tailored to attract investment, steer export, and tourism. Second, if we 
consider the share of Bali’s revenues in the Indonesian budget, it has to be assessed that the own source 
revenue of Bali in 2003 had been the highest in Indonesia, even higher than the capital Jakarta, with the 
districts Badung and Denpasar ranking first and second. (Worldbank Report No. 26191-IND 2003: 26, 119-126) 
Thus the function of Bali as money printing press for regional and national stakeholders is prominent, with little 
concern for the Balinese social, cultural, and natural environment, especially the economic low class. Another 
point to note in this context is the passing of the controversial and in Bali highly unpopular so-called anti-
pornography bill that imposes jail terms for kissing in public or baring ‘sensual’ body parts, and imposes a 
threat and a major limitation to the freedom of cultural and religious expression. However, with an eye on 
foreign exchange revenues, bikinis are not yet forbidden at Balinese Beaches.  
Tourists are allowed to wear bikinis in tourism resorts like Bali and Parang Tritis beach. The porn 
bill will treat recreational and leisure areas differently,’ states lawmaker Husein Abdul Azis of the 
Democratic Party. Bali is the country’s top tourist destination. Indonesia aims to attract 7 million 
tourists in 2008 and collect some US$6.7 billion in foreign exchange revenue. (Dian Kuswandini: 
Porn bill committee OK’s bikinis at resorts. Jakarta: The Jakarta Post , Fri, 10/17/2008) 
Third, the controversial conservatism expressed in the top-down spiritual revitalizing movement named AJEG! 
Bali sponsored by the independent Bali Post  Group which emerged in 2002 has to  be adduced. (Schulte-
Nordholt 2007: 55) Ajeg means immortal, strong, or upright in the Balinese language and it shall provide the 
way to attain physical and spiritual welfare. Ajeg Bali became the key word in a quest for a new master plan 
that respected the delicate  balance between Gods, men and  the environment (Tri Hita Karana). (Schulte-
Nordholt  2007:  2)  Ajeg  has  become  the  catchword  to  indicate  the  need  for  a  socio-cultural  self-defense. 
Concerning the utility of the Ajeg Bali movement, though, the educated elite is divided into two camps, one 
supportive and the other rejecting. In this context, Prof Bawa Atmaja critically remarks, one might ask whether 
Bali  is  a  corporate  identity,  a  product,  a  utopia  or  a  factual  island  with  real  inhabitants  located  in  the 
framework of the globalizing Pancasila-state. While there is much pride in Balineseness and a growing sense of 
the incursions of other ethnic groups, especially the Javanese into Bali, the sense of nationalism and belonging 
to the Indonesian nation-state is remarkable amidst the Balinese, while at the same time in ethnic questions 
the Balinese become increasingly Bali-centric ethno-nationalists, whereas in intra Hindu plurality questions 
they  hold  currently  highly  pluralistic  opinions.  Whether  the  revenues  of  the  Visa  paid  at  the  airport  are 
allocated to the central or the regional government is in ardent dispute, as is the fact that the international 
hotel chains pay too little money to the banjars. Again Covarrubias proves true, “unfortunate as this is, the 
power of our civilization to penetrate can no longer be ignored. It would be futile to recommend measures to 
prevent the relentless march of Westernization. Advocate to preserve the original culture in the midst of 
modern civilization would mean to turn Bali into a living museum, a measure which is certainly impossible”. In 
this context, Schulte-Nordhold (2007) has assessed: “The dilemma, in short, was how to make Bali into an open 
fortress.” 
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7.3. Hindu Dharma Indonesia: Bulwark and Canopy 
This section focuses on the consolidation process and the contemporary state of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. 
7.3.1. One for All and All for One: In search for state funding, civil and political 
rights 
The core values at the nucleus of Balinese culture and religion are Indo-Melanesian, Hindu and Buddhist – 
significantly  influenced  by  Buddhist  and  Shivaist  Tantrism.  (Fic  2003)  Culture,  religion,  and  art  are  closely 
related, and form an inseparable cluster - each element inspiring the other. (Ida Pedanda Bajing, Interview 
2006)  
 
The Balinese do not consider themselves to be the singular Hindu community in Indonesia. They are aware that 
Hinduism as a “way of life” belongs to all human kind, to India and Indonesia alike. Hinduism is not exclusively 
Balinese, but it belongs to numerous Indonesian ethnic groups – only every ethnic group has their own ritual, 
etiquette, ethics, ancestors and local Gods, which are manifestations of One Supreme Lordship. This functional 
interpretation (Triguna, protocol 2007) enabled the Balinese reformers to sustain the megalithic practices of 
ancestor  veneration and to integrate their ancestors as  manifestations of One Supreme Lordship into the 
national monotheism. Likewise, the functional interpretation made it possible to integrate all the different 
pantheons  of  local  and  ethnic  gods  and  goddesses  as  manifestations  or  “rays”  of  One  Supreme  Lordship 
(Upadeca 1967: 17; Triguna protocol 2007)– thereby complying with the provisions of the MORA. 
 
In consequence, during the years of politization of religion, several ethno-religious groups in Sulawesi and 
Kalimantan joined Indonesian Hindu Dharma. In 1964, the Hindu Council joined for pragmatic political reasons 
the Joint Secretariat of the Functional Groups  (Sekber Golkar), because “the situation forced us to do so” 
(Interview Sudharta 2008). With this political move, the Hindu Council aspired to “save the Hindu congregation 
outside  Bali  -  the  friends  at  the  other  islands”  (Interview  Sudharta  2008).  There  are  the  following  Hindu 
communities in Indonesia: Balinese, Javanese (Wongso Kulon and Wongso Weton), Tenggerese, Kaharingan, 
Toraja, Mamasa, Aluktodolo, Batak Karo, and Hindus in Lombok, Madura, Lampung, Ambon (Engki), Medan 
(Indians), and the Sikh community (joined in 2005). As Hindus, they could not be accused of being Communists, 
or of not having a religion, but those ethno-religious groups were regarded as legitimate members of the 
recognized universal Agama Hindu, and therefore protected by the state and given the same political and civil 
rights as to receive birth certificates, identity cards, and jobs in the government. 
 
After 1965, during the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Hindu Dharma Indonesia emerged gradually as unitary 
religion in the arena of Indonesian politics and religion. It is my hypothesis, that it serves as a political and 
conceptual  bulwark  or  canopy  for  local  ethno-religious  traditions  and  practices  gathering  under  its 
administrative umbrella for the following reasons:  
 
  to avoid persecution under the Suharto regime, or by Islamists 
  to receive state funding  
  to receive state protection 
  to be safe from Christian proselytizing and and Islamic dakwah 
  to enjoy the same civil and political rights as the Muslim majority and Christians. 
 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia is accordingly a “political and conceptual” (Picard 2004) meta-framework for ethnic 
and individual beliefs and practices classified as Hindu. Despite the regional and local variations in orthopraxis, 
ethics and theology, one unitary system of creed is maintained throughout Indonesia.  
This unitary version is designed to a large extent by Balinese Hindu reformers from the 1950s onwards, who are 
represented in the Hindu Council and the Hindu Directorate General. Of course, the overrepresentation  of 
Balinese reformers in both institutions results in conflicts and tensions within the elites of those ethno-religious 
groups, as I could observe at the Annual Meeting of the Hindu Council in 2007 and the Workshop on Internal 
Pluralism organized by the Hindu Directorate in 2007. One point of controversy, for example, is that the Hindu 
Directorate  General  builds  temples  following  the  Balinese  model  throughout  Indonesia,  which  does  not 
conform  to  the  local  architecture  outside  of  Bali.  Tensions  also  arise  in  reference  to  the  appointment  of 
officials, and teachers, and the distribution of funding. (Fieldwork in Kalimantan 2011)  
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Hindu class textbooks are another point of ardent dispute, because they teach a Balinese-Indian version of 
Hinduism with little concern to the local variants of other ethnic Hindus. However, these points of contention 
and controversy are internally debated and the internal pluralism is respected – this is in my view of utmost 
necessity, as the Hindu minority as an “ant” needs to demonstrate internal unity and uniformity of creed 
towards the “elephant” of the Muslim majority, if it wants to survive. Since 2006, the Hindu congregation 
increasingly acknowledges their internal plurality and the overrepresentation of Balinese in both institutions 
decreases, as members of the other Hindu ethnicities are increasingly pushed to complete higher education in 
order to be appointed to positions in the central and regional government. In addition, the KTSP textbooks 
acknowledge increasingly local content in the Hindu class. 
In consequence, it is my hypothesis, that Hindu Dharma Indonesia is best described as a designed religion. It is 
a canopy under which local groups united by ethno-religious practices gather to achieve the same political and 
civil rights as the majority religion, or rather, the people of the book, as Islam and Christianity were recognized 
as agama from MORA’s inception in 1946 onwards. Until today, the interpretation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
continues using Islam and Christianity as a system of reference or standard-setting tool, especially educational 
models of both religions. (Triguna, Protocol of Interview, 2007).  In consequence, Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
provides a pluralisticframework for all archipelagic Hindu religions. This pluralistic and functional interpretation 
is sponsored and promoted increasingly by the Hindu Directorate General for the Guidance of the Indonesian 
Hindu community. The graph illustrates my conception of Indonesian Hinduism as One for All and All for One: 
 
 
Because Indonesian Hindus are distributed over the entire archipelago, there are several interpretations of 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia, but despite those differences in understanding and performance, which originate in 
the  various  ethnic  traditions,  Hindu  experts  maintain  that  the  basic  concept  of  One  Supreme  Lordship  is 
identical.  Oversimplified,  Hindu  Dharma  Indonesia  exists  primarily  in  the  heads  of  the  elites  and  their 
discourses, and in the Hindu class textbooks, but in practice, there is Agama Hindu Bali which differs from 
village to village, there is Agama Tengger, Agama Kaharingan, Agama Aluk To Dolo, Agama Sikh and so on. The 
Hindu  fondness  for  pluralism  is  seen  as  being  rooted  in  variations  of  religious  practice  throughout  the 
Archipelago, and these variations may be interpreted using a religious, historical, geographic, or individual 
approach. Interestingly, this understanding is in perfect harmony with the megalithic traditions of legal (cf. 
Hooker 978; Munoz 2006) and religious plurality and pluralism in the Archipelago, where the awareness of 
“internalized  or  internal  pluralism”,  “a  consciousness  of  other  societies  at  the  core  of  each  society’s  self-
definition”. (Bowen 2003: 12) seems to constitute the main socio-cultural trajectory.  
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From the religious viewpoint, in the past, manifold “ways of life” or dharma (the Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and 
Christian dharma) and numerous differing Hindu cults coexisted in the Archipelago, moreover various local 
traditions  were  practiced  in  Bali,  therefore  the  historical  inter-religious  and  intra-religious  plurality  is 
considered  to  be  an  expression  of  the  pluriform  and  polyphone  manifestation  of  One  Supreme  Lordship 
(Balinese: Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa). As possible roots for this polyphony or this understanding of plurality, 
one may adduce 1.) the Hindu philosophical systems (darsana), which approach the empiric one reality with 
different methods; and 2.) the tantric Samkya-Logic, in which the variety of creation emerged from two basic 
principles, which originated in one principle. During meditation, the practitioners are required to repeat the 
steps of creation, but he proceeds from variety to oneness (Upadeca 1967: 17; Triguna protocol 2007, Suka 
Yasa  Interview  2007)  In  consequence,  one  conception  is  applied  at  different  local  sets  of  traditions  and 
practices (local genius, desa, kala, patra) and therefore various understandings and practices emerge. The 
individualistic and spiritual viewpoint assumes one principal understanding, yet for the fact that humans vary in 
their spiritual intelligence, their level of understanding and realization varies profoundly. 
All groups united in the Indonesian Hindu congregation share the same concept of One Supreme Lordship, and 
its basic creeds (Panca Shradda), but rituals, and traditions in each denomination vary. Basically, there is only 
one official understanding of One Supreme Lordship. The geographic condition of Indonesia, however, is used 
to explain the intra-Hindu plurality expressed in the veneration of different local Gods, variations in ritual and 
ethics. Those variations arose because the Hindu denominations have different ancestors, or religious teachers 
(guru), who spread their teaching in one region, but not in another, or simply due to immigration. For example, 
ancestor veneration is a central element of all indigenous Hindu denomination and has its origin in megalithic 
times, whereas for the Indian Hindus and the Sikh community, it is of minor importance. The Indian Goddess Sri 
Lakshmi is not indigenous to Bali, and was not known in the 1930s – the Balinese equivalent would be Rambut 
Sedana. The process of cross fertilization between Indian and Balinese Hindu traditions after 1950, however, 
gave birth to Sri Sedana.  
In  conclusion,  in  the  retrospective  view,  differences  are  explained  by  individual  spiritual  capability  to 
understand  and  realize  faith,  and  the  will  to  upgrade  and  deepen  continuously  religious  and  spiritual 
knowledge, which depends on the stage of reincarnation. In essence, every Hindu denomination follows their 
own traditions, while at the same time it maintains the basic five creeds (panca Sradha) of Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia.  
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7.3.2. How to identify an Indonesian Hindu? 
The government issues an identity card in which my religious affiliation is included; in addition I may be 
identified as Hindu because I believe in Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, enshrined and venerated in my domestic 
Merajan (ancestor shrine) both as ancestor and as Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa. (Triguna, questionnaire) 
 
Indonesian Hindus may be identified according to the participants in my study by the following characteristics:  
1.  legal evidence issued by state authorities as identity documents
391 (birth certificate, identity card, 
marriage license, death certificate) 
2.  Hindu salute (Om Swastyastu & Om SantihSantihSantih) 
3.  Swastika (卐) as central symbol 
4.  communal  and  public  Hindu  practice,  ethics,  and  conduct  (born  into  Hindu  family,  Hindus  are 
informed by their familial, affinal, cultural and social environment - in turn the environment testifies 
their Hindu-ness, because Agama Hindu is expressed in a specific style of worship, conduct, and ethic 
which mirrors the values of the Hindu way of life of Vedic ethics, dharmic lifestyle, and karmic actions) 
5.  Prayer: Veda, Mantra (Tri Sandhya, Panca Sembah) chant (tembang, kidung, kakawin, Dharmagita) 
6.  Devotional acts accompanying Hindu prayer: Flower-offering, burning incense, purification with holy 
water, animal sacrifice 
7.  Offerings/animal sacrifice
392: Upacara (Panca Yadnya Rituals) and Upakara (Paraphernalia, Offerings 
(Sajen, Banten), animal sacrifice (Caru, Tawur) 
8.  Gesture:  Mudra  (a  symbolic  gesture  made  with  the  hand  or  fingers.  Each  Mudra  has  a  specific 
meaning, playing a central role in Hindu and Buddhist iconography), Asana (body position) 
9.  The types and classes of professional high priests (sulinggih), lay priests (pemangku) and their clothing 
and paraphernalia. (The “apex” of a Hindu life is to be called by the community to serve as a lay priest 
or professional high priest – even if the individual does not consent as this is a tough job. In Bali, one 
becomes a professional high priest by belonging to the Brahmin class and being appointed by the 
family, or to the Pande, Pasek, or Dukuh clan, or belonging to the Waisnawa group. There are four 
ways to be appointed as lay priest)  
10.  Production and  centrality of sacred  water  (tirtha) in all  rituals, especially in the  cremation rituals 
(tirtha pangentas, used in the cremation rituals, which transport the deceased soul from the family 
shrine to the family temple in Besakih and transform the deceased soul into an ancestor, is an ardent 
point of concern between the old and the new elites) 
11.  Ritual clothing: Kebaya, Selandang, Sarong, Udang etc. 
12.  Places of worship: Pelangkiran (Shrine in House), Sanggah (Family Shrine), Merajan (Family Shrine), 
Pura (Balinese Temple), Kuil (Indian Temple), Bale (Bali Village Temple, Kaharingan Temple), Candi 
(Javanese Temple) etc. 
13.  Religious holidays: Galungan, Kuningan, Nyepi, Saraswati, Shiwa Latri etc. 
It  is  important  to  note,  that  meditation  or  fasting  as  signs  of  being  a  Hindu  were  not  mentioned  by  the 
participants  in  my  study,  indicating  their  assumption  that  both  devotional  acts  belong  to  all  religious 
communities.  
   
                                                 
391 As Indonesia maintained the controversial legislation to include religious affiliation ion identity cards, the question is in this context, 
whether an equal, just and non-discriminatory administrative practice is warranted for Indonesian Hindus in their encounter with national 
and regional bureaucracy outside Bali. 
392 Currently, there is a fervent quarrel, whether or not the ritual (upacara, panca yadnya) should be retained in its present style. It seems 
to be uncontroversial that the culture and objective of yadnya shall be retained. However, in general there are three opinions on the style 
of ritual: 1.) to exactly retain the style of upacara with costly and exorbitant upakara (offerings) and animal sacrifice (Bali-traditional): 2.) to 
adjust the ritual to the current socio-economic situation by slimming the system of upakara (offerings) to be more modest, less expensive 
and convoluted, but to retain the animal sacrifices (Bali-modern): 3.) not only to slim the system of upakara but to abolish animal sacrifices 
(Indian influenced).   
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7.4. Religious policies and religious education 
The  present  study  sought  to  describe  the  emergence,  conception,  and  organization  of  the  Hindu  class  in 
context of Indonesian educational and religious policies. Those policies comply with national and international 
policies. The study found that the first aim of Indonesian strategic and educational policies is to create an 
Indonesian citizen who has faith in God (Islam: imam or Hindu: sradha), follows the commands of God (Islam: 
taqwa or Hindu: bhakti), and has morals (Islam: akhlak or Hindu: budi pekerti). The dimension of spiritual 
intelligence  in  education  is  a  particular  Indonesian  dimension  of  education,  which  Indonesian  educational 
planners add to the UNESCO standards of student-centered learning throughout life.  
Unique  to  the  Indonesian  case  is,  as  the  findings  show,  the  organization  of  religious  education  as  strictly 
confessional on one side, but at the same time pluralistic, because the citizens have the right to attend religious 
class from elementary to tertiary level in the religion they adhere to instructed by a teacher of the same belief. 
The term religion is defined by MORA and legislation approves of six state-funded religions. In addition, the 
religious  mark  is  a  compulsory  item  in  the  school  report,  and  whether  a  pupil/student  stays  back  or  is 
promoted to the next level depends amongst others on how the religion teacher grades the student.  
In facilitating six compulsory confessional religion classes, Indonesia aims to internalize the respective religious 
representations into the citizenry and to strengthen religious identity, competence, practice and the ability to 
communicate  and  understand  the  agama  they  adhere  to.  At  the  same  time,  however,  an  exclusive 
understanding of religion is nurtured which makes the students aware of considerable religious differences that 
might generate discrimination in schoolyards and the individual personality. 
7.4.1. Human Rights and Freedom of Religion 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, concepts of individual liberty and human rights have been declared 
universally valid. Opposed to that universalism is cultural relativism as expressed in the frequently criticized 
Asian Values. The cultural relativist and orientalist argument claims universal human rights would be a Christian 
concept that may not be extended into non-Christian legacies and cultural areas. One reason cited is “fears that 
the U.S. is an imperial ‘Christian’ power’”. (Marshall, 1998: 18; emphasis in original) The relativist viewpoint 
holds  that  political  theories  and  institutions  developed  in  Southeast  Asian  countries  are  based  on  quite 
different assumptions about the categories and groups that make up nations as is the case in Europe or North 
America. (Bowen, 2005: 153; Parker, 2004: 8, 9) In consequence, Indonesia would have a particular, culturally 
based notion of politics that makes the country unfit for democracy and human rights.  
 
The present study follows Antlöv (2005: 13) in qualifying such relativistic points of view, since a number of 
contradictory understandings of politics coexist side by side, of which no single understanding can be given 
primacy.  The  study  assesses  competing  perspectives  in  Eastern  and  Western  thought,  but  as  difference 
structures identity and alterity, the Eastern way of reasoning and living could only emerge as a construction out 
of  the  contact  with  a  supposed  Western  way  of  reasoning.  In  continuous  reciprocal  cross-fertilization 
processes, both perspectives influence each other and ideas are mediated into local contexts (glocalization).  
 
Similarly, Sen’s study on the genealogy of European and Asian values does not sustain the thesis of a grand 
dichotomy  between  East  and  West.  However,  by  keeping  in  mind  the  concept  of  ‘multiple  modernities’ 
(Houben 2005; Hefner 1994) and the fact that the Asian countries China, India, and Indonesia host the largest 
populations in the world, regional concepts of diversity und pluralism originating in Asian sets of values should 
be  taken  into  serious  consideration  not  only  by  Western  countries,  but  by  Arabic  states  that  propagate 
universal  notions  and  exclusive  worldviews.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  seriously  examined  how  far  Hindu 
concepts and local concepts of pluralism and their embedded styles of conflict management - as for instance 
conducted by Balinese Hindus after the attacks in 2002 and 2005 - can contribute to improve peaceful relations 
between peoples and nation-states.  
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The study observed a discrepancy between empirical and formal dimensions of civil life in Indonesia. Even 
though Indonesia formally acknowledges her ‘kaleidoscopic diversity’ and declares her commitment to achieve 
‘unity in diversity’ and respect of human rights for all on an equal basis, in practice the rights of religious 
minorities and indigenous peoples have been compromised by state interpretations adopted in the name of 
national interest, modernization, economic and social development
393. As demonstrated above, the state is 
constitutionally defined as a religious state, and religion plays a vital role in the public area as august national 
value. State-theism as represented in monotheism or integral monism inspi res the remaining four principles 
and the entire hierarchy of legislation.  
 
The MORA promotes the official definition of the category  agama through its administrative channels. The 
Indonesianstate therefore officially establishes belief in One Supreme Lordship in currently six manifestations 
of agama as foundation for religious harmony to protect Unity in Diversity. In other words, the promotion of 
monotheism is a religiously neutral and tolerant statement that equates Islam with the other religious systems, 
if they meet the catalogue of criteria. Therefore in the last analysis the state conveys limited freedom of 
religion in organizing authoritarian pluralism and most of the citizenry enjoys a high, albeit varying degree, of 
religious freedom.  
 
The right to embrace a religion is guaranteed as one of the basic rights in Indonesia. The freedom to adhere to 
a religion is substantiated in human nature as it is part of creation. Consequently, it is seen as an intrinsic part 
of human nature to adhere to a religion. Since the national asset of socio-cultural diversity is created by One 
Supreme Lordship, all religions are understood as being intrinsically equal, because the entire creation is equal. 
In consequence, the right to religion can neither be bestowed by the state nor by a certain group as it a divine 
obligation. Thus, religious liberty is defined foremost as a group right and an obligation to adhere to one of the 
sponsored religions. This line of thought implies that the naturalistic view of atheism or agnosticism is ignorant 
to human nature. In this, it is not allowed for and constrained as blasphemy or even betrayal of society, 
humanity, and nation. Therefore atheism, communism (during the New Order), and polytheism contradict the 
first principle, which explicitly prescribes state theism as represented in monotheism or integral monism.  
 
Consequently, atheism and polytheism are not sanctioned in the Basic Law. In practical terms this requires all 
persons  to  identify  themselves  with  one  of  the  six  faiths  acknowledged  by  the  Department  of  Religion 
(authoritarian freedom-of-choice-policy). As a result, the 1945 basic law contradicts international human rights 
instruments, which explicitly allow for approaching atheism or any kind of belief system. The double-edged 
legislation results in a scorpion-effect since it supports on the one hand religious pluralism as apparent in its 
exhaustive interfaith harmony legislation, but on the other hand, religious currents as Ahmadiyyahh, the Baha’i 
or local religions are under constant threat of being banned and the awareness of religious communities is 
increasingly exclusive.  
 
On the one hand, Indonesia votes for a fascinating and globally unique treatment of religious plurality, yet on 
the other hand, the adverse impact of such a distinction results in a puzzling and disconcerting management of 
the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of persons belonging to particular religious or ethnic 
groups and indigenous people. It is noteworthy thus that the Committee on the elimination of all forms of 
racial discrimination (CERD) even applauds Indonesia in August 2007,  
 
Indonesia  is  committed  to  the  principle  of  religious  freedom  and  tolerance  and  has  been  actively 
advocating and promoting dialogue as the most effective means of enabling different communities to 
understand and respect one another. Where there is genuine dialogue, communities can live together in 
harmony and work together to address the challenges confronting them. Indonesia has been actively 
promoting various bilateral and multilateral interfaith dialogues in order to promote religious harmony, 
tolerance, respect and solidarity among different faiths and cultures at the regional, international and 
global levels CERD-Report
394 
 
   
                                                 
393 United Nations. 2007 (August). Consideration of Reports submitted by state parties under article 9 of the Convention. Concluding 
observations of the CERD. Indonesia. CERD/C/IND/CO/3 : 3 (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf) 
394 (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf)  
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The discrimination between religion (agama) and belief (kepercayaan) has been upheld in the amended Basic 
Law. The freedom to embrace a religion – definition is up to the Ministry of Religious Affairs – is guaranteed in 
private and in public and to manifest this right in practice and teaching is likewise permitted. Religious freedom 
on  an  individual  and  communal  basis  is  therefore  guaranteed  for  adherents  of  funded  religions.  Thus 
Indonesians have to identify their religion, probably even forced to have a religion, but free to choose between 
the offered ones (authoritarian freedom-of-choice policy), adhere to it and perform their religious worship and 
receive religious teaching according to the adhered to religion. This is noteworthy for a Muslim majority state – 
because not only the people of the book but also Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians are considered as a 
religion (agama). (Tibi 1995; Howell 1987) 
Since  the  authoritarian  freedom-of-choice  between  funded  religions  policy  prohibits  atheism,  the  right  to 
freedom  of  thought  and  conscience  is  thereby  severely  limited.An  authoritarian  pluralism  is  guaranteed, 
however, between Islam and other religions of the book (toleration), and between Islam and religions that 
meet the requirements of the category agama (monotheism-pressure results in toleration), and between such 
sanctioned agama and belief systems (kepercayaan). Despite differing ideological interpretations of religious 
pluralism by Indonesia’s political regimes and contemporary processes of Depancasilasasi, the state apparatus 
continuously maintains theoretical religious pluralism promoted in state policies, even if opposed by and under 
pressure of Islamic fundamentalist thought. Yet, besides the legal framework, there is to a certain extent 
commitment and awareness towards religious pluralism in society and religious communities mostly do live 
together peacefully.  
 
However, alarmingly, the number of people who support a radical Islamic group is increasing; implying that 
pluralists  have  to  toil  to  find  a  strategy  to  deal  with  religious  exclusivists  and  to  disseminate  a  helpful 
understanding of the term religious pluralism. (Nahrowi 2005: 11) It may be said that Indonesia is marching 
towards democracy even though, like all democracies, it has idiosyncrasies and imperfections. Democracy has 
been welcomed by the majority of Indonesian Muslims, although a small minority (…) has rejected it. (Hilmy 
2010: 255) 
7.4.2. Policies on religion 
Following the decades after the proclamation of independence, but especially following the era of reform, 
Indonesia  has  run  through  complex  transformation  and  painful  transition  processes  in  the  social, 
environmental, economic and socio-cultural field. Three cultures of religious practices, the Archipelagic, the 
Hindu-Buddhist, and the Islamic in encounter with Western thought constitute the spine of the Pancasila state. 
Occupying an enormously important place in politics, economics, education and arts, religion permeates every 
section of life in Indonesia. (Kelabora 1976: 230) In general, all state affairs are managed according to religion 
defined as first national value.But one has to recall, religious values are not defined by a single agama, but 
each funded  congregation developed their  agama values in  conformity with their tradition specific  set of 
values expressed in creed, doctrine, and identity. Those particular sets of values shall be respected equally by 
each state funded agama. Consequently, a spiritual dimension is highly valued in Indonesia as state theism and 
spirited statehood demonstrate. Development and religion are interpreted as complementary units, the former 
accelerates  progress  and  the  latter  bestows  inward  and  outward  bliss  and  the  right  attitude  needed  for 
developmental processes.  
 
Starting with the first  Broad Guideline of State  Policy, religion constitutes an integral part of the mental-
spiritual advancement of the Indonesian citizen aimed to bestow physical and psychical progress and welfare. A 
spiritual dimension in education, and the student’s transformation into an individual, who has faith, morals, 
and  follows  the  commands  of  God  is  the  first  developmental  and  educational  objective  in  Indonesia.  In 
consequence religious education is considered to be an integral part of progress and functions to serve societal 
welfare. Peculiar tasks of the MORA are to organize and facilitate the religion class and faith-based education 
systems at all educational levels, the compilation of the curricular content of the religion class and faith-based 
education system, and the administration of state faith-based educational units.  
 
In 1946, MORA has been founded with sections for Islam and Christianity as a nationalist recompense to 
political Islam to comfort modernist Islamic aspirations and to integrate them into the young republic. One of 
its assigned tasks was to put to practice and implement the first principle and article 29 of the 1945 Basic Law 
in society.  
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In the 1950s, MORA, predominantly staffed with modernist Muslims, introduced its monothethic definition of 
religion, which is significantly influenced by the principle of Islamic monotheism (tawhid). AsHindu, Hindu-
Buddhist, and Buddhist religious practices never were fully codified in a sacred text body as the abrahamitic 
religions, those religions initially faced serious problems being recognized, receiving state funding, and state 
protection. In consequence,  in the 1950s, the Balinese community was  classified as  not having a religion, 
because it had 1.) no nabi (founder and/or prophet), 2.) its name was disputed amongst the Balinese, and 3.) it 
was not internationally recognized. Afraid of Christian missionary work and Islamic dakwah, Balinese actively 
engaged in political and conceptual efforts to rationalize and systematize their religion following Islamic and 
Christian parameters.  
 
Synthesizing archipelagic traditions (ancestor veneration, veneration of earth and mountains), Hindu-Buddhist, 
with Indian Hindu traditions, Balinese reformers rationalized and systematized their  agama in a catechism 
(Upadeca) and institutionalized their congregation in the Hindu Council and the MORA in the 1950s.  This 
process has been termed internal conversion by Geertz (1973). In consequence, contemporary Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia as expressed in the basic meta-framework expressed in the five creeds (Panca Sradha), philosophy 
(tatwa), ethics (Susila), and ritual (Upacara) was reinvented along archipelagic trajectories, the Hindu-Buddhist 
legacy and MORA’s definition using Islam and Christianity as reference setting tools. (Triguna Protocol 2007) In 
1958, a Hindu section was opened at MORA. In 1963, it was upgraded to a Directorate. Today, MORA has 
sections in which all state funded religions are represented; however, a manifest overrepresentation of Islamic 
sections is evident.  
 
From 1952 to 1963, Hindu reformers represented in the Balinese educated elite and clerical elite engaged in 
numerous  efforts  to  rationalize,  systematize  and  unify  the  island  wide  divergent  and  variant  religious 
orthopraxy in order to develop a digestible religion to the Muslim-controlled Ministry. Following the proposal 
of I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, they favored the naming Agama Hindu Bali over Hindu Dharma or Agama Tirtha. By 
acknowledging their religion to be Hindu, it enjoyed international recognition, as India just had become an 
autonomous nation state that increasingly gained international influence and had good bilateral relations with 
Indonesia. By following the Indian model broadly, the reformers systematized their sacred scriptures. Alongside 
with the Old Javanese scriptures, the Vedas, and Smriti texts, which were in the 1930s still largely unknown, 
were  recognized  as  a  systematic  body  of  sacred  scriptures.  Those  scriptures,  ancient  stone  inscriptions 
originating in the Hindu-Buddhist legacy, and the local histories of lineages provided them with the founders 
and prophets of their religion. As adherents to “Bali’ism” also lived scattered throughout the archipelago, and 
some ethnic groups in Sulawesi claimed to be Hindu in the late 1950s, the religion also was not limited to a 
single ethnic group.  
It is my hypothesis that the fear of “Bali-ism” and of the rejoining of the Javanese kebatinan groups into the 
fold  of  Hinduism,  Geertz  (1973:  188)  already  has  refered  to,  is  the  reason  that  the  Hindu  community  is 
undercounted, and has problems receiving fair and equal funding from the MORA. This might also be the 
reason why the funding of Hindu education is considerably low, because with a small budget it is very difficult 
to guarantee the quality of Hindu education and educators. As the budget of the MORA is considerable, the 
rejoining of millions of Muslims into Hinduism would considerably alter the distribution of MORA’s budget and 
power relations in Indonesia. 
Education is conceived of as the principal agent of change in Indonesia. In relation to colonial policies and the 
very late educational opportunities for the vast population, educated elites of all political and religious groups 
subscribed to a central meaning to education. The red threat of the ideological struggle between Islamic and all 
other ethnic or interest groups led to two basic difficulties in education: 1.) the administrative multi-system; 
and 2.) the extensive private school sector. We can see that the ideological conflict about the shape of the 
nation state and its culture is manifest in the education system. Indonesian nationalists and the Islamic groups 
always placed a great weight on the importance of education. In consequence, they added spiritual intelligence 
as an important dimension to the national education system. As a uniform national culture, identity, or a 
coherent system of values never had existed, schooling represented a vehicle to achieve a civil religion or a 
national culture. In this context the constitutional link between culture and schooling acquires its meaning. 
Consequently, I assess that the most formative indicator of the nation state’s efforts to construct a civil religion 
or a national culture is the education system. Indeed, the contemporary education system is characterized by 
its spiritual dimension and multi-administration. All Indonesians have the constitutional right to attend school, 
the religion class became compulsory in 1966, and school attendance was made compulsory in 1989.   
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The  right  to  equal  access  to  education  and  to  sacred  scriptures  has  to  be  understood  as  extraordinary 
democratic  improvement  in  Indonesia,  and  especially  in  Bali.  First,  traditional  feudal  and  paternalistic 
communities treated their  members unequally, and second in the course of 150 years  of colonization, all 
Indonesians were treated as second class humans and inferior to their colonizers. Equal education facilitated 
thus a radically different way of thinking: Individual lives became open-ended and individuals could achieve an 
altered social condition and status. The rapid nationwide implementation of a sufficient national education 
system  for  boys  and  girls  alike  must  be  evaluated  as  a  major  success  of  the  emancipation  from  colonial 
exploitation  and  Indonesian  developmental  policies.  Modern  education,  though  remaining  at  a  most 
elementary level throughout the nation, is then the primary device for nurturing national culture and values.  
The outbreak of inter-ethnic and inter-faith conflicts and violence after 1998 awakened the awareness for a 
paradigm-shift in socio-religious diversity management. After the demise of the Suharto regime, Indonesia was 
able to consolidate a fragile democracy having two successful democratic elections. In 2001, the centralistic 
administration has been decentralized and regional autonomy has been implemented. The 1999 Guidelines 
(GBHN) and the 2000 medium-term development strategy (PROPENAS) mandated the drafting of a bill on a 
new  national  education  system  and  the  compilation  of  a  contextual,  competence  based  curriculum.  The 
consistent practice of Pancasila is the main objective set out in the 1999 guidelines.  
 
Tolerance and brotherhood of all  agama shall be created in order to avoid conflicts, disintegration of the 
nation, and separatism. In consequence, faith (imam), following the commands of God (takwa). Morals (akhlak) 
and interactions between faith-based communities are continuously interpreted as the vehicle for maintaining 
national unity and integration. The stabilization of the function, role, and position of the sponsored agama in 
the nation state serves as moral, spiritual, and ethical base. All regulations shall conform to the values of the 
state funded agama. 
 
In consequence, the first aim of national development is to encourage the qualities of faith, following the 
commands of God, and morals to facilitate unity, civilization, progress, and welfare. In that particular context, 
the first target of the state is to upgrade the quality of the religion class and faith based education systems by 
reforming the religion class and the faith-based education sector. The development of the religion class and 
faith based education systems shall strengthen the function and role of agama as they provide the moral base 
of national development and social ethics. Interestingly, interreligious harmony shall be practiced not only in 
elitist interreligious dialogues, but also by facilitating understanding that diversity is located at the very root of 
Indonesian society. As has been shown, this line of argumentation is maintained throughout all consequential 
strategic development plans in a top-down approach.  
 
In 2002, the contextual competence based curriculum (KBK) was compiled. In 2003, the parliament passed Act 
20/2003 of the National Education System, which changed the education paradigm from the  transmission 
model to the transformation model. As stated earlier, the Indonesian education system is seen as a unifying 
force  in  the  formation  of  the  young  Indonesian  citizen.  The  new  education  system  aims  to  develop  the 
students’ potential to mould moral humans who have faith in God, follow the commands of God, have morals, 
are healthy, educated, smart, creative, autonomous, democratic, and responsible. In contemporary Indonesia, 
a mixture between a centralized and contextual or community-based approach is applied. Family, society, and 
government are the main responsible bodies of education. Education is decentralized and all components of 
society have the right and task to actively engage in the operation of the education system. The Indonesian 
approach makes use of local cultural elements in the curriculum as a familiar area to pupils, teachers and the 
subject itself. In that approach local culture is not a mere setting or framework for education, but also the 
content of education. 
 
The Islamic fraction argued that in the development plans since 1973, one of education’s aims was to develop 
faith, following the commands of God, and morals. Thus, they successfully transported the 1966 compulsory 
religion class policy into Indonesian democracy. However, not only the Islamic faction, but also Indonesian 
Hindus supported the inclusion of the provision that every citizen shall attend the religion class in their agama 
instructed by a teacher of the same agama. This provision is in effect for all Indonesian citizens, even at schools 
run  by  foreign  governments,  in  which  either  the  Indonesian  national  or  the  regional  governments  shall 
facilitate the teacher.     
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This provision is seemingly very seldom put to practice. Likewise, for Hindus not living in Bali, this provision was 
rarely implemented during the duration of my fieldwork. In consequence, the regional Hindu Council try to 
facilitate a teacher or the religion class may be taken online or by distance learning, as the religion mark is a 
compulsory item in the school report. In my analysis, Hindus do profit from the compulsory classes, because as 
a minority they have the statutory right to Hindu education throughout the Archipelago, whether local or 
district governments approve of this or not.  
 
Again,  the  long-term  strategic  plan  in  effect  (RPJP)  defines  religion  in  catchy  but  vague  terms  as  a  noble 
national value. It is repeated that the development of religions aims at stabilizing the function and role of 
religions as a moral and ethical base of the nation and strengthens interreligious harmony (kerukunan agama). 
To maintain the unity of Indonesia, interreligious harmony is considered as the crucial element to achieve 
awareness of Indonesia’s multicultural nature. Thus, the RPJP continues previous policies on the sector of 
religion:   
 
In  the  final  analysis,  agama  is  considered  as  a  national  value  and  strategic  element  and  end  of  national 
progress. The first objective of the new contextual and student-centered education system is strengthening of 
faith, following the commands of God, and morals. This post-reform legislation of the religion class continues 
therefore the 1966 religious policies. To achieve this end, the compulsory national curriculum comprises the 
religion class in all state funded agama, instructed by a teacher, who adheres to the same agama as the 
student. This teacher has to be provided by the national or regional government. Religious education at public 
schools aims at strengthening religious competence by nourishing knowledge of religious teachings and proper 
religious practice in the participants.  
 
The target to be achieved is the decline of ethical and moral violations conducted by pupils and students both 
in the environment of schools and in society. The pluralistic awareness extends into the education sphere, 
since  with  Act  20/2003  of  the  national  education  system  and  the  2004  and  2006  curricula,  including  the 
curricula of religious education, a paradigm of peaceful coexistence and human rights is gradually implemented 
to sensitize the youth toward diversity and difference. Religious minorities, such as Hindus, Buddhists, and 
Confucians argue that religious education should be based on a multicultural perspective as enshrined in the 
five principles and the state slogan. Therefore they participate in a religious inclusivism project carried out by 
the  MONE.  However,  the  Muslim  community  is  less  engaged  in  the  program  and  its  pluralist  inclusive 
approaches to organize the religion curricula and textbooks. (Belen Interview 2007)  
7.4.3. Religion class 
The issue of the religion class having been dormant since the 1870s, resurfaced in the early young republic and 
quickly became a great political, ideological, cultural, religious, and educational controversy. (Kelambora 1976: 
236) From 1945 to 1966, participation in the religion class depended on the decision of the parents. In 1966, 
the religion class became compulsory. After the fall of Suharto, the religion class and faith-based education 
systems became the centre of controversy during the deliberation of the new law on the national education 
system in 2003.  
 
Under  the  amended  Basic  Law  and  the  Human  Rights  Charter,  state  support  for  faith-based  education  is 
guaranteed as a right to non-Muslim communities in predominantly Muslim inhabited Indonesia. This is a 
group right and one comes to possess it not through citizenship but through membership within a specified 
agama. The right has an additional collective dimension in that the interest it protects –funding and protection 
of long-established agama – can only be enjoyed in the context of group activity. In consequence, this right 
limits no freedom of others.  
 
In contrast to modern Islamic states which suppress religious plurality, (Weber 2002) Act 20 in 2003 of the 
national education system gives students the right to attend the religious class in the state sponsored faith they 
embrace instructed by a teacher of the same faith. The confessional religion class begins at primary school and 
ends with graduation from a tertiary education institute. This is of particular importance since the religion mark 
determines promotion. In postgraduate studies, however, the religion class is not compulsory. 
 
The  graph  shows  my  model  of  factors  which  influence  the  religion  class  and  the  Hindu  religion  class  in 
Indonesia.  
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During the Sukarno presidency, religious affiliation was - despite being hotly debated - handled quite laxly and 
participation  in  the  religion  class  has  been  optional.  In  the  1950s,  the  educational  aim  was  the  moral 
democratic human. Suharto is reported to have thought of the religious class as a threat to national unity. 
(Belen  Interview  2007)  In  his  view,  the  religion  class  could  lead  to  national  disintegration  as  it  makes 
differences aware, and thereby creates an exclusive and not a plural understanding of religion. (Belen Interview 
2007) However, related to the role of Islam in anti-colonial activities and in education, and the interest of 
modernist Muslims in political, educational, legal, and religious issues, the religion class was made part of the 
general education system in public schools in 1950.  
 
The first Act on Education introduced an optional religion class, since the parents decided whether their child 
attends the class and it did not affect promotion. As a result of the polarization between nationalism, Islam, 
and communism in the early 1960s, the religion class was made a compulsory subject in 1966. After 1966, 
religious affiliation became a crucial factor of citizenship. Since then, the confessional religion class and faith 
based education systems are organized in an exclusive model from primary to tertiary level. The state uses the 
religion class to limit the freedom of religion, as only state funded religions may organize a religion class, faith 
based  education  systems,  and  teaching  in  public.  Continuing  Act  2/1989,  Act  20/2003  on  the  national 
education system enshrined the religion one of the basic subjects in public schools, and therefore it determines 
promotion.  
 
Following Independence, the modernist Muslims have worked incessantly to reverse the policy of the non-
compulsory religion class in public schooling, but the political situation in the 1950s and early 1960s preserved 
the status quo of the non-compulsory religion class. With their efforts, the Islamic group created eventually an 
open public space for Hindus to realize their educational aims in the context of the national education system 
in  the  1960s  and  Indonesian  democracy.  Whereas  the  private  sector  of  Christian  education  and  Islamic 
education has been well established since colonial times, Hindus inexhaustibly struggled for recognition of their 
religion in the 1950s, to have a Hindu religion class introduced into public schools, and to establish a Hindu 
education system in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
In 1968 the first unified curriculum of the Hindu religion class was implemented in Bali, and not uniformly 
throughout Indonesia. The compulsory status of the confessional religion class was continued in 1989, but a 
nationwide implementation of confessional classes for the minority religions has not been achieved. (Sura 
Interview 2007) Hindu students outside Bali were instructed in pasraman or Sunday schools, but the pasraman 
were neither systematized nor authorized for grading students. In consequence, the religious education of 
Hindu  children  outside  Bali  represented  the  main  concern  of  Hindu  strategic  planners  and  the  Hindu 
community in the arena of education. Only since 2003 thepasramanare supervised by the Hindu Directorate 
and grading is carried out by the Hindu Council to guarantee equal educational opportunities for all Indonesian 
Hindus. 
 
The compulsory religion class policy in relation to private schools has been continuously debated in Indonesia. 
The efforts of Islamic groups to implement a provision at public and private schools alike, which ruled that the 
religion teacher had to adhere to the same religion as the student never succeeded during the New Order. It 
was  only  implemented  in  public  schools  and  this  was  also  not  done  evenly  and  equally  for  all  faith 
communities.  In  consequence,  the  confessional  religion  class  and  the  religion  teacher  in  private  schools 
constituted the main ideological problem in education between 1989 and 2003.  
 
Thus,  the  controversy  of  the  religion  class  and  the  religion  teacher  at  private  faith-based  schools  was  a 
contested issue common to the Islamic and Hindu discourse on the religion class. According to the participants 
to my study, the reason might be seen in the Christian religion class at private Christian schools and higher 
education units. The Christian minority in Indonesia is said to have a better economic standard than the other 
congregations. Related to this, Christian private schools have higher quality standards  than state or Islamic 
educational units. Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu students alike are registered with Christian educational units 
and were ‘forced’ to attain Christian instruction. (Sujana Interview 2007; Santika Interview 2007) There was no 
provision that private faith-based schools shall provide religion classes other than the faith the school is based 
on. Therefore, Hindus and Muslims had to attend the Christian religion classes until 2003. After  attending 
school and learning the Christian prayers and credo, the students were feared by the Hindu community to 
identify with Christian religion and then convert to it. (Sujana Interview 2007; Santika Interview 2007) 
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After the fall of Suharto, the issue of the religion class at private faith-based schools became the centre of 
controversy  during  the  debate  on  the  new  education  act  of  2003.  Despite  strong  opposition  from  the 
Christians, (Mujiburrahman 2006: 250) the Islamic groups supported by the Hindu Council successfully included 
in the Act a provision stating that students are entitled to the religion class in their own religion and instructed 
by a teacher of the same religion. Thus, the fear of the Islamic community of a hidden Christian agenda in 
schooling and the feared secularization of the nation, opened up a political space and public room to maneuver 
for the Hindu congregation represented in the Hindu Directorate and the Hindu Council to expand and develop 
the  Hindu  educational  sector.  (Sujana  Interview  2007;  Santika  Interview  2007)  Despite  the  increasing 
exclusivism of agama, the Hindu community profits from current legislation, as, for the first time in national 
history they have the statutory right to develop an educational system that is organized equally to the vast 
Islamic educational system of madrasah.  
 
The Islamic groups supported by Indonesian Hindus successfully included two provision (article 12 and article 
30) in the law stating that students have the right to attend the compulsory religion class in the embraced 
religion which is instructed by a teacher of the same religion. The facilitation of that teacher is the duty of the 
national  or  regional  government  or  the  concerned  religious  congregation  itself.  The  agama  congregations 
successfully defended the compulsory religion class policy of the New Order into Indonesian democracy by 
arguing that in the development plans one of the aims of education is to develop human qualities, including the 
religious qualities of having faith in God (iman, sradha) and following the commands of God (takwa, bhakti).  
 
This is to say that the Hindu followed the trace previously laid by Islamic interests and were thereby able to 
exploit the provisions in the law for their own benefit. Consequently, Hindus do profit from the compulsory 
classes, because as a minority they have the right to attend Hindu religion class throughout the Archipelago. In 
addition, Act 20/2003 gives Hindus the opportunity to establish the statutory Hindu class at all levels and a 
Hindu education system. The compulsory religion class is therefore strongly supported by Hindu intellectuals.  
 
Following the era of reform, the Hindu Dharma education sector witnesses an increasing equality with the 
Islamic education sector. Hindu faculties are opened throughout the country and one virtually might speak of a 
second-time Hindu Dharma Indonesia education boom – following its inception and first blossoming in the 
1960s.  This  boom  is  the  result  of  the  new  orientation  of  the  Parisada  Hindu  Dharma  on  the  social  and 
educational sector, and to the strong leadership qualities and lobbying ability of Prof Yudha Triguna, Director 
General of the Hindu Directorate. Prof Triguna however compares the state of the Hindu education system and 
the Hindu class with a toddler.  
 
In this context, I observed a concern among Hindus living outside Bali and Balinese experts about lagging 
behind the large private Islamic and Christian religious education sector. In Bali, where Hindus as a majority are 
not too much concerned about Hindu classes, leaving alone the professionals, the article on religious education 
is put to practice. However, despite the legal equality of Hinduism to Islam and the provisions of Act 20/2003 
on National Education, this implementation seems to be problematic in financial and organizational terms in 
areas  where  Hindu  are  minorities.  Hindus  not  living  in  Bali  are  really  concerned  even  alarmed  about  the 
religious education of their children.  
 
The present study found that the unique Indonesian approach to organize religious education is an outcome of 
the political situation in Indonesia. The debate on the decree of secularization of the country and the conflict 
between nationalism and Islam in the arena of education triggered the controversy on the place of the religion 
class in public schooling and higher education. Each of these ideological poles has its vested interests to protect 
at all cost. Kelambora (1976) shows how the  status of the religion class in the  school curriculum directly 
corresponds to the position of Islamic groups in this conflict. It also tends to elevate the status of this subject 
from an obscure one to the most important subject in the school curriculum.  
 
Every funded agama congregation has the right to attend the religion class without discrimination, although 
the right not to attend RE is omitted at all. In fostering this authoritarian religious pluralism, Indonesia remains 
loyal to its constitution and statemotto, but in practice the equality is often infringed and compromised by the 
state apparatus and civil actors.  
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As  Act  20/2003  stipulates  the  compulsory  confessional  religion  class  as  basic  subject,  the  students’ 
performance in the religion class determines their promotion. In this, the government’s intervention into the 
agama  sector  is  enormous.  Normatively,  the  freedom-of-choice  policy  allows  for  a  delimited  pluralism  or 
authoritarian pluralism of religion. In this regard, Indonesia organizes the religion class in schooling and higher 
education in a modern and - albeit limited – authoritarian pluralistic manner - a unique approach for an Islamic 
majority state.  
 
Despite its pluralistic and contextual nature, the religion class is organized strictly confessional and inter-faith 
elements are simply non-existant. Contrasting the exhaustive inter-faith legislation, the pillarization (Riis 1999) 
of religion in every sector of life may be seen as to implant an exclusive understanding of agama into society. 
From the elementary level, children are taught to look at each other as distinct by attending different religion 
classes. However, as the religion class is allocated two hours a week only, one might not overestimate this 
point.  
 
Rather, the well documented hesitation or unwillingness of Islamic institutions and actors - may it be private or 
governmental - to actively engage in pluralism indicates and substantiates the lack of inclusive understandings 
and religious exclusivism in Indonesia. Only at the level of higher education, comparative study of religion is 
offered. In the final analysis, exclusive understandings are nurtured at the regional level, and discriminatory 
practices  slow  down  and  hinder  the  even  and  equal  treatment  of  faith-based  communities  the  national 
pluralistic framework provides for.  
 
The integration of the Hindu class into the modern school system and the Hindu education system may be 
considered 1.) as one of the greatest democratic renewals of religion in Indonesia (Steenbrink 2001: 20) and, 
2.) as a singular case of religious pluralism in Muslim majority nation-state. 
7.4.4. Hindu class and Hindu education system: Specifics and challenges 
The rationalization and systematization process from traditional orthoprax religions of Bali to Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia is singular in the world. By choosing from among their religious traditions certain elements that they 
considered essential and universal, the Balinese reformulated elements of their own traditional heritage and 
Hindu-Buddhist legacy into a “new” religion: first as an ethnic religion (1052-1964) and then as a universal 
Hindu religion (1964-present). They also introduced acculturated elements from Indian Hinduism since the 
1940s. The “process of “internal conversion”” (Geertz 1973: 182) may be classified as singular and “unique” 
(Bakker 1993: 323), because it took a course that the Weberian model of rationalization did not predict (Geertz 
1973: 182; Howell 1978: 266-271). It brought forth new religious institutions (Hindu Directorate at MORA, 
Parisada). Summarizing Geertz 1973, Howell 1978, Bakker 1993, and my findings, the current study identifies 
four elements of the “internal conversion”, which in turn resulted in the emergence of the Hindu class and the 
Hindu-based education system in Indonesian democracy: 
1.  intensification of religious concern/ religious reason(ing) 
2.  Belief and Practices related to One Supreme Lordship (first principle of the nation-state)
395 
3.  religious literacy/systematization of doctrine (democratization of access to sacred scriptures; panca 
sradha) 
4.  social organizational institutionalization of religion (Congregational organization in Parisada and Hindu 
Directorate and Agents of religious construction 
 
The intensification of religious concern and reasoning during the colonial period led to foreign ascriptions 
(Dutch, Indian) and self-identification of the Balinese practices as Hindu.  
 
In  1958,  the  Balinese  reformers  and  traditional  elite  consented  to  the  name  Agama  Hindu  Bali.  The  first 
principle, the 1945 Basic Law and Policies of the MORA resulted in an increasing religious literacy and the 
democratization of access to sacred scriptures by segments of the society previously not allowed to access 
scriptures. In addition, it caused the formulation of the five core creeds of Hindu Dharma Indonesia in 1963. 
“Both the act of formulating such a creed and the creed itself are unique in the Hindu world”. (Bakker 1993: 
323)  
   
                                                 
395  I  expanded  Howell’s  concept  of  practices  relating  to  a  transcendental  God,  as  God  may  be  in  discrepancy  to  Islamic  orthodoxy 
conceptualized as immanent.   
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The institutionalization of Hinduism in the nation state resulted in the establishment of the Hindu Council. 
Never before in the history of religion in Bali, an institution modeled after a modern organization existed, 
which could unify the cults, priests, and practices of Bali. Moreover, thirty years after its establishment, the 
ethnic based organization broadened its scope and became national and universal in its outlook as the bulwark 
or canopy for several ethnic groups adhering to traditional religions based on ancestor veneration.   
 
Traditional Balinese religion had no religious teaching for all children. Teaching was given according to the 
social classes children were born into. Whereas the majority of the commoners and peasants were left without 
any education before the Dutch conquest, the access to historical and ritual knowledge was restricted to the 
upper classes (triwangsa), the jero (insiders). The jero were authorized after an initiation ritual (upanayana) to 
study sacred scriptures. The initiation is considered a second birth. After this rite, the student is considered a 
“twice born” belonging to the dwijati segment of society. In consequence, viewed from the social and political 
perspective, knowledge was not freely disclosed prior to the 1920s; it was valuable and a source of power. The 
tight control or release of historical and ritual knowledge and information conferred upon the palace or priest 
compounds considerable advantage, by not sharing information freely both could to an extent direct ritual and 
kinship networks and were vested with a source of power. (Parker 2003: 31) At formal educational units as the 
Dwijendra Foundation, the Indonesian Hindu University, or the State Hindu Dharma Institute the tradition of 
upanayana  is  continued.  Students  are  required  to  participate  in  initiation  rites  prior to  taking  up  studies. 
Likewise, at the end of the studies, a closing ritual is held (mejaya-jaya).  
 
Following the Dutch conquest, sacred scriptures  were no longer restricted to the  triwangsa, but are now 
printed in textbooks and are therefore made available to all Balinese and Hindus. The integration of the Hindu 
class into the public school system may be considered one of the greatest democratic achievements of religion 
in  Indonesia.  The  shift  from  a  traditionally  exclusive  understanding  of  accumulating  knowledge  (ajawera) 
towards the modern universal concept of public schooling for all Balinese demonstrates the secularization of 
expert religious knowledge and religious exegesis and a move towards an understanding of education as a 
universal right, which is not restricted to birth-right privileges. Today, many scriptures have been translated 
into Indonesian or even English and are published as books. Their contents and the designed panca sradha 
were  systematically  developed  into  contents  of  textbooks,  curricula  and  syllabi  and  are  taught  from 
kindergarten  to  higher  education.  The  shift  from  a  traditionally  exclusive  understanding  of  accumulating 
knowledge towards the modern universal concept of schooling for all Balinese demonstrates the secularization 
and democratization of tradition towards an understanding of education as a universal right, which is not 
restricted  to  birth-right  privileges.  Religious  scriptures  were  after  the  1920s  no  longer  restricted  to  the 
triwangsa.  
 
The methods (Sad Dharma) to nurture in the Hindu competencies used in formal and non-formal education 
are: 
7.  Dharma Wacana (method of speech/lecture) 
8.  Dharma Tula (discussion method: panel, sarasehan, symposium, seminar) 
9.  Dharma  Santi  (reading  Vedas  communal  approach  method,  networks  and  clubs, 
silaturahmi/maintaining family ties; anjangsana/ philanthropic visits to orphanages) 
10.  Dharma Gita (Vedas reading method in pesantian mode, from club to national level) 
11.  Dharma Yatra (pilgrimage method in order to attain enlightenment) 
12.  Dharma kanti (method of cooperation with social organizations and state institutions) 
 
These methods are very effective in the nurturing religion and religious competencies and are applied for all 
Hindu communities (Sujana Interview 2007) These methods are used to achieve the twofold solution to the 
problem of Hindu Dharma: Moksartham Jagathiaya ca iti Dharmah, dharma is the path to achieve bliss and 
release.  
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I like to recall that Hindus profit from the compulsory classes, because as a minority they have the right to 
operate and attend the religion class in their faith throughout the Archipelago. The Hindu class and the Hindu 
education system is mainly organized by the Balinese new jero elites, but these elites constitute not a coherent, 
but a highly fractioned group, therefore the contemporaneous Hindu education system and the Hindu religion 
class face challenges located either within the Hindu community or outside the Hindu community. Factors 
inside  the  Hindu  community  which  slow  down  the  progress  of  HRE  are  the  low  educated  human  capital, 
inadequate finances, no congruent view on content and didactics, competition for status and funds between 
institutes and docents, and finally leadership. 
 
Prior to 2003, education was dominated by a centralistic organization. As a natural consequence, the transition 
the  new  educational  act  demands  is  difficult  to  realize,  because  the  educational  institutions  and  their 
stakeholders were not used to create an educational culture which corresponds and materializes the vision and 
mission of the 2003 education system. (Tanu 2007: 2) The phenomena caused by this deficit are (1) the decline 
of piety and moral of pupils, (2) the decline of quality and (3) the decline of standards. (Tanu 2007: 2) In 
consequence,  theweaknesses  of  the  national  education  system  are  to  be  found  in  management  and 
organization (decentralized responsibilities), the budget, the social situation (economy), and the geography of 
Indonesia.  It  has  been  assessed  that  besides  an  insufficient  infrastructure  (textbooks,  buildings,  libraries, 
technology), the quality of the national education system is very low, and since the Hindu class and the Hindu 
education system are a subsystem of the national education system, its quality is low as  well for  several 
reasons.  
 
Considering access and allocation, the access for Hindu students in Bali to the Hindu class in schooling and 
higher education and the Hindu education system is warranted. However, Hindu communities living outside 
Bali face obstacles and sometimes even severe discrimination by the regional governments or schools, when 
they attempt to organize the Hindu religion class, therefore equal access to the Hindu religion class is currently 
not guaranteed in Indonesia. As already mentioned, whereas Hindus as a majority in Bali are not concerned 
about the religion class and Hindu education, in areas, where Hindus are a minority, it is highly problematic to 
put these provisions into practice. Therefore Hindus not living in Bali are alarmed about religious education of 
their children. In theory, Hindu parents could file a lawsuit to seek their constitutional, educational, and human 
right to operate a Hindu religion class at public and private faith-based schools, but according to the officials in 
Jakarta, this has never happened for security reasons. Therefore formal education is complemented with non-
formal  pasraman  education,  to  assure  a  nationwide  grading  of  Hindu  students  to  guarantee  equal 
opportunities in schooling, since Hindus have the lowest educational background and standard throughout the 
population. 
 
Act 20/2003 provides the Hindu minority with the possibility of organizing the Hindu class and a Hindu class 
and education system at all levels. The allocated class time of formal HRE is only two or three hours each week. 
This class time is generally regarded as insufficient, in order to satisfactorily impart religious competence in 
pupils. Reasons are that as a result of the rapid social change, increasingly fewer people work in the agrarian 
sector,  hence  administration,  education  and  services  (handicraft  and  tourism)  are  important  industries 
nowadays. As a result, increasingly more married mothers leave the villages and are employed in urban areas 
and their children are looked after in day care, pre-school, and kindergarten. Thus the familial function to 
transmit religious values and competences is gradually defunct. In addition parents in general are regarded as 
being less qualified to nurture Hindu values and competences by Hindu strategic planners. Traditionally Hindu 
education and moral education was conducted in the core family or clan, but because of social change and 
modernisation many mothers are working and the core families move from villages to cities (Urbanisation) 
because the workforce at the villages is limited and in the south mostly home industries and service sectors in 
relation to tourism booms, so there are no members of the clan to take care of toddlers and children. The 
Hindu women organization has the noble task of organizing PAUD that is education for toddlers and children 
from the level of playgroups to kindergarten. Now that is transmitting Hindu beliefs and morals. (Suryani, 
Interview 2006) 
For the first time in history, a national education standard of the Hindu class and Hindu faith based education 
was stipulated in 2005. This has to be assessed as a major success in the implementation of the Hindu religion 
class, and for the first time in Hindu history a unitary Hindu examination standard of Hindu competences and 
performance was set.  
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There is not yet a continuous Hindu education system established which provides a profound education from 
kindergarten  to  higher  education.  This  is  to  say  the  number  of  private  Hindu-based  educational  units  is 
insignificant compared with other private faith based institutions, whereas a public Hindu-based education 
system (widyalaya) is virtually not existent that is equal to the Muslim (madrasah) or Christian education 
systems, which provide a special faith-based study program at the senior high school. In this context,  the 
outstanding and pioneering position of the  Dwijendra foundation in the area of Hindu based education is 
noteworthy. Similar to the Islamic education system that is equalized with the state education system, the 
establishment  of  an  integrated  course  of  a  public  Hindu  based  education  system  (widyalaya)  is  deemed 
necessary to form graduates qualified in Hindu religion that either continue education at Hindu faith-based or 
general universities, either to be appointed as Hindu teachers or to have an integrated and secure Hindu 
identity and to represent Hindu values in their respective profession. Contemporaneously there are only four 
state Hindu based tertiary institutions and seven private Hindu based tertiary institutions. Public facilities are 
the State Hindu Dharma Institute (IHDN) in Denpasar (established 2005), the undergraduate Hindu Pedagogy 
Study program at the Manado University in Sulawesi (established 2006), the State Hindu Dharma Schools for 
Applied Science (STAHN)  Gede Puja in Mataram, Lombok (established 2003) and the Tampung Penyang in 
Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan (established 2003). Private institutions are UNHI, Universitas Dwijendra, the 
Hindu  Dharma  Schools  for  Applied  Science  in  Klaten,  Java,  the  Agama  Hindu  Schools  for  Applied  Science 
Dharma Nusantara in Jakarta and Lampung, and the Schools for Applied Pedagogy and Education in Amlapura 
and Singaraja, Bali.  
 
Looking at the sum total of schools and tertiary institutions in Indonesia, the Hindu-based institutions hold only 
a minuscule and insignificant share of that sum total. Hindu tertiary institutions face two major challenges, first 
the  quality  of  education  at  those  institutions  is  considered  to  be  lower  than  the  state  universities,  and 
therefore  only  students  enroll  who  are  not  accepted  at  state  universities  and  consequently  the  students’ 
capital is not optimal. Second, there are link and match problems, since the capacities of the labor market to 
absorb graduates of the Hindu based institutions is limited, graduates of Hindu based study programs who hold 
a degree in Hindu Dharma (sarjana agama) may be employed at the Hindu Directorate, the regional Hindu 
offices, at Hindu tertiary institutions, at the Clerical Center of the Army, or as Hindu religion teachers. But they 
will have difficulties to find work in the civil sector, or as teachers at other tertiary institutions, since not even 
the State Udayana University in Bali employs a sarjana agama.  
 
The rapid development of the Indonesian education system has to be assessed as a great achievement, yet it 
produced unqualified teachers that cost the quality of education.Due to the fast expansion of the education 
system, the high demand for Hindu teachers had to be filled with scanty and provisionally trained teachers, but 
it has to be seen as a major success of Hindu educational planners that a Hindu teacher training has been 
operated at all. Additionally, the quality of Hindu instructors is low, because many teachers graduated from 
colleges or universities, where they only attended one or at most two courses in each Hindu subject. Most 
Hindu teachers graduated from schools, where they did not obtain a profound basic education in Hindu religion 
and their knowledge remains superficial.  
 
Related  to  the  paradigm  change  in  education,  another  point  of  concern  for  Hindu  planners  is  that  many 
teachers still apply the teacher centered approach in class, and are less skilled in understanding and employing 
the new child centered contextual paradigm. The negative effect is that religious competence is inadequately 
nourished  in  children,  since  teachers  themselves  frequently  have  insufficient  competences  in  religion  and 
didactics. Moreover teacher’s salaries are low, forcing teachers and lecturers to have two or even more jobs, 
causing  decreasing  labor-discipline  and  willingness  to  work,  health  problems,  and  inefficient  instruction. 
Therefore  all  national  and  Hindu  policies  on  education  target  the  increase  in  quality  of  teachers  and 
graduatesin postgraduate programs. Next, after having graduated from the qualification program, the situation 
of the teachers shall be improved by grants for nourishment, transport, and special grants as stipulated in 
2005. In this regard the Hindu Directorate provides scholarships for teachers, and the Department of Education 
appointed UNHI, IHDN and the Dwijendra University as in-service teacher qualification centers, which even 
have the permit to operate far distance training programs that are not provided by law 20 in 2003. As I have 
shown in a previous chapter, there is a demand for about 30,000 Hindu instructors all over Indonesia. Even in 
the  Hindu  heartland  of  Bali,  there  are  not  enough  Hindu  instructors  at  all  levels.  This  is  to  say  that  the 
distribution of Hindu instructors is uneven and unequal. Reasons are discriminative practices, poorly educated 
Hindu teachers or not enough graduated Hindu teachers. 
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Another problem with regard to the religion teacher is appointment and who pays the salary. State Hindu 
teachers who are paid and appointed by the MONE to public or private schools enjoy the securest position, 
they are assigned a fixed number of courses, they have a fixed salary, they receive regular raises of salary and 
subsidies, they can become class teachers, and finally, their civil rank can rise in hierarchy, as they may be 
promoted as principal or as supervisor. The second type is the Hindu religion teacher paid and appointed by the 
Department of Religion which enjoy a less favorable position, as they cannot become class teachers or be 
promoted as principals or become supervisors, their salaries are paid by honorarium, and they do not receive 
subsidies, thus the Hindu Directorate incessantly negotiates with the MONE about teachers’ assignments and 
appointments.  
 
A major obstacle to the operation of a Hindu education system and the Hindu class is the minuscule budget 
allocated  to  the  Hindu  Directorate  by  the  planning  unit  in  the  Secretariat  General  at  the  Department  of 
Religion. In consequence, state run Hindu educational units are seriously in deficit. This sheds a critical light on 
the generally neutral and pluralistic position and policies of the MORA. I found that Hindu educational planners 
may be as motivated and spirited as possible, yet, if the Head of the MORA planning unit does not approve of 
the Hindu Directorate’s budget plan list, the Directorate is not allocated the necessary budget to realize its 
targets.  
 
Consequently,  prior  to  Prof  Triguna’s  appointment,  the  budget  might  be  influenced  by  the  political  and 
religious orientation of the Head of the planning unit, that is to say whether the head of the planning unit is a 
nationalist  or  a  ‘greenish’  (Sujana  Interview  2007:  Santika  Interview  2007)  –  an  orthodox  –  Muslim,  the 
allocated budget is minuscule or sufficient though still below the optimal amount. There appears to be a drawn 
out argument on the Hindu budget allocation, as according to the proportional argument the Hindu Directorate 
should receive around six percent of the entire budget allocated to the Department, but in practice they 
receive less than one percent of the actual six percent. This reduction is legitimized with the argument that the 
Hindu community would not have many Hindu institutions, and only three tertiary institutes, and therefore it 
would be sufficient to have a small budget. In consequence, an adequate carrying out of the Directorates 
functions is severely restrained. The net effect is that the three state Hindu institutions have a limited budget 
to  operate  educational  activities.  For  that  line  of  argument,  Prof  Triguna  made  a  census  of  all  Hindus  in 
Indonesia, and the real number is now 10, 5 million Hindus. As demonstrated by the steadily increasing budget, 
Prof Triguna argued successfully that for such a number of Hindus, a sufficient budget has to be allocated. He is 
even the first Director General to have a staff car and a staff residence. MORA’s backdoor policies oppose the 
national educational targets, since the statutory program for pre-school Hindu education, for the widyalaya 
and for Hindu inter-faith harmony policies were not subsidized by the Department in 2007 and 2008.  
 
As I have shown, observers of the Hindu class and education system assess that children obtain not only limited 
religious education in school but also increasingly insufficient parental education in religion. As a result, formal, 
informal and non-formal education in Hindu Dharma wins currency as a long-term strategy to engage with 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia. The crucial change in the modern world is that increasing numbers of lay people are 
pressed to understand religion, since not only the religious meaning systems that structured their lives are 
blurred by the impact of modernization and globalization, but also the social systems that structured their lives 
are increasingly destabilized. A net effect of the rapid process of urbanization in Bali is the endangered religious 
and value education of the youngest generation, as young core families live in cities dependent from child care 
institutions;  therefore  the  larger  family  cannot  socialize  the  traditional  values.  For  this  reason  Hindu 
educational planners attest that the religion class has an important position in nourishing Hindu religion and 
values, even if the allocated class time is limited. The function of the religion class is to assist parents in 
nurturing  religion  in  their  offspring,  since  not  all  parents  are  able  to  explain  religion  to  their  children 
sufficiently. Thus Hindu experts in religion and education criticize that society has an unsatisfactory knowledge 
and competence in Hindu Dharma as a whole. Therefore, the national and regional government and the Hindu 
elites are given the mandate to organize a system of Hindu education for children and society at all levels of 
education. The net effect would be that the religion class gradually plants religious competences in the next 
generations and as a side product, in the parents.  
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Concerning  the  operation  of  the  Hindu  education  system  by  Hindus  themselves,  I  found  that  shortages, 
incompetence, vested interests, and internal conflicts as well as disagreement between its exponents are the 
main factors leading to an insufficient functioning of the Hindu education system outside and to some extent in 
Bali.  In  general,  the  universal  Hindu  identity  is  set  as  protection  against  proselytizing  and  discriminative 
practices, whereas Balinese ethnicity is used as protection against “Muslim Java”. The educated new jero elite 
promotes and utilizes religious concepts as tools of power and behind the promotion of those peaceful and 
harmonic concepts are real vested interests related to economics and political authority.  
 
The present work likes to point to the monopoly on textual exegesis held by the Parisada Hindu Dharma and 
the Hindu Directorate which vests enormous power and authority into the hands of these institutions by 
shaping religious practice and education - in case of the Hindu Directorate administrating the scarce funds. It is 
safe  to  say  that  the  Parisada  is  an  institution  for  religion-building,  controlling,  and  promoting  religious 
uniformity  between  Indonesian  Hindus  of  different  ethnicity.  Related  to  domestic  political  factors,  the 
Parisada’s engagement increased only recently in the educational sector, and its education committee was 
inefficient in this regard in 2007. However, the trend is towards a positive improvement of its role in the 
educational sector.  
 
The problem at hand is that there is virtually only a small fraction of Hindu experts, who master both pedagogy 
and  Hindu  Dharma.  Either  the  experts  master  Hindu  theology,  ethics  and  ritual  with  little  command  of 
pedagogy, or they are fully trained pedagogues and researchers, but not qualified to interpret Hindu Dharma. 
Furthermore caused by differences in orientation either towards India or the Archipelagic past, these experts 
usually do not agree on a common viewpoint in exegesis and methods. In brief, they either follow the secular 
Western model in education, or they support the Indian ashram model, but I could observe no efforts made to 
design an own model of Hindu Dharma Indonesia education. In consequence, the inefficiency of the Hindu class 
and the education system administration is caused by a lack of concerted action amongst the actors in the 
educational arena, either the Parisada, or the Hindu Directorate or the respective Hindu education units.  
 
To adduce an example, the tycoons of Hindu education, Prof Triguna and the chair of the Dwijendra foundation 
Wiyana,  whose  grandfathers  already  were  appointed  to  the  positions  their  grandsons  contemporaneously 
hold, maintain a friendly, but competitive and tense relationship. Both belong to the Brahmin class, promote 
discipline, the application of modern technology, and a transparent and sober work ethos. But yet Wiyana’s 
conservative orientation is feudal-balicentric, and whether material or spiritual, he strictly objects to Indian 
influences  in  Bali  fearing  an  Indianization  of  his  beloved  Balinese  culture,  whereas  Prof  Yudha  Triguna  is 
modern oriented, cooperates with Balinese and Indian organizations and individuals alike, and has secularized 
the last stronghold of the Brahmins in September 2007 by declaring that anybody may be appointed as a high 
priest.  Thereby  he  stripped  off  the  feudal  Brahmin  privilege  of  providing  the  professional  high  priests 
legitimated to perform the most important rituals.  
 
It appears that every institution and every teacher training institute has its own ideas and conceptions. There is 
little cooperation and integration between the institutions as I conducted my fieldwork. In consequence, the 
resulting  confusion  slows  down  the  process  of  Hindu  education  planning,  realizing  the  planned  education 
targets,  and  thereby  achieving  progress.  Out  of  this  reasoning  Prof  Triguna  has  adopted  a  national  core 
curriculum aiming to unify the competences Hindu religion educators must learn during their studies. After the 
splitting of the Hindu and the Buddha section at MORA in 2006, Hindu Dharma Indonesia, the Hindu class and 
the Hindu education system are managed centralized by small, educated elites. 
 
However, success of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system depends not only on the goodwill of the 
planning unit at the Secretariat General at MORA, but as I found, likewise on the charisma or  taksu of the 
leadership’s  quality,  personal  relations,  social  networks  and  the  skills  and  professionalism  of  the  staff. 
Therefore the proper operation of the Hindu class and Hindu education system depends on the education, 
quality, and lobbying capabilities of the leadership of the Parisada, the Hindu Directorate and the respective 
tertiary institutions. But these institutions compete and vie for the authority of interpreting Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia, for students, and funds, and in addition their leadership promotes varying perspectives, which are 
followed loyally by their staff which identifies with the institutions and the leadership; in 2008 there existed no 
coherent approach and conception of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system.  
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In the final analysis, the state of the formal Hindu education system is that of a toddler compared to the adult 
Islamic or Christian education systems, which have an integrated course of education from elementary to 
higher  education.  Consequently  the  Hindu  community  is  still  very  backward  in  respect  to  a  faith-based 
integrated course of education from elementary to higher education in general. In order to produce a sufficient 
output of Hindu humans to raise the quality of Hindu human capital in general, a private or state education 
system has to be established across Indonesia to provide the Hindu community, especially the youth, with the 
opportunity of learning throughout life to comprehend and realize Hindu teachings. 
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A Way of traditionally coping with the tragedy of Kuta (in German)” 
Grade: sehr gut (“very good”) 
Commitee: Bernd Nothofer, Tilmann Habermas, Edmund Weber 
Hindu University of Indonesia, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia – August 1998 –August 1999  
Study of Hindu-Theology and Balinese Culture 
 
Eleven March University, Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia – February – Augustus 1998 
Study of Indonesian Language (Dharmasiswa fellow) 
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Professional education and experience 
 
Research and Development, Bali Mode: Visa and Business Consultant, Sanur and Jakarta, Indonesia, June 2012 
– present 
 
Coordinator of Training Program on Indonesian Hinduism, Master and Doctoral Studies Program, Hindu 
University of Indonesia, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, November 2011 – present  
 
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Research Fellow, RD: Governance and Societal Peace, Project: “Genesis, 
Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between 
various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines”, Project Director: Lothar Brock, Project Coordinator: Peter 
Kreuzer, August 2009 – July 2011, funded by DFG (Deutsche Forschungs- Gemeinschaft) 
 
Sworn translator at Darmstadt district court, Germany (allgemein ermächtigte Übersetzerin der Indonesischen 
Sprache am Landgericht Darmstadt), February 2006 – November 2012 
 
Employment History  
 
Tutor for IPP “Religion in Dialogue” PhD. Candidates, Faculty of Protestant Theology, Goethe University 
Frankfurt a. M., Edmund Weber, 2005 -2006 
 
Research Assistant, Technical University of Darmstadt, Architecture, Faculty of Planning and Building in non 
European Areas, Compilation of Online Database, Costa Mathey, 2005 -2006 
 
Research Assistant (Wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Research Department III: 
Democratic Peace; South East Asian Section, Lothar Brock, Peter Kreuzer, 2005 
 
Undergraduate research assistant (Studentische Hilfskraft), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Research 
Department III: Democratic Peace; South East Asian Section, Lothar Brock, Peter Kreuzer, 2003-2004 
 
Undergraduate research assistant (Studentische Hilfskraft), Clinic for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psycho-
Therapy, Goethe University Hospital Frankfurt a.M., (Goethe Universitaetsklinikum), Jochen Jordan, Frankfurt 
a.M., 2000 - 2003 
 
Student job at Deutsche Bau und Boden Bank, during national vacations 1993 - 1997 
 
Awards, Honors and Fellowships 
 
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt Graduate School for Social Sciences and Humanities Graduate, 
awarded fellowship for completing doctoral studies – May 2008 to March 2009 
 
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, awarded Graduate Fellowship “Frankfurt - Doctoral Grant” – May 2006 
– May 2008  
 
University of Leiden, IIAS, Erasmus/Socrates Intensive Program “Social and Cultural Change in Southeast Asia, 
focusing on Indonesia”, May, 21 2006 to Jun, 3 2006  
 
Hindu University of Indonesia, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) awarded research grant for 
completing Master thesis, December 2003 – April 2004 
 
Dharmasiswa Fellowship, Language Faculty, Eleven March University, Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia 
(Department of Education and Culture, Indonesia) – February 1998 – August  
1998 
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Training and Courses (complimentary education) 
 
Interview training for specialists and executives (Interviewtraining für Fach- und Führungskräfte mit), Peace 
Research Institute, Frankfurt a.M, Monika Weiß, October 29, 2010, 
 
Disputation (Disputation), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Dr. 
Dunia M. Mohr, January 27, 2010 
 
MAXQDA (MAXQDA), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Dr. phil. 
Thorsten Dresing, December 8, 2009 
 
Qualitative Interviews (Qualitative interviews), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, 
Frankfurt am Main, Prof. Dr. Cornelia Helfferich, October 8 -9, 2009  
 
Leadership skills for doctoral students (Führungskompetenz für Promovierende), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate 
School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, March 05-06, 2009 
 
Writing Academic Articles in English, Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am 
Main, Dr. Miriam Wallraven, 18.02. 2009 and12.03.2009 
 
Final PhD -phase: Writing Workshop on Scientific processing (Redesign, reformulation ...) and completion of 
doctoral thesis (Endphase Promotion: Schreibwerkstatt Wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung (Rekonzeption, 
Reformulierung …) und Fertigstellung der Promotion), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, 
Frankfurt am Main, January 10-11, 2009  
 
Generic Skills Training: From doctorate to executive positions; how to valorize your doctoral education, 
Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Paule Biaudet, December17-18, 
2008  
 
Qualitative methodology as a "method of choice" (Qualitative Methode als „Methode der Wahl“) Workshop 
Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Prof. Dr. Ingrid Miethe, November 20-21, 
2008  
 
Marie Curie Fellowships in the Seventh Framework Program for research and technological development (FP7), 
Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, November 30-31, 2008 
 
Research Experience  
 
Fieldwork PRIF research project on “Genesis, Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social control: An 
inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines”, 
 
Application and admission of research permit, PRIF research project on “Genesis, Structure and Functioning of 
systems of violent social control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia 
and the Philippines”, February 2011 and July – Augustus 2011 (including three presentation at the Indonesian 
Ministry of Research and Technology) 
 
Preparatory fieldwork PRIF research project on “Genesis, Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social 
control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines”, 
Denpasar, Jakarta, Serang, May 2009 – August 2009 
 
PhD. Field Research (Third step), Validation of Field work at the research sites in Denpasar and Jakarta, cultural 
and academic activities at the research sites, March – April 2008 
 
PhD. Field Research (Second step) at three research sites in Denpasar, Bali (Hindu State Institute, Dwijendra 
Foundation, Hindu University of Indonesia) and in Jakarta (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Directorate General for 
the Guidance of the Hindu Community), cultural and academic activities at the research sites with Prof. Weber, 
conducting of 20 interviews, participating in 6 workshops organized by the Ministry of Religious Affairs,  
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Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Community, participation in the Hindu Council of Indonesia’s 
annual assembly, February 2007 to January 2008 
 
Applying for the research permit to conduct field work at The Indonesian Institute for Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta, 
November 2006 
 
PhD. Field Research (First step) at three research sites in Denpasar, Bali (Hindu State Institute, Dwijendra 
Foundation, Hindu University of Indonesia) and in Jakarta (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Directorate General for 
the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation), conducting of four biographic interviews, Jul-Aug, 2006 
 
Preliminary field work for PhD. Project, “limitation to the research field”, Hindu University of Indonesia, 
Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, June-September 2005 
 
Preparation for translator examination, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, December 2004 – April 2005 
 
MA thesis research on punctual Balinese ritual “Pemarisudha Karipu Baya”, Hindu University of Indonesia, 
Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, academic activities with Edmund Weber, December 2003 – April 2004 
 
Study trip to Bali, Indonesia with Edmund Weber, academic activities at Hindu University of Indonesia, 
Memorandum of Understanding between Goethe University Frankfurt and Hindu University of Indonesia, 
February-April 2003 
 
Study trip to Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Penang) Singapore, Thailand (South-North), February-April 2002 
 
Study trip to Central Java and Bali, Indonesia, February-April 2000 
 
Travelling Indonesia (Lombok, Bali, Java, Sumatra), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Penang) Singapore, Thailand 
(South-North), October 1995 – July 1996 
 
Publication: 
 
Fathurrohman, Ferry and Landmann, Alexandra, Human and Socio-environmental Studies, Kanazawa 
University, Japan, 24/2 (Sep 2012)  “Ancestral Tradition, Social Control, and Sentencing in South Banten: ‘1001 
Rules of the Wiwitan Polity” 
 
„Every man has a religion“, in:  Federlin et al. Was Ist Religion? Beiträge Zur Religionsforschung: Edmund Weber 
zum 70. Geburtstag. 2011. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. pp 71-97  
 
Asien, Juli 2007 104, Book review: Johannes Herrmann: Unter dem Schatten von Garudas Schwingen. Chancen 
und Probleme nationaler Integration in Indonesien, p 186 
 
Paideuma, 52, 2006: Book review: Hinduism in Indonesia, 2004, Martin Ramstedt 
 
Conference Presentations / Papers 
 
Presentation on “Hindu Dharma Education in Indonesia” at the 22
nd Conference of the 
International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Indonesia/Directorate of 
Historical Geography/AIPI/HOMSEA; Surakarta, Central Java, July 02-05, 2012 
 
Presentation on “Restorative Justice A la Baduy”, 8
th Conference of the Indonesian Association of Oral 
Traditions, Association of Oral Traditions and Tandjung Pinang Municipality, Tanjung Pinang, Bintan, Riau, 
Indonesia, 23-26.05.2012 
 
Presentation on Traditional Law of the Baduy Wiwitan Polity, Southeast Asia Update 3, Van Vollenhoven 
Insitute, Leiden, 24. Juni 2011 
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Paper on “Adat Law in Indonesia”, Open Seminar on “Legal Plurality as a Grace” (Kemajemukan Hukum Sebagai 
Rahmat) organized by Ferry Fathurokman, Firman Venayaksa and Alexandra Landmann at House of the Worlds 
(Rumah Dunia), Serang, 04. Februar 2011  
 
Presentation on “Hindu Dharma Indonesia: A tailored religion” at the 21
st Conference of the 
International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), Asian Research Institute; National University of 
Singapore; Singapore, June 22-25, 2010 
 
Presentation on „Qual der Wahl: Religionsfreiheit in Indonesien“ (Tough choice : religious freedom in 
Indonesia), Department of Cultural, Faculty of Southeast Asian Studies, 26.01.2010, Goethe University 
Frankfurt a. M. 
 
Presentation on „Die Bomben-Rede Praesident Yudhoyonos“ (The „bom adress“ of President Yudhoyono) in 
2009, held at the public discussion on “Superwahljahr 2009“ (super election year 2009) at the Conference of 
the PhD. Candidates Network on Indonesia (Tagung des Doktorandennetzwerkes Indonesien), Faculty of 
Ethnology, Excellence Cluster “Normative Orders” Goethe University Frankfurt a. M., October 23, 2009  
 
Paper on „Der hinduistischen Religionsunterricht in Indonesien: Entstehung, Konzeption und Organisation im 
Kontext der Bildungs- und Religionspolitik“ (Hindu religious education: emergence, conception and organization 
in the context of Indoensian educational and religious policies), German Association for Asian Studies, DGA 
junior researcher’ group on Asian Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Asienkunde - DGA Nachwuchsgruppe 
Asienforschung), , Schloss Buchenau, December 8-10, 2006 
 
Competencies & Interests 
 
Linguistic proficiency 
Language  Converse  Write  Read  Experience 
German  1  1  1  Mothertongue 
English  2  2  2  3 years 
Indonesian  1  1  1  Since 1995, certificate 
Malaysian  3  2  2  5 Month 
Dutch  3  3  3  qualification 
Latin  -  1  2  qualification 
 
Computer Literacy: MS Office, MAXQDA, Adobe Photoshop, SPSS 
 
Social sciences and humanities: 
 
  Religious Studies (sociology and ethnology of religion, ritual theories) 
  History and Structure of the Archipelagic Religious Field, Indonesian Hinduism 
  Cultural Studies: functionalism, structuralism, system theory 
  Legal Anthropology: Malayo-Poynesian legal systems, legal pluralism in Indonesia, “Adat Law” (Bali, 
Dayak, Baduy) 
  History and contemporaneous mechanism of Adat Law (Bali, Dayak, Baduy), Indonesian Constitution 
  Area Studies: 
  Indonesia: language, prehistory to contemporary politics, Indonesian Islam and Politics, Indonesian 
Constitution, Indonesian Religious and Educational Policies  
  Bali: social and religious change in Bali, contemporary Balinese culture and religion, Balinese ritual theory, 
adat Bali, Balinese Samkya Philosophy 
  Baduy: culture, religion, and law 
 